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Cem Şişkolar, “Common Nouns and Rigidity” 
The principal question addressed is whether there is a division among common 
nouns which is similar to a familiar division among noun phrases that designate 
particular-level individuals: the one which is captured in the relevant literature 
as the difference between de jure rigid and not de jure rigid singular terms. In 
relation with the previous philosophical literature relevant to noun rigidity it is 
argued that the extant positions on the matter are not defended on the basis of 
well-founded syntactic categories and proper semantic arguments. Proper ways 
to argue for rigidity ascriptions to nouns are described. Then, such arguments 
are sought for the case of rigid/non-rigid division among count common nouns. 
It is shown that there are plausible, albeit inconclusive, reasons to hold that 
among common nouns (N-bar expressions) only simple common nouns are kind 
designators, and that if that is the case these simple common nouns will have to 




Cem Şişkolar, “Cins İsimler ve Gönderimsel Direşgenlik” 
Ele alınan temel soru cins isimler arasında, tekil terimler arasında olan türden, 
dile dayalı bir gönderimsel direşgenlik ayrımı olup olmadığı. Yani, tekil terimler 
arasında dile dayalı gönderimsel direşgenlik gösteren özel isimler gibi cins 
isimler arasında da özel bir sınıf var mı? Bu soruya ilişkin olarak önce bu 
konuyla ilgili felsefi literatürde temsil edilen kuramsal konumların uygun 
sözdizimsel kategoriler kullanılarak ve uygun anlambilimsel temellendirmeler 
verilerek savunulmadığı iddia ediliyor. Ardından uygun anlambilimsel 
temellendirmelerin nasıl olması gerektiği tarif ediliyor. Bundan sonra da dile 
dayalı direşgenlik özelliği gösteren özel bir cins isim sınıfının varlığını 
gösterecek böyle temellendirmelerin varolup varolmadığı araştırılıyor. İlk 
olarak cins isimler arasında sadece basit cins isimlerin türlere gönderme 
yaptığına inanmak için makul ancak kesin olmayan gerekçelerin bulunduğu 
gösteriliyor, ardından eğer bu doğruysa basit cins isimlerin dile dayalı 
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Very concisely expressed the principal question I will be addressing in the 
following text will be whether there is a division among common nouns which is 
similar to a familiar division among noun phrases that designate particular-level 
individuals: the one which is captured in the relevant literature as the difference 
between de jure rigid and not de jure rigid singular terms. I will critically review 
how this question has been handled in the previous philosophical literature, and 
then weigh it myself relative to two frameworks derived from the linguistic 
semantic literature pertaining to the semantics of noun phrases formed by 
common nouns. I will pursue this objective as much as I can by way of ‘a 
rigorous presentation in terms of possible worlds semantics’ as recommended 
but not pursued in Naming and Necessity by Kripke himself.1 
Kripke’s Naming and Necessity lies at the origin of the question concerning 
the rigidity of common nouns (Kripke 1980). In Naming and Necessity Kripke 
famously introduced and defended the view that proper names are de jure rigid 
designators, whereas singular definite noun phrases termed as definite 
descriptions are not. In relation with common nouns, he explicitly claimed that 
those which are natural kind terms are like proper names. He also explicitly 
                                                        
1 “Some of the worst misrepresentations of rigidity would have had much less currency if the 
relevant philosophical discussions had been conducted in the context of a rigorous presentation 
in terms of ‘possible worlds semantics’. I did not do this in the present monograph both because 
I did not want to rest the argument heavily on a formal model and because I wished the 
presentation to be philosophical rather than technical. To readers who are thoroughly familiar 
with intensional semantics the rough outline of a presentation of my views in these terms 




attributed rigid designation to some of these. As a result he has been commonly 
interpreted by its readers to suggest that common nouns that are natural kind 
terms are de jure rigid designators, although he did not provide any explicit 
justification for this suggestion. 
What is it to be a rigid designator? To designate the same thing relative to 
every possible world. What is it to be a de jure rigid designator? To be a rigid 
designator by virtue of linguistic nature of the term rather than by virtue of how 
things stand. So, Kripke has claimed that names designate the same thing in all 
possible worlds by virtue of their linguistic nature. Why what terms denote 
relative to possible worlds should be of interest at all?2  
The interest of what a term denotes relative to the actual state of affairs is 
obvious. The denotation of the term plays a role in the determination of the 
truth values of the sentences in which that term figures. But very often we also 
talk about what might or would or cannot happen and such talk too can be true 
or false. The truth and falsity of such talk in turn depends on what the terms 
forming it denotes relative to possible state of affairs.  
If Alice had not been in France, Bob could borrow her bike. 
For sure we are capable of judging the truth or falsity of our talk about 
possibilities. So, we should be able to determine what our terms denote relative 
to possible state of affairs. But then what is the big deal about Kripke’s claim 
that proper names are de jure rigid designators? We should have known this all 
                                                        
2 I will use denote and its variants as a generic term for reference. I will term different types of 




along. But apparently, we were like the undergrads who in exams systemically 
compute the truth values of disjunctions erroneously, although they are 
competent users of the sentential connective or. Prior to Kripke’s Naming and 
Necessity, it has been seriously and popularly been claimed that proper names 
were synonymous with definite descriptions. For example, famously Frege 
(1893) claimed that the meaning of the name ‘Aristotle’ will be synonymous 
with different definite descriptions for different speakers; for instance for one it 
might mean the pupil of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great whilst for 
another it might mean the teacher of Alexander the Great, who was born in 
Stagira. This was a startling suggestion. It has many unlikely consequences 
noted by Kripke and many other authors after him. For one thing it falsely 
predicts that for someone for whom Aristotle meant the second one of the 
descriptions mentioned above, the sentence Aristotle might not have been born 
in any place other than Stagira will not have a true reading. Surprisingly 
however this view about the meaning of proper names has been very popular 
for almost three quarters of the previous century. 
After discussing issues mainly relating to proper names in the first two 
lectures of Naming and Necessity, in the third lecture Kripke turns his attention 
to the case of general terms. He discusses issues related with such common 
nouns as gold, tiger, cat, animal, lightning, light, water, heat etc.3 He claims that 
such nouns for natural kinds are similar to proper names. He advances the same 
                                                        
3 Kripke refer to the nouns just mentioned alternatively as general terms, terms for natural 
kinds, common names, predicates, general names, natural kind terms, species names, terms for 





claim also for related adjectives such as hot. Kripke does not in fact produce any 
explicit statement to the effect that every such natural kind noun as those 
mentioned above, besides being proper name like, is also a rigid designator. 
Among these terms he explicitly ascribes rigid designation only to the terms 
heat, light and gold.4 However his overall discussion strongly suggests that he 
implies the same for the rest of such nouns as well as the corresponding 
adjectives, and he has been generally interpreted as such. 
Kripke’s ascription of de jure rigid designation to proper names has found 
almost universal acceptance. Yet his ascription of de jure rigid designation to 
natural kind common nouns and certain related adjectives did not receive that 
level of acceptance and initiated a controversy. 
Kripke often appealed to intuitions for both of these ascriptions, and did 
not draw on systematic semantic analyses of a wide range of examples. Yet, in 
comparison with the case of proper names the case of common nouns and 
adjectives presents difficulties that makes it hard to assess on an intuitive basis 
the claim that some special class of common nouns and adjectives are de jure 
rigid designators.  
Proper names’ mode of denotation is pre-theoretically quite clear. 
However we may prefer to name it what a proper name does in a sentence 
                                                        
4 Another general term which Kripke explicitly ascribes rigid designation is the term meter 
(55), as highlighted by Inan (2008). I here omitted mentioning it just because, unlike the other 
terms mentioned in the main text above, the main discussion pertaining to it does not take place 
in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity and it is not a term which one would like to count 




appears to be univocally clear: it purports to pick one single individual –in the 
present work I will refer to this mode of denotation as designation.  
Also it seems that proper names’ being de jure rigid designators can easily 
be intuitively ascertained by considering how we evaluate talk about possible 
state of affairs which involves proper names. The sentence If Alice had not been 
a mean person, Bob would not need therapy appears to pertain to the same 
individuals named as Alice and Bob as the sentence Alice is a mean person and 
Bob needs therapy. 
The intuitively compelling nature of the ascription of de jure rigid 
designation to proper names is also heightened by the plain differences that 
hold between them and definite descriptions, which together with proper 
names are labelled as singular terms, as regards their contributions to the talk 
about possible states of affairs. Definite descriptions prima facie play a similar 
semantic role as proper names qua designators. However they can easily be 
seen to have the potential to designate different things relative to different. If 
Bob’s fiancée had not been a mean person Bob would not need therapy and 
Bob’s fiancée is a mean person and Bob needs therapy may not relate to the 
same person as Bob’s fiancée. 
In contrast, what common nouns’ mode of denotation is is not as clear as 
that of proper names. From an intuitive pre-theoretical standpoint it seems that 
they may be taken to purport to pick a single kind like names. But on that same 
standpoint they may as well be seen as picking each member of a multitude of 
individuals of a certain kind. For example in relation with the common noun 




primarily picks a certain kind of thing, and that it then only derivatively, given 
the sentential context in which it figures, also picks the possibly many 
individuals of that kind. But it is also possible to conceive the primary role of 
tiger in that sentence as merely picking tiger tokens. This pre-theoretical duality 
is reflected in semantic theorizing as well. Common nouns such as tiger are 
usually treated as being primarily appliers that pertain to tokens,5 but 
occasionally they are also treated as being primarily designators that pertain to 
kinds.6 
The absence of an intuitive pre-theoretical clarity regarding the 
denotation mode of common nouns makes it harder to intuitively assess 
ascriptions of rigidity to certain common nouns. Considered as designators, 
natural kind common nouns appear indeed to be rigid. Both in If Bob had not 
kept tigers as pets then Bob would not need emergency treatment and Bob has 
been keeping tigers as pets and Bob needs emergency treatment, the common 
noun tiger pertain to the same kind of thing. But considered as an applier tiger 
does not pertain to the same tiger tokens in these sentences –in the 
counterfactual it also pertains to possible tigers. So, qua designator tiger 
appears to be rigid, but qua an applier tiger is not rigid. 
For sure, Kripke specifically ascribed rigid designation to natural kind 
common nouns, and not merely rigid denotation. And we have just noted that 
                                                        
5 This is the standard procedure instantiated in innumerably many works. It probably 
originated in Montague’s and Lewis’s formal semantic work (Lewis D., 1970) and it is also 
adopted in such a popular formal semantics textbook as Heim and Kratzer (1998).  




considered as designators such nouns indeed appear to pertain to the same kind 
of thing regardless whether they are used to talk about possible states of affairs 
or about actual states of affairs. The problem is that Kripke appeared to imply 
that natural kind common nouns are special in being de jure rigid designators 
among general terms, just as names are special among singular terms. However 
there does not seem to be any general term, which considered as a designator 
won’t be a de jure rigid designator. According to a common understanding of 
the notion of general term, general terms comprise expressions that can form 
syntactic predicates; and these appear to include besides simple adjectives and 
common nouns, modified common nouns as well. As in the case of semantically 
and syntactically simple tiger, the primary mode of denotation of such a 
modified common noun as young tiger born in the wild too can be considered to 
be designation. But if indeed young tiger born in the wild purports to pick a 
specific kind, then presumably it purports to pick the same kind in both If Bob 
had not kept young tigers born in the wild as pets then Bob would not need 
emergency treatment and Bob has been keeping young tigers born in the wild as 
pets and Bob needs emergency treatment.  
So, unlike the case of singular terms, when viewed from a pre-theoretical 
standpoint de jure rigid designation does not appear to set a contrast among 
general terms, pace what Kripke appears to imply with his reference to natural 
kind common nouns. That all general terms may probably be de jure rigid 
designators does not of course indicate that it is wrong to ascribe de jure rigid 




ascription in comparison with its significance as regards the case of proper 
names. 
Such considerations problematizing Kripke’s ascription of de jure rigid 
designation to natural kind common nouns and related adjectives gave rise to a 
controversy about the relevance of the notion of rigidity with regard to general 
terms.  
Some philosophers who take the primary mode of denotation of general 
terms to be designation maintain that as designators all common nouns and 
adjectives are rigid designators. But they hold that the category of general terms 
is not exhausted by adjectives and common nouns, and that it also includes such 
definite phrases as the color of the sky in so far as such phrases can occasionally 
form syntactic predicates. Such putative general terms as the definite phrase the 
color of the sky do not appear to be rigid designators. Drawing on this point 
these philosophers then argue that rigidity interpreted as rigid designation is 
not after all not a completely idle property that all general terms have.7 
Another group of philosophers who take the primary mode of denotation 
of general terms to be application maintain that no general terms, except those 
applying to necessary existents such as mathematical entities, are rigid appliers 
in the sense of truly applying to the same individuals relative to all possible 
                                                        
7 The classic representative of this approach is Salmon (2005). LaPorte (2000) too is often 
considered a proponent of this approach, although as a matter of fact he abstains from using the 
label general term to any of the examples he discusses. Linsky (2006)’s account is very close to 
Salmon, but he inextricably conflates simple general terms –tiger- with constituents that play 
the role of syntactic predicates –is a tiger. Inan (2007) follows Salmon (2005) in accepting the 
color of the sky as a non-rigid general term but distinguishes between singular and predicative 
occurrences of general terms and qualifies his position by arguing that the color of the sky is 
non-rigid in its singular occurrences, whereas he remains non-committal as far as its predicative 




circumstances. Yet, they think that we should formulate the notion of rigidity in 
relation with appliers in some other way than formulating it as applying to the 
same individuals in all possible circumstances. According to these philosophers 
rigid application ought rather be understood in the following way (I will 
henceforth refer to this as rigid* application):  
Applier α is a rigid*-applier iff every individual x is such that if there is a possible world 
w relative to which α applies to x then  for every possible world w’ in which x exists α 
applies to x. 
Equipped with rigid* application, these philosophers appear to be able to claim 
that most natural kind common nouns are rigid*, in the sense of rigid*-
application. For, it seems that tigers cannot fail to be tigers and masses of water 
cannot fail to be masses of water, so on and so forth. Thereby these 
philosophers appear to be able to capture and defend the distinctiveness of 
natural kind common nouns among common nouns as suggested by Kripke 
himself, albeit in a different way.8 
And finally a third group of philosophers find fault, for a number of 
reasons to be studied later, with both of the described ways to defend the 
extension of the notion of rigidity to the case of general terms. This then 
constitutes a rough and brief description of the background upon which I will 
pursue my aim of weighing the question whether there is a linguistically 
significant rigid/non-rigid division among common nouns.9 
                                                        
8 Cook (1980), Mondadori (1978), Devitt (2005). 
9 To stave off a probable misunderstanding due to common association of general term rigidity 
with natural kind terms let me note that I neither intend to examine only the case of so called 
natural kind nouns, nor do I presuppose in any way that de jure rigidity should be co-




My way of approaching this question will specifically aim to correct three 
specific shortcomings which I find both in Kripke’s original discussion in 
Naming and Necessity and in the contributions to the controversy on the 
rigidity of general terms. I find that three points highly relevant for the issue of 
the extension of the notion of rigidity to the case of common nouns are not 
properly handled, neither by Kripke nor by the other philosophers who 
contributed to the controversy on the rigidity of general terms. 
One point concerns the distinction between common nouns and noun 
phrases. It appears that neither Kripke nor the other authors pay heed to this 
distinction although it may have semantic consequences. Kripke explicitly 
ascribes rigidity only to the mass common nouns such as heat, light and gold. 
The peculiar thing about these mass common nouns is that unlike count 
common nouns like tiger, they can form noun phrases and figure in argument 
positions without taking any determiners (i.e. expressions like a, the, all, some). 
Consider the sentences below: 
Alice found some gold in the drawer. 
Alice found gold in the drawer. 
Alice found a tiger in the wardrobe. 
*Alice found tiger in the wardrobe. 
The pair involving the common noun gold are both grammatical and 
meaningful, but this cannot be said for each member of the pair involving the 
noun tiger. Gold can replace some gold but tiger cannot replace a tiger. Some 
gold and a tiger are noun phrases. In so far as gold too can grammatically and 
                                                                                                                                                             
way expressions refer, and not about what they refer to. So, it may not exactly coincide with 




meaningfully replace a noun phrase it too in the second sentence above should 
be operating as a noun phrase: a noun phrase which is formed by the common 
noun gold but which should be distinguished from it. In general, common nouns 
do not have the same meanings and the same mode of denotation as the noun 
phrases they form. So, even if the noun phrase gold is a designator and rigid, one 
cannot immediately infer from this that the same also holds for the common 
noun gold. The same considerations apply all the more obviously for example in 
the case of the definite generic noun phrase the honeybee which designates a 
species and the common noun honeybee. Yet, in the relevant literature these 
latter two terms are often treated as if they were syntactically and semantically 
on a par.10 
The second point concerns the semantics of the common nouns. Whether 
common nouns are designators for kinds or appliers for tokens seem to be a 
question that cannot be settled on intuitive grounds alone. Unlike the case of 
proper names, our intuitions appear to support both alternatives as regards the 
denotation mode of common nouns. Another difficulty one faces in determining 
the denotation mode of common nouns is related with the previous critical 
point I raised.  Common nouns contribute to the determination of the truth 
conditions of sentences only via forming noun phrases which may have different 
denotation modes than the common nouns that form them –e.g. the chinese 
cook vs. chinese cook  (proper names too contribute to the truth-conditions by 
forming noun phrases, but these noun phrases have the same denotation modes 
                                                        




as the proper names that form them). For this reason it seems that the issue of 
the denotation mode of common nouns can be settled only through going into 
wider theoretical considerations pertaining to the semantics of noun phrases 
formed by common nouns themselves. The authors that contributed to the 
controversy on the rigidity of general terms do not go beyond assuming that 
common nouns should be treated as appliers or as designators; and do not dwell 
at all on the implications of their assumptions regarding the semantics of noun 
phrases. Yet the question about the denotation mode of common nouns is of 
great relevance to the question whether the notion of rigidity can play any 
significant role in relation with common nouns. For example, it may be the case 
that common nouns are best treated as appliers and that as appliers de jure 
rigidity may be of no relevance to them. 
The third point concerns nothing less than the justifications given for 
ascriptions of de jure rigidity to specific common nouns. In fact often no such 
justifications are ever provided.  
For example, almost all contributors appear to agree that the common 
noun tiger should be de jure rigid. But no contributor takes the pain of setting 
an argument to justify this view. In fact, that natural kind common nouns and 
only them should be de jure rigid is often accepted as if it were an axiom, and 
attempts to formulate a notion of rigidity that will apply to common nouns are 
assessed according to whether they are consistent with that axiom. But why 
natural kind common nouns should be de jure rigid is not scrutinized at all.  
Furthermore, when it is claimed that tiger is rigid according to this or that 




and without considering how this ascription will fare in accounting for the 
truth-conditions assigned to sentences in which the noun tiger occurs. 
For example, it is generally accepted that if tiger is a designator it has to be 
a de jure rigid designator, but why this has to be so is not supported by semantic 
arguments. It may be retorted why should they, given that evidently whether it 
is used in talk about possible state of affairs or in talk about possible state of 
affairs tiger will pertain to the same kind of thing, and if that kind to which it 
pertains is taken to be its designatum then the designatum will remain the same 
in both sorts of talk. Still, it is desirable to go beyond this intuitive evidence and 
consider the question from a semantic-theoretical point of view: what would go 
wrong if we treated tiger as a non-rigid designator in our endeavor to account 
for the way the truth-conditions of English statements are determined on the 
basis of the contributions of their constituents? If per impossible nothing would 
go wrong then we would be free to accept that tiger may be a non-rigid 
designator despite the apparent intuitive evidence to the contrary. 
This may appear as a futile exercise to show the intuitively obvious. Yet, it 
is not. Figuring out the theoretical reasons that would require us to affirm/deny 
ascriptions de jure rigid designation may be of assistance in settling the cases of 
the common nouns where our intuitions are not as compelling as in the case of 
tiger.  For example, consider the case of the modified taxonomic common noun 
endangered cat. Intuitively, this noun will not pertain to the same kind of thing 
in talk about possible states of affairs as in talk about the actual states of affairs. 
In fact, it does not seem to pertain to one single kind at all. Of course, it may be 




regardless whether it is used in talk about possibilities or in talk about the 
actuality, something we would more efficiently refer to by using a phrase like 
the endangered-cat-kind. Yet, the very intuitiveness of taking endangered cat to 
primarily pertain to such an abstruse kind rather than to a variety of 
endangered cat species, and taking this abstruse kind to be the denotation of 
that modified common noun is questionable. So, it seems that unlike the case of 
tiger, there is no intuitive certainty regarding the question whether if 
endangered cat is a designator it is a rigid designator. For, already in 
entertaining the possibility that the noun endangered cat may be a designator 
for the endangered-cat-kind we seem to step beyond our intuitions. For this 
reason I think that the question whether such a noun as endangered cat can be 
treated as a de jure rigid designator can only be settled by considering how well 
the assumption that modified taxonomic nouns too are de jure rigid designators 
fares in accounting for the truth-conditions of the sentences in which such 
nouns figure.  
The present text will strive to improve on the extant philosophical 
literature pertaining to ascription of rigidity to common nouns in relation with 
the shortcomings described here. 
Rather than simply assuming that common nouns should be treated as 
designators for kinds or appliers for particulars, I will scrutinize how well these 
two options fare in accounting for the semantics of the noun phrases formed by 
common nouns. To this end I will tap on the linguistic semantic literature on the 




Carlson (1980) has convincingly argued that certain noun phrase 
constructions formed out of common nouns should be taken as denoting kinds; 
and among them he specifically held that bare plural phrases and definite 
generics operated as names for kinds. For example, he drew attention to noun 
phrases like the following: 
Whales face extinction due to excessive hunting. (bare plural) 
The whale faces extinction due to excessive hunting. 
The Beluga and the Narwhal are whales. (bare plural predicate ) 
The Beluga is not a shark species, it is a whale. (indefinite singular predicate) 
Alice objects to the classification of a whale under the Phocoenidae family. (indefinite 
singular) 
Alice claims that the cladistic analysis shows that the whale should rather be put under 
an altogether new family. (taxonomic definite singular) 
The whale is a highly intelligent mammal. (definite generic) 
Some whales are not endangered species. (quantified)11 
 And although Carlson’s specific ways of analyzing these constructions have 
been criticized and rejected, the views that certain noun phrases denote kinds, 
and among them some designate kinds have been retained in the semantic 
literature on the noun phrases formed by common nouns.  Clearly, however 
common nouns can also be used to form noun phrases that denote particular 
level entities. 
The stars of the theme park, Alice and Bob, are whales. (bare plural predicate) 
Whales have torn our nets last night. (bare plural) 
One of the stars of the theme park, Alice, is a whale. (indefinite singular predicate) 
Last night a whale should have thorn off the fish nets. (indefinite singular) 
Surely, the whale should have been disoriented to come into these waters and tore our 
nets off. (definite singular) 
The whales escaped by jumping off the pool over the gate into the sea. (definite plural) 
Two whales tore out nets. (quantified) 
                                                        
11 In thinking up such examples I am mainly indebted to Carlson (1980) and Krifka et al. 




This variety in the semantics of the noun phrases formed by common nouns can 
be theoretically accommodated in a number of ways. Having certain noun 
phrase types that apparently operate as kind designators may motivate the 
option to take common nouns themselves to be kind designators so as to obtain 
straightforward derivations of kind level designata for kind designating noun 
phrases. But one then will have to formulate special functions to account for the 
particular level denotations of other types of noun phrases. Or one can keep the 
common nouns as particular level appliers as is the standard course in formal 
semantics, and formulate special functions that derive kind level designata from 
their applier level meanings. 
Some of these options have been evidenced in the literature. Carlson 
himself (1980) took common nouns to be particular level appliers and 
accounted for the noun phrases which he argued to operate as names for kinds 
by formulating functions that mapped the meanings of the common noun into 
appropriate kinds. Neo-Carlsonian works such as Chierchia (1998) and Dayal 
(2004) follow and improve on Carlson.  
On the other side we see that the option of taking common nouns to be 
kind designators has been adopted in such works as Krifka (1995), Longobardi 
(2006), Zamparelli (2000). Thereby one can straightforwardly derive kind level 
designation for kind designating noun phrases; but then one has to formulate 
special functions that map common noun meanings into particular level applier 
meanings to account for noun phrases which have particular level denotations. 
In sum there are different options regarding the semantics of common 




the semantic contributions of the various types of noun phrases. Possibly, there 
is no way to decide between them as they really are equally adequate. Or one of 
them may prove to be more potent. Either of these outcomes is relevant for the 
issue of common noun rigidity. Considered as appliers it indeed seems unlikely 
that any common noun can be de jure rigid –i.e. that it be an applier which by 
linguistic-semantic design has the same extension relative to every index of 
evaluation. Then, if there are not any theoretical reasons to treat common nouns 
as designators rather than as appliers the notion of de jure rigidity may be 
judged to be devoid of significance for common nouns. If on the other hand 
there are reasons to treat some or all common nouns as kind designators rather 
than as appliers, the notion of de jure rigidity may possibly have a footing 
among common nouns, provided that one can demonstrate that some/all 
common nouns should be assumed to be de jure rigid designators to account for 
certain sentence level semantic phenomena. 
Another shortcoming I attributed to the extant literature pertaining to 
common noun rigidity was that ascriptions of rigidity or rejections thereof were 
not properly justified. In the present text, I will strive to construe proper 
theoretical justifications for such claims that target common nouns rather than 
appealing to intuitive evidence.  
De jure rigidity understood as constancy of denotation relative to 
evaluation indexes (viz. possible worlds), is a notion that finds its natural home 




semantics deployed with the help of the notion of possible worlds.12 The basic 
goal of this brand of semantics is to give theories that describe in a systematic 
manner how the truth-conditions we observably assign to the sentences may be 
related to the meanings of the constituents of these sentences and their manner 
of syntactic composition. Consequently one basic criteria relative to which such 
theories and their semantic claims are assessed is their success in predicting 
and explaining the semantic judgments of competent speakers about to the 
truth-conditions of different sentence types. Such judgments may directly 
pertain to the truth conditions or they may be judgments about ambiguity, 
equivalence, contradiction, contingency, entailment etc.  
Ascriptions of de jure rigidity or rejections thereof to a certain family of 
denoting expressions cannot be assessed in isolation but only in relation with 
such theories in their goal to give systematically correct predictions of the 
semantic judgments of competent speakers. To justify an ascription of de jure 
rigidity to a family of denoting expressions one should show there are certain 
semantic judgments the explanation of which requires that ascription in a 
theoretical framework which otherwise does generally well in correctly 
predicting and explaining semantic judgments about a large variety of sentence 
types. 
                                                        
12 A brand of linguistic-semantic theorizing that originated in such works as Montague 
(1970A), (1970B), (1973), Lewis (1970), further connected with the tradition of 
transformational grammar through such works as Partee (1973), (1975), and that finds a 





I want to highlight two points in relation with the picture of semantic 
justification sketched here. One is that de jure rigidity ascriptions should aim to 
explain some pre-theoretically ascertainable semantic phenomena –such as 
playing a role in explaining such properties and relations as ambiguity/non-
ambiguity, contingency/non-contingency etc. The second point is that such 
ascriptions should be assessed in the context of theoretical frameworks which 
in their explanatory span goes well beyond the semantic phenomena that may 
motivate the de jure rigidity ascriptions.  
To illustrate the first point we can consider the case of the commonly 
accepted ascription of de jure rigid designation to proper names. As we will 
illustrate in due course, that ascription is useful in giving a neat theoretical 
explanation of a pre-theoretically ascertainable ambiguity/non-ambiguity 
divergence that obtains between modal sentences that involve only proper 
name arguments and modal sentences that involve definite description 
arguments: 
Richard Nixon might have been female. 
The 37th president of US might have been female. 
The ascription of de jure rigid designation to proper names can also be used to 
explain our pre-theoretical semantic intuition that identity sentences with 
proper name arguments should always be non-contingent, although identity 
sentences need not always be non-contingent: 
Noah is Gılgamesh, but this might not have been so. 




Likewise, the justification of ascription of de jure rigidity to some class of 
common nouns too, say semantically simple common nouns, minimally requires 
that that ascription does some linguistic-semantic explanation of the sort the 
ascription of de jure rigid designation to proper names does.  
To explicate the second point according to which ascriptions of de jure 
rigidity should be assessed in the context of wider theoretical frameworks 
whose explanatory span go beyond cases that may motivate the ascriptions of 
de jure rigidity, we can consider the following probable situation in relation 
with the ascription of de jure rigidity to a certain class of common nouns. It may 
be the case that ascriptions of de jure rigidity have a theoretical significance of 
the sort illustrated just above only if common nouns are treated as designators. 
But perhaps theoretical frameworks in which common nouns are treated as 
appliers have at least the same explanatory range as the theoretical frameworks 
in which common nouns are taken to operate as designators and furthemore 
they don’t need to ascribe de jure rigidity to any sort of common noun. For 
example, in the English context a theoretical framework which takes common 
nouns to be designators will have to explain why for example in English a 
common noun such as tiger is not interchangeable in all syntactic contexts with 
the name Panthera tigris or the definite phrase the tiger . In comparison, in a 
framework in which common nouns are treated as appliers the divergent 
syntactic distribution of tiger and Panthera tigris can be explained without any 
cost. Again, in comparison with a framework which treats both adjectives and 
common nouns as appliers, a framework where all common nouns including 




to derive in a more roundabout way a kind designatum for wounded tiger out of 
the meanings of the constituents wounded and tiger, where at least tiger will 
have to be another kind designator. Now, if frameworks in which common 
nouns are treated as designators do not have advantages that will 
counterbalance such disadvantages as those mentioned above, and if 
furthermore the semantic phenomena which motivates ascriptions of de jure 
rigidity in such frameworks can also be explained without recourse to any de 
jure rigidity ascriptions in frameworks which treat common nouns as appliers, 
then there will be no need to extend of the notion of de jure rigidity to the case 
of common nouns. 
In the present text in weighing the question whether the notion of de jure 
rigidity has any significance in the case of common nouns I will examine 
whether one can raise a case for ascribing de jure rigidity to a certain class of 
common nouns which can be justified along the lines adumbrated above. I will 
look into whether sentential semantic phenomena like ambiguity/non-
ambiguity, contingence/non-contingence which are crucially relevant to justify 
the ascription of de jure rigidity to proper names will also be relevant in the 
case of common nouns. I will not however consider these phenomena in a way 
that ignores the general issues concerning the semantics of the common nouns 
and of the noun phrases they form. As I have previously indicated noun phrases 
formed by common nouns manifest a great semantic variety. There are different 
approaches to accommodate that variety, which involves different theoretical 
options as to the semantic type to be ascribed to the common nouns: will they 




appropriate? The analysis of the semantic phenomena which is susceptible to 
give support for the ascription of de jure rigidity to some/all common nouns 
will therefore be handled relative to general approaches which also have the 
potential to account for the semantic variety of the noun phrases formed by 
common nouns and some further phenomena that pertains to the general 
semantics of common nouns. 
The game plan for the coming chapters will then be as follows. In the 
second chapter I will discuss important elements of the extant literature that 
pertains to issue of the significance of the extension of the notion of de jure 
rigidity to the case of common nouns. I will first give a critical presentation of 
Kripke’s introduction of the view that some common nouns, specifically those 
for natural kinds are rigid designators. Then I will give a critical general 
presentation of the controversy on general term rigidity that emerged in 
reaction to Kripke’s ascription of rigid designation to some common nouns. In 
support of the discussion of this chapter there will be an appendix at the end of 
the main text. There I will critically discuss in a detailed manner a number of 
influential texts representative of the different views defended in the 
controversy on the rigidity of general terms. In these detailed discussions I will 
futher substantiate some criticisms which will rather be cursorily raised in the 
general presentation of the controversy on rigidity of the general terms. 
In the third chapter I will discuss the objectives and the methodology of 
the branch of truth-conditional semantics to which the property of de jure 
rigidity naturally belongs and from the point of view of which I will weigh the 




the meantime I will have occasion to introduce the formalism I will use in the 
rest of the present work.  
In the fourth chapter I will illustrate how the commonly accepted view 
that proper names are de jure rigid designators can be justified properly. The 
aim of that illustration will be to lay down a template which can be followed to 
justify ascriptions of de jure rigidity to common nouns. The justification will 
draw on the analysis of two types of pre-theoretically observable semantic 
phenomena mentioned above: non-ambiguity of sentences with modal elements 
and proper name arguments, and the non-contingency of identity sentences 
involving proper name arguments. 
In the fifth chapter I will illustrate the variety in the semantics of the noun 
phrases formed by common nouns. The interest of considering the semantics of 
the noun phrases formed by common nouns was indicated above: common 
nouns contribute to the determination of sentential meanings only by forming 
noun phrases which may manifest a variety of meanings.  
In the sixth chapter I will describe and comparatively assess two 
frameworks designed to account for the variety in the meanings of the noun 
phrases formed by common nouns. One of these frameworks, which I will label 
as the C-framework, will take all common nouns to be appliers. This framework 
will therefore have to resort to special semantic operations to account for the 
kind designating meanings of certain types of noun phrases. The other 
framework, which I will label as the K-framework, take simple (non-modified) 
non-taxonomic common nouns to be kind designators whereas it will treat 




K-framework will take semantically simple common nouns like tiger, transistor, 
electron to be kind designators; but it will treat taxonomic common nouns like 
species to be kind level appliers and modified common nouns such as wounded 
tiger to be particular level appliers.  I will bypass the option of taking all 
common nouns to be kind designators regardless whether they are taxonomic, 
modified or simple. The theoretical reasons for this will be explained at the end 
of the sixth chapter. 
In the seventh chapter drawing on the template set in the fourth chapter 
for the justification of de jure rigidity claims and drawing on the frameworks 
described and motivated in the sixth chapter I will seek ways to justify the view 
that some class of common nouns are de jure rigid. To this end I will examine 
from the standpoints of the two frameworks the semantic phenomena that has 
the potential to give reasons to hold that some class of common nouns should be 
de jure rigid. 
The results to be reached in the seventh chapter be summarized in the 
following way. Of the two frameworks on the semantics of common nouns that 
will be formulated, the K-framework, the one in which only the semantically 
simple non-taxonomic common nouns are kind designators, will be seen to 
warrant a theoretically significant ascription of de jure rigidity to common 
nouns: the semantically simple non-taxonomic common nouns will have to be 
assumed to be de jure rigid designators from the standpoint of that framework 
to explain certain modality related semantic phenomena.  
For example, of the following pair of sentence the first one has a certain 




1 a To avoid surveillance Alice must use an obsolete Japanese mobile model. 
b To avoid surveillance Alice must use a Sharp SH903i. 
Namely, 1a has a reading which can be paraphrased as Actual obsolete Japanese 
models are such that every possible circumstance in which Alice avoids 
surveillance Alice uses one or another token of one or another of these models –
this reading may not be plain to see but in the relevant chapter I will argue that 
it exists. This reading which will be characterized as non-specific de re exists 
alongside the ordinary de dicto reading which can be paraphrased as in every 
possible circumstance in which Alice avoids surveillance Alice uses one or 
another token of a Japanese mobile which is obsolete. These two readings are 
not equivalent. According to the de dicto reading of 1a the qualifications of the 
mobile model which is relevant in relation with circumventing the surveillance 
are the obsoleteness and to be made in Japan, otherwise any model will do. 
According the non-specific de re reading of 1a however what is relevant for 
circumventing the surveillance is that the model used be one or another of the 
Japanese models that are actually obsolete: obseleteness and to be made in 
Japan are not relevant to avoid surveillance, they are just markers for the 
relevant models.  
In contrast, 1b does not have a kind level non-specific de re reading which can 
be distinguished from its de dicto reading. More precisely, the de dicto reading 
is equivalent to the kind level non-specific de re reading. This is reflected in the 
truth conditional equivalence of the following ways of paraphrasing 1b: The 
Sharp SH903i is such that every possible circumstance in which Alice avoids 
surveillance Alice uses one or another token of that model and in every possible 




of the Sharp SH903i.  Both according to the kind level non-specific de re reading 
and according to the de dicto reading of 1b what is relevant to circumvent the 
surveillance is that Alice uses no other than the model Sharp SH903i, the very 
model which actually bears that name.  
I will argue that under a framework like the K-framework which takes 
simple non-taxonomic common nouns like Sharp SH903i to be kind designators, 
such a difference as the one that holds between 1a and 1b is explainable only if 
simple non-taxonomic common nouns are assumed to be rigid kind designators. 
More specifically, if in 1b Sharp SH903i were a kind designator but not a rigid 
one, then the de dicto reading could be taken to relate Alice’s circumvention of 
the surveillance not to a single model but to a variety of different models. But it 
seems that 1b does not support such a reading. 
Another semantic phenomenon which I will show to support ascribing 
rigid designation to simple non-taxonomic common nouns under the K-
framework relates to the contingency/non-contingency divergence observed in 
identity statements with kind designating noun phrase arguments. For example, 
the first of the following identity sentences is non-contingent, whereas the 
second is contingent: 
2 a The neutrino is in fact the same particle as the antineutrino. 
b The neutrino is in fact the same particle as the particle discovered by Reines and 
 Cowan at 1956. 
This divergence can readily be explained in terms of the definite noun phrase 
arguments’ rigidity or non-rigidity. However such an explanation does not 
directly support a rigid/non-rigid distinction among common nouns. It will 




some definite phrases directly depended on the rigidity of the common nouns 
which form them. According to the K-framework the so called definite generics 
like the neutrino are exactly such definite noun phrases. I will thus argue that 
according to the K-framework such divergences as the one that obtains between 
2a and 2b supports assigning rigid kind designation to simple non-taxonomic 
common nouns. 
However these results will be compromised by the fact the C-framework 
which takes all common nouns to be appliers can (i) more or less account for 
the phenomena that constitute the reasons in favor of viewing semantically 
simple common nouns as kind designators, (ii) can moreover account for the 
modality related semantic phenomena illustrated above without ascribing de 
jure rigidity to any common noun.  
In the sixth chapter I will cite some reasons to prefer the K-framework, 
according to which rigid designation plays a role in the semantics of some 
common nouns, over the C-framework, which need not give rigidity any role in 
relation with common nouns. But there are counter-reasons supporting the 
opposite preference as well. It will be much beyond the scope of the present text 
to conclusively decide between these two frameworks as many of the decisive 
issues are not related with the rigidity issue at all. So, I will simply indicate the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of both approaches and leave at that. 
This description of the conclusion to be reached gives the impression that 
not much will be achieved after all. The reason for this feeble conclusion is the 
contrived semantics of common nouns and the noun phrases formed by them. 




work should not be measured by that conclusion. I wish that its achievement be 
measured relative to its endeavor to discuss the issue of the rigidity of common 
nouns without glossing over the contrived semantics of common nouns, and to 




CHAPTER II  
 THE LITERATURE PERTAINING TO THE COMMON NOUN RIGIDITY 
As set in the introductory chapter my principal aim in this work is to study the 
relevance of the notion of rigidity to common nouns –i.e. terms like tiger, 
wounded tiger, transitor, bee species which is typically harmed for honey. And 
the motivation for this study lies in the shortcomings I perceive to exist in the 
philosophy of language literature pertaining to the controversy on general term 
rigidity. This literature has spawned in response to Kripke’s ascribing rigid 
desigination to natural kind common nouns and some related adjectives. The 
category of common nouns is not much in use in the literature in question. 
Rather, the literature uses the category of general terms, although there does 
not seem to be a consensus on the extension of that category. Still, whichever 
way one delimits the category of general terms, common nouns are always 
included and the discussion has therefore direct relevance to the case of 
common nouns, and vice versa. 
In the present chapter I will present with a critical outlook the principal 
views defended in this literature pertaining to the rigidity of common nouns and 
the arguments through which they are defended. It will have two main parts. In 
the first part I will give a critical presentation of Kripke’s introduction of the 
view that some common nouns, specifically those for natural kinds are rigid 
designators. Then I will give a general critical presentation of the controversy 
on general term rigidity that emerged in reaction to Kripke’s ascription of rigid 




critical discussions of a number of much cited papers which represent the 
different views defended in the controversy on the rigidity of general terms. 
The Origin: Naming and Necessity 
In Naming and Necessity Kripke (1981) famously introduced and defended the 
view that proper names are de jure rigid designators, whereas singular definite 
noun phrases termed as definite descriptions are not. In relation with common 
nouns, he explicitly claimed that those which are natural kind terms are like 
proper names. He also explicitly attributed rigid designation to some. As a result 
he has been commonly interpreted by its readers to suggest that common nouns 
that are natural kind terms are de jure rigid designators, although he did not 
provide any explicit justification for this suggestion. Below I will first cover 
threads of discussion in Naming and Necessity which is relevant to Kripke’s 
ascription of de jure rigidity to proper names, then I will pass to discuss Kripke’s 
handling of the case of common nouns in that same work. 
Proper Names, Rigid Designation and Surrounding Issues in Naming 
and Necessity 
In Naming and Necessity Kripke uses mundane examples to show that when we 
talked about possibilities we all along have been using and understanding 
proper names to designate the same thing relative to each of them –that is, that 
we have been using names as rigid designators. Kripke’s discussion is very 




and what we would not say; he makes the reader judge for herself how she in 
fact uses and understands proper names, by making her reflect on the ways she 
evaluates talk about possible state of affairs.  
Kripke does not give any syntactic and semantic analyses of his examples. 
Furthermore the relation between his claim that proper names are rigid 
designators, and his other influential claims such as that names are not 
synonymous with definite descriptions, that identity sentences involving two 
proper names are non-contingent, are not clear. That is, it is not clear which is 
being deduced from which. Now let me briefly present the principal threads of 
his discussion which are one way or another related with the claim that proper 
names are de jure rigid designators.  
I find that the most compelling pieces in Kripke’s discussion that show that 
we have been using names as rigid designators were those in which he 
contrasted such pairs as the following: 
1 a The US president in 1970 might not have been the US president in 1977. 
b Nixon might not have been Nixon. 
Kripke suggested to use such modal sentential contexts as the one exemplified 
in the sentences in 1 as a test through which we can intuitively deduce whether 
a singular term is a rigid designator or not. If the resulting sentence cannot ever 
be evaluated as true, as in the case of 1b, then that designator should be rigid. 
How does this test show whether a singular term is a de jure rigid designator or 
not? We will give a more detailed account about this in the coming chapters. For 
the time being let the following suffice. Unlike 1a, we intuit that it is impossible 




relative to every state of affairs that might have been the case we would not 
have such an intuition. Certainly we see no problem in evaluating 1a as true, 
where the syntactic arguments are the two occurrences of the definite 
description the US president in 1977, and clearly this definite description will 
not have the same designatum relative to every possible states of affairs. Since 
our linguistic intuition tells us that we would not ever do the same with proper 
name arguments, proper names should be de jure rigid designators.   
Another part of Kripke’s discussion which is relevant for his claim that 
proper names are rigid designators was his discussion about the identity 
sentences. He claimed, contradicting the prevalent opinion of the day, that 
identity sentences with proper name arguments should be necessarily true, if 
true. And that we know a priori  that truth entails necessary truth in the case of 
such sentences (109). He again argued for this claim by appealing to our 
intuitions. For example he asks us to consider whether under any circumstances 
we would judge Hesperus is Phosphorus to be false, given that Hesperus is 
actually Phosphorus. The necessary truth of true identity sentences with proper 
name arguments further confirm the thesis that proper names are rigid 
designators. If each of Hesperus and Phosphorus are rigid designators and what 
they designate relative to the actual state of affairs is the same, then relative to 
all possible circumstances they will designate the same thing as one another, 
and thus Hesperus is Phosphorus will be true relative to all possible 
circumstances. Furthermore our a priori knowledge that that truth entails 
necessary truth in the case of identity sentences with proper name arguments 




proper names’ being rigid designators is a feature fixed by linguistic design in so 
far as competence in the language appears to be sufficient to know such 
entailments. 
A considerable part of Kripke’s discussion on names is aimed against the 
view that each proper name is inhering in a descriptive content which helps us 
to identify the designatum of the proper name. He has given three distinct types 
of arguments which purport to show that this view has implausible 
consequences. Of these we will here only illustrate the so called modal 
argument. 
2 Gödel must have proved the completeness theorem for first order logic. 
If all the identifying information I had about who Gödel is is that he is the one 
who first proved the completeness theorem for first order logic, then apparently 
according to the descriptive content view, for me Gödel could only mean the 
person who first proved the completeness theorem for first order logic. But if 
this were the case then there would be a reading of 2 under which I would have 
to evaluate it to be true. That is, I would have to evaluate as true the reading 
which can be paraphrased as it is necessary that Gödel proved the completeness 
theorem for first order logic.  But as things stand 2 does not have such a 
reading.13  
                                                        
13 This argument is also named as the unwanted necessity argument. Note that considered by 
itself this type of argument is effective in refuting only the claim that names’ content are 
contingently satisfied descriptions. This type of argument is for example inffective against the 
claim Gödel has a content which can be expressed by the rigidified description the person who 
actually proved the completeness of first order logic.  Besides this type of argument Kripke gives 
two further types of arguments, commonly labeled as semantic arguments and epistemic 
arguments (Salmon 1981, 24-31) . And the claim that Gödel  has rigidified descriptive content 
the person who actually proved the completeness theorem for first order logic cannot stand 




The relation of this discussion with the claim that names are rigid 
designators is two-fold. On the one hand, if names are indeed rigid then they 
cannot have contents expressible by definite descriptions which involve 
descriptions that are satisfied by entities only contingently. Relative to a state of 
affairs definite descriptions designate the entity which uniquely satisfies 
relative to that state of affairs the descriptive conditions they express.  As what 
uniquely satisfies a contingent description will change relative to different state 
of affairs, the designata of contingent definite descriptions will also change 
when they are being used to talk about different possible scenarios. On the 
other hand, if indeed names do not have descriptive contents, that is, if the way 
they designate does not have anything to do with the satisfaction of descriptive 
conditions then there should be no reason for their designatum to change 
relative to different possibilities. 
Natural Kind Common Nouns, Rigidity and Surrounding I ssues in 
Naming and Necessity 
In the third lecture of Naming and Necessity Kripke turns his attention to the 
case of general terms. He discusses issues related with such common nouns as 
                                                                                                                                                             
out versions of descriptive content theories for names which trump all these three types of 
theories taken together, and which futhermore can give straightforward explanations of certain 
phenomena which prove difficult to explain for non-descriptive theories for names –such as 
explaining how we are able to look out for and investigate the designata of the names we use, 
the informativeness of identity sentences with proper name arguments, the semantics of doxatic 




gold, tiger, cat, animal, lightning, light, water, heat etc.14 He claims such nouns 
for natural kinds are similar to proper names. Besides these common nouns he 
claims the same also for such adjectives as hot, loud, red (p. 134).   
Kripke does not produce any explicit statement to the effect that every 
such natural kind noun as those mentioned above is also a rigid designator. 
Among these terms he explicitly ascribes rigid designation only to the terms 
heat, light and gold.15 However his overall discussion strongly suggests that he 
implies the same for the rest of such nouns as well as the corresponding 
adjectives. Since Kripke does not dwell as much on the case of adjectives as he 
does on the case of common nouns for natural kinds, and since in the present 
work I will primarily focus on the case of common nouns, I will conduct the 
following presentation of Kripke’s views mainly in reference to common nouns.   
Kripke supports his claim that common nouns for natural kinds are like 
proper names mainly in two ways. First, he argues that, just like names, 
common nouns for natural kinds cannot be taken to connote a complex 
descriptive content which putatively determines its denotata. Second, he argues 
that, just like identity sentences with proper name arguments, theoretical 
                                                        
14 Kripke refer to the nouns just mentioned alternatively as general terms (p. 134), terms for 
natural kinds (p. 127, p.136), common names (p. 127), predicates (p.127), general names (p. 
127), natural kind terms (p.127), species names (p. 134), terms for substances (p. 116), terms 
for natural phenomena (p. 134). I will here simply refer to them as common nouns for natural 
kinds.   
15 Another general term which Kripke explicitly ascribes rigid designation is the term one 
meter (p. 55). I here omitted mentioning it just because, unlike the other terms mentioned in the 
main text above, the main discussion pertaining to it does not take place in the third lecture of 
Naming and Necessity and it is not a term which one would like to count among the so called 




identifications such as a lightning is an electrical discharge, with noun phrase 
arguments formed by natural kind nouns are necessarily true, if true.  
As for the rigidity claim concerning the common nouns for natural kinds, 
Kripke does not give any explicit argument in its defense. Moreover, this time 
unlike his discussion concerning proper names, he does not even suggest an 
intuitive test using which we can intuitively deduce the rigidity of a common 
noun. We thus have only Kripke’s arguments to the effect that natural kind 
nouns are like proper names in the mentioned two respects to depend on as an 
intuitive justification for his claim that nouns for natural kinds are rigid 
designators.  
Kripke argued against the idea that nouns for natural kinds are 
synonymous with the descriptions which may have been used to introduce 
these nouns into the language by way of identifying their denotations. According 
to a simplistic implementation of this idea, for example, tiger will be 
synonymous with a description like large carnivorous quadripedal feline, tawny 
yellow in color with blackish transverse stripes and white belly or heat will be 
synonymous with whatever gives us sensations of hotness. Kripke plausibly 
argues that tiger cannot be synonymous with a description like large 
carnivorous quadripedal feline, tawny yellow in color with blackish transverse 
stripes and white belly, as there might be tigers which may not satisfy the 
identifying description associated with the term tiger, and there might be non-
tigers which satisfy the description associated with tiger. 
Even if we grant Kripke’s point that common nouns are not synonymous 




analysis for natural kind common nouns and the view that such nouns are rigid 
designators is tenuous. If we decide to treat common nouns for natural kinds as 
designators, we can, perhaps even should, do the same about the descriptions 
putatively associated with them. For, after all most of the descriptions Kripke 
envisages are just modified common nouns, and in all sentential contexts in 
which a simple common noun is semantically interpretable it can be replaced by 
a convoluted modified common noun without any harm to semantic 
interpretability. That is, for example, gold can be replaced by yellow ductile 
metal in all sentential contexts, and the resulting sentences will still be 
meaningful –albeit they will have different meanings. So, if the designata of 
common nouns for natural kinds will be taken to be kinds, then the designata of 
descriptions considered as designators can as well be taken to be kinds. Now, it 
is not clear whether descriptions, when they are treated as designators for 
kinds, will designate different kinds relative to different possible states of 
affairs. On the contrary, it seems that, for example yellow ductile metal will 
designate relative to all possible circumstances the same kind; more specifically 
the kind which at any possible world w is instantiated by a token x if and only if 
x is yellow, ductile and metal at w. So, being a description, a fortiori not being a 
common noun for a natural kind, may not be an impediment to rigid 
designation. Then, not just natural kind nouns but other common nouns too, 
even those which themselves are descriptions or are synonymous with 
descriptions, may be rigid designators. But if rigid designation may arguably be 




natural kind nouns are not synonymous with descriptions will not lend any 
support to natural kind nouns’ being rigid designators.  
Let’s now turn to the other respect in which Kripke found natural kind 
nouns to be similar to proper names. According to Kripke, just as the truth of the 
identity sentences formed with proper name arguments entail their necessary 
truth, the truth of theoretical identification sentences with arguments formed 
from natural kind nouns entails the necessary truth of these identification 
sentences. Moreover, Kripke claims that as in the case of identity sentences, in 
the case of such theoretical identification sentences as well this entailment is 
known a priori.  Kripke’s examples of theoretical identification sentences were 
the following: 
3 Light is an electromagnetic radiation. 
Water is H2O. 
Gold is the element with atomic number 79. 
Cats are animals. 
Heat is the motion of molecules. 
Ligthning is an electrical discharge. 
Whales are mammals. 
Kripke defends his claim that in the case of such sentences truth entails 
necessary truth by resorting as usual to our intuitions as to whether we can 
conceive any circumstances relative to which we will evaluate as false a 
theoretical identification sentence which we evaluate as true relative to the 
actual state of affairs.  
However the relation between these claims about theoretical 
identification sentences with arguments formed out of natural kind common 
nouns and the claim that such common nouns are rigid designators is again not 




proper names’ being rigid designators semantically requires that if such identity 
sentences are true they must be necessarily true. Kripke appears to hold that a 
similar semantic requirement holds between the rigidity of common nouns for 
natural kinds and the necessary truth of true theoretical identification 
sentences. How this latter requirement obtains is however not clear at all. 
Identification sentences such as Lightning is an electrical discharge are not 
identity sentences. So, the alleged semantic requirement cannot exactly be of 
the same type as in the case of identity sentences with proper name arguments. 
Such sentences as Lightning is an electrical discharge are often analyzed as 
universal quantifications. Yet this analysis is of no help either: even if the pair of 
common nouns that occur in such sentences are taken to be rigid designators 
for natural kinds, their truth will not entail their necessary truth if such 
sentences are analyzed as universal quantifications. Every lightning is an 
electrical discharge does not entail Necessarily every lightning is an electrical 
discharge, even if lightning and electrical discharge are assumed to be rigid 
designators. That the actual extension of the kind designated by lightning is in 
the actual extension of the kind designated by electrical discharge does not 
entail that the extensions of these two kinds will be related in the same way 
relative to all possible state of affairs.16 Perhaps the identification sentences are 
neither identity sentences nor universal quantifications, but have an altogether 
                                                        
16 This is a point which belongs to the common lore of the controversy on the rigidity of 
general terms. I do not know who came with it first or where I myself learned about it first. It is 




different analysis.17 But Kripke does not propose any sort of semantic analysis 
for his examples of theoretical identification sentences.  
Critical Remarks onNaming and Necessity ’s Ascription of Rigid 
Designation to Some Common Nouns 
The Want of a Proper Semantic Argument  
For a semanticist who is in the business of describing how the truth-conditions 
of sentences are determined on the basis of the meanings of their constituents, 
the de jure rigidity related discussions in Naming and Necessity constitute a 
starting point rather than a finished semantic argument. Kripke appeals to our 
linguistic intuition as to how we would evaluate his examples if such and such 
were the case, and very informally suggests that our intuitions showed that we 
have been using names and common nouns for natural kinds rigidly by virtue of 
the semantic design features of natural languages. But Kripke did not do what a 
semanticist would do: considering a range of examples and then arguing that 
our intuition as to how we would evaluate these examples is best explained if 
we adopt such and such analyses, plus the assumptions that proper names or 
common nouns for natural kinds are rigid designators. 
Far be it from me to belittle Kripke’s achievement; often real philosophical 
achievement comes by way of revealing the obvious that has previously been 
                                                        
17 I think that they should rather be analyzed as characterizing sentences, which have an 
intrinsic modal operator. For more on the semantics of characterizing sentences see Krifka et al. 





overlooked. Kripke’s claim about names was so plausible that it did not require 
formal semantic analyses to gain general acceptance. In fact, probably a dry 
defense of that claim involving formal semantic analyses of examples, would be 
less effective and more prone to be cursively read and forgotten. Nonetheless a 
run of the mill defense of the sort a semanticist would give for such a claim, one 
which involves explicit semantic analyses and assumptions is not pointless, 
because pending such a defense we may be incapable to state the reasons why 
we should accept a semantic claim which we intuitively find extremely 
plausible. Indeed, precisely this seems to be case in relation with Kripke’s claim 
that proper names are rigid designators. For example, two authoritative sources 
on the matter, Salmon (1981) and Soames (2002) propose two alternative 
justifications for this claim. According to Salmon names’ de jure rigidity follows 
from their non-descriptivity (32-33).18  According to Soames however de jure 
rigidity of names is a datum which can be used in arguments against claims that 
names are descriptive (22-24).  
It is the same with Kripke’s rigidity claim regarding natural kind common 
nouns. Kripke has not given a proper semantic justification for it. To obtain such 
a justification one first has to lay down the truth conditions we intuitively assign 
to identification sentences and to modal sentences involving such common 
nouns, and also the truth-conditions of similar sentences which involve other 
types of common nouns, to see whether there are any differences in the ways 
                                                        
18 According to Salmon (1981) the argument against claims of synonymy with certain 
descriptions does not use de jure rigidity; the so called modal argument does not have among its 




we tend to evaluate them. If such a difference is discerned, then one will strive 
to show that the difference in question can best be explained by assuming that 
common nouns for natural kinds are rigid designators. To this end one has to 
give plausible semantic analyses for these sentences such that these analyses 
will yield the intuitively known truth conditions and the differences thereof only 
if common nouns for natural kinds are distinctively assumed to be rigid 
designators.19  
In Naming and Necessity Kripke partly accomplishes only the first part of 
such a semantic justification for the thesis that common nouns for natural kinds 
are rigid designators; namely illustrating certain aspects of how we tend to 
evaluate modal sentences or identifications involving such common nouns. But 
this time, differently than his case for proper names’ rigidity, a consideration of 
how we intuitively evaluate certain relevant sentences falls short of constituting 
an intuitively compelling case for the rigidity of natural kind nouns. 
Are Common Nouns Designators?  
I have above mentioned that Kripke explicitly ascribes rigid designation only to 
the common nouns heat, light, gold. The generalization of this ascription to the 
other common nouns for natural kinds which he mentions and in general to all 
                                                        
19 In the coming chapters I will first give an explicit linguistic-semantic argument for the de 
jure rigidity of names. I will do so because the issue of the rigidity of certain types of common 
nouns turns around the question whether an analogous argument can be given for them as well. 
Then, in a later chapter I will explore whether similar arguments can be set up for the de jure 
rigidity of certain types of common nouns. As previously indicated in the introduction I however 
do not presuppose in any way that de jure rigidity, if significantly applicable to common nouns 




such common nouns is an implication we, and other more authoritative readers, 
derive from Kripke’s discussion in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity.  
In the third lecture, alongside the mass common nouns heat, light and gold 
Kripke dwells on such count nouns as tiger, cat, cow as well. Common nous, 
mass or count, are often taken to be token level appliers (to have predicative 
denotations of type <e,t>) rather than being designators like names and 
pronouns. Not without a reason. Common nouns can form nominal predicates; 
they can combine with adjectives or relative clauses to form modified common 
nouns; they can combine with determiners such as a, the, some, all, three to 
form noun phrases.  
4 That bit that Alice could not swallow was bootleg liquor. 
Mumbo is a tiger. 
Mumbo and Jumbo are tigers. 
Alice poured hot water into the sink. 
Alice noticed a wounded tiger in the clearing. 
Alice poured some water into the sink. 
Alice noticed three tigers in the clearing. 
Alice noticed many tigers in the clearing. 
In these positions paradigmatic designators such as proper names, pronouns, 
and definite phrases even if they designate kinds, are usually not possible: 
5 ?That bit that Alice could not swallow was this highly potent transparent spirit  
? Simba is a panthera tigris. 
?Mumbo and Jumbo are panthera tigris. 
*Simba is that striped Asian feline species. 
*Alice poured hot that transparent liquid into the sink. 
?Alice noticed a wounded panthera tigris. 
*Alice noticed (a) wounded that panthera species. 
*Alice poured some that transparent liquid into the sink. 




* Alice noticed many that striped Asian panthera species in the clearing.20 
Most importantly, names and pronouns, without combining with any 
determiners can form noun phrases which in turn function as syntactic 
arguments, singular count common nouns cannot do the same (mass common 
nouns such as water, gold and plural count common nouns such as tigers appear 
to be an exception, but see further below).  
6 Panthera tigris used to be common in this region. 
This striped Asian panthere species used to be common in this region. 
This striped Asian panthera species is termed as ‘the tiger’. 
The tiger used to be common in this region. 
Tigers used to be common in this region. 
The tiger is termed as ‘Kaplan’ in Turkish. 
Bootleg liquor is more commonly known under the name ‘Moonshine’. 
*Tiger used to be common in this region. 
*Tiger is a striped Asian panthera species. 
*Tiger is termed as ‘Kaplan’ in Turkish. 
These elements of syntactic organization can rather be given a simple semantic 
explanation. Verb phrases are appliers (have unsaturated denotations of type 
<e,t>). Names are designators (have saturated denotations of type e). For this 
reason their semantic composition determines a truth value. Common nouns 
cannot combine with verb phrases because they too are appliers (i.e. they too 
have unsaturated predicative denotations of type <e,t>). But as appliers 
common nouns can form verb phrases (i.e nominal predicates). Common nouns 
can figure in syntactic arguments that combine with verb phrases only by taking 
determiners and forming noun phrases (although there are some exceptions to 
be discussed below). In accordance with this determiners and specifically 
                                                        





quantifiers are usually assigned denotations of type <<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>> that 
are satiated by denotations of type <e,t> to yield denotations of type <<e,t>,t> 
for quantified noun phrases. Having denotations of type <<e,t>,t> noun 
phrases formed by the combination of a common noun with a determiner can 
then combine with verb phrases to determine a truth value. What we have very 
briefly described here is in fact the most common way common nouns and other 
expressions that can combine with them are interpreted.21 
It is not impossible to take common nouns to be designators and account 
for the phenomena illustrated above. But such an account will have to bring in 
additional semantic operators (to account for the common nouns capability to 
form predicates, to combine with quantifiers and adjectives) and additional 
syntactic assumptions (to account for singular count common nouns’ not being 
able to form determinerless noun phrases which can function as syntactic 
arguments, despite their being designators). These extras should be balanced by 
theoretical gains which are impossible or difficult to obtain under an approach 
which assigns predicative denotations to common nouns. So, taking common 
nouns to be designators for kinds is a step that goes against a common wisdom 
that presents apparent theoretical advantages, and thus is in need of 
justification. 
                                                        
21Among indefinitely many works that adopt this treatment we can cite Kratzer and Heim 
(1998), Lewis (1970), Chierchia (1998), Partee (1986). For a support of the view that relates 
syntactic distribution patterns with semantic properties see Chierchia (1985) pgs. 433-434. 
Soames (2002)’s discussion on the rigidity of general terms is shaped by the view that common 




Did Kripke Ever Ascribed Rigid Designation to Common Nouns?  
Now, let me briefly look at the apparent exception constituted by mass nouns 
and plural nouns to the generalizations above. This exception is specifically 
relevant in relation with Kripke’s claim about common nouns for natural kinds. 
One interesting point about the common nouns for natural kinds which Kripke 
explicitly ascribes rigid designation, namely heat, light and gold, is that each of 
them is a mass common noun; and to no count nouns he explicitly ascribes rigid 
designation.22 The peculiar thing about mass common nouns is that, unlike 
singular count couns, they can form determinerless noun phrases which then 
function as syntactic arguments –determinerless noun phrases only involve 
nouns but no determiners such as a, the, all, some etc.: 
7 Alice cannot touch gold due to some rare sort of allergy of hers. 
The pranksters served Alice bootleg liquor instead of water. 
Alice poured bootleg liquor on the burning paper. 
The same peculiarity also holds for plural nouns. 
8 Alice cannot touch peaches due to some rare sort of allergy of hers. 
The pranksters served Alice peaches instead of nectarins. 
Alice threw tomatoes at the umpire. 
Such determinerless syntactic arguments as those highlighted in the sentences 
above are syntactically speaking noun phrases. And there are syntactic reasons 
to distinguish between the noun phrases and the nouns that form them even if 
                                                        
22 We noted that Kripke explicitly ascribed rigid designation to one meter. One meter is not a 
count common noun, though the term meter is a count common noun. Strictly speaking Kripke 
does explicitly ascribe rigidity to meter. But as we also noted his discussion appears to imply 




this distinction is not morphologically marked. Consider the following pairs of 
sentences: 
9 a The pranksters served Alice water. 
b The pranksters served Alice some hot water. 
10 a Alice threw tomatoes at the umpire. 
b Alice a few big ripe tomatoes at the umpire. 
In 9 we see that water and some hot water fulfill the same syntactic role: they 
constitute the second object-argument of the verb phrase in 9a and 9b. For this 
reason some hot water can grammatically replace water in 9a and vice versa 
water can replace some hot water in 9b. Moreover there is nothing special about 
the sentences in 9, water can replace some hot water and vice versa in any 
sentence in which these play the role of syntactic arguments –objects or 
subjects of verb phrases. However this inter-changeability cannot be 
generalized to all occurrences of the morphologic form water. For example, 
some hot water cannot grammatically replace the word water that occurs 
within the phrase some hot water –some hot some hot water is not 
grammatical. Nor can it grammatically replace water as it occurs in any of such 
phrases as a little water, a lot of water, much water etc.  This difference suggests 
the idea that not all occurences of the morphologic form water correspond to 
the same type of syntactic constitutent. On the one hand there is a water which 
is the same sort of syntactic constituent as some hot water, and which like some 
hot water can form function as syntactic arguments of verbs. On the other hand 
there is another water which, unlike some hot water can combine with 




The same considerations equally validly apply to tomatoes. Occurences of 
tomatoes that function as syntactic arguments are interchangeable with 
occurences of a few big ripe tomatoes. However, a few ripe tomatoes cannot 
replace the tomatoes that occurs in the phrase a few big ripe tomatoes; nor for 
that matter can it replace the occurences of tomatoes occur within such phrases 
as all tomatoes, some tomatoes, most tomatoes etc. Again, this difference 
suggests that we have to distinguish between two types of syntactic 
constituents both of which has the same morphologic form. There is the 
tomatoes which is on a par with such phrases as a few big ripe tomatoes, all 
tomatoes, some tomatoes, most tomatoes all of which always function as 
syntactic arguments of verb phrases and which are grammatically 
interchangeable. And there is the tomatoes which unlike these phrases can 
combine with adjectives and quantificational determiners. 
Owing to such considerations in generative syntactic theories nouns 
phrases are distinguished from the common nouns that form them; this is so 
although in some cases the nouns phrases consist only of a common noun. So, 
the mass common noun water has to be distinguished from the bare noun 
phrase water and the plural common noun tomatoes has to be distinguished 
from the bare plural noun phrase tomatoes.23  
Returning now to Kripke’s examples, we have to conclude that 
syntactically speaking the nouns heat, light, gold are not exactly the same 
syntactic entities as the noun phrases heat, light, gold. Now, could not this 
                                                        




difference be ignored as just a syntactic distinction which is devoid of a 
semantic dimension? I do not think so. This syntactic difference can be given 
and often has been given a semantic dimension as well.24 It is arguable that 
unlike bare noun phrases formed by mass common nouns, mass common nouns 
themselves are not designators –i.e don’t have a denotation of the saturated 
type e. One piece of evidence for this is already stated. The mass common nouns 
in question here, and in general all common nouns can form syntactic 
predicates, combine with quantificational determiners to form quantificational 
noun phrases and combine with adjectives to form modified common nouns. 
However such paradigmatic designators such as pronouns or definite phrases 
(thus of the saturated type e), even if they designate kinds, cannot usually do 
any of these. So, qua common nouns mass nouns such as gold, heat, light may 
preferably be assigned predicative denotations of type <e,t>, to align them with 
singular count common nouns which also can naturally occur in the stated 
positions, and to differentiate them from proper names, definite phrases and 
pronouns which cannot.25 
On the other hand determinerless noun phrases formed by mass common 
nouns, can stand as syntactic arguments just as definite phrases and pronouns 
can. Moreover as we will see in subsequent chapters there are compelling 
reasons to take bare noun phrases to be kind designators. So, qua 
                                                        
24For example in Chierchia (1985) (pp. 433-434). 
25 Under this approach the denotations of mass nouns will apply to sums like plural nouns. The 
incapability of mass nouns’ combining with counting determiners can then be accounted in a 
number of ways. For a survey of different possible approaches the reader can refer to Pelletier 




determinerless noun phrases gold, heat, light and the like may rather be taken 
to be designators to align them with definite phrases and pronouns in their 
capacity to operate as syntactic arguments.26  
As was the case in relation with the general case about common nouns, the 
semantics of mass common nouns can be, and in fact often is, handled 
differently than described here, albeit not without extra assumptions which are 
balanced by other theoretical gains. 
Before that background it is all the more interesting that Kripke assigned 
rigid designation explicitly only to heat, light and gold among common nouns. 
Thus, Kripke has ascribed rigid designation explicitly only to three terms which 
qua bare noun phrases can and often are plausibly considered to be designators.  
This may not be an accident, because considered as bare noun phrases that are 
designators, the rigidity of heat, light and gold, can be compellingly defended on 
the same intuitive way Kripke had defended the rigidity of proper names. Yet 
the same is still not true for the mass common nouns heat, light and gold and the 
other singular count common nouns discussed by Kripke. 
Above when we discussed the relation between Kripke’s claims that 
common nouns for natural kinds are rigid designators and that these nouns are 
not synonymous with descriptions, we indicated that if common nouns for 
                                                        
26 The kind level designata of these are derived from the particular level predicative 
denotations of the underlying common nouns. To this end special implicit operations are 
postulated. In the fourth chapter of the present work we will see an example of how this is done. 
The view that determinerless noun phrases formed by plural common nouns and mass nouns 
are kind designators although the underlying common nouns may not be so is a quite popular 
view in linguistic semantic literature. It is labeled as theNeo-Carlsonian view and we will have 
occasion to discuss it in the fifth chapter of the present work. Again the reader can refer to 




natural kinds are taken to be designators then it seems that the same can be 
argued to be the case for other common nouns, even for those which are 
descriptions, and that if all common nouns are designators, prima facie all of 
them are rigid. Take the example of unmarried male. It is not a natural kind 
common noun and it is not semantically simple. If it designates a kind relative to 
the actual state of affairs, that kind is the same kind designated by bachelor 
relative to the actual state of affairs. Now, the question is, assuming that 
unmarried male is a designator, can we describe conditions relative to which 
unmarried male will designate a different kind than it designates relative to the 
actual state of affairs? That is, can we for example form a counter-factual of the 
form If such and such were the case, an unmarried male might do so, where 
such and such refers to a set of counterfactual conditions such that as a result 
unmarried male in the second clause will intuitively have to be taken to 
designate a different kind than the one it designates relative to the actual state 
of affairs? Prima facie this does not seem likely.27 And apparently the same is 
                                                        
27 It might be retorted that such a modified noun as animal with black stripes can be used as a 
non-rigid designator. For example relative to a world in which the only species characterized by 
black stripes were a hawk species of the bird genus accipiter, under a certain way of using, 
animal with black stripes will designate that black-striped accipiter species; and relative to a 
word in which the only species with black stripes were a shark species then relative to that 
world Animal with black stripes will designate that shark species. The same considerations can 
be extended to the case of unmarried male in relation with worlds where for example only 
extrovert males are unmarried and worlds in which introvert males are unmarried; and it can 
be claimed that unmarried male too can designate relative to one world the extrovert male kind 
and relative to another world the introvert male kind (Inan 2008, 223). This purported non-
rigid designator usage is unlikely. To see this consider again our world where only one species 
of the genus accipiter is characterized by having black stripes. Relative to that world it is alleged 
that animal with black stripes might be taken to designate that species. Now suppose also that in 
that same world the only accipiter species happen to be our black striped hawks. Cannot we 
then say in the same vein relative to that same world animal with black stripes designate the 
genus accipiter?  But how can a semantically non-plural noun have multiple designata? Similar 
considerations make it unlikely that unmarried male can ever be used to alternatively designate 
the extrovert male kind or the introvert male kind relative to different worlds. For example 




the case for any common noun. So, it seems, if common nouns are designators, 
they generally are rigid designators; the common nouns for natural kinds do not 
constitute an interesting exception in this respect. Then however rigid 
designation ceases to be a property that marks a difference among common 
nouns.28  
Kripke consistently used the verb designate both for proper names and 
examples of common nouns he highlighted in the third lecture. Perhaps, we 
have been reading too much from this preference. Perhaps, he used designate as 
a generic term for reference, just as we in this text use denote as a generic term 
for all sorts of reference. Then, it is possible that he meant a different referential 
relation when he used designate in relation with proper names than the one he 
meant when he used it in relation with common nouns. Then perhaps in the 
latter case he meant by it the predicative mode of denotation, namely 
application –where the denotata are unsaturated predicative functions of type 
<e,t>.   
                                                                                                                                                             
extrovert males are blond, if it is allowed that unmarried male designate the extrovert male 
kind, then by the same token it should be allowed to designate the blonde male kind. I think that 
the reason why a noun such as animal with black stripes can mistakenly be considered to be a 
non-rigid designator is that it can in fact be used as a non-rigid taxonomic applier, as in Every 
animal with black stripes is currently extinct. We will have occasion to consider many instances 
of such usage in the 6th chapter. When inadvertently such a taxonomic applier use is also 
imported to the case of unmarried male for which it is not in fact very usual, then it seems that 
unmarried male can be used as a non-rigid designator, whereas in fact it used as a taxonomic 
applier.  
28 Due to such considerations for example Salmon (1981) wrote “every general term that 
designates at all, whether descriptionally or nondescriptionally is a rigid designator” 
presumably including among general terms only adjectives and common nouns (p. 69-72). This 
has been the commonly held view in relation with the general term rigidity, up until again 
Salmon himself (2005) attempted to tweak the notion of general term so that it included such 




But things do not look brighter with regard to the theoretical significance 
of rigidity for common nouns, even if we drop the assumption that natural kind 
terms are designators, and instead take them to be appliers, as is more 
commonly done.  
If we generalize the property of rigidity to apply to any sort term with any 
sort of denotation, the natural way to go will be to say that the rigidity of a 
denoting term , be it a designator, applier or a quantifying phrase or what not, 
is ’s having the same denotation relative to any evaluation index (i.e. possible 
world). In the case of designators this amounts to having the same saturated 
denotation of type e; in the case of appliers to have the same unsaturated 
denotation of type <e,t>; in the case of quantifying phrases to have the same 
unsaturated denotation of type <<e,t>,t>. 
If common nouns are appliers then they will have unsaturated denotations 
of type <e,t>. In this case rigidity for common nouns for natural kinds will 
amount to their denoting the same function that maps individuals into truth 
values, relative to all evaluation indexes (i.e. to have a constant intension of type 
<s,<e,t>>). Then, however, it seems that if the common nouns for natural 
kinds discussed by Kripke are appliers, they are not rigid.29 Consider the case of 
tiger. Surely, There might have been a tiger different than every tiger has a true 
reading. Prima facie, there would not be such a reading if tiger’s denotations 
                                                        
29 Rigid application in question here is different from the property with the same name that 
has been defended by Devitt to constitute the analogue of what rigid designation is for proper 
names. Devitt’s rigid application is not just constancy of predicative denotation across 
evaluation index. We will discuss Devitt’s rigid-application below. There to distinguish it we will 




were the same relative to all evaluation indexes, and thus its denotation mapped 
exactly the same individuals to truth relative to every evaluation index.30 In this 
vein contrast that sentence with, There might have been a prime number 
different than every prime number. This latter sentence does not have a true 
reading because the common noun prime number’s denotation maps exactly the 
same individuals to truth relative to every evaluation index.  
So, if common nouns for natural kinds are appliers they appear to be non-
rigidly so. And apart from common nouns which truly apply to abstract entities, 
such as those for mathematical entities, there does not seem to be any common 
noun which will be rigid as an applier. And the rigidity of these appliers for 
mathematical entities will surely be due to the special nature of what they apply 
to rather than a semantic design feature fixed by natural language, and thus it 
will not be de jure. Then, rigidity again does not seem to correspond to a 
theoretically significant difference among common nouns, even when they are 
generally taken to be appliers.  
So the conclusion to draw seems to be that rigidity understood either as 
rigid application or rigid designation does not correspond to any linguistically 
significant difference among common nouns and that there will be no reason to 
                                                        
30 Actually a true reading can be ensured for this sentence, even if tiger is taken to be rigid as 
an applier. One way to this would be to adapt to English an analogue of Kripke’s semantics for 
first order modal languages. In Kripke’s semantics, quantifiers range over different domains 
relative to different worlds. This idea can be adapted to English, by adopting models of English 
that specify quantifying domains for every evaluation index and by relativizing the denotations 
of quantifier terms such as every, some to these domains (under the usual extensional 
treatment for them they are given denotations of type <<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>). For example, relative 
to an evaluation index s, some can be taken to denote the function λP.λQ.x(dsx & (Px & Qx)) 
where ds is a function that maps to truth every individual in Ds, the quantifiying domain of s. As 
Ds’s will be different for different s’s, the denotation of some will be different relative to different 




invoke the property of rigidity in relation with common nouns in semantic 
theory, or so it seems. 
In the chapters to come our principal task will be to study the semantics of 
common nouns and of the noun phrases formed by them in a more detailed way 
so as to find a way to counter this prima facie plausible conclusion to the effect 
that rigidity does not make any linguistically significant difference among 
common nouns. 
Here I finish my critical presentation of Kripke’s discussion in Naming  and 
Necessity where the view that some common nouns, namely those for natural 
kinds, are rigid designators had been introduced. I now turn to a critical 
presentation of the controversy that resulted in reaction to Kripke’s ascription 
of de jure rigidity to natural kind common nouns.  
The Controversy on the Rigidity of General Terms 
Kripke’s ascription of rigid designation to common nouns for natural kinds and 
to some related adjectives did not find an acceptance as widespread as his 
ascription of the same property to proper names. And there ensued a 
controversy which has come to be regarded as a controversy on the rigidity of 
general terms, as common nouns and adjectives are generally regarded as 
general terms. 
The views defended on this controversy pertained to the generalization of 
one of the critical points we’ve made above in relation with Kripke’s ascription 




either appliers or designators. If the former is the case, virtually none is a de 
jure rigid applier and if the latter is the case, then all are rigid designators. 
Either way rigid denotation, understood either as rigid application or rigid 
designation, cannot be a property that makes a difference among common 
nouns. 
The Two Pronged Argument against the Theoretical Significance of 
General Term Rigidity 
Above in the section on Kripke we gave an argument to the effect that rigidity 
either understood as rigid application or understood as rigid designation does 
not yield a significant division of common nouns. That same argument can be 
extended to the more general case of general terms.  
General terms, that is, adjectives, simple common nouns and modified 
common nouns are commonly taken as appliers –i.e. assigned unsaturated 
predicative denotations of type <e,t>. Or they are taken to be designators for 
kinds or properties and entities like that –i.e. they are assigned saturated 
denotations of type e. And there does not seem to be an alternative apart from 
these two choices.31  
If all general terms are taken to be designators for kinds/properties, then 
it seems that all general terms will consequently be rigid designators. For, when 
                                                        
31 One may think that they can alternatively be taken to be designators of sets of tokens. But 
when the overall shape of the semantic theory to result is considered this alternative is formally 
equivalent to take them to have predicative denotations of type <e,t>.  Under the former option 
predication relation will have to be understood as set memberhip, under the general semantic 




we talk about possible states of affairs the putative kinds/properties that 
correspond to our general terms do not seem to change.  
11 a Alice might have invited some bachelors to her party. 
b Alice has invited some bachelors to her party. 
  
12  Alice might have invited to her party some rich handsome helmsmen. 
  Alice has invited to her party some rich handsome helmsmen. 
  
13  Alice might have painted these walls red. 
  Alice has painted these walls red. 
  
14  Alice might have bought an unused copy of that book. 
  Alice have bought an unused copy of that book. 
If we take general terms to designate kinds/properties then it seems that the 
highlighted adjectives, common nouns and modified common nouns in each of 
the above given pairs of sentences will have to be taken to designate the same 
kind/property regardless whether they occur in a piece of talk about the actual 
states of affairs or they figure in a piece talk about possible states of affairs. If 
any of these highlighted general terms considered as kind/property designators 
were not rigid designators then the modal sentence in which it figures would 
have an ambiguity of the sort that is not seen in the non-modal counterpart. If 
for example bachelor were not a rigid designator for a certain kind it would be 
expected that 11a had two non-equivalent readings which could be paraphrased 
in the following ways: (i) Bachelors are such that it was possible that Alice 
invited some instances of them to her party and (ii) it was possible that Alice 
invited some instances of bachelors to her party. Here the former reading would 
correspond to the wide scope interpretation of the noun phrase formed by 
bachelor and would pertain to the kind designated by bachelor relative to the 




phrase’s narrow scope interpretation, and would pertain to the kinds 
designated by bachelor relative to possible states of affairs, which might be 
different than the kind designated by bachelor relative to the actual states of 
affairs. 
On the other hand if general terms were appliers, then none would be de 
jure rigid appliers –understood as having the same predicative denotation of 
type <e,t> relative to all evaluation indexes by virtue of the semantic design 
features of the natural language. Almost all common nouns satisfy the following 
schema: 
There might have been (an)  different than all (s) that there is (are) 
This will be possible only if these common nouns had the capacity to truly apply 
to things which they did not truly apply to relative to the actual states of affairs. 
The exceptions are mathematical common nouns such as number, triangle, even 
number. But their exceptionality is not a linguistic-semantic one. Their rigid 
application is arguably a result of the special metaphysics of the entities they 
apply to rather than their being common nouns of a special sort as a design 
feature of natural languages. 
Again apparently almost all adjectives will satisfy the following schema: 
There might have been (an)  stuff (thing) different than all  stuff (things) that there 
are. 
There might have been frozen stuff different than all frozen stuff that there are. 
There might have been a fresh thing different than all the fresh things that there are. 
This will be possible only if these adjectives had the capacity to truly apply to 
things which they did not truly apply to relative to the actual states of affairs. 




abstract entities such as even, prime etc. But such adjectives have the same 
denotations relative to all possible worlds not due to the semantic design 
features of the natural language, but arguably due to the special metaphysical 
natures of the entities to which they truly apply. 
Now, there seems to be no other possibility for general terms than to be all 
treated as appliers or to be all treated as designators. In the former case 
virtually no general terms will be rigid appliers –apart from some which apply 
to metaphysically special entitites. In the latter case, all general terms will be 
rigid designators. So, in either case there will be no linguistically significant 
division of general terms relative to having rigid denotation (where denotation 
is understood either as designation or application). Either virtually all will be 
non-rigidly denoting terms or else all will be rigidly denoting terms.  
From the property rigidity to be adopted in relation with general terms it 
is expected that it plays a theoretical role analogous to the one rigid designation 
plays in relation with singular terms.32 It is also believed that unless the 
property of rigidity marks a difference among general terms that theoretical 
role cannot be a significant one. The problem with general terms now appears 
to be that the most straightforward ways to define a rigidity property for 
general terms do not seem to give a significant division of general terms.  
                                                        
32 There are different views about that role. For example Devitt 2005 holds that that role is to 
counter certain descriptive analyzes of natural kind common nouns; Schwartz 1980 appears to 
expect that rigidity should explain the putative distinctness of natural kind nouns; LaPorte 
(2002) holds that the rigidity of general terms should explain the necessity of certain true 
identity sentences.  I too have one. I have already adumbrated my view in the introduction: 
ascriptions of de jure rigidity should play a role in the explanation of the truth conditions related 
properties of sentences such as ambiguity/non-ambiguity, contingency/non-contigency. I will 
contest other views in the second part of the present chapter when I discuss the representative 
papers; I will further motivate my view in the second chapter and illustrate it in relation with 




Different Responses to the Two Pronged Argument 
The two pronged argument against the theoretical significance of the property 
of rigid denotation in relation with general terms is what stirred the 
controversy on the rigidity of general terms. It has been repeated with slight 
modifications over and over in the opening pages of the most papers that 
contributed to that controversy. The parties that contributed to this controversy 
can be divided into three groups with regard to how they react to the two 
pronged argument.  
One group maintains that rigidity, either in the form of rigid designation or 
in the form of rigid application or in the form of rigid*-application (Devitt 
(2005)’s notion which will explored below), is not a property which has an 
important theoretical significance for general terms from a semantic point of 
view.33 
A second group maintains that general terms are designators for kinds 
(that is, that they have denotations of type e just like proper names), and that 
some general terms are rigid designators, whilst some are not.34 
And a third group maintains that general terms are not designators, but 
appliers (that is, semantic predicates with predicative denotations of type 
<e,t>). In that respect they contradict Kripke who took both names and natural 
kind common nouns to be designators. Yet they concur with Kripke that some 
                                                        
33 Representatives of which include Soames (2002), Schwartz (1980), (2002). 
34 Salmon (2005), Linsky (2006), Inan (2008); LaPorte (2000) is often read in this way 




special common nouns, including natural kind common nouns, are rigid*, albeit 
not rigid designators but rigid*-appliers –with a definition of rigid application 
different than the one described above.35 
Now I will briefly present the views of these different parties. I will point 
to the standard criticisms raised against them and some additional problematic 
aspects. A more thorough critical assessment of the principal representatives of 
these views will be given in an appendix. There I will give more substance to the 
criticisms which will often be merely described in the present section. 
Some General Terms Are Rigid Designators, Some Are Not 
One way to counter the two pronged argument has been to argue that if general 
terms are taken to be designators, there will be some general terms that are not 
rigid designators. Representatives of this approach hold that common nouns 
and adjectives designate kinds/properties. Moreover they admit that as such it 
is not just natural kind common nouns and related adjectives that are rigid 
designators, contrary to what Kripke’s discussion led people to believe; nominal 
kind common nouns such as bachelor and hunter and even modified common 
nouns such as wounded tiger, handsome hunter too will be rigid designators. 
However according to them there are more general terms than just adjectives 
and common nouns. They count such definite noun phrases as the color of the 
sky and the insect species typically farmed for honey too as general terms. Such 
                                                        




definite noun phrases are arguably not rigid designators. So, if they are general 
terms then not all general terms will be rigid designators and rigidity will be a 
property that makes a difference among general terms. 
The foremost representative of this approach is Salmon (2005), who at 
length argues that the definite noun phrase the color of the sky should be 
counted among general terms alongside adjectives and common nouns, because 
like the latter such definite phrases can form syntactic predicates in sentences 
such as The eyes of my beloved are the color of the sky.  
LaPorte (2000) too is commonly cited as a representative of this approach. 
In fact the definite phrase the insect species that is typically farmed for honey is 
one of his examples. However, LaPorte never claims that such definite phrases 
are general terms.36 He does not use the label general term even once in that 
paper. Instead he deploys his discussion using the label kind designator. 
According to his own formulation of his position not every kind designator is a 
rigid designator; common nouns of all sorts are all rigid kind designators, such 
definite phrases as the honeybee, the soda pop too are rigid kind designators 
but there are also such definite phrases as the insect species that is typically 
farmed for honey and the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties 
which are not rigid kind designators. Despite LaPorte’s avoidance of the label 
general term, he has commonly be taken to argue for a position similar to 
Salmon (2005). For this reason I too here include LaPorte (2000) among the 
                                                        
36 Note also that unlike the color of the sky, the insect species that is typically harmed for 




representatives of the position that some general terms are rigid designators 
and some are not rigid designators. 
One standard criticism raised against this approach is that as its own 
proponents admit the proposed property of rigidity for general terms does not 
distinguish natural kind nouns from other common nouns.37 Both such natural 
kind nouns as tiger, gold and such nominal kind nouns as bachelor, hunter, 
married woman are admitted to be rigid designators. This criticism moves from 
the premise that the rigidity property that is sought should distinguish natural 
kind nouns from other nouns. This expectation is generated from the fact that 
Kripke’s examples of common nouns which he claimed to be like proper names 
in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity were all natural kind nouns. I will 
return to this criticism in a special section of the appendix (1980). 
Another often repeated criticism against this approach questions whether 
the definite phrases singled out as examples of non-rigid general terms are 
indeed non-rigid. This criticism often addresses LaPorte’s examples the 
honeybee typically farmed for honey and the beverage my uncle requests at 
superbowl parties. But it can as well be applied to Salmon (2005)’s the color of 
the sky. Very briefly formulated this criticism runs as follows. It is claimed that if 
there is such a kind as beverage-my-uncle-requests-at-superbowl-parties 
(BMURASP) which is instantiated by a beverage token if and only if the uncle in 
question requests that token at superbowl parties then the definite phrase the 
beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties will rigidly designate that 
                                                        




kind. Then it is argued that someone who holds that the beverage my uncle 
requests at superbowl parties is non-rigid designator can only do so by 
presupposing that such a kind as BMURASP does not exist. But, it is claimed, this 
is a controversial metaphysical presupposition, and the rigid/non-rigid division 
among general terms that is upheld on the basis of it will then not have 
linguistic-semantic relevance.38 
Despite its being repeated in a number of different papers this criticism is 
clearly ineffective. In fact it was LaPorte who first formulated this as a possible 
criticism against his own position. LaPorte rightly pointed out that even if there 
were such a kind as BMURASP obviously we often do not use the phrase the 
beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties to designate BMURASP. This 
can clearly be seen by considering the following sentences: 
15 The beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties is coffee. 
The beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties changes every two or three 
years. 
In fact it is dubious that the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties is 
ever used to designate such a kind as BMURASP, because neither we nor the 
proponents of this criticism against LaPorte (2000) could use the beverage my 
uncle requests at superbowl parties to designate that kind in order to formulate 
the criticism in question. Rather, as rightly indicated by Inan (2008) we had to 
use hyphenation as in the-beverage-my-uncle-requests-at-superbowl-parties or 
we had to use the specially concocted abbreviation BMURASP to designate that 
kind. 
                                                        




Another criticism against this approach questions the attribution of 
general term status to such definite noun phrases as the color of the sky.39 This 
criticism mainly addresses Salmon (2005), who explicitly defends the view that 
the color of the sky is a general term. LaPorte (2000) does not characterize his 
non-rigid specimens, the insect species that is typically farmed for honey and 
the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties as general terms; but 
nonetheless he has often been read as if he does. So, provided that we too read 
him that way this criticism can be extended to LaPorte’s examples as well. 
Singular terms are terms that can form syntactic arguments of verb 
phrases and that purport to designate one single entity. A clearcut definition of 
what a general term is has never been around. But it seems that it has always 
been required of a general term that they be able to combine with the is of 
predication to form predicates. Common nouns and adjectives clearly satisfy 
this requirement, and they have commonly be taken to be general terms.  
It is unlikely that besides this requirement a further semantic requirement 
that demanded of general terms to be designators of kinds/properties or that 
they be appliers was ever in effect. For, such common nouns as tiger or 
adjectives as hot have been taken to be general terms both by those who took 
them to be designators and by those who took them to be appliers. 
To my knowledge prior to Salmon (2005) no one has considered explicitly 
and unequivocally such definite phrases as the color of the sky as general 
                                                        
39 For instance by May (2003) responding to an earlier version of Salmon (2005) presented at 




terms.40 For, it appears to be a singular term as it can clearly figure in syntactic 
argument positions and it apparently purports to designate one single entity. In 
fact, as a definite phrase its syntactic and semantic constitution can be analyzed 
in the same ways as such a definite phrase as the violin of Alice. The only 
difference between them is that the former purports to designate a universal 
whilst the latter a particular. 
Salmon (2005) defends the view that the color of the sky is a general term 
by making the satisfaction of the mentioned requirement a sufficient condition 
for being a general term. According to him, if a term can combine with the 
predicative is to form the predicate of a sentence it should count as general 
term. Thus, the color of the sky too should count as a general term no less than 
the noun blue because we have such sentences as the following: 
16 a The eyes of my beloved are blue. 
b The eyes of my beloved are the color of the sky. 
Salmon takes general terms to be designators of kinds/properties, and treats 
the predicative is as an operator that forms appliers out of designators of 
kinds/properties41: 
17 [is]([blue])=λx.{x is an instance of [blue]} 
                                                        
40 Linsky (2006), whom Salmon (2005) cites, is not unequivocal in this regard. He rather 
seems to equate with general terms the syntactic predicates themselves (is blue, is the color of 
the sky), thus including the predicative is into the general term. 
41 We read in p.232, note 22 the following: “I prefer to regard the predicate ‘is the color of the 
sky’ as designating its extension (non-rigidly, of course) while expressing the property of having 
the same color as the sky, as the predicate’s semantic content. On this view the 
copula/operators formalized above may be taken as designating (with respect to a possible 
world and time) the function that assigns to any universal its metaphysical extension (in that 
world at that time) – making each copula/operator roughly analogous to the functor ‘the 




 [is]([the color of the sky])=λx.{x is an instance of [the color of the sky]}42 
Taking capacity to form predicates by combining with the predicative is as a 
sufficient condition for being a general term and interpreting the predicative is 
as an operator forming appliers out of designators of kinds/properties appear 
to lead to undesirable consequences when a greater range of examples are 
considered. Consider the following sentences: 
18 a Alice is plump, strong and the mother of Bob’s children. 
b  Alice is the mother of Bob’s children. 
c  To satisfy Bob, Alice has been every kind of woman. 
d Alice is some kind of lunatic who lets her children to drive the truck 
unattended.43 
Presumably the is in 18a is the predicative is rather than the is of identity. It can 
combine with the conjunctive phrase plump, strong and the mother of Bob’s 
children. This indicates that in 18b too the is can be interpreted as the 
predicative is.44 But first, this contradicts Salmon’s analysis of the predicative is. 
Second, notwithstanding that analysis, are we to count the mother of Bob’s 
                                                        
42 Salmon’s formalism is a bit different than mine, but not in essentials. Here I use […] to 
represent the interpretation function that maps a term α to its denotation. 
43 The examples here may appear strained, but they are not my inventions. Graff (2002) uses  
He is tall, handsome and the love of my life, and Zamparelli (2000) discusses such an example as 
John has been every kind of doctor. However, it may quite reasonably be objected that such 
sentences are special, grammatically strained for some literary effect, and that therefore one 
cannot base generalizations over them. Yet Salmon's example the eyes of my beloved are the 
color of the sky sounds no less strained and no more generalizable than my examples. I brought 
forward these examples to problematize Salmon’s view that combining with the predicative is is 
a defining criterion for being a general term. Salmon's case for the existence of general terms 
that are non-rigid crucially depends on the availability of such examples as the eyes of my love 
are the color of the sky. If these are not taken into consideration he cannot claim that such terms 
as the color of the sky are general terms. In this case, neither would there be any need to refute 
his characterization of general terms by using such examples as in question here. 
44 Graff (2001) cites this among evidence that definite descriptions are in fact appliers (have 




children as a general term? And there is nothing special about 18a and the 
phrase the mother of Bob’s children. Many definite descriptions that designate 
particulars can be used to form such sentences as 18a. Are we to count them as 
general terms too?  
The occurrences of is in 18c and 18d too are presumably of the predicative 
variant. But they combine with the quantified noun phrases every kind of 
woman and some kind of lunatic. Again, Salmon’s analysis of the predicative is is 
contradicted. These quantified noun phrases are not designators –they don’t 
have denotations of type e. And again are we to count these quantified phrases 
as general terms too because they can combine with the predicative is to form 
the predicates of 18c and 18d. 
So it seems that Salmon’s defense of the view that the color of the sky 
should be counted as a general term rather leads to the dissolution of the 
category of general terms. Salmon (2005) did not take into account such 
examples as the ones given in 18 (except the possibility of interpreting 18b as a 
predication which he tentatively addresses in a footnote). And it is not clear 
how he would deal with them to give us a stable category of general terms that 
includes the color of the sky but excludes such phrases as the mother of Bob’s 
children, every kind of woman etc. A more detailed discussion of Salmon (2005) 
in regard to this question is given in the appendix.  
An alternative way to define a stable category of general terms to include 
such definite phrases as the color of the sky seems rather unlikely. And 
remember that as we indicated above it is also unlikely that the category of 




kinds/properties. Authors who are of a different persuasion regarding the 
denotation type of common nouns and adjectives often label these as general 
terms. 
Assuming that we still want to use the label general term, it seems that it is 
best to keep things the way they have implicitly been before the category of 
general terms came into scrutiny in relation with the controversy on the rigidity 
of general terms. Namely, to identify the category of general terms with the 
unison of the categories of common nouns and adjectives. I think that an even 
better option would be to completely discard the dichotomy singular 
term/general term. For such examples as 16 and 18 indicate that there are 
oddballs that satisfy both the properties traditionally associated with singular 
terms and also those associated with general terms. If in place of the categories 
singular term and general term, we simply use the categories of common noun, 
adjective and noun phrase to mark syntactic distinctions and the categories, 
designator, applier and quantifier to mark semantic distinctions, nothing will be 
amiss.45  
Under both of these proposed options however the two pronged argument 
formulated above will apparently hold its sway. Salmon (2005) and LaPorte 
(2000) could counter that argument only by attributing general-termhood to 
certain definite phrases which hitherto were never considered as general terms. 
For, they themselves have granted that all adjectives and common nouns are 
rigid designators. Now, if these definite phrases are not general terms, and only 
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adjectives and common nouns are, then the conclusion that rigidity, understood 
as rigid designation, does not make a difference among general terms will still 
hold.  
Discarding the category of general terms altogether is also not an 
appropriate response to the two pronged argument. The interest generated by 
the two-pronged argument in the philosophy of language lies in that its original 
intent was to question Kripke’s attribution of rigidity to some common nouns 
and adjectives. That argument came to be formulated using the label general 
term because common nouns and adjectives have always been regarded as 
general terms. But the real target has been the claim that a certain property of 
rigidity is corresponds to a semantic difference among common nouns and 
among adjectives. And discarding the category of general terms will clearly not 
vindicate this claim against the two-pronged argument when it is formulated in 
a way that makes its real intent explicit. 
I now leave the standard criticisms raised against the approach 
represented by Salmon (2005) and attributed to LaPorte (2000) to pass to two 
critical points which have been rarely raised but which I deem more important 
than the standard ones. And one of them pertains to the topic of the real intent 
of the two pronged argument we just have introduced. 
Salmon (2005) and LaPorte (2000) counter the two-pronged argument 
against general term rigidity by including among general terms some kind 
designating definite phrases. But no one writing on the extension of the notion 
of rigidity to the case of general terms had hitherto ever considered such 




had considered as general terms only adjectives and common nouns and had 
concluded that they will all be rigid if they are taken to designate kinds.46 
Moreover Kripke’s discussion in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity , 
which stands at the origin of the controversy on the rigidity of general terms 
and which is the main target of the two-pronged argument stated above, 
appeared to be primarily concerned with common nouns, and to a lesser extent 
with adjectives. So, it seems to me that the primary question that stirred the 
controversy on the rigidity of general terms appears to be whether there is a 
property of rigidity that will make a difference among common nouns and 
among adjectives, as Kripke appeared to affirm. If this is true, then even if we 
grant that Salmon’s and LaPorte’s putative examples of non-rigid general terms 
are indeed general terms, the principal question that stirred the controversy on 
the rigidity of general terms will remain unaddressed.   
My second critical point is about the way Salmon (2005) and LaPorte 
(2000) have argued for their semantic claims. Above one of the criticisms I 
raised in relation with Kripke’s discussion on the rigidity of general terms in 
Naming and Necessity  was that he did not give proper justifications neither for 
the claim that common nouns are designators nor for the claim that natural kind 
common nouns among them are rigid designators. The same criticisms apply to 
Salmon (2005) and LaPorte (2000) as well. Salmon (2005) and LaPorte (2000) 
assume that all common nouns and adjectives are rigid designators, and 
                                                        
46 Salmon (1981) wrote “every general term that designates at all, whether descriptionally or 




contrast them with kind designating definite phrases which they deem to be 
non-rigid general terms but they do not properly justify their assumption.  
Why should we believe that all common nouns are designators? Above we 
have already indicated in the section on Kripke’s Naming and Necessity that 
there are plausible reasons to treat common nouns as appliers.  Their syntactic 
distribution is very different than that of kind designating noun phrases such as 
the tiger, Panthera tigris, this civic status. The latter can be syntactic arguments 
of verbs whilst the former cannot; and the former can combine with adjectives 
and quantificational determiners, and form syntactic predicates while the latter 
usually cannot. If such noun phrases as the tiger, Panthera tigris, this civic status 
have the same designation as tiger and bachelor respectively why can’t the 
former be replaced in by the latter, or vice versa? The syntactic distribution of 
adjectives too is different than the related nouns that designate properties 
(compare for example alert and alertness). Like common nouns, adjectives can 
form syntactic predicates, but nouns such as wisdom, heat, freshness cannot. 
Moreover adjectives can combine with common nouns but such nouns as 
wisdom, heat, freshness cannot. Again if they designate the same entities why 
are not they interchangeable? Adjectives and common nouns are standardly 
treated as appliers (assigned predicative denotations of type <e,t>) to partially 
account for the described difference in their syntactic distribution from kind or 
property designating noun phrases. Given that treating adjectives and common 




have given some reasons in favor of treating them as designators. 47 Are there 
such reasons? In later chapters when we explore the literature on the semantics 
of common nouns and the noun phrases formed by them we will see that there 
indeed are some plausible reasons to treat some common nouns at least as 
designators, notwithstanding the difference in their syntactic distribution from 
kind designating noun phrases. 
Furthermore even if we accept that common nouns and adjectives are all 
designators why should we believe that they will be rigid designators? This is a 
presupposition of the two-pronged argument as well. Almost every contributor 
to the controversy of the rigidity of general term cites the two-pronged 
argument but no one ever hints at why if a common noun is a designator it will 
have to be a rigid designator. 48 The reason for this omission may be the 
intuitive obviousness. But notwithstanding its obviousness an attempt to 
explicitly and rigorously justify this claim will be beneficial to understand the 
theoretical role rigidity possibly plays in the semantics of common nouns, 
                                                        
47 Salmon does not give  reasons to hold that in general adjectives should be held to be 
designators. But specially in relation with the adjective blue, he argues that the most 
straightforward way to account for the entailment {the eyes of my beloved are the color of the 
sky, the color of the sky is blue}⊨the eyes of my beloved are blue is to take all occurences of blue 
in these sentence to be designators. I counter this argument in the appendix’ special section on 
Salmon (2005).  
48 LaPorte (2000) contrasts the non-contingecy of such identity sentences as The honeybee is 
Apis mellifera with the contingency of such sentences as the insect species that is typically 
farmed for honey is Apis mellifera.  He suggests that this difference can be explained by the 
rigidity of the noun phrases the honeybee and Apis mellifera, and the non-rigidity of the insect 
species that is typically farmed for honey. But the rigidity of the honeybee does not by itself 
entail the rigidity of the common noun honeybee neither does the non-rigidity of the insect 
species that is typically farmed for honey entail the non-rigidity of the modified common noun 
insect species that is typically farmed for honey. The entailment depends on how kind 
designating noun phrases have to be analyzed, on whether there is one type of such definite 





however insignificant that role may be. That such an understanding is still 
wanting may be discerned from the fact that many recent papers on the rigidity 
of general terms disagree about the theoretical role the property of rigidity is to 
play in relation with general terms and in relation with common nouns in 
particular. Some expect that it should distinguish natural kind common nouns 
from others (Schwartz, 1980, 2002), some claim that its role is to refute the 
theories according to which natural kind common nouns are synonymous with 
descriptions (Devitt, 2005). As will be further explicated below I believe that the 
primary theoretical role ascriptions of de jure rigidity can play in relation with 
any class of expressions is to explain the way we tend to evaluate the sentences 
we produce. And that this is so can be seen as soon as one makes an effort to 
answer questions of the form why should we believe that such and such 
expressions are de jure rigid? 
To recapitulate, Salmon’s and LaPorte’s papers move from the premises 
that common nouns and adjectives are either all appliers or all designators, and 
that if adjectives and common nouns are designators then adjectives and 
common nouns will be rigid designators.  They seek to show that even if all 
adjectives and common nouns are rigid designators, it is not the case that all 
general terms are rigid designators. To make their point they extend the 
category of general terms in an arguably untenable way by including kind 
designating definite phrases among general terms. Thereby they do not say 
anything interesting about the issue that originally generated the controversy 
about the rigidity of general terms –viz. whether there is a rigid/non-rigid 




properly justify the premises which they draw on. I believe scrutinizing these 
premises should have been the starting point in responding to the two pronged 
argument. 
Some General Terms Are Rigid*-appliers, Some Are Not  
Some other authors have sought to counter the other horn of the two-pronged 
argument: if general terms are appliers then virtually all will be non-rigid. This 
is done by adopting a slightly different definition of rigid application than the 
one presupposed in the two-pronged argument.  
Above we have proposed to define rigidity in such a way that it can pertain 
to all types of denotation. To this end we have characterized rigid denotation as 
constancy of denotation relative to all evaluation indexes. Given this 
characterization rigid application amounts to having the same unsaturated 
predicative denotation of type <e,t> relative to all evaluation indexes. Then 
however only nouns and adjectives that exclusively apply to necessary existents 
such as mathematical entities can be rigid appliers.  
Cook (1980) and Devitt (2005) propose the following definition for rigid-
application, which from now on I will term as rigid*-application: 
A general term  is a rigid*-applier iff it is such that if it applies to an object in any 
possible world, then it applies to that object in every possible world in which the object 
exists.  
Are there rigid*-appliers? Presumably yes. Nouns for living species, nouns for 
kinds of stuff, nouns for astronomical objects, in short most natural kind nouns 




sentence a tiger might not have been a tiger is necessarily false. This is possible 
only if tiger considered as an applier is a rigid*-applier. But not all common 
nouns are rigid*-appliers. It is not the case that a bachelor might not have been 
a bachelor is necessarily false, so bachelor is not a rigid*-applier. What about 
artifact nouns such as TV set? It depends on how you evaluate such sentences as 
a TV set might not have been a TV set. Devitt thinks that contrary to 
appearances these sentences are not necessarily false and that in general 
artifact nouns should be non-rigid*.  
So, it seems that rigid*-application finely divides common nouns into 
rigid* and non-rigid* classes. Moreover, it seems to do this along the lines 
Kripke adumbrated that it should happen: natural kind nouns are rigid*-
appliers but nominal kind nouns are arguably not.  
There are a number of criticisims standardly raised against the 
consideration of rigid*-application as the property of rigidity for general terms 
which is the analogue of what rigid designation is relative to singular terms. 
One of them is that application cannot distinguish natural kind nouns from 
other common nouns.  In this vein Devitt’s claim that artifact nouns such as TV 
set are not rigid*-appliers is questioned. Also, it is indicated that there are such 
natural kind common nouns as frog and butterfly which truly apply only to the 
mature tokens of certain species. A frog might not have been a frog is not 
necessarily false because a token which actually is a frog might not have 
reached that mature stage. This criticism, as previously indicated in relation 




should distinguish natural kind nouns from other nouns. I will critically 
consider this premise later below when I discuss Schwartz (1980). 
Another criticism due to LaPorte (1997) questions the view that nouns for 
living species are rigid*-appliers. According to the modern taxonomic views 
whether a token belongs to a certain species depends on the contingent matter 
of fact whether in the ancestral lineage under consideration there had been an 
off-shoot that became a new species. According to this view, had there been an 
offshoot that formed a new species in the lineage that actually forms the species 
Panthera Tigris, then Panthera tigris would have been considered as 
extinguished and the tokens which actually belong to Panthera tigris would 
have been considered to belong to another species.  So, if we accept this 
taxonomic approach and if tiger is by definition the common noun that truly 
applies to tokens of Panthera Tigris, then tiger will not be a rigid*-applier. 
Devitt’s response to this criticism is to simply deny the accuracy of these 
modern taxonomic approaches.   
A further criticism raised against the rigid*-application view is that 
adjectives such as hot, yellow and measurement unit nouns such as meter, 
kilogram are not rigid*-appliers.49  This criticism presupposes that these should 
have turned out to be rigid general terms. And the reason for this is simply the 
fact that in Naming and Necessity Kripke held them to be rigid along the natural 
kind common nouns. But it may well be the case that Kripke was wrong.  
                                                        




Note that the three criticisms so far considered question only the 
extension of the property of rigid*-application. Some expressions which were 
expected to turn out as rigid general terms because in Naming and Necessity 
Kripke explicitly or implicitly held them to be rigid, do not appear to be rigid*-
appliers. But notwithstanding the accuracy of the points made by these 
criticisms, it may still be the case that rigid*-application is a property that is 
responsible for a linguistic-semantically important division of common nouns, 
albeit one that does not divide common nouns along the lines that were 
adumbrated by Kripke. The next criticism is different in this respect. 
Devitt (2005) acknowledges that claiming that a noun is a rigid*-applier 
entails ‘a fairly robust metaphysical thesis’ about the particulars that noun 
applies to (146).50 If tiger is a rigid*-applier, it follows that tiger tokens are 
necessarily tiger tokens. If gold is a rigid*-applier it follows that tokens of gold 
are necessarily so. These may be plausible metaphysical theses. But it is claimed 
that a semantic property should not have metaphysical corollaries,51 and rigid*-
application is criticized because it has.52 
I do not see why a semantic property should not have metaphysical 
consequences. From the truth of Alice is a chimera , it follows that there is a 
                                                        
50 The claim that tiger is a rigid applier has robust metaphysical consequences provided that it 
has a non-vacuous denotation and that denotation is determined by a kind. In principle it is 
possible that a certain term is a rigid*-applier by stipulation or linguistic design but fails to have 
a denotation. Just as such a name as Herlock Sholmes, as a proper name, should be a rigid 
designator but fails to pick a designatum. 
51 Salmon (1981). 




chimera. To take common nouns to be kind designators entail that there are 
kinds. The claim that the even prime is a rigid-designator is a true semantic 
claim and entails that some entity is necessarily even and prime.  
But this criticism is clearly up to something. The cases in which a 
metaphysical corollary is entailed by the instantiation of a semantic property 
are not all the same. Because semantic properties can be instantiated in 
different ways.  In some cases the instantiation of a semantic property is 
dependent on non-linguistic matters of fact. The truth of Alice is a chimera is 
one such property. It is the same with the rigidity of the even prime. In some 
other cases semantic properties are instantiated because that they be 
instantiated is a design feature of natural languages or solely follows from such 
design features. The ambiguity of Everyone knows someone is one such 
example. Another such example is thought to be the rigidity of proper names. In 
the former type of cases the semantic properties are said to be instantiated de 
facto. In the latter types of cases they are said to be instantiated de jure.53  
Now the last criticism against rigid*-application can be understood as 
making the following plausible point. It is unlikely that rigid*-application is both 
                                                        
53 The distinction drawn here between dependence on linguistic design and dependence on 
matter of fact is unmistakably reminiscent of the problematic analytic/synthetic distinction. And 
it may be as hard to give a stable characterization. Yet, I think semantic properties following 
from linguistic design may be characterized as those features which in semantic theorizing we 
would like to specify as the semantic fixtures of the language under examination (for the 
empirical constraints on the determination of these fixtures see the discussion of the third 
chapter below). Among these can be counted the semantic functions of basic lexical elements 
(e.g. that common nouns are appliers), the semantic function common to the members of a 
certain category of grammatical constituents (e.g.  that indefinite noun phrases are quantifiers). 
These fixtures are theoretical and therefore subject to revision. Yet, I think that proper names' 
being rigid designators is one such strongly attested linguistic fixture. Note that the features in 
question here are very general and fundamental. In this respect they are unlike the special 
semantic features pertaining to bachelor which one would like to cite to account for the 




a property that is instantiated de jure by certain nouns and that it has a 
metaphysical consequence that amounts to essentialism.54 For then, 
essentialism with respect to certain classes of things will directly be a corollary 
of the design features of language. For example, if tiger is de jure rigid*-applier 
then it will follow that tiger tokens cannot fail to be tiger tokens. Anyone who 
contests this about tigers –e.g. Hindus or people who adopt the recent 
taxonomic views and think that tiger applies to instances of Panthera tigris- will 
be committing a linguistic-semantic blunder.  
It seems that Devitt himself does not think that the familiar examples of 
rigid*-appliers are so de jure. Devitt (2005) describes the introduction of a 
natural kind noun in the following way (the emphasis is mine): 
A kind term covered by the causal theory applies to all objects that are of 
the same kind as the actual sample in which the term was grounded 
(allowing perhaps for a few “errors” in the sample). So, wherever being a 
member of that kind is essential to any member, the term will be a rigid 
applier. So the rigid application of a natural kind term like ‘gold’ is 
explained partly by the semantic fact that it is covered by a causal theory 
and partly by the metaphysical fact that each piece of gold is essentially 
gold.  
This passage from Devitt indicates that a natural kind noun is not stipulated to 
be rigid* at its introduction. Rigidity* is a parameter that is fixed ‘partly by the 
metaphysical fact that’ the target kind is one that is instantiated essentially. In 
this respect then according to Devitt kind nouns’ being rigid*-appliers is like the 
                                                        
54 Inan (2008) makes these same points but without making explicit that the metaphysical 
corollaries constitute a problem for ascriptions of de jure rigid*-application, rather than 
ascriptions of de facto rigidity. Anyway ascriptions of de facto rigidity are clearly not as 




the even prime’s being a rigid designator, it depends on matters of fact that is 
not fixed by the language’s design.  
But then the linguistic-semantic interest of rigid*-application reduces 
greatly. Rigid designation was of a great interest in relation with singular terms 
because some of them, namely proper names arguably instantiated them de jure 
–i.e. as a semantic design feature of natural languages. As such proper names’ 
being rigid designators could be used to give linguistic-semantic explanations of 
certain general patterns of semantic phenomena such as the non-contingency of 
identity sentences with proper name arguments, proper names’ not causing 
sentential ambiguity in modal sentences etc. And I will contend that such 
explanations constitute the primary justification for attributing de jure rigid 
designation to proper names, which then is a linguistic justification. Now, if 
rigid*-application is not instantiated de jure then it cannot be used to give 
linguistic-semantic explanations of semantic phenomena. Nor, in the absence of 
such linguistic explanatory work, can its attribution to certain common nouns 
be given a linguistic justification. The justification of its attribution to any 
common noun with a decent amount of informative content will inevitably get 
entangled in metaphysical matters –only such common nouns with little 
informative content as thing, object, kind etc. may be exceptions. 
So, to recapitulate, if rigid*-application is in some cases instantiated de 
jure, pace Devitt who does not seem to think so, then we will have to 
acknowledge that essentialism with respect to certain classes of things is forced 
upon us by the design of our language. On the other hand if cases of rigid*-




property from a linguistic point of view. In either case rigid*-application 
appears to be a problematic candidate for being the analogue of what rigid-
designation is for singular terms. 
My final critical points will not concern the rigid*-application proposal 
itself but rather how it is defended by its proponents. First, Devitt, Cook and 
others who defend the rigid*-application approach to general term rigidity 
assume that all common nouns are primarily appliers –i.e. that they all have 
unsaturated predicative denotations of type <e,t>. Above I had criticized those 
who defend the rigid designation approach to general term rigidity because 
without any argument they assume that common nouns were all designators. I 
had noted that this assumption is very much in need of defense as the standard 
approach to the semantics of common nouns is to take them to be appliers. So, 
the proponents of rigid*-application are in this respect in line with the standard 
approach regarding common nouns. However, besides the reasons that support 
the standard applier treatment of common nouns there also are some 
phenomena that support the view that some common nouns at least should be 
treated as designators. Some common nouns can be used to form noun phrases 
which are most easily interpreted as kind designators: 
Dodos are extinct. 
The dodo is extinct. 
The dodo is a flightless bird. 
Birds have evolved from reptiles. 
The bird has evolved from reptiles. 
Transistors have been invented in the 20th century. 




Most interestingly such common nouns can support apparently kind 
designating pronouns even when they do not themselves form kind designating 
noun phrases: 
Alice shot a tiger although she knew that they were about to get extinct.55 
The proponents of rigid*-application do not take into consideration these 
phenomena and tell nothing about how they can be accommodated if one treats 
common nouns as appliers.  
Second, as we noted above, the proponents of rigid*-application does not 
seem to care whether their examples of rigid* common nouns are de jure or de 
facto. From a linguistic semantic point of view only de jure rigid*-appliers are of 
interest. If one is to claim some common nouns are de jure rigid*-appliers one 
has to find examples of semantic phenomenon, give plausible semantic analyses 
of them and argue that under these semantic analyses the phenomena can be 
explained if it is assumed that the common nouns involved are rigid* as a 
semantic design feature fixed by the language. Are there such phenomena? For 
example, one may think that for certain common nouns  the following schema 
yields necessarily false sentences has such a potential: 
an  might not have been an . 
The proponents of rigid*-application either do not provide such arguments 
(Cook), or are aware of this way of arguing, even illustrate it, but ascribe 
secondary importance to it (Devitt).  Very interestingly Devitt (2005) illustrates 
                                                        




how rigidity* attributions can explain certain observed semantic phenomena. As 
I will argue later in the special section on Devitt (2005) of the appendix these 
explanations are defective. But regardless the success or the failure of these 
explanations the point I want to highlight is that Devitt thinks that such 
explanations do not constitute the justification for the rigidity* attributions. 
Devitt regards such explanations as secondary theoretical work. He holds that 
the primary theoretical work for rigidity* ascriptions is that they reject what he 
calls, certain ‘descriptive accounts of natural kind terms’. According such 
accounts for example the noun tiger is synonymous with the modified noun 
large carnivorous quadrupedal felines that are tawny yellow in color with 
blackish transverse stripes and white belly. Indeed if tiger is rigid* then this 
account must be false. But note that this is the case if that noun is indeed rigid*. 
Obviously, the fact that one semantic view contradicts another can hardly be a 
justification for either view. Thus, the theoretical role that warrants ascriptions 
of rigidity* cannot be the role identified by Devitt. 
My Expected Contribution 
The literature on the controversy on general term rigidity gives the impression 
that most of the contributions on the controversy about general term rigidity 
focuses on the problem of formulating a property of rigidity for general terms 
that will prima facie give a division of general terms into rigid/non-rigid groups. 
Some do it by implausibly extending the category of general terms to include 




modifications in the definition of rigidity normally understood as constancy of 
denotation, and disregarding the very important de jure/de facto distinction 
(Devitt, 2005). 
But they do not give much effort to justify their semantic claims. Is it 
justified to take some/all common nouns to be designators/appliers? Is it 
justified to take some to be rigid designators/rigid*-appliers? Why should we 
believe that tiger for example is a rigid designator/rigid*-applier, even if we 
accept that it is a designator/applier?  
The contributors can be condoned because the two pronged argument 
stated above has a certain urgency. First we have to find a property of rigidity 
which prima facie makes a difference among general terms, we can then strive 
to give more rigorous justifications for its ascription to certain general terms, 
they seem to think.  
As I have indicated in the introduction I plan to go the other way round: I 
will limit my attention solely to the case of common nouns with the aim of 
investigating whether proper linguistic-semantic justifications can be provided 
for ascriptions of de jure rigid designation to certain common nouns but not 
all.56  I will first briefly discuss how in my view ascriptions of de jure semantic 
properties should be justified, and illustrate my view by mounting such a 
justification for the commonly held view that proper names are de jure rigid 
designators. This will happen in the next two chapters, the third and the fourth. 
                                                        
56 I will disregard rigid*-application because although it indeed gives a division of common 
nouns, that division is not of interest from a linguistic point of view, for the reasons that are 




In the third chapter I will describe truth-conditional semantics deployed with 
the help of possible worlds and the way semantic claims are justified in such 
theories. In the fourth chapter I will illustrate these justification methods in the 
case of the claim that proper names are rigidi designators. Then I will return to 
common nouns and consider their semantics in relation with the issue whether 
they should be appliers or designators. To this end, in the fifth and the sixth 
chapters I will examine the semantics of common nouns from a broader 
perspective by following the linguistic-semantic literature on the semantics of 
common nouns and the noun phrases formed by them. And then, drawing on the 
results of the examination of the semantics of common nouns, in the seventh 
chapter I will consider whether it is possible to mount proper linguistic-
semantic arguments that justify the ascription of de jure rigid designation to 






Above I have criticized the extant literature pertaining to the issue of common 
noun rigidity due their omission of giving proper linguistic-semantic 
justifications for their ascriptions of rigidity to one or another family of terms. 
In this chapter I will discuss the criteria of adequacy on the basis of which we 
should judge claims pertaining to the issue whether there is a linguistic-
semantically significant rigid/non-rigid division among common nouns. In a 
nutshell the criteria of adequacy in question are simply the basic criteria of the 
discipline to which such claims belong, namely intensional natural language 
semantics. Accordingly, I will here discuss the basics of the objectives, the 
criteria of adequacy, and the methods of intensional semantics.  
Truth-conditional semantic theories and claims can be deployed in a 
number of different frameworks. Most common among them are the intensional 
frameworks deriving from the works of Richard Montague and David Lewis. In 
these frameworks meanings are modelled by functions or partial functions 
ranging over indices that involve possible worlds. And in the present work I too 
will adopt one such framework, a slightly modified implementation of the 
frameworks described in Heim and Kratzer (1998) and Heim and Fintel (2011). 
My second task will then be to describe that framework. In the meantime I will 
fix the formal notation I will use throughout the rest of the present work. 
Third, I will describe how denotation is to be understood in the particular 




definitions of denotation and rigid denotation. I will describe how the three 
types of denotation that will be most relevant in the present work are 
distinguished: designation, application and quantifying over.  
Intensional Truth-conditional Semantics and the Criteria of Adequacy 
in Semantics 
The claim that proper names are de jure rigid designators but definite 
descriptions are not is hardly a pre-theoretical claim that can be understood by 
laypeople. The same is the case for the claim some but not all common nouns 
denote rigidly (under a suitable formulation of denotation for common nouns). 
To a certain extent the notion of rigidity roughly understood as the denotation 
of the same entity (entities) relative to all possible worlds can be explicated in 
terms of whether a term pertains to the same thing when it is used in a 
statement about the actual states of affairs as when it is used in a statement 
about possible states of affairs. Still, the notion of denotation relative to a 
possible world is rather most relatable to a certain research tradition in natural 
language semantics which accepts an ontology of possible worlds and uses that 
ontology to study a certain dimension of linguistic meaning: namely the 
tradition of intensional truth-conditional semantics initiated by Montague and 
Lewis.  
Kripke too appears to acknowledge the appositeness of deploying the 
notion of rigidity in the context of intensional semantics, although he himself 
did not do so. In the later written preface to Naming and Neccessity he puts the 




Some of the worst misrepresentations of rigidity would have had much 
less currency if the relevant philosophical discussions had been conducted 
in the context of a rigorous presentation in terms of ‘possible worlds 
semantics’. I did not do this in the present monograph both because I did 
not want to rest the argument heavily on a formal model and because I 
wished the presentation to be philosophical rather than technical. To 
readers who are thoroughly familiar with intensional semantics the rough 
outline of a presentation of my views in these terms should be clear 
enough without an explicit development… (Kripke 1981, pg15, n16) 
I think that the claims pertaining to the rigidity of proper names or of some 
common nouns should be justified or scrutinized by using ways of 
argumentation available in that tradition and according to the criteria in effect 
in that tradition.  
The discipline of truth-conditional semantics studies linguistic meaning in 
natural languages in so far as it determines the truth-conditions of natural 
language sentences relative to contexts of utterance. There certainly are many 
dimensions of linguistic meaning other than that. But the discipline singles out 
that function as its subject matter and abstracts away as far as possible from the 
other functions. So, within the purview of truth-conditional semantics the 
meaning of a sentence is what determines truth-conditions relative to contexts 
of utterance; and the meaning of its sub-sentential elements is their 
contribution to the determination of these truth-conditions. This function of 
meaning is singled out as an object of study because it pertains to an important 
boon of the use of language, if not the most important: communication of 
information. 
Usually a sentential utterance in a given context does not have a unique 





The liquid in this glass is not water 
The condition that actually makes this utterance true or false is unique. But 
clearly this utterance fails to convey information that uniquely determines that 
condition. For example, suppose that this utterance is true because the liquid in 
the glass happens to be alcohol. Yet, we cannot say the utterance conveys the 
information that that specific condition obtains. Rather the utterance 
determines a number of conditions. One among these is the condition that the 
liquid in the glass is alcohol, another is the condition the liquid in question is 
Sprite, a further one is that it is coffee etc. Through his assertion the speaker 
conveys to its audience only the message that at least one member of a specific 
set of possible conditions actually obtains. Roughly, this is one reason why in 
the intensional variant of truth-conditional semantics people have had recourse 
to possible worlds to describe sentential meanings.57  
But this is not the only reason. In addition to that, possible worlds are used 
to analyze how we can use language to convey information about what is 
possible, what is not possible, what must be the case if certain other things 
happen etc. This happens through the use of modal auxiliary verbs, modal 
adverbs, and conditional constructions: 
The liquid in this glass cannot be ignited. 
The liquid in this glass might be ignited. 
If this liquid were heated over 80oC, it would ignite. 
                                                        
57 There also are well established traditions of truth-conditional semantics that do not use 
possible worlds to study meaning. But the property of rigidity which is the main topic of the 
present work cannot be formulated in these traditions. In the semantic tradition that the 
present work follows the property of rigidity has to be invoked in the explanation of certain 
semantic phenomena. In other traditions that do not have an ontology of possible worlds these 




In the intensional variant of truth-conditional semantics the operation of modal 
expressions and constructions are analyzed as different ways of quantifying 
over possible worlds.  
The Compositionality of Lingustic Meaning 
A working hypothesis about natural languages which define truth-conditional 
semantics in its core is what is termed as the compositionality of linguistic 
meaning. It is the production of sentential information content by the 
combination of the contributions of recurrent syntactic units in recurrent 
syntactic forms. This hypothesis is thought to explain the striking combination 
of two aspects of natural languages: their vast expressive power and their being 
learnable in less time than a one-third of average human life span.  
The conjunction of the facts about the way humans master the sign 
systems that are languages with their temporal and mental limitations, and the 
fact that these systems have a vast expressive power is partly explained by 
attributing them the compositionality feature. This explanation can be roughly 
described as follows. The number of sets of possible conditions that can be 
determined by the use of sentences is vast, but sentences are not associated 
with sets of conditions directly. All sentences are constituted by the 
combination recurrent basic syntactic elements in recurrent syntactic ways. 
These basic syntactic elements and ways of combination are considerably less in 
number; they contribute the same way in all their occurrences in the sentences. 




contributions of its basic elements and their form of combination and partly by 
the context of use. So that, only the mastery of the contributions of the basic 
syntactic elements and the forms of combination is sufficient to sort out which 
set of possible conditions a sentence will determine relative to a context of 
use.58 
Theories of Truth-conditional Semantics 
The compositionality feature of natural languages is what makes the truth-
conditional natural language semantics a complicated theoretical discipline 
rather than a mere reporting and classifying field of study. The discipline 
produces theories describing how the vast array of sentential meanings are 
produced using a limited number of recurrent basic elements and forms. The 
interest can be directed to the specifics of a particular language as well as to the 
general aspects of all languages. 
 At the specific level a theory of truth-conditional semantics for a 
particular natural language will aim to describe how the set of possible 
                                                        
58 As a working hypothesis truth-conditional semantic theories always strive to keep the 
hypothesis of compositionality of meaning as far as possible. But in certain cases the 
presupposition that recurrent syntactic constituents always contribute the same meaning in all 
of their occurrences is somewhat tweaked. For instance the noun phrase dodos figure as the 
subject in both of the following sentences: Dodos are extinct, Dodos are running. Yet, it seems 
that while in the former sentence the denotation of dodos is a kind whereas in the second 
sentence it is an existential generalized quantification. Of course it is possible to explain such 
cases as involving homonyms, but this would be to miss a prospect of generalization; similar 
pairs of examples can be formed with many other noun phrases. Instead it is postulated that the 
contribution of a constituent remains the same in all its occurrences but that in certain special 
sentential contexts certain implicit semantic operators are triggered to map that original 
contribution to another suitable contribution. In the following chapters when we deal with the 
interpretation of noun phrases we will come upon cases where recourse to such implicit 




conditions expressible by the sentences of that language are compositionally 
determined by the contributions of the constituents of those sentences.  This 
will roughly be done in the following way. It will sort the basic recurrent 
syntactic elements and forms out of which the sentences are formed, and it will 
specify the contributions these elements and forms should bring in so that the 
sentences which they form can determine the truth-conditions they happen to 
determine relative to the contexts of use. I have been using the future tense 
because a unified theory for the entirety of one natural language has never been 
given.  Instead at the present stage the output of the discipline is in the form of 
semantic theories for fragments of languages which may or may not be 
compatible with one another.    
At general level, truth-conditional semantic theories aim to single out the 
distribution of the meaning related features among natural languages. Which 
types of sentential meanings are universally expressible? Which types of 
sentential meanings are always produced in similar ways? Which ones are 
produced in different ways? Which types of sentential constituent meanings are 
found in all languages? Which types of sentential constituent meanings always 
co-occur in a natural language? Which types of constituent meanings never co-
occur in a language? Which features of compositional organization are 
universal? etc. For example, basic syntactic elements with meanings that give 




Empirical Criteria of Success for Semantic Claims and Theories about 
Natural Languages 
At both of these levels theories of truth-conditional semantics are empirically 
constrained, in much the same way as any linguistic theory about natural 
languages are. Natural languages may be deemed to be the abstract entities, on a 
par with mathematical entities or universals. But they are realized as 
competences in certain target communities of people.59 Therefore any theory 
about a natural language spoken by a certain target community is constrained to 
yield results that predict the linguistic judgments and behavior of the target 
community. In the same vein any theory about the general features of all natural 
languages is constrained to entail results that are commonly attested by the 
specific theories about particular languages. Theories which absolve themselves 
from these constraints will be merely specifying unrealized languages or 
aspects thereof.  
At this point consideration of the aims and the success criteria of the 
discipline of syntax will be helpful. For example, ‘French’ is the name for the 
abstract system which happens to be realized as a competence in a specific 
community of people. The syntax of French is the part of that system that 
specifies the proper sentences of French. A theory of syntax for French will sort 
out the basic elements and the principles of combination whereby all sentences 
of French are produced. This will be the description of an abstract entity. But 
the aim of the theory is to describe the abstract entity which happens to be 
                                                        




realized as a competence in a specific target community. How can we ascertain 
that the theory describes the right abstract entity, the one realized as 
competence rather than another, or at least an abstract entity which in 
important respects similar to the one that is realized in the target community.  
We can measure the success of the theory in the mentioned respects by 
considering whether it entails claims of well-formedness that predict the 
linguistic output and linguistic judgments of the target community of people. It 
is of course possible that sometimes some people deemed as competent 
speakers err in their performance or in their grammaticality judgment. But it is 
not possible that most of the members deemed competent most of the times err 
in their competence. Besides predictive accuracy another measure for the 
theory’s success will be whether it describes an abstract system that can be 
realized as a competence in the target community given the humanely mental 
and temporal limitations of the members of the community. If for example the 
theory describes a system which cannot be realized as a competence through 
the observed language learning patterns in effect in the community, then that 
system cannot be the one which the theory aims to describe. The data against 
which the predictive accuracy of a syntactic theory is measured in principle 
consists of the linguistic output of the target community and their judgments. 
But in practice theoreticians often draw on their own intuitions, as they 
consider themselves as members of the community where the supposed 
competence is realized. 
These points are also valid for theories of truth-conditional semantics 




which relate sentences with sets of possible conditions relative to contexts of 
utterances. But their aim will always be to describe the system which happens 
to realized as a competence in a target community, or at least a system which is 
very close to it in important respects. Their success in this respect will be 
measured in ways similar to those in effect in relation with theories of syntax 
for natural languages. Are the truth-conditions assignments to sentences 
relative to contexts of use entailed by the theory predict the assignments made 
by the target community, in so far as these can be ascertained through 
observation? Can the system described by the theory be realized as a 
competence in the target community given the observed linguistic learning 
patterns in the community?  
Let me open up in more detail the measure of predictive accuracy in its 
application to truth-conditional semantic theories. How a target community 
assigns truth-conditions to sentences relative to contexts of use can be 
ascertained in several ways. One of them is of course direct query. Would Pipits 
lay speckled eggs be true although male pipits do not lay eggs? Would Every 
pipit lays speckled eggs be true although male pipits do not lay eggs? As a result 
of similar queries we can for example conclude that English speakers assign 
different truth conditions to such generalizations as Pipits lay speckled eggs 
than the ones they assign to the corresponding universal quantifications.  
But besides direct queries for truth conditions we can also resort to 
judgments of equivalence, contradiction, ambiguity, contingency, entailment.60 
                                                        
60 For the content of this paragraph and for the general outlook on truth-conditional semantics 




Are the following sentences equivalent? (would they under all conditions be both true 
or both false)? 
Some seats are not booked. It is not the case that every seat is booked. 
 
Do the following sentences contradict one another? 
Pipits lay speckled eggs. Male pipits do not lay eggs. 
 
Are the following sentences ambiguous? (Are there circumstances such that in a given 
single context one use of it will be true and another will be false?) 
Every seat is booked by a woman. 
The 37th president of US might not have resigned from office. 
Birds held sacred by the ancient Egyptians might not have been long legged. 
Ibises might not have been long-legged. 
 
Are the following sentences contingent? (Are they either true relative to all 
circumstances or false relative to all circumstances?) 
A bachelor is a novice brick layer. 
One meter is 3.2808399 feet. 
The woodchuck is the groundhog. 
Vernon Sullivan is Boris Vian. 
The 37th president of US is Richard Nixon. 
 
Does the former sentence entail the latter? (Is it the case that relative to all 
circumstances if  the former is true the latter will be true as well?) 
Pipits lay speckled eggs; Every pipit lays speckled eggs. 
Every astronaut is a heavy drinker; An astronaut is an heavy drinker. 
As in the case of syntactic theories, in practice researchers often simply draw on 
their own intuitions and on those of the community of researchers.  
The success of a truth-conditional semantic theory about a fragment of a 
particular language will then be measured according to the following criteria. To 
what extent can the theory predict the well attested ways the target community 
assigns truth-conditions to the sentences of the fragment. Can the partial system 
described by the theory be part of a system that can be learned as a competence 
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by the target-community? Does the theory meshes well with the other 
successful theories given for other fragments of the language?  
The value of a single semantic claim about a particular language will in 
turn be measured by considering whether it is required that it be entailed by 
successful theories about various fragments of that particular language. And the 
value of a single semantic claim concerning all or many languages will be 
measured by considering whether it is required that it be entailed by the 
successful semantic theories concerning these languages.  
Back to Rigidity: the Criteria to Judge Claims of Rigid Reference  
The claim that proper names are rigid designators but some definite 
descriptions are not, is a general semantic claim about categories of expressions 
apparently found in all languages. Thus, its value is to be measured according to 
the criteria laid above. It is required that it be entailed by successful semantic 
theories about various fragments of natural languages. Thus, given the above 
given of criteria of success for semantic theories it is ultimately required that 
the content of that claim has to be assumed to correctly predict the observable 
truth-condition assignments in various natural languages. The same is true for 
the claim that some general terms are rigid relative to their mode of denotation 
whilst some are not. If it turns out that predictive accuracy can be assured 
without making these claims, then these claims have to be rejected. Thus in 
principle there are clear cut criteria on the basis of which we can judge the 




The extant discussions about the rigid/non-rigid division among singular 
terms are, if not wanting, at least not explicit in this respect. They do not give 
explicit arguments showing that a theory which predicts truth-value 
assignments correctly has to assume that proper names are rigid designators 
and that some definite descriptions are not. As we indicated in the previous 
chapters, the same is all the more true in relation with the extant arguments for 
or against the existence of a rigid/non-rigid division among general terms. 
Those who defend the existence of such a division do not show that such a 
division among general terms is needed to explain and predict the observed 
truth-value assignments. And those who reject the existence of such a division 
among general terms do not show that such a division is not needed or that it 
leads to incorrect predictions. It is quite significant that some parties of the 
controversy raised the question what is the theoretical work to be done by 
attributing rigidity to general terms. The foregone discussion constitutes a clear 
answer to this question. The theoretical work to be done by any semantic claim, 
not only the rigidity claims, is in essence the same.  
Representations of Meanings by Partial Functions and Compositions 
Thereof 
Abstracting away all functions of sentential meaning other than determining 
truth-conditions relative to contexts of use, sentential meanings can simply be 
modeled by partial functions from contexts into sets of possible worlds. 
Equivalently, we can model them as partial functions mapping contexts into 




does not much depend on the context dependence of the determination of 
sentences’ truth-conditions, we can simply fix contexts and only model the 
operation of sentential meanings relative to fixed contexts, so as to not to 
complicate the models and their representations unnecessarily. That is, we can 
simply model the operation of sentential meanings relative to fixed contexts as 
partial functions mapping possible worlds into truth-values. Given that my 
research aim does not much depend on context dependence I will follow this 
latter path.  
Once the operation of the meaning of a sentence relative to a fixed context 
of use is modeled as a partial function from the set of possible worlds into the 
set of truth-values, the textual representation of the model can be given thus: 
⟦Bob likes Alice⟧g=λs.[Bob likes Alice]s,g 
In general for any English sentence or sentential constituent X, I will use the 
notation λs.[X]s,g to refer to the partial function defined over the set of worlds 
that models the the truth-conditional dimension of the meaning of X.  I will 
usually use the symbol s as a variable ranging over possible worlds – I will use 
@ to refer to the actual world. And I will use the superscript g to refer to the 
variable assignment induced by the fixed context of use and which will be 
relevant for the interpretation of pronouns and other pronoun like constituents. 
When the variation of variable assignments does not make any difference as 
regards the final interpretation of a sentence I will usually omit the subscript g. 
With s used as variable, the representation is intended to be understood in 
in the same way as the textual representations of arithmetical functions using 




to the integer 3x2+5.  λs.[Bob likes Alice]s refers to the partial function which 
maps a world w for which it is defined to the truth-value [Bob likes Alice]w. 
Given the compositionality feature of natural languages sentential 
meanings are determined by the meanings of their constituents. Thus modeling 
the meaning of Bob likes Alice in the indicated way will be quite superficial and 
will not display at all the compositionality feature. For a sentential meaning 
model with more flesh, we can model the meanings of sentential constituents as 
well by suitable partial functions and then model the sentential meanings as the 
result of an operation defined over the partial functions that model the 
meanings of the constituents.61   
Semantic Types 
Before defining such an operation however I should best introduce a way to 
easily keep track of the descriptions of the partial functions that will be used. 
Partial functions that are used to model the meanings of sentential constituents 
                                                        
61  For an early account and exemplary implementation of formal truth-conditional analysis of 
meaning with the help of functions see Lewis (1970). For a non-intensional implementation of 
the approach which is closer to the one to be adopted here, see Heim and Kratzer (1998), For 
the intensional version see Heim and Fintel (2011). For another account of the approach see 
Chierchia and McConell-Ginet (2000), 88-99. In this work I partly follow Heim and Kratzer 
(1998) and its as yet unpublished sequel Heim and Fintel (2011). Heim and Fintel (2011) give 
mainly an extensional theory and resort to intensions only in cases where modal expressions 
are involved and their rules of semantic composition is defined over extensions rather than 
intensions, except in the case of Intensional Functional Application which is introduced to deal 
with modal expressions. I instead take intensions to be the semantic values of expressions. The 
rules of semantic composition I will deploy below are adapted from theirs to fit semantic values 




are typified via a recursively defined system of types according to their domains 
and ranges.62   
definition of the types: 
e, t, s are basic types 
basic types are types 
if a, b are types <a,b> too is a type 
 
the interpretation of the types : 
e is the type of individuals 
t is the type of 0 and 1 
s is the type of possible worlds 
for a,b types, <a,b> is the type of every partial function from the set of entities of type a 
into the set of entities of type b 
 
For any type a, Da is the set of entities of type a 
Sentences are modeled by partial functions from the set of possible worlds (Ds) 
into {0,1} (Dt). Therefore those partial functions will be of type <s,t>.  
With regard to the modeling of the meanings of most sentential 
constituent types under the sort of set up adopted here there exists more or less 
common ways of proceeding, which I too will follow. Below I list how the most 
familiar categories of basic constituents will be modeled: 
Proper names are modeled by partial functions from DS into De, and thus will be of type 
<s,e>. 
Non-transitive verbs, adjectives and common nouns are standardly modeled by partial 
functions from DS into D<e,t>, and thus will be of type <s,<e,t>>.63 
                                                        
62 See for example Heim and Kratzer (1998) pp. 28-29, intensional types p. 303. 
63 Although assigning intensions of type <s,<e,t>> is the standard approach, in 6th chapter we 
will see reasons to assign to some of them at least designator intensions of type <s,e>. As 
regards adjectives there are two common approaches. One takes their forming syntactic 
predicates as their primary role and assign then applier intensions of type <s,<e,t>>. The other 
takes their noun mofiying function as primary and assign them intensions of type 
<s,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>. Either way, then one has to account for the other function that is left out. 
This is done either by introducing implicit type shifting operators or introducting additional 
modes of semantic composition (additional to the one to be introduced below). More on this will 




Transitive verbs are modeled by partial functions from DS into D<e,<e,t>>, and thus will 
be of type <s,<e,<e,t>>>.  
Quantificational determiners (every, some, most, one, two etc.) are modeled by partial 
functions of type <s,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>. 
Quantificational noun phrases are modelled by partial functions of type 
<s,<<e,t>,t>>. 
For constituents of other categories I will indicate the way they are to be 
modeled later as the need arises to do so. 
The type of the partial function which is taken to model the meaning of an 
expression  is called the semantic type of . Thus, the semantic type of Bob is 
<s,e> and the semantic type of likes is <s,<e,<e,t>>> etc. 
Syntax and Semantics 
Semantic theories are built on syntactic theories. Semantic theories describe 
how the meanings of sentences are determined by the meanings of their 
syntactic constituents. The constituents of a sentence and the hierarchical 
relations that obtain between them are determined by the syntactic theory. 
Currently there are quite a number of different schools of syntactic theories. But 
the most popular among them is the so called transformational generative 
grammar initiated by Chomsky. The truth-conditional semantic framework we 
adopt in the present work derives from Heim and Kratzer (1998) and Heim and 
Fintel (2011) that have adopted the syntactic approach of the transformational 
generative grammar.  
Contemporary and common implementations of transformational 
generative syntax distinguish between the surface structure of a sentence and 




takes place relative to the logical forms rather than the surface structure. These 
logical forms are are derived from the surface structure through syntactic 
transformation rules. There are a number of motivating factors for this 
distinction between the logical form level and surface structure level. Here I can 
only refer to one of them which will be very relevant in the present work. It is 
well known that sentences with multiple quantifier phrases manifest sentential 
ambiguity. Everyone loves someone is one such example. The supposition of the 
existence of different logical forms that can be related with a given surface 
structure enables the explanation of such sentential ambiguities in terms of 
differences in the logical forms. For example, according to this approach 
Everyone likes someone can assume either one of the logical forms.  
[NP Everyone] [VP [Vlikes] [NP someone]] 
[NP Someone]1 [S[NP Everyone] [VP [Vlikes] t1]] 
The subscripted element t1 figuring in the second logical form is what is termed 
as a trace. Very roughly with regard to semantic interpretation it does the same 
job as the pronoun him/her which relate to someone in the following 
paraphrase Someone is such that everyone likes him/her.  
Returning now to Bob likes Alice, it too presumably has two such logical forms 
but these determine the same sentential meanings.  
[S [NPBob] [VP [V likes] [NP Alice]]] 
[NP Alice]1 [S[NP Bob] [VP [Vlikes] t1]] 
Since these LF’s will lead to equivalent interpretation I will continue my 
exposition referring to the first logical form which reflects the surface structure. 




Alice to form the verb phrase likes Alice. This latter then combines with the 
noun phrase Bob to form the sentence Bob likes Alice. The meaning of the whole 
sentence has to be determined following the same path. First the meanings of 
likes and Alice will compose to yield the meaning of the VP likes Alice. Then, the 
meaning of the latter will combine with the meaning of Bob to yield the meaning 
of the whole LF.64  
Semantic Composition 
To model this determination, the meanings of Bob, likes  and Alice will be 
modeled by partial functions respectively of types <s,e>, <s,<e,<e,t>>> and 
<s,e>. The composition of meanings will be modeled by a binary operation that 
is defined over the set of partial functions of type <s,a> (where a can be of any 
of a number of types to be specified). 
The functions modelling the meanings of Bob and Alice can be represented 
thus (taking for granted that proper names are rigid designators, which we will 
strive to justify in the next chapter) :  
⟦Bob⟧=λs.[Bob]s=λs.Bob  
⟦Alice⟧=λs.[Alice]s=λs.Alice 
And the meaning of likes can be modeled by the following function of type 
<s,<e,<e,t>>>: 
                                                        
64 Although strictly speaking sentential meanings are meanings of LF’s, I will in general simply 
write meaning of a sentence, so long as the sentence in question has only one LF, or all of its LF’s 




⟦likes⟧=λs.[likes]s= λs.λy.λx.{relative to s, x likes y}65  
Now let’s define the semantic composition operation in such a way that 
λs.[likes]s can be combined with the function λs.[Alice]s to yield as result a 
function that can be further combined with λs.[Bob]s to yield as result a function 
that maps situations into truth-values.  
I Let γ be a branching node with α and β as daughters (i.e. [γ]=[αβ]) that 
 respectively are of semantic types <s,a> and <s,b> such that a=<b,c>. 
 Then the semantic composition of ⟦α⟧g and ⟦β⟧g is 
 {⟦α⟧g , ⟦β⟧g}=λs.([α]s,g([β]s,g))=λs.[γ]s,g=⟦γ⟧g and it is of semantic type 
 <s,<a,c>>.66 
Now we have the means to model how the meaning of Bob likes Alice is 
determined by the meanings of its constituents. The meanings of the pairs of 
constituents that syntactically compose to form more complex syntactic 
constituents in the LF will compose semantically. Then, the LF 
[S [NPBob] [VP [V likes] [NP Alice]]] 
will yield the following semantic composition which amounts to a partial 
function of type <s,t>: 
{λs.[Bob]s, { λs.[ likes]s, λs.[Alice]s}}=λs.([likes]s([Alice]s))([Bob]s) 
                                                        
65 The notation ‘{relative to s, x likes y}’ will be interpreted as a function which maps (s,y,x) 
triplets into truth or falsity according to whether x likes y or not. In general in describing 
functions using the lambda formalism I will use the notation ‘{S(X)}’ where S(X) will be a 
sentential function in our meta-language (English plus the formalism of first order logic) to refer 
to the characteristic function that maps a given X0 to truth iff S(X0) is true. This use of the braces 
‘{‘ , ’}’ should be distinguished from their use to represent the semantic composition of two 
meanings.  
66 This clause is adapted from the Heim & Fintel (2011)’s Functional Application rule, which 




The meaning of [V likes] is λs.[likes]s,  a function of type <s,<e,<e,t>>>. Its 
semantic composition with the meaning of [NP Alice], λs.[Alice]s which is of type 
<s,e>, yields as the meaning of the VP [VP[Vlikes][NPAlice]] the function 
λs.[likes]s([Alice]s) of type <s,<e,t>>: 
λs.[likes]s= λs.λy.λx.{relative to s, x likes y} 
λs.[Alice]s=λs.Alice assuming that Alice is a rigid designator  
{λs.[likes]s, λs.[Alice]s} 
{λs.λy.λx.{relative to s, x likes y}, λs.[Alice]s} 
λs.λx.{relative to s, x likes Alice}  
λs.[likes]s([Alice]s) 
λs.[likes Alice]s 
The semantic composition of the meaning of [VP [V likes] [NP Alice]] with λs.[Bob]s 
of type <s,e>, the meaning of [NPBob], in turn yields the function 
λs.([likes]s([Alice]s))([Bob]s) which will be of type <s,t>: 
λs.[likes]s([Alice]s)= λs.λx.{relative to s, x likes Alice} 
λs.[Bob]s=λs.Bob assuming that Bob is a rigid designator  
{λs.[likes]s([Alice]s), λs.[Bob]s} 
{λs.λx.{relative to s, x likes Alice}, λs.Bob} 
λs.{relative to s, Bob likes Alice} 
λs.([likes]s([Alice]s))([Bob]s) 
λs.[Bob likes Alice]s 
Above I have specified for each constituent the partial functions that can be 
taken as their meanings. I have assigned to like the partial function 
λs.λy.λx.{relative to s, x likes y}, to Alice and Bob respectively the functions 
λs.Bob and λs.Alice. Then I have illustrated how given these functions the 
meaning of the whole sentence Bob likes Alice is determined through semantic 
composition.  In what follows I usually will not go into such details. I will not 




these meanings semantically compose for each sentence I will analyze, unless it 
is relevant for the discussion at hand and it is not obvious how it can be done. 
Furthermore I usually will not reveal the complete compositional structure of 
each sentence I analyze in all its details. I will only reveal as much structure as 
needed. For example, if the semantic structure of the VP likes Alice is not 
relevant for the discussion at hand I may represent the meaning of Bob likes 
Alice simply in the following way: 
λs.[likes Alice]s([Bob]s) 
In the simple example we have considered so far there did figure any pronoun 
or pronoun like expressions. In order to be able to deal with them we shall 
assume that all such expressions will come indexed in logical forms and in their 
interpretation we will resort to the apparatus of variable assignments. Variable 
assignments will map indexes to elements of Da (where a can be any type) and 
the indexed constituents will be interpreted thus: 
⟦αi⟧g=λs.[αi]s,g=λs.g(i) 
Accordingly relative to a variable assignment g such that g(2)=Alice, we will 
have the following: 
[S [NPBob] [VP [V likes] her2]] 
⟦[[Bob] [[likes] her2]]⟧g 
{⟦Bob⟧g, {⟦likes⟧g, ⟦her2⟧g}} 
{λs.[Bob]s,g,{λs.[likes]s,g, λs.Alice}} 
{λs.Bob,{λs.λy.λx.{x likes y relative to s}, λs.Alice}} (assuming that names are rigid 
designators) 
{λs.Bob, λs.{x likes Alice relative to s}} 




Meanings, Models of the Meanings and Representations of the Models  
We should clearly distinguish between the following: (i) the meanings of 
expressions and semantic operations (ii) functions modeling these and (iii) the 
representations of these functions.  
I do not intend to identify meanings and the semantic operations 
pertaining to them with the functions that model them. For one thing, these 
functions are not sufficiently fine grained to model every aspect of the 
meanings. More philosophically, I believe that meanings are robust non-
mathematical, albeit quite complicated properties.  
However, for ease of expression I will simply refer to those functions as 
the meanings themselves. So, I will allow myself to write as if the 
representations of these functions are the representations of the meanings 
themselves. From time to time I will even be briefer by referring to the semi-
formal representations as the semantic representations of the sentences and 
their constituents. Of course my full but non-explicit meaning will always be 
that they are the representations of the mathematical entities which in turn 
model the meanings. 
Generalized Quantifiers and Their Representations 
Quantificational NP’s are such phrases as every student, some professors, every 
student and some professors, many professors, a few professors etc. Such noun 
phrases are standardly analyzed as partial functions of type <s,<<e,t>,t>>. 




representing sentences which involve quantificational noun phrases (NPs), I too 
will follow the generalized quantifiers analysis.67 One advantage of the 
generalized quantifier analysis is that thereby we can ensure that a 
quantificational NPs’ meaning is the result of the semantic composition of the 
meanings of its constituents and that it further composes with other meanings 
to form the meaning of the sentential clause in which it figures.68 
I noted that quantificational NP’s are such phrases as every student, some 
professors, every student and some professors, many professors, a few 
professors etc. Quantificational determiners are such constituents of 
quantificational NP’s as every, most, few etc. According to generalized 
quantifiers analysis quantificational NP’s are phrases of the semantic type 
<s,<<e,t>,t>>. That is, their meanings are such partial functions that for any 
s∈Ds for which they are defined they give partial functions which map partial 
functions of type <e,t> to {0,1}.  
The generalized quantifier analysis enables the analysis of the meanings of 
1a-b in the manner indicated:  
1 a Every student is tired. 
  [S[NP every student][VPis tired]] 
{λs.[every student]s, λs.[tired]s} 
λs.[every student]s([tired]s) 
                                                        
67 Specifically I will follow the version of Heim and Kratzer (1998). For another version see 
Chierchia and Mc Connell-Ginet (2000). 
68 Another advantage of the generalized quantifier analysis is that this analysis gives a unified 
semantic analysis of all quantificational NP’s, including those like most professors and few 




1 b Some students are tired. 
  [S[NP Some students][VPare tired]] 
{λs.[some students]s, λs.[tired]s} 
λs.[some students]s([tired]s)  
According to these representations λs.[every student]s  is of type 
<s,<<e,t>,t>>which semantically composes with λs.[tired]s of type <s,<e,t>> 
to yield a meaning of type <s,t>; and exactly the same thing is also true of 
λs.[some students]s.  
Clearly every student and some student have different meanings. And, this 
difference in meaning clearly depends on the differences in the meanings of 
every and some. The meanings of quantificational NP’s themselves are the result 
of the semantic composition of the meanings of their semantic constituents: a 
common noun and a quantificational determiner.  Common nouns are 
standardly treated as being of the semantic type <s,<e,t>> . And under the 
generalized quantifier analysis quantificational determiners are analyzed as 
being of the semantic type <s,<<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>>. So that when the meaning 
of the quantificational determiner semantically composes with the meaning of a 
common-noun, the result is a meaning of type <s,<<e,t>,t>>, precisely the 
semantic type of the quantificational NP’s.  
So, the meanings of every student  and some student can be more perspicuously 











And the meanings of 1a-b can be more perspicuously represented in the 
following way: 
1 a Every student is tired. 
  [S[NP[Devery][Nstudent]]][VPis tired]] 
{{λs.[every]s, λs.[student]s}, λs.[tired]s} 
{λs.[every]s([student]s), λs.[tired]s} 
λs.([every]s([student]s))([tired]s) 
1 b Some students are tired. 
  [S[NP[Dsome][Nstudents]]][VPare tired]] 
{{λs.[some]s, λs.[students]s}, λs.[tired]s} 
{λs.[some]s([students]s), λs.[tired]s} 
λs.([some]s([students]s))([tired]s) 
So, far we did not say anything about the specific meanings of quantificational 
determiners. The specific meanings of every and some can be formulated in the 
following way: 
Let P,Q be variables ranging over partial functions of type <e,t>, 
 λs.[every]s=λs.λP.λQ.{(∀x)(P(x)=1  Q(x)=1}69 
 λs.[some]s=λs.λP.λQ.{(x)(P(x)=1 &  Q(x)=1} 
Now if we assume that, 
  λs.[student]s=λs.λx.{x is a student} 
  λs.[tired]s=λs.λx.{x is tired} 
                                                        
69 Here (∀x)(P(x)=1  Q(x)=1) belongs to the meta-language and has its usual interpretation.  
{(∀x)(P(x)=1  Q(x)=1)} is the characteristic function for that open sentence. That is, it maps 
the partial functions P, Q of types <e,t> into truth if and only if (∀x)(P(x)=1  Q(x)=1) is true. 




Then, the semantic composition of the meanings of every andstudent yields the 
following: 
{λs.[every]s,λs.[student]s} 
{ λs.λP.λQ.{(∀x)(P(x)=1  Q(x)=1}, λs.λy.{y is a student}} 
 λs.λQ.{(∀x)(λy.{y is a student}(x)=1  Q(x)=1} 
And the semantic composition of the meanings of every student and tired yields 
the following: 
{{λs.[every]s,λs.[student]s}, λs.[tired]s} 
{ λs.λQ.{(∀x)(λy.{y is a student}(x)=1  Q(x)=1},  λs.λz.{z is tired}} 
 λs.{(∀x)(λy.{y is a student}(x)=1  λz.{z is tired} (x)=1} 
In formulating the partial functions to be taken as the meanings of 
quantificational determiners we have used the formalism of first order logic 
under its usual interpretation. We can simplify the semantic representation of 
quantificational determiners and quantificational noun phrases (and later the 
representations of the contributions of modal expressions) under the present 
set up if we interpret the formalism of the first order logic incorporated into our 
meta-language in such a way that its predicates get as values functions of type 
<a,t> (where a can be type e or s), rather than sets. To this end we can interpret 
the logical operators of first order logic (quantifiers: ∀x, x and truth-functional 
connectives) as functions as well. Accordingly, I will interpret truth-functional 
connectives of the FOL as functions of type <<t,t>,t> and the quantifiers of FOL 
as functions of type <<a,t>,t> (where a can be type e or s). Thus we will have, 
Let P,Q be functions of type <a,t>, 
~P(x)=1 iff P(x)=0 
P(x)Q(x)=1 iff if P(x)=1 then Q(x)=1 





(∀x)P(x)=1 iff for any value of x, P(x)=1 
(x)P(x)=1 iff for at least one value for  x, P(x)=1 
Then, more compactly but equivalently to the former formulation we can 
formulate the partial functions which were assigned to every and some thus: 
Let P,Q be variables ranging over partial functions of type <e,t>, 
 λs.[every]s=λs.λP.λQ.(∀x)(P(x)  Q(x)) 
 λs.[some]s=λs.λP.λQ.(x)(P(x) &  Q(x)) 
And the semantic representations of Every student is tired and Some students 
are tired can more compactly be given thus: 
λs.λP.λQ.(∀x)(P(x)  Q(x))([student]s)([tired]s) 
λs.λQ.(∀x)([student]s (x)  Q(x))([tired]s) 
λs.(∀x)([student]s (x)  [tired]s (x)) 
 
λs.λP.λQ.(x)(P(x) & Q(x))([student]s)([tired]s) 
λs.λQ.(x)([student]s (x) & Q(x))([tired]s) 
λs.(x)([student]s (x) & [tired]s (x)) 
Quantified Phrases in Object Positions 
Our presentation of how quantified phrases will be interpreted leaves out an 
important case which will repeatedly arise in the later chapters: the 
interpretation of sentences in which quantified phrases occur in object 
positions: 
2 Alice crushed every bottle. 
This sentence has the following surface structure: 
2A [NPAlice][VP [V crushed] [NP every bottle]]] 
Yet this structure cannot be interpreted on the basis of what has been deployed 




<s,<e,<e,t>>> and the quantified phrase [NP every bottle] is of type 
<s,<<e,t>,t>>. As such they cannot semantically compose.  
It is supposed that 2 has also a logical form in which [NPevery bottle] takes 
wide scope relative to every other element. 
2B [NP every bottle]1 [S[NPAlice][VP [V crushed] t1]] 
But neither is this logical form interpretable. With the trace t1 interpreted as a 
pronoun of type <s,e>, [S[NPAlice][VP [V crushed] t1]]] is now interpretable as a 
sentence (type <s,t>). But then [S[NPAlice][VP [V crushed] t1]]] cannot 
semantically compose with [NPevery bottle] which is of type <s,<<e,t>,t>>. 
To surmount these problems we will follow Heim and Kratzer (1998). 
They propose an alternative way to represent logical forms in which a noun 
phrase has moved to the wider scope relative to its position in the surface 
structure.70 According to this proposal, when an NP moves to the wide scope, as 
in the logical form of 2 in which [NPevery bottle] takes wide scope relative to 
every other element, the result should rather be represented in the following 
way: 
2B [NP every bottle]1 [1 [S[NPAlice][VP [V crushed] t1]]] 
Here the role the index ‘1’ is supposed to play is like the role played by such that 
in the following paraphrase of 2: 
Every bottle is such that Alice crushed it. 
                                                        
70 Another option they discuss is type raising the denotations of the quantifiers in situ without recourse to any 
movement. I did not follow that option because I would anyway introduce movement to deal with sentential ambiguity 
phenomena, which is the most common way of proceeding. Yet, It is possible to explain a range of sentential ambiguity 




We will interpret such structures as [1 [S[NPAlice][VP [V crushed] t1]]] by the 
adding the following clause to the definition of semantic composition: 
II Let γ be a branching node with α and β as daughters (i.e. [γ]=[αβ]) where α 
 dominates only a numerical index i and β is of semantic type <s,t>. 
 Then ⟦α⟧g=i. 
 Then the semantic composition of ⟦α⟧g and⟦β⟧g will be  
 {⟦α⟧g , ⟦β⟧g }=λs.λx.[β]s,g(x/i) 71 
Here g(x/i) is the variable assignment such that: 
Dom(g(x/i)) = Dom(g) ∪ {i} 
g(x/i)(i)=x 
For any j such that i≠j and j∈Dom(g), g(j)=g(x/i)(j) 
Using this new clause of semantic composition [1 [S[NPAlice][VP [V crushed] t1]]] 
will be interpreted in the following way: 
[1 [S[NPAlice][VP [V crushed] t1]]] 
⟦1 [[Alice][[ crushed] t1]]⟧g 
{1, ⟦[[Alice][[ crushed] t1]]⟧g} 





And given this interpretation of [1 [S[NPAlice][VP [V crushed] t1]]] which yielded a 
meaning of type <s,<e,t>> the logical form 2B can be interpreted in the 
following way by recourse to our first clause of semantic composition: 
2B [NP every bottle]1 [1 [S[NPAlice][VP [V crushed] t1]]] 
⟦[every bottle]1 [1 [[Alice][[ crushed] t1]]]⟧g 
{⟦every bottle⟧g, ⟦1 [[Alice][[ crushed] t1]]]⟧g} 
                                                        
71 This clause is adapted from Heim&Fintel’s Predicate Abstraction rule. Apart from the 
extensionality/intensionality difference, their rules was syncategorematic whereas here I took 




{λs.λQ.(∀y)([bottle]s,g(y)  Q(y)), λs.λx.[crushed]s,g(x)([Alice]s,g)} 
λs.(∀y)([bottle]s,g(y)  (λx.[crushed]s,g(x)([Alice]s,g))(y)) 
λs.(∀y)([bottle]s,g(y)  [crushed]s(y)([Alice]s,g)) 
I previously indicated that in general I will not represent the logical forms and 
the interpretations based on them as detailed as above –unless the point I want 
to make requires a detailed analysis. So, in place of the detailed [1 [S[NPAlice][VP 
[V crushed] t1]]], I would like to have to deal simply with [1 [SAlice crushed t1]]. I 
also indicated that I will omit reference to variable assignments unless these 
make any difference in the resulting interpretation. In this vein note that for any 
assignment pairs g, g’ we will have the we have the following equality: 
⟦1 [[Alice][[ crushed] t1]]⟧g 
= λs.λx.[crushed]s,g(x)([Alice]s,g) 
=λs.λx.[crushed]s,g’(x)([Alice]s,g’) 
=⟦1 [[Alice][[ crushed] t1]]⟧g’ 
For, for any evaluation index s, the denotations [crushed]s,g and [Alice]s,g will 
remain the same no matter which variable assignment g is selected. So, I will 
usually take the liberty to represent and interpret the logical form 2B and 
logical forms like that simply in the following way: 
2B [NP every bottle]1 [1 [SAlice crushed t1]] 
⟦[ every bottle]1 [1 [Alice crushed t1]]⟧ 
{⟦every bottle⟧, ⟦[1 [Alice crushed t1]]⟧} 
{λs.λQ.(∀y)([bottle]s(y)  Q(y)), λs.λx.[Alice crushed tx]s} 
λs.(∀x)([bottle]s(y)  λx.[Alice crushed tx]s(y)) 
λs.(∀x)([bottle]s(y)  [Alice crushed ty]s) 




The Interpretations of Modal Constructions 
My stated principal aim in this work is to investigate whether some sort of 
rigidity property makes a difference among common nouns. I indicated that to 
this end I will pursue the example set by the way the way the de jure rigidity of 
proper names can be justified. In the next chapter I will show that one of the 
principal ways in which ascriptions of de jure rigidity to proper names is to 
compare their semantic interaction with modal expression with that of definite 
description; such a comparison reveals that unlike definite descriptions, proper 
names never lead to sentential ambiguity in those interactions. So, inevitably I 
will have to analyze sentences involving modal expressions –mainly modal 
auxiliary verbs like must, might, can, want etc. Here I will now describe how I 
will represent the contributions of modal auxiliaries in the rest of the present 
work. 
I will adopt a generalized quantifier analysis of modal auxiliaries such as 
must, might, can, where quantification ranges over possible worlds72. The modal 
auxiliaries will be assigned meanings of types <s,<<s,t>,t>> -compare with 
the semantic type of quantificational noun phrases which is <s,<<e,t>,t>>. As 
such modal auxiliaries will semantically compose with sentential meanings 
(type <s,t>) to yield further sentential meanings in accordance with a new 
clause of semantic composition yet to be introduced. Necessity expressing 
auxiliaries like must, ought will introduce a universal generalized quantifier. 
                                                        
72 I will adopt a simplified form of the analysis presented in Heim and Fintel (2011). These two 
in turn defer to the rather popular account of Kratzer presented in such works as Kratzer 




Possibility expressing auxiliaries like may, might, can will introduce an 
existential generalized quantifier.  In short I will adopt the following analyses: 
⟦must⟧g=λs.[must]s,g=λs.λp<s,t>.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃p(s’)) 
⟦might⟧g=λs.[might]s,g=λs.λp<s,t>.∃s’(R(s)(s’)&p(s’))73 
That is, relative to an evaluation index s must will operate as a function which 
maps a sentential meaning α to truth iff at all worlds s’ accessible to s relative to 
a contextually determined accessibility relation R, α(s’) yields truth; relative to 
an evaluation index s might will operate as a function which maps a sentential 
meaning α to truth iff at some worlds s’ accessible to s relative to a contextually 
determined accessibility relation R, α(s’) yields truth.74 The contextual 
variability of accessibility relations will account for the different flavors of must, 
might and the like which can express a wide range of necessity/possibility 
including epistemic, deontic, natural (circumstantial) etc. Now let’s consider the 
analysis of the following modal sentence: 
3 [to satisfy Carol’s wishes] Alice must invite Bob. 
We will assume that such a sentence as 3 can assume such logical forms as the 
following: 
3A  [Alice]1 [1 [must [t1 invite Bob]]] 
3B  [Alice]1 [1 [[Bob]2 [ 2 [must [t1 invite t2]]]]] 
                                                        
73 Again, besides the overarching semantic values as intensions/extensions difference, these 
analyses differ from Heim & Fintel’s (pg.38) in that according to their analysis,  [must]s= 
λR.λp<s,t>.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃p(s’)) To support that analysis they assume that in logical forms modal 
auxiliaries have implicit restrictors R as sisters. I eschewed this more detailed analysis for the 
sake of simplicity. 
74 Of course strictly speaking in our meta-language formalism where predicates are interpreted 





3C  must [Alice invite Bob] 
I will illustrate how the given analysis of the modal auxiliaries will play out in 
the interpretation the logical form 3A. 
⟦[Alice]1 [1 [must [t1 invite Bob]]]⟧ 
The meaning above should obtain as the result of the semantic composition of 
the meanings of the two main constituents of the logical form 3A, namely ⟦Alice⟧ 
and ⟦1[must [t1invite Bob]]⟧. Here the first clause of semantic composition will 
apply, as ⟦Alice⟧=λs.[Alice]s=λs.Alice is of type <s,e> and given the second 
clause of semantic composition we should have for any variable assignment g: 
⟦1[must [t1invite Bob]]⟧ 
{1, ⟦must [t1invite Bob]⟧g} 
λs.λx.[must [t1invite Bob]]s,g(x/1) (type <s,<e,t>>) 
But as yet what does the meaning λs.λx.[must [t1invite Bob]]s,g(x/1) accomplishes 
and how must contributes to that meaning is not made explicit. To make these 
explicit let’s now focus on the interpretation of ⟦must [t1invite Bob]⟧g. It should 
come out as the result of the semantic composition of ⟦must⟧g and ⟦t1 invite 
Bob⟧g and should be of type <s,t>. That is, we should have, 
⟦must [t1invite Bob]⟧g 
{⟦must⟧g, ⟦t1 invite Bob⟧g} 
{λs.λp<s,t>.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃p(s’)), λs.[t1 invite Bob]s,g} 
Intuitively the result of the semantic composition, ⟦must [t1invite Bob]⟧g, should 
be a function that  map a world w to truth iff ⟦must⟧g(w)=[must]w,g maps the 
proposition ⟦t1 invite Bob⟧g to truth. Yet we have, 
⟦must⟧g=λs.λp<s,t>.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃p(s’)) of type <s,<<s,t>,t>> 




As such they cannot semantically compose via neither of the semantic 
composition clauses we have described so far. To obtain the desired result out 
of the semantic composition of ⟦must⟧g and ⟦t1 invite Bob⟧g I will add the 
following third clause to our definition of semantic composition: 
III Let γ be a branching node with α and β as daughters (i.e. [γ]=[αβ]) that 
 respectively are of semantic types <s,<<s,a>,b>> and <s,a>, where a,b can  be 
 any types. Then the semantic composition of ⟦α⟧g and ⟦β⟧g is  
 {⟦α⟧g , ⟦β⟧g }=λs.([α]s,g(λs’.[β]s’,g))=λs.[γ]s,g=⟦γ⟧g and it is of semantic type <s,b>.75 
Armed with this third clause we can now open up ⟦must [t1invite Bob]⟧g in the 
desired way as the semantic composition of ⟦must⟧g and ⟦t1 invite Bob⟧g: 
⟦must [t1invite Bob]⟧g 
{⟦must⟧g, ⟦t1 invite Bob⟧g} 
{λs.λp<s,t>.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃p(s’)), λs’’.[t1 invite Bob]s’’,g} 
λs.(λp<s,t>.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃p(s’))(λs’’.[t1 invite Bob]s’’,g)) sem. comp. clause III 
λs.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃ λs’’.[t1 invite Bob]s’’,g (s’)) 
λs.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃[t1 invite Bob]s’,g) 
Using this result we can go on with the the interpretation of the logical form 3A 
which was the original task at hand: 
⟦[Alice]1 [1 [must [t1 invite Bob]]]⟧ 
{⟦Alice⟧, ⟦1[must [t1invite Bob]]⟧} 
{λs.Alice, ⟦1[must [t1invite Bob]]⟧} 
{λs.Alice, {1,⟦must [t1invite Bob]]⟧g}} 
{λs.Alice, {1, λs.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃[t1 invite Bob]s’,g)}}  
{λs.Alice, λs.λx.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃[t1 invite Bob]s’,g(x/1)} semantic composition clause II 
λs.(λx.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃[t1 invite Bob]s’,g(x/1)(Alice)) semantic composition clause I 
λs.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃[t1 invite Bob]s’,g(Alice/1)) 
 
λs.∀s’(R(s)(s’)⊃[invite]s’(Bob)(Alice)) had we given a more detailed analysis of [t1 
invite Bob] as [t1 [[invite] [Bob]]] 
                                                        




Beside auxiliaries like must, might, can, there are other verbs which are 
regarded as modal and susceptible to an analysis involving quantification over 
possible worlds but which unlike must, might, can require as arguments not just 
a proposition but a subject of e type as well. These include such verbs as want, 
wish, believe etc. In the coming chapters we will have to deal with some 
examples involving the verb want. So, before finishing I will briefly focus on 
want. I will adopt the following analysis of the contribution of want: 
⟦want⟧=λs.[want]s=λs.λp<e,t>.λx.∀s’(Rb(x)(s)(s’)⊃p(s’))76 
According to this analysis want is of type <s,<<s,t>,<e,t>>>. [want]s maps a 
sentential meaning p into a function that maps individuals x into to truth or 
falsity according to whether for all worlds s’ in which x’s desires relative to s are 
realized p(s’) is truth. Relative to an individual x, Rb(x) operates as an 
accessibility relation that enables ∀s’(Rb(x)(s)(s’)⊃p(s’)) to express bouletic 
necessity relative to x. Now I will illustrate how this analysis of want will play 
out in the interpretation of a simple sentence. 
4 Alice wants Bob to sleep. 
 [Alice][wants [Bob to sleep]] 
⟦[Alice][wants [Bob to sleep]]⟧ 
{⟦Alice⟧, {⟦wants⟧, ⟦Bob to sleep⟧} 
{λs.Alice, { λs.λp<e,t>.λx.∀s’(Rb(x)(s)(s’)⊃p(s’)), λs.[Bob to sleep]s}} 
{λs.Alice, λs.(λp<e,t>.λx.∀s’(Rb(x)(s)(s’)⊃p(s’))(λs’’.[B. to s.]s’’))} sem. comp. clause III 
{λs.Alice,  λs.λx.∀s’(Rb(x)(s)(s’)⊃ λs’’.[Bob to sleep]s’’(s’))} 
{λs.Alice,  λs.λx.∀s’(Rb(x)(s)(s’)⊃ [Bob to sleep]s’)}  
λs.(λx.∀s’(Rb(x)(s)(s’)⊃ [Bob to sleep]s’)(Alice)) semantic composition clause I 
λs.λx.∀s’(Rb(Alice)(s)(s’)⊃ [Bob to sleep]s’) 
                                                        




Different Types of Denotation and Rigidity 
I have already indicated that I will use the term denote to cover all sorts of 
reference, including designation, application and quantifying. Designators have 
denotations of type e, appliers have denotations of type <e,t>, and quantifying 
noun phrases have denotations of type <<e,t>,t>. Now, let me relate the notion 
of denotation with the notion of meaning taken as a partial function defined 
over Ds.  
The meaning of any expression  will be modeled by a partial function that 
has a type of the form <s,a>, where a will be a certian type. I will take that type 
a as the denotation type of . And the denotation of  relative to a certain 
evaluation index s0 will be a constant or a function of type a. 
For example, a proper name  is assigned a meaning of type <s,e>. ’s 
denotation relative to a certain evaluation index s0 will be a constant of type e. I 
will continue to term all expressions that have denotations of type e as 
designators. 
Common nouns are usually assigned meanings of type <s,<e,t>>. So the 
denotation of a common noun relative to a certain evaluation index s0 will be a 
function of type <e,t>. I will term all expressions that have denotations of type 
<e,t> as appliers. In some cases it will be helpful to refer to the set of things the 
denotation of an applier  maps to truth relative to a specific evaluation index 
s0. I will term that set as the the extension of  relative to s0. 
Under the generalized quantifier analysis quantificational noun phrases 




noun phrase relative to a certain evaluation index s0 will be a function of type 
<<e,t>,t>. I will term all expressions that have denotations of type 
<<e,t>,t>as quantifiers and their mode of denotation as quantification. 
I identify the property of rigidity for an expression with that expression’s 
having the same denotation relative to all evaluation indexes for which a 
denotation is defined –i.e. possible worlds. In other words, rigid expressions are 
those whose meanings should be modeled by constant partial functions. Rigid 
designators will have the same designata relative to all possible worlds for 
which their meaning determines a designatum. Rigid appliers will have the 
same extensions relative to all possible worlds for which their meanings 





THE ARGUMENT FOR THE RIGIDITY OF PROPER NAMES 
I will now argue that by linguistic design proper names must be rigid 
designators although this is not the case for definite noun phrases commonly 
termed as definite descriptions . The main purpose of this exercise is to set an 
example which I will follow when I deal with the case of common nouns.  
I will give two arguments, each of which are pieces of abductive inference 
for the same conclusion. Each argument will take as premises a set of linguistic 
data and some commonly held syntactic and semantic assumptions. I will show 
that the linguistic data gets a general linguistic-semantic explanation if by the 
design of language names must always operate as rigid designators but that 
definite descriptions need not operate as rigid designators.   
The first argument will be concerned with modal sentences in English. I 
will give examples that show that there is a divergence among modal sentences 
which involve proper names or definite descriptions in argument positions as to 
whether they manifest a certain type of ambiguity. The examples will indicate 
that the ambiguity in question is correlated with the presence of definite 
descriptions. In contrast those which contain only proper names as arguments 
do not manifest the ambiguity in question. I will then show that this divergence 
and the stated correlation can be given a wholesale explanation if it is assumed 
that definite descriptions can and proper names cannot be rigid designators by 




The second argument concerns identity sentences –sentences making 
identity statements. I will give examples that show that there is a divergence 
among such sentences as to whether they are contingent or not. Again we will 
discern a correlation between the presence of definite descriptions in the 
identity sentences and the contingency. In contrast identity sentences that 
contain only proper names as arguments will be seen to be always non-
contingent. I will then show that this divergence among the identity sentences 
and the stated correlation can be given a wholesale explanation if again it is 
assumed that by design names must always operate as rigid designators but 
that definite descriptions need not operate as rigid designators. 
Divergent Ambiguity Phenomenon in Modal Sentences 
There are a number of different ways to convey a modal meaning. Some of them 
are explicit in that modal meaning is introduced by a special expression, modal 
auxiliary verbs such as might or modal adverbs such as necessarily. Some of 
them are implicit in that there is not any explicit modal expression in the 
sentence but the sentence’s meaning is modal: conditional sentences77 and 
sentences which are termed as characterizing sentences in the linguistic 
literature78 convey a modal meaning although they do not contain any special 
expressions to which the generation of the modal meaning can be attributed. So, 
                                                        
77 Kratzer (1986), Lewis (1973). 




each of the following are examples of sentences which convey a modal meaning 
in one of the stated ways. 
Bruce Lee might have won an Oscar. (modal auxillary) 
Bruce Lee trained 5h per day. (characterizing sentence) 
If Bob sits on this chair, then it will break. (non-truth functional if…then…) 
If the American delegate sits on this chair it will break. (non-truth functional if…then…) 
The Sun will necessarily turn into a red dwarf. (modal adverb) 
The 40th president might have won an Oscar. (modal auxillary) 
The prime minister wears a red poppy on the Remembrance Day. (characterizing 
sentence) 
Bob wears a red hat on Christmas Eve. (characterizing sentence) 
There is a semantic divergence among modal sentences with designator 
arguments. Some manifest a certain type of ambiguity and some don’t. 
Furthermore the ones that manifest that ambiguity are those involving at least 
one argument which is a definite description. In contrast those which contain 
only proper names as arguments do not manifest that sort of ambiguity. In fact if 
in the ambiguous sentences we replace the definite descriptions with proper 
names the resulting sentences will not be ambiguous in the particular way in 
question here. This is the general linguistic data upon which I will base the first 
argument for the conclusion that proper names must be rigid designators but 
definite descriptions may not be so. 
I will now discuss in detail the case of sentences involving modal 
auxillaries and arguments that designate particulars. I will also illustrate that 
clearly the same ambiguity divergence pattern obtains in the case of other types 
of modal sentences and that in all cases of modal sentences it can be explained 
in the same way. 
A certain type of ambiguity is observable in modal sentences involving the 




disappears when the definite descriptions are replaced with proper names. 
Consider the following sentences: 
1 a The 37th president might have been female. 
 b Nixon might not have been female. 
1a is ambiguous. It can both be read as saying that the actual 37th president 
might have been female  as well as saying that it might have been the case that 
the 37th president was female. These two readings determine different truth 
conditions. Consequently, 1a is false under the first reading and but true under 
the second reading. The actual 37th president of US was Richard Nixon. Although 
in the most general sense of possibility –metaphysical possibility- perhaps it 
was possible that he was female, rarely when we use modal auxiliaries we have 
in mind the whole range of metaphysical possibility. Rather any ordinary 
utterance of 1a will be about what is possible relative to the normal flow of 
affairs.  
1b does not manifest such an ambiguity. Under the only reading it has 
where possibility is to be judged relative to the normal flow of affairs that 
sentence is false. This is so despite the fact that 1b differs from 1a only in that in 
place of the 37th president it has the proper name Nixon as argument. 
A similar ambiguity divergence obtains in other types modal sentences 
with designator arguments depending the type of singular terms they contain. 
Those that contain only proper name arguments never manifest any ambiguity, 
but this is not the case for those that contain definite description arguments. 
2 a Bob’s kid is likely to develop schizophrenia. 
 b Alice is likely to develop schizophrenia. 
  




 b Alice seldom serves Bob. 
Ordinary conditional constructions rarely express the material conditional 
truth-function. Rather they are usually analyzed as modal construction 
expressing what must happen if certain possible circumstances obtain. That this 
analysis is on the right track can be ascertained by the fact that just as in the 
case of previous examples conditionals involving definite description arguments 
are often ambiguous as illustrated below. But again when these definite 
descriptions are replaced by proper names the ambiguity ceases to obtain. 
4 a If the American delegate sits on this chair it will break. 
 b If Bob sits on this chair it will break. 
Characterizing sentences contain no explicit element to which a modal 
contribution might be attributed. Yet, they are commonly analyzed as 
expressing what must happen in the usual flow of affairs. If such analysis of the 
characterizing sentences is correct then when they contain definite descriptions 
we should expect to observe the same sort of ambiguity as the one we have seen 
to obtain in other types of modal sentences involving definite descriptions. And 
again we should expect to see that ambiguity disappear when the definite 
descriptions are replaced with proper names. These expectations are borne out: 
5 a Alice works for the American delegates. 
 b Alice works for Bob and Claire. 
The examples indicate a general divergence pattern regarding ambiguity that 
obtains among modal sentences involving designator arguments. And the 
correlation of the ambiguity with the occurrence of definite descriptions 




sentences to be ambiguous in a certain way. In contrast the absence of that sort 
of ambiguity in the examples that involved only proper name arguments 
suggests that some aspect of the proper names that distinguishes them from 
definite descriptions prevents the emergence of the ambiguity in question. 
A general linguistic-semantic explanation can be given for the illustrated 
pattern if we make two assumptions. The first assumption is syntactic: modal 
sentences determine a multiplicity of logical forms in which noun phrase 
arguments scope narrowly or widely relative to the possibly implicit constituent 
which is responsible for the modal meaning. The second assumption is 
semantic: it is linguistically possible for definite descriptions to designate 
different individuals relative to different evaluation indexes but it is not 
linguistically possible for proper names to designate different individuals 
relative to different evaluation indexes.  
If these two assumptions are granted the ambiguity of modal sentences 
involving definite descriptions will be explained as due to the possibility of 
scoping the definite descriptions narrowly or widely with respect to the modal 
constituent. Logical forms in which non-rigid definite descriptions take narrow 
scope will determine sentential meanings different than the logical forms in 
which these same definite descriptions take the wide scope. Modal constituents 
bring in quantification over evaluation indexes. In the logical forms in which the 
definite descriptions take narrow scope, their evaluation index variable will be 
bound by the modal quantifier; but in the logical forms in which the definite 
descriptions take the wide scope their evaluation index variables will remain 




evaluation index as the whole sentence in which they figure is to be interpreted. 
If a definite description is not rigid then its designatum relative to the 
evaluation index relative to which the whole sentence is to be evaluated may be 
different than the designata it will have relative to the other evaluation indexes 
over which the modal quantifier ranges. Whence arises the difference in the 
sentential meanings that result when the definite descriptions take the wide 
scope or narrow scope. 
Modal sentences with proper name arguments too should have similar 
logical forms in which the proper names take narrow scope or the wide scope. 
But in the case of these latter a logical form in which a proper name takes the 
wide scope will determine the same sentential meaning as the logical form in 
which that proper name takes the narrow scope. Because regardless whether 
the evaluation index variable of a proper name is bound by the modal quantifier 
or not it will contribute the same designatum relative to all evaluation indexes 
for which its meaning determines a designatum 
I will now proceed to illustrate how this explanation works on the basis of 
the examples with modal auxiliaries. 1a determines two logical forms. In one of 
them the definite phrase the 37th president takes narrow scope. In the other the 
37th president takes wide scope leaving behind a trace which is semantically 
dependent on the interpretation it will get in the wide scope.79 
1 a The 37th president might have been female. 
1aA [S [T might] [S [NP the 37th president] [VP have been female]]]] 
                                                        
79 For a syntactic account for the possibility of such two logical forms see Heim and Fintel 




1aB [S [NP the 37th president] [S [T might] [S t1 [VP have been female]]]] 
The first of these two logical forms where might has the widest scope will get 
the following semantic analysis: 
1aA [S [T might] [S [NP the 37th president] [VP have been female]]]] 
1ai derived from 1aA: 
{λs[might]s, {λs.[the 37th president]s, λs.[have been female]s}} 
{λs.[might]s, λs.[have been female]s([ The 37th president]s)} 
{λs.λS.s’(R(s)(s’) & S(s’)), λs.[have been female]s([ The 37th president]s)} 
λs.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’([ The 37th president]s’)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
s’(R(@)(s’) & [have been female]s’([ The 37th president]s’)) 
The result is a sentential meaning in which evaluation index variable of the 37th 
president is bound by the existential quantification over evaluation indexes 
introduced by might. This sentential meaning determines the following truth 
conditions: 
True at w iff there are worlds w’ such that w’ is accessible to w and the denotation of 
have been female relative to w’ maps to truth the designatum of the 37th president 
relative to w’.  
The second logical form associated with 1a,  1aB where the noun phrase the 37th 
president gets the widest scope will on the other hand gets the following 
interpretation: 
1aB [S [NP the 37th president] [S [T might] [S t1 [VP have been female]]]] 
1aii derived from 1aB: 
{λs.[the 37th president]s, {1, {λs.[might]s,{ λs.[t1]s,g, λs.[have been female]s}}}} 
{λs.[the 37th p.]s, {1, { λs.λS.s’(R(s)(s’) & S(s’)), { λs.[t1]s,g, λs.[have been female]s}}}} 
{λs.[the 37th president]s, {1, { λs.λS.s’(R(s)(s’) & S(s’)), λs.[have been female]s([t1]s,g)}}} 
{λs.[the 37th president]s, {1, λs.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’([t1]s’,g))}} 
{λs.[the 37th president]s, λs.λx.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’([t1]s’,g(x/1)))} 
{λs.[the 37th president]s, λs.λx.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’(x))} 




when evaluated relative to @: 
s’(R(@)(s’) & [have been female]s’([the 37th president]@)) 
Here the evaluation index variable of the 37th president is not bound by the 
existential quantification over worlds introduced by might. Consequently, the 
37th president will be evaluated relative to the same evaluation index as the 
whole sentence. The resulting sentential meaning determines the following 
truth-conditions: 
True at w iff there are worlds w’ such that w’ is accessible to w and the denotation of 
have been female relative to w’ maps to truth the designatum of the 37th president 
relative to w. 
Note that in the evaluation of 1aii relative to t world w, only the the designatum 
of the 37th president relative to w is relevant. In contrast in the evaluation of 1ai 
relative to a world w, the designata of the 37th president relative to other worlds 
w’ are relevant as well. 
If The 37th president is not a rigid designator, an assumption which is 
confirmed by the way such definite phrases are semantically analyzed, it will 
follow that for some worlds w and w’, [The 37th president]w ≠ [The 37th 
president]w’. Then clearly the sentential meaning –i.e. the truth conditions- 
determined by the logical form 1ai will be different than the sentential meaning 
determined by the logical form 1aii.  
If 1a determines two logical forms in which the 37th president takes the wide 
scope or the narrow scope, 1b, which has the same syntactic structure as 1a, 
should determine two similar logical forms too. These would be the following: 
1 b Nixon might have been female 
1bA [S [T might] [S [NP Nixon] [VP have been female]]]] 




And the semantic derivation of sentential meaning from these logical forms 
should proceed in the same way as were the case with the logical forms of 1a. 
The logical form in which might has the widest scope will thus get the following 
interpretation: 
1bA [S [T might] [S [NP Nixon] [VP have been female]]] 
1bi derived from 1bA: 
{λs[might]s, {λs.[Nixon]s, λs.[have been female]s}} 
{ λs.λS.s’(R(s)(s’) & S(s’)), {λs.[Nixon]s, λs.[have been female]s}} 
{λs.λS.s’(R(s)(s’) & S(s’)), λs.[have been female]s([ Nixon]s)} 
λs.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’([ Nixon]s’)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
s’(R(@)(s’) & [have been female]s’([ Nixon]s’)) 
Here the evaluation index variable of Nixon is bound by the existential 
quantification introduced by might. Thus, in the evaluation of the whole 
sentence relative to a world w, not just the designatum of Nixon relative to w, 
but its designatum relative to other possible worlds w’ will as well be relevant. 
The sentential meaning 1bi determines the following truth conditions: 
True at w iff there are worlds w’ such that w’ is accessible to w and the denotation of 
have been female relative to w’ maps to truth the designatum of Nixon relative to w’. 
The logical form 1bB on the other hand will get the following interpretation: 
1bB [S [NP Nixon]1 [S 1 [ [T might] [S t1 [VP have been female]]]]] 
1bii derived from 1bB: 
{λs.[Nixon]s, {1, {λs.[might]s,{ λs.[t1]s,g, λs.[have been female]s}}}} 
{λs.[Nixon]s, {1, {λs.λS.s’(R(s)(s’) & S(s’)),{ λs.[t1]s,g, λs.[have been female]s}}}} 
{λs.[Nixon]s, {1, { λs.λS.s’(R(s)(s’) & S(s’)), λs.[have been female]s([t1]s,g)}}} 
{λs.[Nixon]s, {1, λs.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’([t1]s’,g))}} 
{λs.[Nixon]s, λs.λx.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’([t1]s’,g(x/1)))} 
{λs.[Nixon]s,  λs.λx.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’(x))} 
λs.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’([Nixon]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 




Here the evaluation index variable of Nixon is not bound by the existential 
quantification introduced by might. Thus in the evaluation of the whole 
sentence relative to a possible world w only the desigatum of Nixon relative to 
w will be relevant. The meaning 1bii determines the following truth-conditions: 
truth at w iff there are worlds w’ such that w’ is accessible to w and the denotation of 
have been female relative to w’ maps to truth the designatum of Nixon relative to w. 
If Nixon were not a rigid designator then the sentential meanings 1bi and 1bii 
derived respectively from the logical forms 1bA and 1bB would be different and 
1b would consequently be ambiguous just like 1a. But this is not the case. If 
Nixon is a rigid designator on the other hand the truth conditions determined by 
1bi and 1bii will be the same: 
1bi λs.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’([ Nixon]s’))    
truth at w iff there are worlds w’ such that w’ is accessible to w and the denotation of 
have been female relative to w’ maps Nixon to truth. 
1bii λs.s’(R(s)(s’) & [have been female]s’([Nixon]s)) 
truth at w  iff there are worlds w’ such that w’ is accessible to w and the denotation of 
have been female relative to w’ maps Nixon to truth. 
For any worlds w, w’ the designatum of Nixon relative to w’ will be the same as 
its designatum relative to w –i.e. for any s∈Ds [Nixon]s will be the same 
individual. Thus, unlike 1a, 1b will not be ambiguous, although like 1a it 
determines two distinct logical forms. 
There is nothing special about the pair of sentences 1a and 1b. We can 
produce many such pairs at will. Whenever in an ambiguous modal sentence 
involving definite description arguments we replace the definite descriptions 




So, the pair 1a and 1b illustrates a general phenomenon. And clearly 
explanations similar to the one we gave of the ambiguity divergence between 1a 
and 1b will apply in all similar cases. If this way of explaining the ambiguity 
divergence in question here is to be generalized, then we will need the two 
assumptions already mentioned at the beginning. One of these was the syntactic 
assumption that modal sentences determine a multiplicity of logical forms 
depending on the way the noun phrases take scope with respect to the modal 
constituent. The other is the semantic assumption that proper names by 
linguistic design must be rigid designators, but that there is not such a necessity 
for definite descriptions. The syntactic assumption in question here is a 
corollary of the principles of noun phrase movement that is generally accepted 
in transformational generative grammar tradition for reasons independent of 
specific the ambiguity issue handled here. These principles then get further 
support because as we have seen they are also of help in the explanation of the 
ambiguities of the sort considered here. The semantic assumption with regard 
to the obligatory rigidity of proper names on the other hand does not in my 
opinion have a justification that is independent from the explanatory work I 
have illustrated above – and the one concerning identity sentences which I will 
illustrate below. That this assumption enables us to give a linguistic-semantic 
explanation of a general semantic phenomenon regarding modal sentences with 
designator arguments is the justification for its adoption. Had it been devoid of 





The explanation of the remaining cases of ambiguity/non-ambiguity 
divergence of the modal sentences involving singular term arguments will be 
similar to the case just considered, and will presumably further support 
ascription of de jure rigidity to proper names.  For, common semantic analyses 
of such constituents as seldom, likely, of if…then… constructions and of 
characterizing sentences involve quantification over possible worlds. But as 
there are thorny issues regarding the details of those analyses I will not discuss 
their cases separately. 
Divergent Contingency Phenomenon in Identity S entences 
Identity sentences, or their negations, whose arguments are proper names 
always appear to be non-contingent sentences. This can be discerned in the 
following examples which sound inconsistent, when might is read with the 
alethic sense of possibility: 
Hesperus is Phosphorus, but this might not have been so. 
It is not the case that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but it might very well be. 
Leo Tesfai is Len Kahsai, but it might not be so. 
Leo Tesfai is not Len Kahsai, but he might very well be. 
But this non-contingency cannot be attributed to all identity sentences, and 
their negations. The following sentences are okay even when might is read with 
alethic sense: 
The brightest star of the evening sky is Venus, but this might not have been so. 
The brightest star of the evening sky is not Venus, but it might have been so. 
The author known under the name ‘Leo Tesfai’ is Len Kahsai, but it might not have 
been so. 




The non-contingency of identity sentences the arguments of which are proper 
names can be explained by attributing de jure rigidity to proper names; the 
capacity of identity sentences which contain at least one definite description 
argument to be contingent can in turn be explained by noting that definite 
descriptions need not always be rigid designators. 
6 Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
 [[Hesperus] [is [Phosphorus]]] 
{λs.[Hesperus]s, {λs.λx.λy.{x=y}, λs.[Phosphorus]s}} 
{λs.[Hesperus]s, λs.λx.{x=[Phosphorus]s}}  
λs.{[Hesperus]s =[Phosphorus]s} 
If by linguistic design Hesperus has the same denotation at every evaluation 
index s and if the same is the case for Phosphorus, then either Hesperus is 
Phosphorus will be true relative to all evaluation indexes or it will be false 
relative to all evaluation indexes.  
7 The brightest star of the evening sky is Venus. 
 [[The brightest star of the evening sky] [is [Venus]]] 
{λs.[The brightest star of the evening sky]s, {λs.λx.λy.{x=y}, λs.[Venus]s}} 
{λs.[The brightest star of the evening sky]s, λs.λx.{x=[Venus]s}}  
λs.{[The brightest star of the evening sky]s =[Venus]s} 
If the brightest star of the evening sky does not have the same denotation at 
every evaluation index s then even if Venus is rigid, then the brightest star of the 
evening sky is Venus may be true relative to some evaluation indexes and false 
relative to some other. 
There is not much to be said about the provided explanation of the 
phenomenon of contingency divergence among identity sentences formed with 




explained, then the wholesale assignment of rigidity to proper names is 
confirmed further, and corroborates the previously given explanation of the 
phenomenon of the ambiguity divergence in modal sentences with particular 





THE VARIETY OF NOUN PHRASES FORMED BY COMMON NOUNS 
In the previous chapter we have illustrated how an explicit linguistic-semantic 
argument can be raised to defend a rigidity/non-rigidity divergence among a 
certain class of terms on the basis of the non controversial case of proper names 
and definite descriptions. Our proclaimed objective is of course to mount similar 
arguments that pertain to common nouns. But we will not be able attack this 
objective immediately. 
As indicated in the introduction and in the chapter on the relevant 
philosophical literature, the case of common nouns present difficulties which 
have no counterpart in the case of proper names. Common nouns often 
contribute to the interpretation of sentences by forming noun phrases the 
semantic contributions of which is a non-trivial function of the meanings of the 
common nouns that form them. Futhermore the semantic output of these noun 
phrases formed by common nouns is quite varied: appliers, quantifiers, 
designators which may be kind level or particular level. For two interconnected 
reasons this predicament of the common nouns should stop us from attacking 
the issue of the common noun rigidity headlong. 
First, the mode of denotation (applier or designator) and the type of 
denotation (kind or particular) that should be ascribed to common nouns 
cannot be immediately determined. One should first consider the semantic 
output of the noun phrases formed by common nouns, which is not itself a 




can judge which modes and types of denotations can be assigned to common 
nouns so that the semantic outputs acscribed to the noun phrases formed by 
them are accounted for in the best way.  
Second, our ultimate objective is to determine whether there is a 
rigidity/non-rigidity difference among common nouns themselves. The basic 
data we can use on this issue will pertain to the interpretation of sentences, 
specifically on their ambiguity/non-ambiguity and on their modal properties. 
But the effects of the rigidity/non-rigidity of the common nouns on the 
interpretation of sentences is not immediate as common nouns’s semantic 
contribution is effected by way of being an input to the interpretation of the 
noun phrases. The rigidity/non-rigidity of common nouns does not require the 
noun phrases they form to be rigid or non-rigid, and vice versa. So, to be able to 
judge whether there is a rigid/non-rigid difference among common nouns on 
the basis of sentence level semantic data we have to have an exact idea as to 
how the semantic output of noun phrases is derived from the meanings of the 
common nouns. 
For these reasons the proper discussion on the rigidity of common nouns 
will come after I discuss first the semantic variety of the noun phrases formed 
by common nouns, and second the different ways to account for that variety. 
In the present chapter I will deal with the variety of the noun phrases 
formed by common nouns. After a preliminary section on syntactic matters 
regarding common nouns and noun phrases, I will illustrate the different types 
of meanings commonly assigned to such noun phrase types as indefinites, bare 




their mode of denotation (designation, application or quantification) and the 
type of denotata they they pertain to (kinds or particulars). We will also see that 
regarding the types of meanings to be assigned to certain noun phrase types 
there is not as yet a consensus –e.g. bare plural noun phrases like tigers. One 
thing I won’t do in the present chapter is to discuss how these different types of 
meanings for noun phrases can be derived in a principled way from the 
meanings of the common nouns that form them. This will be the topic of the 
next chapter.  
Common Nouns, Modified Common Nouns and Noun Phrases 
Simple common nouns are such expression as automobile, planet, expression, 
water, oil, president. They form a syntactically and semantically basic lexical 
category. Together with proper names they form the more inclusive lexical 
category nouns (N).  Syntactically they can be characterized as simple 
expressions which can combine with determiners. Determiners are such 
expressions as a, the, every, some, most, many, two etc. Determiners combine 
with common nouns to form noun phrases (NP’s, characterized below) as in 
some water, every oil, most planets, two automobiles, few presidents, the water, 
an oil, the planet, the president. Common nouns can also form nominal 
predicates in sentences; when they do so, some require determiners some don’t:  
The liquid in this glass is not water. 




Although semantically common nouns and adjectives are often assigned similar 
meanings (viz. predicative meanings of type <s,<e,t>>), note that the given 
characterization of common nouns excludes adjectives. Adjectives can form 
predicates but unlike common nouns they cannot combine with determiners: 
 *every fresh is green. 
 *Two young looked for you. 
The apples are fresh.  
These applicants are young.  
Furthermore, adjectives can be directly combined with common nouns to form 
new nouns. But two common nouns usually cannot be combined to form a new 
noun.  
Fresh apples need not be green. 
*Fruit apples need not be green. 
Common nouns can be modified by clusters of adjectives, relative phrases and 
prepositional phrases to form further noun like elements.  
One red apple that Alice bit yesterday is in the fridge. 
One truck load of fresh apples from Amasya have scattered all over the road. 
These modified nouns, like the simple common nouns, can combine with 
determiners to form determiner phrases as seen above or can form nominal 
predicates as seen in the following sentence. 
The only thing in the fridge is a red apple bitten by Alice. 
The category formed by simple common nouns, modified common nouns and 




the sign N’.80 The postulation of the category of N’ can be justified considering 
that every modified common noun forms a syntactic and semantic unit which is 
grammatically replaceable by a simple common noun and vice versa. 
Furthermore both simple common nouns and modified common nouns can be 
replaced by one: 
The red apple on the table and the one bitten by Alice are the only red apples left.  
The red apple on the table and the green one bitten by Alice are the only apples left. 
For simplicity I will take both simple common nouns and the constituents that 
result through their modification to constitute the category common nouns. 
Without this convention, strictly speaking the portent of the present work 
should rather be redescribed as the investigation of constituents of the category 
N’ as to whether some among them should be singled out as de jure rigid. 
Nouns constitute a lexical category, alongside adjectives, verbs, adverbs 
etc. But the syntactic, and consequently the semantic, analysis of sentences 
cannot be based on lexical categories alone. The same sequence of lexical items 
can constitute two different sentences depending on how we partition the 
sequence into constituents. 
Alice [saw [the man with a telescope]] 
Alice [saw [the man]] with a telescope] 
Hence emerges the need for another set of categories alongside lexical 
categories to analyze sentences into. The categories of sentence constituents are 
phrases. Phrases are formed by lexical elements and are named according to the 
                                                        




lexical elements that heads them. The phrases headed by a member of category 
N are termed as noun phrases (NP).81 82   
NP’s are phrases headed by nouns and fulfill the argument function in 
sentences. They include phrases formed by bare nouns as well as common 
nouns combined with determiners: 
The dodo is extinct. (definite singular NP) 
Two male dodos have recently been found in Tasmania. (quantified NP, bare singular 
NP) 
Every bicycle assembled by Alice have broken. (quantified NP) 
The conquistadors shot birds held sacred by the natives. (definite plural NP, bare 
plural NP) 
Pink Cadillacs have been awarded to the winners. (bare plural NP, definite plural NP) 
Following the process, boiling water should be poured into the sink. (definite singular 
NP, bare singular NP, definite singular NP) 
It is illegal to shoot any bird held sacred by the natives. (quantified NP) 
No planet is beyond our reach (quantified NP) 
Automobiles became an indispensable feature of modern life. (bare plural NP) 
Water is scarce around here. (bare singular NP) 
Alice is convicted for shooting a bird held sacred by the natives. (Bare singular NP, 
indefinite singular NP) 
In English only plural count common nouns, mass common nouns and proper 
names can head bare NP’s. Singular count nouns can head NP’s only by 
combining with determiners.  
                                                        
81 Traditionally NP’s were regarded as arguments of verb phrases that are headed by nouns. 
Among NP’s were included bare arguments formed by nominals alone without any determiners 
but also arguments formed by the combination of nominals with determiners. But recent 
theories in the transformational tradition distinguish the latter as Determiner Phrases, and take 
them to be headed by determiners. In these theories the category we singled out as N’ above are 
regarded as NP’s proper. As regards bare arguments that were previously considered as NP’s 
there is an ongoing disagreement as to wheter they are NP’s, or DP’s with implicit 
unpronounced determiners. Despite the popularity of these recent syntactic theories however in 
semantic theorizing practitioners often continue to use the older framework unless a semantic 
point to be made is sensitive to this preference. In the present work we do the same. 





Some NP’s can also form predicates in sentences. The most typical of these 
are indefinite singular NP’s, bare plural NP’s and NP’s headed by common nouns 
modified by number adjectives.83 
The Sun is a yellow dwarf. 
The Sun and the Proxima Centauri are yellow dwarves. 
The Sun and the Proxima Centauri are two yellow dwarves. 
In the rest of the chapter I will explore the variety in the semantic output of the 
NP’s headed by common nouns. I will exclusively focus on the semantics of NP’s 
headed by count common nouns (for this reason heretofore I will drop using the 
qualification count). 
The Semantic Variety of Noun Phrases Formed by Common N ouns  
One and the same common noun can be used to form different types of noun 
phrases. This variety can be illustrated by considering the case of whale.84  
1 a Whales face extinction due to excessive hunting. (bare plural) 
 b The Beluga and the Narwhal are whales. (bare plural predicate ) 
 c The stars of the theme park, Alice and Bob, are whales. (bare plural predicate) 
 d Whales have torn our nets last night. (bare plural) 
 e One of the stars of the theme park, Alice, is a whale. (indefinite singular    
  predicate) 
 f Last night a whale should have torn off the fish nets. (indefinite singular) 
 g The Beluga is not a shark species, it is a whale. (indefinite singular predicate) 
 h Alice objects to the classification of a whale under the Phocoenidae family.   
 (indefinite singular) 
                                                        
83 Number terms in argument NP’s are often distinguished from number terms figuring in 
predicate NP’s. The former are regarded as quantifiers whereas the latter are regarded as 
adjectives. 




 j Surely, the whale should have been disoriented to come into these waters and 
  tore our nets off. (definite singular) 
 k Alice claims that the cladistic analysis shows that the whale should rather be  
  put under an altogether new genus. (definite singular) 
 l The whale is a highly intelligent mammal.(definite singular) 
 m The whales escaped by jumping off the pool over the gate into the sea. (definite 
  plural) 
 n Two whales tore out nets. (quantified)  
 o Some whales are not endangered species. (quantified) 
Corresponding to this syntactic variety there surely is a semantic variety. The 
semantic variety is in fact greater than the syntactic one. For example, as the 
reader may have already noticed, the whale in its occurrence in 1j cannot be 
taken to make the same semantic contribution as it does in its occurrence in 1k. 
It happens to be the case that, as will be more amply illustrated below, noun 
phrases of the same syntactic types formed by the same common nouns may 
produce different types of semantic contributions in different sentential 
contexts. 
More precisely we will see that noun phrases formed by common nouns 
shows semantic variety in two respects. First, the types of their denotations 
differ. That is these phrases differ in whether they designate entities (type e), 
apply to entities (type <e,t>), or quantify over entities (type <<e,t> t>).85 
Second, they differ in the types entities involved in their denotations. 
Surely NP denotations typically pertain to particulars.  That is, designate, apply 
to or quantify over particulars. But, as can be noticed in the examples of phrases 
formed by whale, there are reasons to think that some NP denotations should 
                                                        




pertain to entities which are not particulars. In the semantic literature these 
entities are termed as kinds.  
What are kinds? Following the linguistic-semantic literature on genericity 
I will simply assume that besides particulars there are such entitities as kinds 
and that such noun phrases as this kind (of ), this model (of ), this type (of ) 
designate kinds (and I will term such noun phrases simply as kind phrases).86 
Below I will illustrate the semantic variety of the NP’s formed by common 
nouns in the two respects mentioned. I will illustrate the semantic contributions 
standardly assigned to NP’s in a variety of sentential contexts so that the 
sentences they figure in get the truth-conditions we intuitively ascribe them to 
have. But I will not go into the semantic analyses of the NP’s themselves. This is 
a job for the next chapter where I will discuss different possible ways to derive 
the variety in the denotations of the NP’s which are formed by common nouns 
as a function of the meanings of the common nouns that form them.  
Indefinite Singular NP’s 
1 e One of the stars of the theme park, Alice, is a whale. (indefinite singular) 
 f Last night a whale should have torn off the fish nets. (indefinite singular) 
 g The Beluga is not a shark species, it is a whale. (indefinite singular) 
 h Alice objects to the classification of a whale under the Phocoenidae family.   
  (indefinite singular) 
Indefinite singulars are NP’s of the form a(n) , where  is a common noun. In 
the syntactic organization of sentences they can operate as arguments of verbs 
                                                        




in subject or object positions. They can also form the predicate in nominal 
predications. In argument positions they are often taken to have 
quantificational denotations (type <<e,t>,t>), but there are other, perhaps 
better, theoretical options as well.  In predicate position they are usually taken 
to have predicative denotations (type <e,t>), but again there are other 
possibilities. In both of these positions their denotations can pertain to kinds or 
particulars.  
Indefinite Singular NP’s Denoting Particulars 
The denotation of the indefinite singular NP’s figuring in the following sentences 
pertain to particulars. 
2 a The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday was a road bike.  
 b A road bike stood locked next to Alice’s bike. 
Yet the semantic types of these NP’s are not the same. a road bike in 2a occurs in 
the predicate position and it will standardly be assigned a denotation of type 
<e,t> that applies to particular road bikes.  
2 a The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday is a road bike. 
  [[NP The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday][VP is [NP a road bike]]] 
{λs’.[e The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday]s’, {λs’.λP.P, λs’.[<e,t>  a road bike]}} 
{λs’.[e The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday]s’, λs’.[<e,t>  a road bike]} 




The indefinite articles occurring in NP’s that figure in predicate positions are 
usually interpreted as vacuous. The same is the case for the predicative 
copula.87  
In 2b a road bike occurs in an argument position and following a common 
approach deriving from Montague’s and Lewis’ work it can be assigned an 
existential generalized quantifier (GQ) denotation of type <<e,t>,t>> that 
pertains to particular tokens:88  
2 b A road bike stood locked next to Alice’s bike. 
  [S[NP a road bike][VP stood next to Alice’s bike]] 
{λs’.[<<et>,t> a road bike]s’, λs’.[<e,t> stood next to Alice’s bike]s’} 
λs’.[<<e,t>,t> a road bike]s’([<e,t> stood next to Alice’s bike]s’) 
Here the contribution of [NP a road bike] relative to an evaluation index s’ will be 
a function that maps a predicative denotation P into truth if and only if there is 
at least one road bike token x for which P(x) is true. That is, if for example we 
take the common noun road bike to have a predicative denotation then we will 
have,  
λs’.[<<et>,t> a road bike]s’=λs’.λP.x([<e,t>road bike]s’ & P(x)) 
Here the indefinite article will not be interpreted as semantically vacuous, but 
will be given an existential quantifying determiner interpretation, 
                                                        
87 Heim and Kratzer (1998) pgs. 61-62. Another option may be to interpret a road bike in 2a as 
an existentially quantified phrase and the copula as the is of identity. However then in such a 
sentence as The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday is not a road bike one should expect 
a reading according to which a particular road bike was not the priciest gift Alice received. 
Whether there indeed is such a reading is dubious. 





which when it combines with road bike interpreted as an applier will yield the 
given interpretation of [NP a road bike].89 
From then on I will adopt this treatment of indefinite singular arguments. 
But it is neither the only one nor the best. It cannot account for the semantic 
contribution of a considerable range of indefinite singular arguments: 
3 a Everyone who owns a road bike is proud of it. 
 b A road bike is usually lighter than 12 kg. 
For example in 3a and 3b too a road bike figures in argument positions, one 
would expect that in these sentences too it can be assigned an existential GQ 
meaning quantifying over particulars.  But note that 3a is one of those notorious 
donkey sentences and interpreting  a road bike here as an existential GQ would 
not yield the salient reading of the sentence. The salient reading is obtainable 
however if it is assigned a universal GQ meaning. And 3b is a so called generic 
sentence where a road bike can neither be interpreted as an existential GQ nor 
as a universal GQ. One way to deal with this variety in the meaning indefinite 
singular phrases may be to take indefinite singular phrases to be ambiguous 
between different GQ meanings –still it is not certain whether there is a GQ 
meaning that will work in the case of 3b. But there is also a relatively recent but 
common approach introduced in Heim (1982) that takes indefinite singular 
phrases in argument positions as introducing variables restricted by 
accompanying predicates which can treat all occurences of indefinite singular 
                                                        





phrases in argument positions uniformly. But under Heim’s approach as well 
the occurrences of a road bike in the sentences 3a-b will denote to particular 
tokens. 
Trying to accomodate this approach here will take us too far afield. The 
derivation of the semantic structures it assigns to sentences are derivable only 
through a considerable reshuffle of the surface syntax of sentences, and the 
interpretation rules for these logical forms are not straightforward. For these 
reasons I will ignore this approach to the semantics of indefinite noun phrases. 
Most of the discussion in the next chapter on the rigidity of common nouns is 
not based on sentences that are best handled by Heim’s approach. 
Indefinite Singular NP ’s Denoting Kinds 
Indefinite singular NP’s can also denote kinds. This is termed as their taxonomic 
reading. Consider the following specimen: 
4 a  The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 is a road bike by the Czech maker Morati. 
 b  A road bike by the Czech maker Morati has been launched today. 
 c This week in her blog Alice has reviewed a road bike by the Czech maker   
 Morati. 
In 4a the subjectThe Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 is a kind-designating phrase, it does not 
designate a contextually salient particular token but a certain bike model –it can 
be replaced by this model without any change in the truth-conditions. Such 
phrases are called definite generics and I will separately cover them below. In 
the predicate position we have the indefinite singular a road bike by the Czech 




straightforward interpretation for the indefinite singular in the predicate will be 
to assign it predicative denotations of type <e,t>, but one which truly applies to 
only bike models rather than the tokens. Thus, 4a will have receive the following 
interpretation: 
4 a  The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 is a road bike by the Czech maker Morati. 
  [[NP The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3][VP is [NP a road bike by the Czech maker Morati]]] 
{λs’.k[e The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s’, {λs’.λP.P, λs’.k[<e,t>  a r. b. by the Czech maker Morati]}} 
{λs’.k[e The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s’, λs’.k[<e,t>  a road bike by the Czech maker Morati]} 
λs’.k[<e,t>  a road bike by the Czech maker Morati](k[e The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s’) 
In 4b, the predicate is formed by [VP has been launched today] . In relation with 
bikes it will truly apply only to models rather than the tokens.  That predicate 
here combines with the subject formed by the indefinite singular a road bike by 
the Czech maker Morati which thus should be taken to denote kinds. If we 
pursue the described treatment of indefinite singulars in argument positions, 
then it should be assigned existential GQ denotations quantifying over kinds 
rather than over tokens. Thus we will have, 
4 b  A road bike by the Czech maker Morati has been launched today. 
  [S[NP a road bike by the Czech maker Morati][VP has been launched today]] 
{λs’.k[<<et>,t> a r. b. by the Czech maker Morati]s’, λs’.k[<e,t> has been launched today]s’} 
λs’.k[<<e,t>,t> a road bike by the Czech maker Morati]s’(k[<e,t> has been launched today]s’) 
In 4c, the indefinite noun phrase a road bike by the Czech maker Morati figures 
as the object of the verb review. The object of a bike review in a blog is typically 
a certain model of bike, rather than a bike token. Even if during the review 




reviewed one bike. If so, then the indefinite noun phrase, figuring as the object-
argument should again be taken to denote models of bike: 
4 c This week in her blog Alice has reviewed a road bike by the Czech maker Morati. 
  [S[NP a r. b. by the C. maker M.]1[1 [S this week in her blog Alice has reviewed t1]]] 
{λs’.k[<<e,t>,t>a r. b. by the C. maker M.]s’, {1, λs’.[this w. in her blog A. has reviewed t1]s’}} 
{λs’.k[<<e,t>,t>a r. b. by the C. maker M.]s’, λs’.λy.[this w. in her blog A. has reviewed ty]s’} 
λs’.k[<<e,t>,t>a r. b. by the C. maker M.]s’(λy.[this week in her blog Alice has reviewed ty]s’) 
One issue that comes immediately to mind is the connection between the kind 
denoting and particular denoting uses of indefinite singular phrases. Are the 
underlying common nouns ambiguous between a kind denoting reading and a 
particular denoting reading? Or is it the case that either the kind-referring 
reading or the particular referring reading is the native reading and the other is 
derived by a special operation forced by the sentential context in which the 
term is used? The same issue will reemerge when we consider other phrases 
formed by common nouns. This issue will be dealt with in the next chapter after 
we consider the all noun phrases formed by common nouns and all types of 
denotations that are commonly assigned to them. 
Another issue that can first be raised in relation with kind denoting 
indefinite singular phrases, and one that will reemerge below as we consider 
other sorts of noun phrases is the possibility to use phrases that apparently are 
kind denoting as arguments in sentential contexts that require arguments which 
denote particulars (I will hitherto term such sentential contexts as particular 
level sentential contexts, and I will term the contexts that require kind denoting 
arguments as kind level sentential contexts). Consider the following sentences: 




 b Bob wants to buy a road bike that was positively reviewed by most of the bike 
  sites he follows. 
 c Alice found the remains of an extinct bison. 
In these sentences the highlighted indefinite singulars appear to denote kinds. 
They appear forced to assume a taxonomic interpretation as the common nouns 
that form them involves the kind level modifiers, endangered, that was 
positively reviewed by most of the bike sites he follows, extinct. However the 
sentential contexts in which they figure are particular level. Below we will 
repeatedly come upon cases of such sortal discrepancies between the 
denotation of an argument and the denotation of the sentential context in which 
that argument figures. Such sortal discrepancies are usually resolved by the 
postulation of special operations that adjust the denotation type of either the 
sentential context or the argument.  
Bare Plural Noun Phrases  
1 a Whales face extinction due to excessive hunting. 
 b The Beluga and the Narwhal are whales. 
 c The stars of the theme park, Alice and Bob, are whales. 
 d Whales have torn our nets last night. 
Bare plural phrases are noun phrases formed by plural common nouns, which 
can form predicates or operate as arguments barely, that is, without any overt 
determiner. In either of these positions they can denote particulars or kinds. In 
predicate position they are usually taken to predicatively apply to sum 
individuals, that is, pluralities of kinds or of particulars. As regards their 
occurences in argument positions, their denotation type and whether they 




argue that virtually all non-taxonomic bare plural phrases designate a kind 
when they are in argument position. Some other authors argue that only in 
certain special sentential contexts they designate kinds but otherwise they 
operate like the plural version of non-taxonomic indefinite singular phrases. 
There also are taxonomic bare plural arguments; but their semantics is a 
relatively less addressed issue, although their case is quite relevant for the 
controversy on the semantics of the non-taxonomic bare plural arguments. Now 
let’s look at the examples and the semantic phenomena that are taken to 
constitute the evidence for this semantic variety. 
Bare Plural Phrases in Predicate Position 
Curiously in English plural count common nouns, unlike singular count common 
nouns, do not require determiners to form noun phrases that can figure in 
predicate or argument positions. Thus in English we have bare plural phrases 
figuring predicate positions: 
6 a The bikes at Alice’s room are  road bikes. 
 b The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog are road bikes. 
The interpretation of bare plural NP’s in argument positions is a controversial 
issue as we will see below, but as regards their interpretation in predicate 
positions there is not any controversy. In predicate positions they are usually 
assigned predicative meanings of type <s,<e,t>> that truly apply to sum 
individuals. Sum individuals are entities introduced to account for the semantics 




such as Alice, Bob, and Carol. They are considered entitites of type e alongside 
atomic individuals. Sum individuals can be sums of kinds or sums of particulars, 
or simultaneously of both –a little more will be said about them in the next 
chapter. So for example 6a and 6b will be interpreted in the following way: 
6 a The bikes at Alice’s room are road bikes. 
  [[NP the bikes at Alice’s room] [VP are [NP road bikes]]]  
{λs’.pl_p[e the bikes at Alice’s room]s’,λs’.pl_p[<e,t> road bikes]s’}  
λs’.pl_p[<e,t> road bikes]s’(pl_p[e the bikes at Alice’s room]s’) 
6 b The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog are road bikes. 
  [[NP The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog] [VP are [NP road bikes]]]  
{λs’.pl_k[e The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog]s’,λs’.pl_k[<e,t> road bikes]s’}  
λs’.pl_k[<e,t> road bikes]s’(pl_k[e The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog]s’) 
According to these in both 6a and 6b road bikes has a predicative denotation. 
But in 6b it has a non-taxonomic denotation that applies to bike tokens, whereas 
in 6b it has a taxonomic denotation that applies to bike models. 
Bare Plural Phrases in Argument Positions 
As I indicated above there is a controversy about the interpretation of bare 
plural phrases in argument positions. Some authors argue that almost all non-
taxonomic bare plural phrases in argument positions designate kinds; that is 
that they have name like denotations of type e, with kinds as the denotata. Some 




bare plural phrases designate kinds, but reject that they always do so.90  This 
controversy focuses on non-taxonomic uses of bare plurals in argument 
positions. Beside this use, all parties of this controversy would agree that bare 
plural phrases also have a taxonomic use. Yet, the taxonomic use of bare plural 
arguments is not addressed with as much detail, despite the fact that as we will 
see later it is quite relevant for the controversy about the semantics of the the 
non-taxonomic bare plural arguments. 
There will be a relatively long coverage of bare plural arguments’ semantic 
output in the present chapter, and of the way they derive that output out of the 
meanings of the common nouns that form them in the next chapter. This is so in 
spite of the fact that when I discuss the rigidity of common nouns my examples 
will not involve bare plural phrases. The reason for this long coverage is that 
different possible views about bare plural arguments meanings’ have 
repercussions on the question regarding the types and modes of denotation that 
should be assigned to common nouns (specifically in relation with the question 
whether all common nouns should be assigned kind designator meanings); 
which in turn will be seen to be relevant as regards the question whether there 
is a rigid/non-rigid distinction among common nouns.  
                                                        
90 The case for the view that virtually all bare plural NP arguments formed by non-taxonomic 
common nouns always refer to kinds was first raised by Carlson (1980), most of the arguments 
to that effect in the subsequent literature derives from that text. In my presentation I mainly 
depend on the discussions, examples and arguments of Krifka et al. (1995), Chierchia (1998), 




Bare Plural Phrases as Arguments in Kind Level Sentential Contexts 
Foremost among data suggesting that bare plural phrases can designate kinds 
are sentences in which they occur as arguments of predicates that typically take 
kind designating arguments, and where they are replaceable by kind-phrases, 
which we have at the outset assumed to designate kinds, without any change in 
the truth-conditions (the required plural/singular shift is overlooked as being 
solely due to syntactic reasons).  
7 a Dodos are extinct. / This species is extinct. 
 b Red ants are not endangered. / This species is not endangered. 
 c Dot matrix printers are no longer produced. / This type of printer is no longer  
 produced. 
 d L36s are no longer produced. /This printer model is no longer produced. 
 e Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s have been launched today. / This model has been    
  launched today. 
 f This week Alice’s blog has reviewed Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s. / This week Alice’s  
  blog reviewed this model. 
 g Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s are designed by a Czech design team. / This model is   
  designed by Czech design team. 
 h Ernest Rutherford discovered protons. / Ernest Rutherford discovered this  
  type of particle. 
 j Transistors are invented by Julius Edgar Lilienfeld. / This type of device is   
 invented by Julius Edgar Lilienfeld. 
The replaceability of bare plural arguments by kind phrases by itself may not be 
taken to show that those bare plural phrases designate kinds. Yet in conjunction 
with the difficulty of interpreting these phrases in other ways, this 
replaceability strongly suggests that, such bare plural phrases designate kinds. 
In this vein one may consider treating the bare plural phrases occurring in 
subject or object positions in the above sentence as some sort of implicitly 
quantified noun phrases. Initially, one may consider the possibility to assign the 




denotations of type <<e,t>,t>. Consider the case of 7a (we assume for the time 
being that non-taxonomic plural common nouns have predicative denotations of 
type <e ,t> that applies to sums of particulars): 
7 a Dodos are extinct. 
  [[NPDodos][VP are [Adj extinct]]]  
i {λs. p[∃_GQ Dodos]s, λs.[extinct]s} 
 λs.p[∃_GQ Dodos]s([extinct]s) 
 λs.λP.x(p[ <e,t>Dodos]s(x) & P(x))([extinct]s) 
 λs.x(p[<e,t> Dodos]s(x) & [extinct]s(x)) 
 
ii {λs. p[∀_GQ Dodos]s, λs.[extinct]s} 
 λs.p[∀_GQ Dodos]s([extinct]s) 
 λs.λP.∀x(p[<e,t> Dodos]s(x)  P(x))([extinct]s) 
 λs.∀x(p[ <e,t>Dodos]s(x)  [extinct]s(x))  
 
iii {λs. k[e Dodos]s, λs.[extinct]s} 
 λs.[extinct]s(k[edodos]s) 
If dodos is assigned an existential or universal GQ denotations quantifying over 
sums of particular dodos as in i and ii, then the predicate extinct should be taken 
to apply to sums of particulars. But this predicate cannot meaningfully apply to 
sums of particulars. If it could then, it could also meaningfully combine with the 
noun phrases that designate sums of particulars. But this is not the case: #My 
three pets, Hyperion, Thetis and Kronos, are extinct. Note that even if per 
impossible, extinct were taken to mean something like ceased to exist that can 
also apply to particulars and pluralities of particulars, interpreting the dodos in 
7a as an existential GQ would still not be appropriate. Dodos are extinct implies 
the disappearance of all dodos, not just of some dodos. So, iii where dodos is 
taken to designate kinds seems to be the most appropriate representation. 




7 f This week Alice’s blog has reviewed Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s. 
  [S[NP Ti Pro Race SC 1.3’s]1[1 [S this week in her blog Alice has reviewed t1]]] 
i {λs.p[ _GQ Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s], λs.λy.[this week Alice’s blog has reviewed ty]s } 
 λs.p[_GQ Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s]s(λy.[this week Alice’s blog has reviewed ty]s) 
 λs.λP.x( pl_p[<e,t> Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s]s(x) & P(x))(λy.[this w. A.’s b. has r. ty]s) 
 λs.x( pl_p[<e,t> Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s]s(x) & λy.[this w A.’s blog has reviewed ty]s(x))  
 λs.x( pl_p[<e,t> Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s]s(x) & [this week Alice’s blog has reviewed tx]s)  
 
ii {λs.p[ ∀_GQ Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s], λs.λy.[this week Alice’s blog has reviewed ty]s } 
 λs.p[∀_GQ Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s]s(λy.[this week Alice’s blog has reviewed ty]s) 
 λs.λP.∀x( pl_p[<e,t> Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s]s(x)  P(x))(λy.[this w. A.’s blog has r. ty]s) 
 λs.∀x( pl_p[<e,t> Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s]s(x)  λy.[this w. A.’s blog has reviewed ty]s(x))  
 λs.∀x( pl_p[<e,t> Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s]s(x)  [this week Alice’s blog has reviewed tx]s)  
  
iii {λs.k[e Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s], λs.λy.[this week Alice’s blog has reviewed ty]s } 
 λs.λy.[this week Alice’s blog has reviewed ty]s(k[e Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s]s) 
Under the salient reading of 7f, Ti Pro Race SC 1.3s cannot be interpreted as an 
existential GQ quantifying over bike tokens, which is synonymous with Ti Pro 
Race SC 1.3s . Surely it is possible to review bike tokens; for example one can 
review tokens of a rare vintage bike model. But the salient reading of 7f is not 
that. It is rather, This week Alice’s blog has reviewed the Ti Pro Race SC 1.3. 
According to this 7f will be true even if in preparing the review Alice sees and 
uses only one token of Ti Pro Race SC 1.3. But according to interpretation i the 
truth of 7f would require that Alice uses at least two tokens of the Ti Pro Race 
SC 1.3 in preparing the review. Obviously nor could Ti Pro Race SC 1.3’s can 
interpreted as a universal GQ as in ii, which is synonymous with All Ti Pro Race 
SC 1.3’s. So, again iii where Ti Pro Race SC 1.3’s is taken to designate a specific 
model seems to be the appropriate analysis. 
Similar considerations can be raised against interpreting the bare plural 
phrases in the remaining sentences in 7 as universal or existential GQ’s. And 




designating kinds it then seems appropriate to interpret these phrases as 
designating kinds. 
Apparently alongside their interpretation as kind designators some of 
these phrases have also the option to be interpreted as taxonomic existential 
GQ’s.91 As phrases that quantificationally denote the sub-kinds of the kind 
corresponding to the common noun that forms the phrase. In this vein consider 
7j. 
7 j Transistors are invented by Julius Edgar Lilienfeld.  
i λs.[are invented by Julius Edgar Lilienfeld]s(k[e transistors]s) 
 
ii λs.k[_GQtransistors]s(λy.[are invented by Julius Edgar Lilienfeld]s(y)) 
 λs.λP.x( pl_k[<e,t> transistors]s(x) & P(x))(λy.[are i. by Julius Edgar Lilienfeld]s(y)) 
 λs.x( pl_k[<e,t> transistors]s(x) & [are invented by Julius Edgar Lilienfeld]s(x))  
If you know about the controversial status of Julius Edgar Lilienfeld as the 
inventor of the the transistor, when used out of blue the salient reading of 7j will 
be one that is paraphrasable by The transistor is invented by Julius Edgar 
Lilienfeld (7ji). But besides this reading it can also be used to say that Lilienfeld 
invented a number of transistor models.92 This second reading obtains when 
transistors is interpreted taxonomically as an existential GQ (7jii), and it does 
not imply that Lilienfeld is the inventor of the transistor. Both of these are 
legitimate readings of 7j. 
                                                        
91 Not all these phrases are interpretable taxonomically. Apparently this is the case because  
the kinds corresponding to the common noun occuring in them is an infima species below which 
there is no further specification. 
92 Curiously, the non-taxonomic kind designating reading is not available but the taxonomic 





Note that as in the case of indefinite singular phrases, apparently the same 
bare plural noun phrase can support different interpretations. In the transistors 
case considered here this happens more strikingly in the same sentential 
context.  As told before the ways whereby these readings are derived will be 
considered in the next chapter where we will analyze noun phrases internally 
and consider the semantic options for the common nouns that form these 
phrases. 
Bare Plural Phrases as Arguments in Particular Level Contexts 
Besides the non-taxonomic kind designating interpretation and the taxonomic 
kind denoting quantificational interpretations so far considered, bare plural 
arguments can apparently assume a third type of interpretation under which 
they rather quantificationally denote particulars.   
8 a Alice did not steal Cadillac Eldorados from Bob’s gallery. 
b Every witness saw Cadillac Eldorados in Alice’s junkyard. 
The sentences in 8 appear to have meanings similar to those in 9, and in both 
sentences in 8 the bare plural argument Cadillac Eldorados appears to denote 
automobile tokens, as do the indefinite singular arguments in the sentences in 9.  
9 a Alice did not steal a Cadillac Eldorado from Bob’s gallery. 
b Every witness saw a Cadillac Eldorado in Alice’s junkyard. 
Yet there is something peculiar about bare plural arguments that figure in 
particular level episodic contexts. To see this let’s compare the readings that can 




The indefinite singular objects in 9 will normally be assigned existential 
GQ denotations. Note that 9a and 9b are ambiguous. Each can be used to express 
two distinct truth-conditions. This ambiguity can be explained by the existence 
of logical forms in which the highlighted indefinite arguments take narrow or 
wide scope relative to the negation (9a) and the quantificational noun phrase 
every witness in (9b). Each of these sentences will thus have a pair of non-
equivalent interpretations which will account for their ambiguity. Let’s focus on 
the readings of 9a. Pre-theoretically it is known that it has two readings: one 
according to which there is a Cadillac Eldorado which Alice did not steal, and 
another according to which Alice did not steal any Cadillac Eldorado. These two 
readings are accounted for by the following logical forms and derivations: 
9 a Alice did not steal a Cadillac Eldorado from Bob’s gallery. 
9aA [a Cadillac Eldorado]1 [1 [not [Alice stole t1 from Bob’s gallery]]] 
9ai derived from 9aA:   
{λs’.p[_GQ a Cadillac Eldorado]s’ , {1, {λs’.~, λs’.[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’}}} 
{λs’.p[_GQ a Cadillac Eldorado]s’ , {1, λs’.~[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’}} 
{λs’.p[_GQ a Cadillac Eldorado]s’ , λs’.λy.~[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’} 
λs’.p[_GQ a Cadillac Eldorado]s’ (λy.~[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’) 
Assuming that the common noun Cadillac Eldorado has a predicative denotation of 
type <e,t>: 
λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>Cadillac Eldorado]s’(x) & P(x))(λy.~[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s) 
λs’.x(p[<e,t>Cadillac Eldorado]s’(x) & λy.~[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’ (x)) 




9 a Alice did not steal a Cadillac Eldorado from Bob’s gallery. 
9aB  not [[a Cadillac Eldorado]1 [1 [Alice stole t1 from Bob’s gallery]]] 
9aii derived from 9aB:  
{λs’.∼, {λs’.p[_GQ a Cadillac Eldorado]s’ , {1, λs’.[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’}}} 
{λs’.∼, {λs’.p[_GQ a Cadillac Eldorado]s’ , λs’.λy.[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’}} 
{ λs’.∼, λs’.p[_GQ a Cadillac Eldorado]s’ (λy.[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’)} 
Assuming that the common noun Cadillac Eldorado has a predicative denotation of 
type <e,t>: 
{ λs’.∼, λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>C. E.]s’(x) & P(x))(λy.[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s)} 
{ λs’.∼S, λs’.x(p[<e,t>Cadillac Eldorado]s’(x) & λy.[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’ (x)) 
{ λs’.∼, λs’.x(p[<e,t>Cadillac Eldorado]s’(x) & [Alice stole tx from Bob’s gallery]s’) 
λs’.~x(p[<e,t>Cadillac Eldorado]s’(x) & [Alice stole tx from Bob’s gallery]s’)  
The similarity in meaning between the sentences in 8 and 9 suggests that the 
bare plural phrases in 8 too should be assigned GQ denotations like the 
indefinite phrases in 9. In the case of bare plural Cadillac Eldorados the suitable 
GQ denotation seem to be existential plural. However there seems to be one 
important difference between the sentences in 8 and those in 9. The sentences 
in 8 are not ambiguous. They curiously appear to lack the readings that would 
correspond to the wide scope existential GQ interpretation of the bare plural 
phrase Cadillac Eldorados, despite the fact that the sentences in 8 should in 
principle be capable to assume the same logical forms as those in 9. Let’s focus 
on the case of 8a. It seems that 8a does not have a reading that corresponds to 
the interpretation 8ai which can be paraphrased as There is a Cadillac Eldorado 




8 a Alice did not steal Cadillac Eldorados from Bob’s gallery. 
8aA [Cadillac Eldorados]1 [1 [not [Alice stole t1 from Bob’s gallery]]] 
8ai derived from 8aA:  
{λs’.pl_p[_GQ Cadillac Eldorados]s’ , λs’.λy.~[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’}93 
λs’.pl_p[_GQ Cadillac Eldorados]s’ (λy.~[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’) 
Assuming that the common noun Cadillac Eldorados has a predicative denotation of 
type <e,t>: 
λs’.λP.x(pl_p [<e,t>Cadillac Eldorados]s’(x) & P(x))(λy.~[A. stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s) 
λs’.x(pl_p [Cadillac Eldorados]s’(x) & λy.~[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’ (x)) 
λs’.x(pl_p [Cadillac Eldorados]s’(x) & ~[Alice stole tx from Bob’s gallery]s’) 
8aB  not [[Cadillac Eldorados]1 [1 [Alice stole t1 from Bob’s gallery]]] 
8aii derived from 8aB:  
{λs’.∼, {λs’. pl_p [_GQ Cadillac Eldorados]s’ , λs’.λy.[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’}} 
{λs’.∼, λs’. pl_p [_GQ Cadillac Eldorados]s’ (λy.~[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’)} 
Assuming that the common noun Cadillac Eldorados has a predicative denotation of 
type <e,t>: 
{λs’.∼, λs’.λP.x(pl_p[<e,t>Cadillac Eldorados]s’(x) & P(x))(λy.[A. stole ty from Bob’s g.]s)} 
{λs’.∼, λs’.x(pl_p[Cadillac Eldorados]s’(x) & λy.[Alice stole ty from Bob’s gallery]s’ (x)) 
{λs’.∼, λs’.x(pl_p[Cadillac Eldorados]s’(x) & [Alice stole tx from Bob’s gallery]s’) 
λs’.~x(pl_p[Cadillac Eldorados]s’(x) & [Alice stole tx from Bob’s gallery]s’ 
Carlson (1980) and the Neo-Carlsonians, Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004), 
take this peculiarity of non-taxonomic bare plural NP arguments in particular 
level episodic sentential contexts as a piece of evidence that almost all non-
taxonomic bare plural NP arguments designate kinds, and not just in kind-level 
contexts. They show how by assigning bare plural arguments kind designation 
their forced narrow scope interpretation can be explained. Without going into 
the details of this explanation, which will be covered later, the reader can assess 
how assigning kind designation to bare plural arguments can explain the 
appearance of forced narrow-scope interpretation, by considering the following 
                                                        




sentences which are obtained by replacing the occurrences of Cadillac 
Eldorados in 8 by the occurrences of the kind phrase this Cadillac model, 
assuming that the model in question is the Cadillac Eldorado: 
10 a Alice did not steal this Cadillac model from Bob’s gallery. 
b Every witness saw this Cadillac model in Alice’s junkyard.  
This Cadillac model designates a model but nonetheless it can also non-
problematically occur in particular level contexts (explanations of how kind 
denoting phrases can sometimes occur in particular level sentential contexts 
will be covered in the next main section of this chapter). The sentences in 10 
does not appear to be ambiguous and they seem to have the same truth-
conditions as the sentences in 8, assuming that this model designates the 
Cadillac Eldorado. At any evaluation index s, 10a will be true if and only if at s it 
is not the case that there is an instance of the Cadillac Eldorado that Alice stole. 
And 10b will be true at s if and only if at s every witness x is such that x saw at 
least one instance of Cadillac Eldorado in Alice’s junkyard. 8a and 8b 
respectively seem to have readings with exactly these same truth-conditions, 
and no other readings than these. 
Of course the mentioned authors who take non-taxonomic bare plural 
arguments to always designate kinds are due an explanation as to why bare 
plural arguments in particular level contexts, such as those in 8, appear to 
denote particulars rather than kinds. They do so by means extrinsic to the bare 
plural noun phrases. Specifically by postulating an operator that applies to the 
particular level predicative meanings of the verbs/verb phrases of which the 




operation postulated by Chierchia (1998). Anyway, as the sentences in 10 show, 
an explanation of how kind designating arguments can occur in particular level 
contexts is required independently from the case of bare plural arguments, and 
the explanations given by these authors cover both cases. 
Bare Plural Arguments in Particular Level Contexts as Antecedents of 
Kind Designating Pronouns 
Another phenomenon invoked by Carlson (1980) as evidence for taking non-
taxonomic bare arguments to designate kinds are cases of pronominal co-
reference. Bare plural arguments which occur in particular level sentential 
contexts and which apparently denote particulars appear to constitute 
referential antecedents for pronouns designating kinds (Carlson 1980): 
11 Bill trapped bald eagles last night even though he knows full well that they are on 
the verge of extinction. 
The pronoun they occurring in the second clause of 11 appears to designate the 
bald eagle kind, the species Haliaeetus leucocephalus. The most straightforward 
way to explain this will be to to take the bare plural phrase bald eagles in the 
first clause to function as the referential antecedent of the pronoun. Yet, if here 
the bare plural bald eagles  functions as a particular level existential GQ, then 
they can only get as its designatum the sum of the eagle tokens trapped by Bill 
last night; and these tokens cannot sensibly be attributed extinction. Carlson 
reasons that then the bare plural bald eagles should in fact be functioning as a 
kind designator, and that the appearance of existential GQ reading is effected by 




This reasoning is compromised by the fact that the indefinite singular a 
bald eagle too can constitute an antecedent to a kind designating pronoun in the 
same sentential context as the one in 11.  
12  Bill trapped a bald eagle last night although he knows full well that they are on the 
verge of extinction. 
To take a non-taxonomic indefinite singular like a bald eagle to designate a kind 
will be an unwarranted move however. We have seen that bare plural phrase 
can non-problematically figure in kind-level sentential contexts, but non-
taxonomic indefinite singular phrases cannot.  
A more plausible move will be to locate kind designation in the common 
noun bald eagle and to argue that the pronoun they derives its kind-level 
designation from the common noun itself, whilst the indefinite singular noun 
phrase itself interpreted as a particular level existential GQ. 
Later I will refer back to this phenomenon to motivate the approach 
according to which semantically simple non-taxonomic common nouns 
designate kinds. 
Points against the Claim that Non-taxonomic Bare Plural Arguments 
Always Designate Kinds 
Other authors such as Wilkinson (1991), Krifka et al. (1995), Van Geenhoven 
(2000), Krifka (2004) reckon that in kind level contexts, such as those present 
in the sentences in 7, bare plural arguments designate kinds, they however 
reject the idea that bare plural arguments designate kinds when they occur in 




8 a Alice did not steal Cadillac Eldorados from Bob’s gallery. 
 b Every witness saw Cadillac Eldorados in Alice’s junkyard.  
Let’s now see some of the reasons why the Carlsonian view on bare plural 
arguments occurring in particular level contexts has been criticized. The critical 
points to be discussed below have been covered in Krifka et al. (1995). 
Of course one of the principal reasons for resisting the idea that bare 
plural arguments designate kinds in particular level contexts is the appearance 
that in these contexts they rather seem to denote particulars. 
Another reason is the divergence between bare plurals and definite 
generics, another kind designating noun phrase type which I will cover next. 
Definite generics are a sort of definite singular phrase that designate kinds –e.g. 
the lion, the transistor, the road bike. If a bare plural argument such as Cadillac 
Eldorados can designate a kind in particular level contexts one may expect that 
the same kind can be designated by the corresponding definite generic the 
Cadillac Eldorado. And whatever means is proposed to explain how the former 
can figure in particular level contexts which normally require particular level 
arguments, the same means can presumably apply to the occurrences of the 
latter in the same sentential contexts. However these plausible expectations do 
not materialize. Compare sentences in 8 with those in 13. 
8 a Alice did not steal Cadillac Eldorados from Bob’s gallery. 
 b Every witness saw Cadillac Eldorados in Alice’s junkyard.  
13 a Alice did not steal the Cadillac Eldorado from Bob’s gallery. 
 b Every witness saw the Cadillac Eldorado in Alice’s junkyard. 
If the Cadillac Eldorado could designate a Cadillac model in the sentences in 13 




the sentences in 8 have. But the sentences in 13 do not have such readings. For 
example, 8a is naturally read as saying that Alice did not steal any Cadillac 
Eldorado from Bob. But 13a cannot ever be used with such a reading.  
A third reason for dissatisfaction with the claim that bare plural 
arguments designate kinds in particular level contexts is that it implies a 
questionably permissive attitude as to which common nouns have 
corresponding kinds. The principal argument for taking non-taxonomic bare 
plural arguments to designate kinds in particular level contexts is their peculiar 
way of scope taking in such contexts. Now this peculiarity appear to obtain not 
just when the bare plural arguments are formed by simple common nouns such 
as lion, transistor, Cadillac Eldorado but also when bare plural arguments are 
formed by modified common nouns such as wounded lion, faulty transistor, 
crashed Cadillac Eldorado: 
14 Alice did not discern wounded lions in the area. (apparent forced narrow scope for  
wounded lions) 
Every circuit on the main-board is ruined by faulty transistors. (apparent forced 
narrow scope for  faulty transistors) 
No witness saw crashed Cadillac Eldorados in Alice’s junkyard. (apparent forced 
narrow scope for  Cadillac Eldorados) 
So, if this peculiarity is the principal reason for taking bare plural arguments in 
particular level contexts to designate kinds then the bare plural arguments 
wounded lions, faulty transistors, crashed Cadillac Eldorados too should be 
taken to designate kinds. Then one would expect that definite generics 
designating the same kinds can be formed using the same modified common 
nouns. That is, one would expect the definite singular phrases the wounded lion, 




designating definite generics. However, although one can form kind designating 
definite generics using the simple common nouns lion, transistor, Cadillac 
Eldorado, as illustrated below, 
15 The lion is near extinction in this part of Africa. 
The transistor is invented in the 19th century. 
The Cadillac Eldorado has been launched in 1949. 
it seems impossible to form such definite generics on the basis of the modified 
common nouns such as wounded lion, faulty transistor, crashed Cadillac 
Eldorado. In general most modified common nouns cannot form kind 
designating definite generic phrases (Krifka et al., 1995).  A neat explanation of 
this difference between modified common nouns and semantically simple 
common nouns would be that the former don’t designate kinds whilst the latter 
do. Such an explanation would however imply that bare plural phrases formed 
by modified common nouns cannot designate kinds as the underlying common 
nouns don’t designate kinds.  
The authors who for such reasons do not accept Carlson’s and the Neo-
Carlsonians’ views on bare plural arguments should however provide 
alternative explanations of the phenomena that lead to hold that bare plural 
arguments are kind designators even in particular level sentential contexts. 
Foremost among such phenoma is the illustrated scope peculiarity manifested 
by the bare plural arguments. Among these authors critical of the Carlsonian 
view Geenhoven (1998, 2000) and Krifka (2004) have indeed proposed and 
defended alternative explanations; and in the next chapter we will have 






1  j Surely, the whale should have been disoriented to come into these waters and 
  tore our nets off. 
 k Alice claims that the cladistic analysis shows that the whale should rather be put 
  under an altogether new genus. 
 l The whale is a highly intelligent mammal. 
 m The whales escaped by jumping off the pool over the gate into the sea. 
Definite phrases are noun phrases of the form the  where  is a common noun. 
They usually operate as arguments of verb-phrases. In these positions they are 
usually regarded as designators (i.e. assigned denotations of type e). Another 
common way to interpret their occurrences in argument positions is to assign 
them GQ denotations of type <<e,t>,t>. They can be used to designate 
particulars as well as kinds. Prima facie there seem to be two distinct ways in 
which they designate a kind. First, like bare plural phrases and indefinite 
singular phrases, they seem to have a taxonomic use. In their taxonomic use 
they designate a specific sub-kind of the kind which corresponds to the common 
noun that forms them. Second, they can be used to directly designate the kind 
corresponding to the common noun that forms them. Under this latter use they 
are termed as definite generics. Now let’s consider these different uses of 
definite phrases in a more detailed way. 
Definite Phrases Denoting Particulars 
Definite noun phrases in argument positions are often used to denote 
particulars as is the case in the following sentences. 




b All of us saw the bear coming out of the woods, picking the basket and swiftly 
 disappearing into the woods again. 
c The winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final is from Jamaica. 
d The finalists of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final are black people. 
e The self-absorbed cyclists knocked Alice down. 
Some authors, including Montague, assign definite arguments that denote 
particulars GQ denotations of type <<e,t>,t>. However more commonly they 
are interpreted as designators (denotation type e). According to this latter 
approach a definite singular phrase designate the unique particular that 
satisfies the descriptive condition set by the common noun that forms the 
definite phrase. A definite plural phrase on the other hand designates the 
maximal sum individual that satisfies the descriptive condition set by the plural 
common noun that forms the plural definite phrase. Thus the sentences 16c and 
16d will be interpretated along the following lines: 
16 c The winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final is from Jamaica. 
  [NP The winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final][VP is from Jamaica] 
{λs.sg_p[e The w. of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final]s,λs.λx.[ is from Jamaica]s(x)} 





16 d The finalists of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final are black people. 
  [NP The finalists of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final][VP are black people] 
{λs.pl_p[e The finalists of the 2012 L. Games’ 100m final]s,λs.λx.[ are black people]s(x)} 
λs.[are black people]s(pl_p[e The finalists of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final]s) 
Often however the common nouns forming the definite arguments do not by 
themselves identify unique individuals independently from the context of use –
e.g. 16a,b and e. To account for these cases a function that restricts the 
discursive domain as a function of the contexts of use can be included in the 
analysis of the definite singular arguments. We will see how this is done in the 
next chapter. In this chapter I only present the denotation types commonly 
assigned to various types of noun phrases, I will discuss the analysis of the noun 
phrases, including the definite phrases, in the next chapter.  
Definite Phrases Denoting Kinds 
Definite phrases can also be used to designate kinds. This apparently happens in 
two different ways. In some sentential contexts definite singular (or plural) 
phrases are used taxonomically to designate a specific sub-kind of the kind 
corresponding to the common noun that forms them (or a specific sum 
consisting of some of the subkinds). Let’s term definite phrases used this way as 
taxonomic definites. But in other sentential contexts the same definite singular 
phrases can also be used to specifically designate the kind corresponding to the 
common noun that forms them.  I had previously indicated that definite singular 
phrases used the latter way are termed as definite generics. In English there are 




definite singular phrases. Let’s now first consider the evidence for the definite 
generic usage. 
Definite Generics 
In certain sentential contexts definite singular phrases seems to operate like 
names for kinds. Consider the following sentences: 
17 a The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 has been launched at 2001. 
b The iPad2 is out of stock within days of its launch in the country. 
c The Anatolian leopard is now extinct in the Aegean region. 
d At the time, the bicycle industry was not impressed with the mountain bike, 
 which many regarded as a short-term fad. 
In the sentences in 17 the definite singular arguments appear to operate like 
names of the kinds corresponding to the common nouns that form them. This 
idea is supported by the repleacability, without any apparent change in the 
truth conditions of the sentences, of these definite singular arguments by kind 
phrases designating the kinds corresponding to the common noun that forms 
the definite arguments: 
18 a This model has been launched at 2001. 
b This version of iPad is out of stock within days of its launch in the country. 
c This feline species is now extinct in the Aegean region. 
d At the time, the bicycle industry was not impressed with that type of bike, which 
 many regarded as a short-term fad. 
Definite singular phrases which operate in the manner illustrated in 17 are 
called definite generics. Definite generic interpretation of definite singular 
phrases is not possible in non-generic (episodic) particular level sentential 




already given the relevant examples above in the section on bare plural phrases. 
I reproduce them below: 
19 a Alice did not steal this model from Bob’s shop 
b Every witness saw this model in Alice’s junkyard  
  
20 a *Alice did not steal the Cadillac Eldorado from Bob’s gallery 
b *Every witness saw the Cadillac Eldorado in Alice’s junkyard 
Taxonomic Definite Phrases 
I indicated that there apparently are two different sorts of definite singular 
phrases that can designate kinds. One of these sorts are the definite generics we 
have just considered. The other sort, which we will cover now, are the 
taxonomic definite phrases. Consider the following sentences: 
21 a Alice invented a molecular transistor and sold the transistor to Intel for $ 100 
 millon. 
b The transistor has been invented by Edgar Lilienfeld. 
c A new whale species has been discovered in New Zealand and the team who 
 made the discovery  proposed to name the whale as Tasmacetus shepherdi. 
d If one day the whale becomes extinct it will not be the fault of the Japanese alone. 
Both of the the transistor’s in 21a and 21b designate a kind. But the one in 21b 
is a definite generic and designates the whole transistor-kind, whereas the one 
in 21a designates only a new transistor type invented by Alice. Similarly, both of 
the the whale’s in 21c and 21d designate a kind. But the whale of 21d is a 
definite generic and designates the whole whale kind, whereas the whale of 21c 
designates a new whale species or genus. 
The transistor of 21a and the whale of 21c are taxonomic definite 




designate particulars. For example, the biker and the passerby in the previously 
considered 16a, 
16 a The biker irritated the passerby with his loud rev up. 
respectively designate the contextually salient particular who is a biker and the 
contextually salient particular who is a passerby. In the same vein, the transistor 
of 21a designates the contextually salient transistor type and the whale of 21c 
designates the contextually salient whale species. The transistor of 21b and the 
whale of 21d in contrast manage to designate respectively the whole transistor-
kind and the whole whale-kind without any contextual input.  
Is There Just One Sort of Kind Designating Definite S ingular? 
There are two views about the definite generics. Dayal (2004) proposed to 
reduce definite generics to a special case of taxonomic definite singulars. That is 
according to Dayal the manner whereby each of the transistor’s and the whale’s 
in 21 designate a kind is the same as the familiar one whereby definite singulars 
designates the contextually salient particulars that uniquely satisfy the 
descriptive condition expressed by the common nouns that form them. Another 
view, held for example by Krifka et al. (1995) and Longobardi (2005) is that the 
definite articles of the definite generics such as the transistor  of 21b and the 
whale of 21d are semantically different than the definite articles of the 
taxonomic definite singulars such as the transistor of 21a and the whale of 21c 
and those of the ordinary definite singulars that designate particulars. 




occurring in such proper names as the Sudan, the Sahara etc. Such definite 
articles are called expletives. I will not further discuss these views here as I will 
return to this issue later in the next chapter where I will consider the internal 





EXPLAINING THE SEMANTIC VARIETY OF NOUN PHRASES FORMED BY COUNT 
COMMON NOUNS 
In the previous chapter we have seen that the denotations of the noun phrases 
formed by common nouns differ from one another both with respect to the type 
of entity they denote and with respect to their mode of denotation. Below I 
reproduce the bunch of sentences illustrating the noun phrases formed by the 
term whale, now indicating also their denotation modes and the types of the 
entities they denote to in light of the foregone discussion:94 
1 a Whales face extinction due to excessive hunting. (bare plural, kind     
  designating) 
 b The Beluga and the Narwhal are whales. (bare plural, taxonomic predicative,  
  applying to kinds) 
 c The stars of the theme park, Alice and Bob, are whales. (bare plural, predicative, 
  applying to particulars) 
 d Whales have torn our nets last night. (bare plural, kind designating or GQ   
  quantifying over particulars) 
 e One of the stars of the theme park, Alice, is a whale. (indefinite singular,    
  predicative, applying to particulars) 
 f Last night a whale should have thorn off the fish nets. (indefinite singular, GQ,  
  quantifying over particulars) 
 g The Beluga is not a shark species, it is a whale. (indefinite singular, taxonomic  
  predicative, applying to kinds) 
 h Alice objects to the classification of a whale under the Phocoenidae family.   
  (indefinite singular, taxonomic GQ, quantifying over kinds) 
 j Surely, the whale should have been disoriented to come into these waters and 
  tore our nets off. (definite singular, designating a particular) 
 k Alice claims that the cladistic analysis shows that the whale should rather be put 
  under an altogether new genus.(definite singular, taxonomic, kind designating) 
                                                        
94 In the present chapter we will consider the semantic analysis of noun phrases which we kept 
unanalyzed in the previous chapter, and we will deal with the same example sentences as those 
given in the previous chapters.  For this reason, the numbering of sentences in this chapter 
continues the numbering of the fifth chapter, and sentences which have already been numbered 




 l The whale is a highly intelligent mammal.(definite singular, generic, kind   
  designating) 
 m The whales escaped by jumping off the pool over the gate into the sea. (definite 
  plural, designating particulars) 
 n Two whales tore out nets. (quantified, GQ, quantifying over particulars)  
 o Some whales are not endangered species. (quantified, taxonomic GQ, quantifying 
  over kinds) 
The denotations of the phrases formed by common nouns are surely a function 
of the the meanings of the common nouns, and when present, of the 
determiners that combine with the common nouns. But clearly the meaning 
differences among the noun phrases formed by the same common nouns cannot 
be accounted simply by the involvement of different determiners. For one thing, 
some noun phrases do not involve any determiner at all (e.g. whales) but they 
can assume different meanings in different sentential contexts. For another, 
noun phrases formed by the same common noun and determiner can assume 
different meanings (e.g. the whale). 
Ideally a common noun  has the same meaning in all of its uses. The 
different noun phrases formed by  involve different operations which take as 
argument the meaning of. Some of these operations can be identified as the 
semantic contribution of the determiners that are involved. But as indicated 
there are more noun phrase meanings around than the number of distinct 
determiners. For this reason there is a need to postulate implicit semantic 
operations that are not associated with any explicit determiner.  
A futher reason to postulate implicit semantic operations is to account for 
the occurrence of a noun phrase that have a certain type of denotation as an 
argument in a sentential context which normally requires arguments with 




The illustrated variety in the denotations of the noun phrases is derived 
from the meanings of the common nouns in different ways by different authors. 
Authors sometimes have different views as to the range of the real variety in the 
denotation types assumed by the tokens of a certain noun phrase type. A 
denotation-type variation attributed by some authors to phrases of a certain 
type is deemed to be only apparent by certain other authors. The latter then 
derive the apparent denotation-type variety by means extrinsic to the phrase. 
We have already seen that this is the case for example in relation with bare 
plural arguments: Carlson (1980), Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004) take 
them to operate as kind designators in all sorts of sentential contexts. Other 
authors on the other hand takes them to operate as kind-designators only in 
kind-level sentential contexts, otherwise they take them to operate then as the 
plural version of indefinites (Krifka et al. (1995); Wilkinson (1991)) or even as 
appliers (Geenhoven, (1998), (2000)). 
Even when there is agreement about the range of denotation-type variety 
manifested by the tokens of a certain phrase type, the variety may still be 
derived in different ways. In this case the authors’ accounts may differ in the 
meaning type to be assigned to the underlying common nouns and/or in the 
implicit operators to be postulated to yield the phrasal meanings.  
In short, due to different ways of assessing the linguistic evidence at hand 
the semantic literature presents different means to account for the variety 
illustrated in the previous chapter. And in particular it presents different means 
to account for the kind-level denotation/particular-level denotation variation 




In the present chapter I will present two frameworks which represent two 
basically diffent strategies to derive the meanings of noun phrases from the 
meanings of the common nouns that form them. 
One is the C-framework which follows the Neo-Carlsonian authors 
Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004) –these two authors have identical accounts 
except the treatment of definite generics. C-framework assigns predicative 
meanings (type <s,<e,t>>) to all count common nouns; it takes count common 
nouns to be ambiguous between kind level taxonomic variants and particular 
level non-taxonomic variants; and it derives the variety in the meanings of the 
noun phrases formed by common nouns on this basis. 
The second framework to be presented is the K-framework which assigns 
kind designator meanings to semantically simple non-taxonomic common 
nouns. As regards modified common nouns and taxonomic common nouns the 
K-framework assigns them applier meanings of type <s,<e,t>> which will be 
kind level or particular level depending on whether the common noun in 
question is taxonomic or not.   
For the K-framework we cannot cite any specific author as the source, at 
least not for every aspect of it. It partially follows the account of Krifka et al. 
(1995) and Krifka (1995) as regards the type of meaning to be assigned to 
common nouns and the analysis of certain types of noun phrases; but it diverges 




plural phrases which are analyzed in Krifka et al. (1995) as Heimian 
indefinites.95 
In the present work our stated goal is to explore the semantics of common 
nouns to see whether we can raise a plausible argument to hold that some class 
of common nouns should be singled out as de jure rigid. As we have seen in the 
first two chapters the philosophical literature on general term rigidity either 
promotes an applier analysis of common nouns or a kind designator analysis of 
common nouns. Each of the C-framework and the K-framework to be presented 
below will adopt one of these two popular views regarding at least the 
meanings of simple non-taxonomic common nouns. But improving on the 
philosophical literature in the formulation of the said frameworks we will work 
out the details of how these two views can support the variety of noun phrases 
formed by common nouns. 
The C-framework will in fact take all common nouns, regardless whether 
they are taxonomic or modified, to be appliers. So, it will really represent a 
worked out version of the decision to take common nouns to be primarily 
appliers. Yet the K-framework will treat only simple non-taxonomic common 
nouns as kind designators, while treating taxonomic or modified common nouns 
as appliers. Why don’t we simply choose a framework which rather follows one 
part of philosophical literature in analyzing all common nouns as kind 
designators and work out the details of this decision regarding the 
                                                        
95 As mentioned before I avoid the Heimian analysis of certain NP’s as variables due to its 
complexity. The discussion regarding the issue of the rigidity/non-rigidity of the common nouns 




interpretation of noun phrases? I can only fully answer this question after I 
finish the descriptions of the C-framework and the K-framework, and therby 
illustrate the issues one has to face in accounting for the semantic output of the 
noun phrases as a function of the meanings of the common nouns that form 
them. In the course of this description it will be seen that assigning kind 
designation to modified common nouns or to taxonomic common nouns has 
implausible theoretical consequences which disadvantage it both with respect 
to the option of assigning applier meanings to all common nouns and with 
respect to the option of assigning kind designating meanings only to the 
semantically simple non-taxonomic common nouns.  Simply put, to take all 
common nouns to be appliers, as the C-framework will do, is a theoretically 
better option than to take all common nouns to be kind designators. But to take 
only the semantically simple non-taxonomic common nouns to be kind 
designators while assigning appliers meanings to modified or taxonomic 
common nouns, as the K-framework will do, has certain theoretical advantages 
over treating all common nouns as appliers. I will return to this issue at the end 
of the chapter where I will comparatively assess the advantages of the C-
framework and the K-framework. 
However, it will not be viable for me to present, compare and critically 
assess all approaches regarding the semantics of noun phrases formed by 
common nouns that have ever been defended. It will not even be viable to give a 
full assesssment of the two frameworks that will be presented below. I will 
briefly state their relative advantages and disadvantages. But I will not be able 




The decisive issues about these frameworks are quite complicated and too far 
afield from the issue of common noun rigidity pursued here. This does not mean 
that these decisive issues are not relevant. In fact they are relevant because as 
we will see in the next chapter, it will be possible to construe linguistic 
arguments to single out some common nouns as de jure rigid only under the K-
framework. The linguistic semantic phenomena that indicates from the 
standpoint of the K-framework the need to single out some class of common 
nouns as de jure rigid will not have such a portent relative to the  the C-
framework. 
Here is a rough sketch of what will come in the present chapter. After 
giving a short description of the basic ontology presupposed by the two 
frameworks to be presented I will pass to the said presentations. I will present 
the framework separately, first the C-framework and then the K-framework. In 
the presentation of each framework I will start with a description of their 
treatment of the common nouns. In these descriptions I will describe the 
meaning types they assign to the common nouns, how they account for 
modification and finally the fundamental semantic operations on the meanings 
of the common nouns which they will use in accounting for noun phrase 
meanings. Each of the frameworks to be presented need such operations. The C-
framework assigns predicative meanings to common nouns, but assign kind 
designating meanings to bare plural noun phrases. The K-framework assigns 
kind designating meanings to semantically simple non-taxonomic common 
nouns, but assigns particular level generalized quantifier meanings to quantified 




operation to derive kind designating meanings from the common nouns’ 
meanings, and the latter needs an operation to derive particular level 
predicative meanings from kind designating common noun meanings.  
After the descriptions of how common nouns will be treated, I will 
describe how each framework accounts for the variety in the meaning of the 
noun phrases on the basis of its treatment of the common nouns. That is for 
each framework I will describe how they derive the meanings of various 
subtypes of indefinite phrases, bare plural phrases, definite phrases from the 
meanings they assign to the common nouns.  
Finally at the end of the chapter I will assesss the advantages and the 
disadvantages each of the frameworks has relative to one another, and relative 
to the option of taking all common nouns to be kind designators. 
There will be a relatively long coverage of the analysis of bare plural 
arguments. We have already seen in the previous chapter that bare plural 
arguments manifest a scope related peculiarity. One proposed way to explain 
this peculiarity is that these bare plural arguments are kind designators 
(Carlson (1980); Chierchia (1998)). This peculiarity is not just manifested by 
bare plurals formed by simple non-taxonomic common nouns; certain bare 
plural arguments formed by taxonomic common nouns and modified common 
nouns manifest it as well. Yet, at the same time there are good reasons to think 
that such common nouns are not kind designators. So, the treatment of bare 
plural arguments and the explanation of their scope peculiarity has implications 
regarding whether any, some or all common nouns should be treated as kind 




noun rigidity. Because as we will later see a rigid/non-rigid division among 
common nouns can be supported by linguistic-semantic arguments of the sort 
illustrated in the fourth chapter only under the K-framework which assigns kind 
designator meanings only to semantically simple common nouns; yet it is not 
supported under the C-framework which treats all common nouns as appliers. 
The Ontological Structure of the Domain of Individuals 
Before the description of the C-framework and the K-framework I have to 
describe the structure of the domain of individuals De, which will be 
presupposed by both of these frameworks, notwithstanding their differences.  
The domain of individuals De will include particular individuals, kind 
individuals. In addition to them to account for the denotations of plural NP’s and 
plural predicates, we will postulate that De contains sum-individuals which have 
as parts other individuals and themselves; and for any subset A of De, it is 
postulated that there is an individual +A of which members of A are parts and 
which is a part of every individual of which +A’s parts are parts. For example, a 
cycling team roaster formed by Alice, Bob and Carol has as its parts (i) each of 
Alice, Bob and Carol, (ii) every pair formed by Alice, Bob and Carol, and (iii) 
Alice, Bob and Carol all together. The part relation intended here of course is not 
one that holds for example between a cyclist and his left leg. Otherwise we 
would have to count among Skyteam’s Tour de France 2012 roaster Bradley 
Wiggins’s left leg as well. For another example consider the components of a 




components can exist whilst the computer does not. So, the components cannot 
be parts of the computer in the sense of part highlighted here.96 97 
I will occasionally indicate what sort of individuals a certain meaning 
pertains to by using subscripts adjoined to the sign e. I will use combinations of 
the following abbreviations: pl. for sum individuals, sg. for atomic individuals, k 
for kinds and p for particulars. For example, <s,epl_p> will be used to indicate 
that the meaning in question is a designator meaning that pertains to sums of 
particulars;  <s,< esg_k,t>> will be used to indicate that the meaning in question 
is a predicative meaning pertaining to kinds. 
The C-framework 
The Treatment of Common Nouns under the C-framework 
We have seen that noun phrases formed by count common nouns can designate, 
apply to or quantify over particulars as well as kinds. Ideally count common 
nouns should have the same native meaning in all sentential contexts. The 
semantic variety the noun phrases that can be formed by a certain count 
                                                        
96 The sums and the parthood in question here form a structure very similar to the one formed 
by sets and set membership, but they are different. Landman (1989) argues that they are very 
similar to sets theoretic structures and shuns sums for sets. But then he is forced to take the 
referents of names to be singletons. To avoid this consequence we follow here Link (1983). 
97 Given the postulation of the special part relation and the sum individuals De becomes a 
#complete join semi-lattice with atoms. Such a structure has the following specifications: A set S 
is a #complete join semi lattice with atoms iff there is a partial order ≪ on S, every non-empty 
subset A of S has a least upper bound relative to ≪, there are members a of S such that for every 
b∈S, if b≪a then b=a. Let S be #complete join semi lattice, let + (join) be the binary operation 
over S such that for every a,b∈S  a+b=the least upper bound of {a,b}, then + is idempotent, 




common noun should be derivable from that native meaning in a principled 
manner.  
Now the question is which type of native meanings should be assigned to 
count common nouns so as to account in the best way for the semantic variety 
of the phrases they form. In the present section I will present how the C-
framework, derived from Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004), handles the 
semantics of count common noun meanings with a regard to derive from them 
the variety in the meanings of the noun phrases in the most efficient way 
possible. I will also discuss how under that framework the meanings of the 
semantically complex common nouns (common nouns modified by adjectives, 
relative clauses or prepositional phrases) will be derived as a function of the 
meanings of their constituents.  
Simple Non-taxonomic Common Nouns under the C-framework 
Simple common nouns are such common nouns as metal, tiger, bachelor, 
transitor, Iphone5. They are not modified by any adjective, relative clause or 
prepositional phrase; they present no inner syntactic or semantic complexity. 
Some such common nouns appear to be natively taxonomic: species, halogen, 
alloy. Some apparently cannot ever be used taxonomically: electron. And some 
can be used both taxonomically and non-taxonomically: transistor, whale. 
Regarding cases of the latter type there may be different approaches to explain 
the relation between the taxonomic and the non-taxonomic uses. But the non-




taxonomic use is derived from the non-taxonomic use or such common nouns 
are taken to be ambiguous. Here I will first present the C-framework’s treatment 
of simple non-taxonomic count common nouns. 
The C-framework will follow the standard treatment of common nouns. 
Under the C-framework the non-taxonomic simple singular common nouns will 
be assigned predicative meanings of type <s,<esg_p,t>> which truly apply to 
atomic particulars –And non-taxonomic simple plural common nouns will be 
assigned meanings of the type <s,<epl_p,t>>that truly apply to sums of 
particulars. The meanings of singular common nouns will be taken as basic and 
that of the plural common nouns will be derived by a simple operation applying 
to the meaning singular common noun. There are different ways to formulate 
such a pluralizing operator.  For example, Chierchia (1998) formulates the 
following operation which we will adopt under the C-framework: 
λs.pl_p[<e,t>whales]s 
= PL(λs.sg_p[<e,t>whale]s) 
= λs.λx.(~ sg_p[<e,t>whale]s(x) & ∀y((y≪x & Atom(y)) sg_p[<e,t>whale]s(y))) 
In the previous part of the present chapter we have seen that certain noun 
phrases formed by semantically simple non-taxonomic common nouns are best 
treated as kind designators: Cadillac Eldorados are out of production, The 
Cadillac Eldorado is out of production. We have also seen such phenomena as 
pronominal kind designation by pronouns the antecedents of which are 
apparently particular level noun phrases: Alice shot a tiger, unwitting that they 
are on the brink of extinction. Then the C-framework is bound to somehow 




predicative and that pertain to particulars (type <s,<ep,t>>). On this matter 
the C-framework will follow Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004). 
Chierchia (1998) takes common nouns to have predicative meanings of 
type <s,<ep,t>>. To derive kind designating meanings from such meanings 
Chierchia postulates an implicit operation ∩ (read as down operation). We can 
render his definition for this operator in the following way:98 
                                                        
98 In fact Chierchia identifies kinds with certain intensions of type <s,ep>: functions that map 
possible worlds into maximal sums or groups of particulars that share a common characteristic. 
Not every such intension is accepted to be a kind. Such intensions are taken to be the denotata of 
bare noun phrases which are kind designators according to Chierchia –not their meaning. 
Chierchia’s original definition of the down operator reads thus (pg.351): Let  be a predicative 
meaning of type <s,<epl_p,t>>, ∩=λs.i(s), if λs.i(s) is a kind. Here i is the iota operator 
defined thus: Let  be a predicative meaning of type <s,<ep,t>>, relative to an evaluation index 
s, i(s)=the largest individual x (under ≪) such that (s)(x). Chierchia treats the result of the 
operation, ∩=λs.i(s), as the denotation of bare noun phrases rather than as their intensions 
(i.e. meaning in my terminology) and Chierchia’s discussion is laid in terms of denotations 
rather than intensions. Note that these denotations are of type <s,ep>, hence strictly speaking 
they will not be designata. For, designata are commonly understood to be denotata of type e. 
Still, Chierchia ‘for the sake of simplicity’, includes entities of type <s,ep> which are kinds into 
De, and conducts this discussion for the most part as if kinds were entities of type e. Apparently 
there is a certain conflictual tension between the identification of kinds with entities of type 
<s,ep> and the subsequent treatment of them as entities of type e –i.e. as designata. Chierchia 
taps on both of these conflicting assumptions. The latter assumption enables him to claim that 
English is a language in which bare noun phrases formed by common nouns are used as 
designators (semantic arguments) without the involvement of any implicit determiners, just like 
proper names. The former assumption however is required given the definition of the crucial 
operator ∩ as ∩=λs.i(s)  . This definition plays a crucial role in Chierchia’s explaining as to 
why singular count nouns cannot undergo this type shift, and consequently why we cannot have 
bare singular NP’s formed by English count nouns. In this work it is not possible for us to assess 
whether these conflicting threads amounts to a contradiction. Anyway any contradiction can be 
avoided by not including kinds conceived as entities of type <s,ep> into De.  Yet, then the 
presentation of Chierchia’s theory and its embedding into an account which covers certain other 
types of kind denoting NP which are not considered by Chierchia himself faces certain 
complications. For example, Chierchia does not discuss the ramification of his identification of 
kinds with entities of type <s,ep> for the denotations of kind level predicates such as invent and 
extinct which would normally be assigned denotations respectively of types <ek,<ep,t>> and 
<ek,t> . If the identification is to be kept these rather have to be treated as having denotations 
respectively of types <<s,ep>, <ep,t>> and <<s,ep>, t>. Another complication is related with 
the denotations of taxonomic common nouns, an issue which Chierchia (1998) does not address 
at all. Taxonomic nouns are usually treated as kind level appliers (denotation type <ek,t>). 
Under Chierchia’s official doctrine these would have to be treated has having denotations of 
type <<s,ep>,t>. Furthermore these taxonomic nouns can be modified by kind level predicates 
such extinct as in extinct mammal, can be used to form indefinite noun phrases (an extinct 
mammal), or to form quantified noun phrases (every extint mammal). If taxonomic common 
nouns are assigned denotations of type <<s,ep>,t>, one will have to add additional clauses into 




Let  be a predicative meaning of type <s,<ep,t>>, 
∩=λs.kα, if there is a unique kind kα  such that  ∀s’∀x(I(s’)(x, kα) ≡ α(s)(x)). 
Otherwise undefined. 
Here I(s)(x,y) is meant to be a function which relative to an evaluation index s 
maps x,y to truth iff x is an instance of y at s. 
Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004) uses the implicit operator ∩ to explain 
bare plural noun phrases’ capacity to designate kinds. And under the C-
framework we will follow suit. I will describe the details of this account below 
when I give the analysis of bare plural noun phrases according to the C-
framework.  
Besides bare plurals we have seen that definite noun phrases termed as 
definite generics such as the Iphone, the whale, the transistor too can be used to 
designate kinds. Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004), whom we follow in the 
formulation of the C-framework, give different accounts on the matter of 
definite generics. But neither use the implicit operator ∩ in these accounts.  
Chierchia (1998) postulates that the definite article the has a variant which 
inheres an operation which derives a kind designating meaning from the 
particular level predicative meaning of the singular count noun that forms it. 
                                                                                                                                                             
determiners. To avoid all these complications in the present work I present Chierchia’s view by 
treating kinds as entities of type e and ignoring his identification of them with entities of type 
<s,ep>. For this reason I defined ∩  in such a way that it does not presuppose such an 
identification.  For our purposes this simplification does not present any inconvenience as all 
the points to be made in the next chapter regarding the issue of the rigidity/non-rigidity of 
common nouns and of the noun phrases formed by them could as well be made under 
Chierchia’s official doctrine as well –albeit the semantic analyses leading to these points would 
be considerably more complicated. And anyway Chierchia himself wrote “Let me immediately 
qualify: I am not saying that kinds are individual concepts. Kinds are whatever your favorite 
worldview says that they are. However, in a compositional semantic system that computes truth 
conditions they can be represented as individual concepts of sort. For simplicity’s sake, let us 
assume that such individual concepts are members of the domain of individuals (i.e., they live in 




Dayal (2004) gives an account according to which the singular common nouns 
forming definite generics are the taxonomic variants of these common nouns. 
On this matter the C-framework will follow Dayal (2004)’s account the details of 
which will be presented later below. 
Simple Taxonomic Common Nouns under the C-framework 
Previously in the present chapter we have seen that common nouns can form 
taxonomic noun phrases that denote the sub-kinds of the kind corresponding to 
these common nouns’ native meaning. We have seen that such phrases as every 
whale, a whale, some road bikes, two Cadillacs besides their ‘ordinary’ 
particular denoting uses can be used to denote the sub-kinds of the kind which 
supposedly corresponds to the common noun that forms them. We can account 
for the ambiguity of such phrases in a number of ways. We can take the 
determiners involved in such phrases to be ambiguous. Or we can take the 
common nouns involved to be ambiguous. Or else we can postulate implicit 
operations, triggered in certain sentential contexts, which derive predicative 
taxonomic meanings from the natively non-taxonomic meanings of the common 
nouns. The first of these options is rarely adopted, the most commonly adopted 
options are the second and the third. 
The C-framework we set out to describe is derived from Carlson (1980) 




(1980) and Dayal (2004) explicitly posits such an ambiguity.99 They take 
common nouns to be natively ambiguous between between predicative 
particular applying meanings of type <s,<ep,t>>and predicative kind applying 
meanings of type <s,<ek,t>>.  According to this, for example such a common 
noun as whale has in fact two variants: a particular level applier that is true of 
whale tokens and a kind level applier which is true of whale species or genera. 
Modification of Common Nouns under the C-framework 
New nouns can be obtained by modifying simple common nouns with 
adjectives, relative clauses or prepositional phrases: 
wounded whale, whale wounded by Japanese harpooners, extinct whale, new whale, 
whale from the arctic  
The meaning of a modified common noun should be a function of the 
denotations of the simple common noun and the modifiers that form it. In this 
section I will describe how the meanings of modified common nouns will be 
determined under the C-framework.  
Regarding the meanings of the modifiers there are two common 
approaches: (i) to assign modifiers meanings of type <s,<e,t>> or (ii) to assign 
modifiers meanings of type <s,<<e,t>,<e,t>>. The reason for this bifurcation 
is that adjectives and prepositional phrases most commonly occur in two 
different positions in sentences. Either they combine with common nouns as 
                                                        
99 Carlson (1980) himself takes certain common nouns to be ambiguous between a taxonomic 
and non-taxonomic variant. The initiator of the Neo-Calrsonian approach Chierchia (1998) does 




modifiers: Alice treated a wounded whale, Alice met a man from the Alaska . Or 
they form the predicate: This whale was wounded, This man is from Alaska . 
Each approach regarding the semantics of modifiers seem to take one of these 
positions as primary, assigns a native meaning which is suitable for that 
position. Then to account for the contribution of modifiers in the other position, 
certain theoretical adjustments or operations are called in.100  
Here I will adopt the former approach in the formulation of the C-
framework. I adopt this approach because it is less complicated than the other, 
given the simpler semantic types assigned to the modifiers. Then, under the C-
framework the meaning of modified noun will be the result of the composition 
of the meaning of a modifier (type <s,<e,t>>) and the meaning of a common 
noun (type <s,<e,t>> according to the C-framework). Note that as it stands our 
semantic composition operation introduced in the third chapter is not defined 
over pairs of meanings of type <s,<e,t>>; to adopt the stated approach we then 
have to add a fourth clause to the semantic composition operation. Such a clause 
as the following will do: 
IV Let γ be a branching node with α and β as daughters (i.e. [γ]=[αβ]) that both  
 are of the semantic type <s, <e,t>>. Then the semantic composition of ⟦α⟧s,g  
 and ⟦β⟧s,g is  {⟦α⟧s,g , ⟦β⟧s,g }=λs.λx.([α]s,g(x) & [β]s,g(x))=λs.[γ]s,g=⟦γ⟧g and it is  
 of semantic  type <s,<e,t>>.101   
                                                        
100 There appears to be no linguistic-semantic reason to assing universal designating meanings 
of type <s,<eu,t>> to adjectives. Unlike common nouns adjectives cannot form phrasal 
arguments that designate such universals. The case of color terms appears to belie this 
observation. But it seems to be more coherent to treat color terms as having one nominal and 
one adjectival variant. Since the remaining adjectives have morphologically distinct nouns that 
correspond to them.  




Under the C-framework simple non-taxonomic common nouns, their modifiers 
and the modified common nouns will all be assigned meanings of type 
<s,<ep,t>>. Meanings of this type for modified common nouns are derived 
through the semantic composition of the meanings of the modifiers and the 
meanings of the simple common nouns. 
Then under the C-framework the meaning of the non-taxonomic wounded 
whale will be derived thus: 
[N’[Adj wounded] [N whale]] 
{λs.p[<e,t>wounded]s, λs.p[<e,t>whale]s} 
λs.λx.( p[<e,t>wounded]s(x) & p[<e,t>whale]s(x)) 
The derivation of the meanings of modified taxonomic common nouns under the 
C-framework will proceed in a similar manner. Under the C-framework 
taxonomic common nouns and their modifiers will all be assigned meanings of 
type <s,<ek,t>>. For example the derivation of the meaning of extinct whale 
can be described thus: 
[N’[Adj extinct] [N whale]] 
{λs.k[<e,t>extinct]s, λs.k[<e,t>whale]s} 
λs.λxk.( k[<e,t>extinct]s(xk) & k[<e,t>whale]s(xk)) 
Above we have illustrated the semantics of modification of common nouns by 
adjectives. But as mentioned above common nouns can also be modified by 
relative clauses as in whale which is wounded by Japanese harpooners, and by 
prepositional phrases as in whale from Arctic.   
Relative clauses will be assumed to have a logical form as the following:102 
                                                        




[CP which1 [t1 is wounded by Japanese harpooners]] 
The semantic contribution of such relative clauses will be derived using the 
semantic composition clause II, which I reproduce below: 
II Let γ be a branching node with α and β as daughters (i.e. [γ]=[αβ]) where α  
 dominates only a numerical index i and β is of semantic type <s,t>. 
  Then ⟦α⟧g=i and the semantic composition of ⟦α⟧g and⟦β⟧g will be  
  {⟦α⟧g , ⟦β⟧g }=λs.λx.[β]s,g(x/i). 
Then we will have, 
⟦[CP which1 [t1 is wounded by Japanese harpooners]]⟧ 
{⟦which1⟧, ⟦t1 is wounded by Japanese harpooners⟧} 
{1, λs.[ t1 is wounded by Japanese harpooners]s,g} 
λs.λx.[t1 is wounded by Japanese harpooners]s,g(x/1) 
which we will conveniently render as follows: 
λs.λx.[tx is wounded by Japanese harpooners]s 
Then under the C-framework a common noun can compose with a relative 
clauses in the same way as it does with an adjective: 
[N’[N whale][CP which is wounded by Japanese harpooners]] 
{ λs.p[<e,t>whale]s, λs.λy.[ty is wounded by Japanese harpooners]s } 
λs.λx.( p[<e,t>whale]s(x) & λy.[ty is wounded by Japanese harpooners]s(x)) 
λs.λx.( p[<e,t>whale]s(x) & [tx is wounded by Japanese harpooners]s) 
The Semantic Analyses of Noun Phrases  
under the C-framework 
Above we have described how the C-framework will treat the semantics of 
common nouns. Now, I turn to the description of how noun phrases formed by 
common nouns will be analysed under the C-framework drawing on the 




semantic machinery introduced above. I begin with indefinite singular noun 
phrases. 
Indefinite Singular Noun Phrases under the C-framework:  
Non-taxonomic Indefinite Singulars 
2 a The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday is a road bike. 
  [[NP The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday][VP is [NP a road bike]]]   
{λs’.[e The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday]s’, λs’.[<e,t>  a road bike]} 
{λs’.[e The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday]s’, λs’.[<e,t>  a road bike]} 
λs’.[<e,t>  a road bike]([e The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday]s’) 
Non-taxonomic indefinite singular phrases in predicate positions, as in 2a, are 
standardly assigned predicative denotations of type <esg_p,t>. If non-taxonomic 
common nouns are assigned native meanings of type <s,<esg_p,t>> as is done 
under the C-framework  then the meanings of the indefinite singulars in 
predicate positions are taken to be the same as those of the common nouns that 
form them. The indefinite article a in indefinite singulars occurring in the 
predicate position is often considered as semantically vacuous.  
 [NP a [road bike]] in predicate position 
{λs.λP.P, λs.p[<e,t>road bike]s} 
λs.p[<e,t>road bike]s 
Non-taxonomic indefinite singulars can also occur in argument positions: 
2 b A road bike stood locked next to Alice’s bike. 
I have previously mentioned that two different treatments are common in the 




Montague/Lewis way of assigning them existential GQ denotations (type 
<<e,t>,t>), and the Heim way of of treating them introducing variables. In 
describing the C and the K frameworks we will follow the GQ analysis. 
Under the Montague/Lewis treatment of indefinite singulars in argument 
positions the indefinite singular determiner a is given the following analysis: 
λs’.[<<e,t>,<<e, t>,t>>a]s’=λs’.λQ <e ,t>.λP<e,t>.x(Q(x)&P(x)) 
Then under the C-framework according to which singular non-taxomic common 
nouns are assigned meanings of type <s,<esg_p,t>> the sentence 2b will get the 
following interpretation: 
2 b A road bike stood locked next to Alice’s bike. 
  [S[NP [D a] [N road bike]][VP stood next to Alice’s bike]]  
the interpretation of  2b according to the C-framework: 
{{ λs’.[<<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>a]s’, λs’.p[<e,t>road bike]s’}, λs’.[<e,t> stood next to Alice’s bike]s’} 
{{ λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)), λs’.p[<e,t>road bike]s’}, λs’.[<e,t> stood next to Alice’s bike]s’} 
{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>road bike]s’(x) & P(x)), λs’.[<e,t> stood next to Alice’s bike]s’} 
λs’.x(p[<e,t>road bike]s’(x) & [<e,t> stood next to Alice’s bike]s’(x)) 
Indefinite Singular Noun Phrases under the C-framework:  
Taxonomic Indefinite Singulars 
In the first part of the present chapter we had seen that certain indefinite 
singular phrases are taxonomically used in argument positions or in predicate 
positions to denote kinds. I reproduce the relevant examples below: 
4 a The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 is a road bike by the Czech maker Morati. 
 b A road bike by the Czech maker Morati has been launched today. 
 c This week in her blog Alice has reviewed a road bike by the Czech maker Morati. 
Under the C-framework the taxonomic indefinite singular arguments will be 




The only difference is that the common nouns forming the taxonomic indefinite 
phrases will be the taxonomic variants. Remember that according to the C-
framework taxonomic common nouns are assigned kind level applier meanings 
of type <s,<esg_k,t>>. 
4a where the indefinite singular a road bike by the Czech maker Morati 
figures in the predicate position will be interpreted under the C-framework in 
the following way:  
4 a The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 is a road bike by the Czech maker Morati. 
  [[NP The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3][VP is [NP [D a] [N’  r. b. by the Czech maker Morati]]]] 
{λs’.k[e The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s’, {λs’.λP.P, λs’.k[<e,t>   r. b. by the Czech maker Morati]}} 
{λs’.k[e The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s’, λs’.k[<e,t> road bike by the Czech maker Morati]} 
λs’.k[<e,t>  road bike by the Czech maker Morati](k[e The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s’) 
And 4b where the indefinite singular a road bike by the Czech maker Morati 
figures in the argument position will be interpreted under the C-framework in 
the following way:  
4 b  A road bike by the Czech maker Morati has been launched today. 
  [S[NP [D a] [N road bike by the Czech maker Morati]][VP has been launched today]] 
{{ λs’.[<<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>a]s’, λs’.k[<e,t> r. b. by the C. maker M.]s’}, λs’.[<e,t> has been l. today]s’} 
{{ λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)), λs’.k[<e,t> r. b. by the C. maker M.]s’}, λs’.[<e,t> has been l. t.]s’} 
{λs’.λP.x(k[<e,t> r. b. by the Czech maker Morati]s’(x) & P(x)), λs’.[<e,t> has been l. t.s’} 
λs’.x(k[<e,t> r. b. by the Czech maker Morati]s’(x) & [<e,t> has been launched today]s’(x)) 
Taxonomic indefinite phrases naturally occur in kind level sentential contexts. 
But occasionally some taxonomic phrases which appear to be inherently 
taxonomic occur in particular level episodic sentential contexts as in the case of 
the following examples: 
22 a Alice found the carcass of an extinct bison. 




 c Alice shot an endangered game bird. 
 d Alice drove a Cadillac model designed by Damon. 
It appears that in such examples either particular level arguments become the 
subjects of kind level taxonomic predicates (22b) or taxonomic arguments 
become objects of particular level verbs (22c,d) or taxonomic arguments 
combine with particular level common nouns to form genitive constructions 
(22b). So, the interpretation of these sentences according to the native 
meanings of the constituents will inevitably result in sortal conflicts.  In the 
literature on the semantics of noun phrases this issue has not been addressed. 
Specifically, Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004) whom we follow in the 
formulation of the C-framework, does not consider such examples as in 22. 
To resolve sortal conflicts that obtain in such sentences as those in 22 I 
will introduce an operator labelled as detax that applies to taxonomic applier 
meanings to map them into particular level applier meanings.  
Let α be a meaning of type <s,<ek,t>> 
Detax(α)=λs.λx.∃y(I(s)(x,y) & α(s)(y)) 
Detax maps a kind level applier meaning α into a particular level applier 
meaning which relative to a given evaluation index s will map a token x to truth 
iff x is an instance of a kind y to which α applies truly relative to s. 
I will assume that such common nouns as endangered game bird, extinct 
bison, Cadillac model designed by Damon are natively taxonomic. Yet, I will also 
assume that when they form noun phrases which occur in particular level 
sentential contexts, their meaning  can optionally undergo the operation detax 




detax for common nouns that are inherently taxonomic, 22c can be interpreted 
thus: 
22 c Alice shot an endangered game bird. 
  [[an] [endangered game bird]][1 [Alice][[shot][t1]]] 
{{λs.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)), detax(λs.k[<e,t>e. game bird]s)}, λs.λy.[shot]s(y)([Alice]s)} 
{{λs.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)),λs.λx.∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>e. g. b.]s(y))}, λs.λy.[shot]s(y)([A.]s)} 
{λs.λP.x(∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>e. g. b.]s(y))&P(x)), λs.λy.[shot]s(y)([Alice]s)} 
λs.x(∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>endangered game bird]s(y))& [shot]s(x)([Alice]s)) 
Above I have reported that the issue we here suggest to resolve via the 
postulation of the operator detax has not been addressed by Chierchia and 
Dayal. Yet, although they do not directly address the issue, they introduce a 
sortal conflict resolution mechanism called DKP in relation with kind 
designating phrases that occur in episodic particular level sentential contexts, 
and this mechanism may be thought to be useful in the interpretation of such 
sentences as those in 22 as well. I will cover the DKP in the coming section 
about bare plural phrases. And in a later section I will show that DKP faces 
problems in dealing with such sentences as the following: 
23 Alice did not film a bird which was long thought to be extinct. 
The bird in the lower bough is an endangered bird. 
Then we will see that under the C-framework we need both detax and DKP to 
deal with taxonomically interpreted NP’s. 
Bare Plural Phrases under the C-framework 
In this section I will present how C-framework will deal with bare plural 




a great semantic variety both as regards what they denote and as regards how 
they denote. This variety was observed even in the uses of the same bare plural 
phrase in different sorts of sentential contexts. 
24 a The stars of the theme park, Alice and Bob, are whales. 
b Alice did not see whales in the theme park. 
c Whales are an endangered mammal family. 
d The Beluga and the Narwhal are whales. 
e Alice discovered whales and insisted to name one of them Monodon aliciae. 
Above we had noted there is an ongoing controversy about the interpretation 
bare plural phrases in argument positions. First however let me remind you 
points of consensus about the interpretation of bare plural phrases. There is a 
consensus about the semantics of bare plural phrases in predicate positions: in 
predicate positions they have predicative denotations and can either be 
taxonomic (24d) or non-taxonomic (24a). There is a consensus that in 
argument positions they can designate kinds in kind level sentential contexts 
(24c). The C-framework’s treatment of bare plural phrases will follow the 
consensus on these points.  
The disagreement in relation with bare plural phrases concerns the 
interpretation of non-taxonomic bare plural arguments in particular level 
contexts as in (24b). Authors such as Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004), from 
whose papers we derive the C-framework, argue that most non-taxonomic bare 
plural phrases designate kinds even when they occur in argument positions in 
particular level sentential contexts. Yet, this position is criticized by Geenhoven 
(2000) and Krifka (2004).  
Finally, as regards the interpretation of taxonomic bare plural arguments 




that Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004) does not have anything to say about 
them. However I will show that the principal piece of evidence which lead 
Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004) to argue that non-taxonomic bare plural 
arguments should be kind designators applies in the case of taxonomic bare 
plural arguments as well.  
The way Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004) argue for their taking bare 
plural arguments to be kind designators has ramifications as to which common 
nouns should be seen as having corresponding kinds. For, given their arguments 
which we will present now it follows that taxonomic common nouns and 
modified common nouns as well should have corresponding kinds. This last 
issue in turn is very much relevant in judging the advantages and the 
disadvantages of adopting the C-framework or the K-framework, which we will 
present after the C-framework’s presentation. The K-framework will take 
simple non-taxonomic common nouns to be kind designators, but it will take 
modified common nouns and taxonomic common nouns to be appliers –for 
reasons to be discussed later. And in the next chapter we will show that a 
rigid/non-rigid distinction among common nouns will be significant only under 
a framework like the K-framework which takes simple non-taxonomic common 
nouns to be designators but takes modified and/or taxonomic common nouns to 
be appliers. Hence our long dwelling on the issue of the interpretations of bare 




Bare Plural Phrases under the C-framework: Predicates 
Under the C-framework which takes all common nouns to have predicative 
meanings of type <s,<e,t>> the interpretation of bare plural phrases in 
predicate positions will be the same as the plural common nouns that form 
them. That is, they will be assigned meanings of type <s,<epl,t>>.  Non-
taxonomic common nouns will yield non-taxonomic bare plural predicates, and 
taxonomic common nouns will yield taxonomic bare plural predicates. Thus, 
under the C-framework 6a and 6b will get the following interpretations: 
6 a The bikes at Alice’s room are road bikes. 
  [[NP The bikes at Alice’s room] [VP are [NP [N road bikes]]]]  
 
 b The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog are road bikes. 
  [[NP The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog] [VP are [NP [N road bikes]]]]  
The interpretation of 6a according to the C-framework: 
{λs’.pl_p[e the bikes at Alice’s room]s’,λs’.pl_p[<e,t> road bikes]s’}  
λs’.pl_p[<e,t> road bikes]s’(pl_p[e the bikes at Alice’s room]s’) 
 
The interpretation of 6b according to the C-framework: 
{λs’.pl_k[e The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog]s’,λs’.pl_k[<e,t> road bikes]s’}  
λs’.pl_k[<e,t> road bikes]s’(pl_k[e The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog]s’) 
Bare Plural Phrases under the C-framework: Bare Plural Non-
taxonomic Arguments 
Previously we noted that there is a general agreement that in such sentences as 
the following bare plural phrases designate a specific kind: 
Red ants are not endangered. 
Dot matrix printers are out of production. 
Protons are discovered by Ernest Rutherford . 




But according to Carlson (1980), Chierchia (1998), Dayal (2004), whose work 
we follow in formulating the C-framework, most non-taxonomic bare plural 
arguments always operate as kind designators, even when they occur in 
particular level sentential contexts such as the following: 
Alice bought dot matrix printers to print out receipts. 
Alice replaced faulty transistors with new ones. 
The thesis that bare plural arguments operate as kind designators was first 
defended by Carlson (1980). Some of the arguments Carlson gave for this thesis 
and the specific manner in which he accounted for the appearance that bare 
plural arguments denote particulars in particular level contexts were found 
problematic later. But all of the authors who defend this thesis still defend it on 
the basis of the arguments first introduced by Carlson (1980). Some of these 
arguments were presented in the first part of the present chapter. Here, instead 
of Carlson (1980) I will present Chierchia (1998)’s analysis. Chierchia’s analysis 
is more recent and it has been influential and adopted by quite a number of 
authors, whilst Carlson’s ingenious analysis does not currently have such 
following. 
 Chierchia (1998) reasserts, under the banner a neo-Carlsonian approach, 
Carlson (1980)’s view that most bare plural phrases in argument positions 
always designate kinds.  He of course reckons that they designate kinds when 
figuring in kind level sentential contexts. But following Carlson (1980) he 
furthermore argues that previously illustrated scope peculiarities of bare plural 




kind designating as well. Thus, according to Chierchia (1998) mountain bikes in 
all of the following sentences designate kinds: 
25 a Mountain bikes have evolved from road bikes. 
b Mountain bikes stand locked to next to Alice’s bike. 
c Mountain bikes have wide tires. 
d Alice repaired mountain bikes. 
Assigning kind designation to the mountain bikes in 25a appears non 
problematic; the sentential context in which it figures as an argument is kind-
level. However the sentential contexts in 25b-d are particular level and if 
mountain bikes designate a kind then it seems that both sentences are either 
bound to be false or will not make sense at all.  
Below I will first describe how Chierchia analyses bare plural arguments 
as kind designating phrases. Then I will describe his account of how kind 
designating bare plural arguments can meaningfully figure in particular level 
contexts.  
Previously while describing C-framework’s account of non-taxonomic 
common noun meanings we have presented the implicit operator ∩ introduced 
by Chierchia (1998). I reproduce its definition below: 
Let  be a predicative meaning of type <s,<ep,t>>, 
∩=λs.kα, if there is a unique kind kα  such that  ∀s’∀x(I(s’)(x)(kα) ≡ α(s)(x)). 
Otherwise undefined. 
Chierchia argues that in English the meanings of non-taxonomic bare plural 
arguments are derived through the application of ∩ to the meanings of the non-
taxonomic plural common nouns that form them. This is so regardless whether 
these bare plural arguments occur in kind level sentential contexts or in 




argument mountain bikes occurring in the sentences in 25 is derived from the 
meaning of the plural common noun mountain bikes forming it, thus: 
[NP  mountain bikes] 
 ∩(λs’.pl_p[<e,t>mountain bikes]s’))  
 λs’.the-mountain-bike-kind 
Then according to Chierchia (1998) the interpretation of 25a will proceed thus: 
25 a Mountain bikes have evolved from road bikes. 
  [[NP Mountain bikes][VP have evolved from road bikes]] 
the interpretation of  25a according to the C-framework: 
{ ∩(λs’.pl_p[<e,t>mountain bikes]s’), λs.k[<e,t> have evolved from road bikes]s} 
{ λs’.the-mountain-bike-kind , λs.k[<e,t> have evolved from road bikes]s} 
λs.k[<e,t> have evolved from road bikes]s(the-mountain-bike-kind) 
Now I pass to Chierchia’s account of how bare plurals as kind designating 
phrases can figure in argument positions in particular level contexts as in 25b. 
25 b Mountain bikes stand locked to next to Alice’s bike. 
To account for the occurrence of kind designating bare plurals in particular level 
sentential contexts Chierchia formulates an implicit operation which he labels 
as derived kind predication (DKP). This operation is triggered when a kind 
designating argument is to combine with a particular level predicative 
constituent. It applies to the meaning of predicative constituents to make them 
kind level.103 
                                                        
103 There are two sorts of particular level contexts: episodic contexts and sentential contexts. 
DKP concerns only the treatment of bare plural arguments in episodic contexts. For generic 
contexts Chierchia has another proposal which I will not present here, as the semantics of 
generic sentences involve complications which will deflect us far from the coverage of the 




Let  be a a meaning of type <s,<ep,t>>: 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.x(I(s’)(x)(zk) & (s’)(x)) (Here zk is a variable ranging over kinds)104 
Using DKP the truth-conditions of 25b can be derived thus: 
25 b Mountain bikes stand locked next to Alice’s bike. 
  [NP mountain bikes][VP stand locked next to Alice’s bike] 
the interpretation of  25b according to the C-framework:  
{ ∩(λs’.pl_p[<e,t>m. bikes]s’)), λs.p[<e,t> s. l. n. to Alice’s b.]s} type misfit DKP is triggered 
{ λs.the-montain-bike-kind, DKP(λs.p[<e,t> stand locked next to Alice’s bike]s)}  
{ λs.the-montain-bike-kind, λs.λzk.x(I(s)(x)(zk) & p[<e,t> s. l. next to Alice’s bike]s(x))}  
λs.λzk.x(I(s)(x)(zk)  & p[<e,t> s. l. next to Alice’s bike]s(x))( the-montain-bike-kind)  
λs.x(I(s)(x)(the-montain-bike-kind)   & p[<e,t> stand locked next to Alice’s bike]s(x))  
What about the cases in which a bare plural argument occurs in the object 
position of a verb which take only particular level arguments? When we attempt 
to derive the truth-conditions of such a sentence on the basis of the logical form 
which reflects the surface form, the DKP operation defined in the manner 
Chierchia does is of no help. 
25 d Alice repaired mountain bikes. 
  [Alice][[repaired][mountain bikes]] 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[repaired]s,  ∩(λs’.pl_p[<e,t>mountain bikes]s’)}}  
misfit, but DKP is  not available for such types 
The transitive verb repair should have a native meaning of the sorted type 
<s,<ep,<ep,t>>. But the DKP operation as defined by Chierchia can only apply 
to applier meanings (i.e. type <s,<ep,t>>). Chierchia does not discuss this 
                                                        
104 The original definition of DKP reads, Let  be a  denotation of type <ep,t>: 
DKP()=λzk.x(x≪zk(s’) & (s’)(x)). In footnote 98 I reported that Chierchia (1998) originally 
identifies kinds with intensions of type <s,<ep,t>>, but that he nonetheless treats them as 
entities of type e. In the same footnote I indicated that to avoid a complicated presentation I will 
ignore the identification of kinds with intensions and I will treat kinds straightforwardly as 
entities of type e. That’s the reason why here I have to give a formulation of DKP slightly 




problem; he semantically analyzes only a logical form in which the object 
argument is raised to the wide scope: 
I did not see spots on the floor. 
[spots on the floor]1[I did not see t1]105  
Yet he reckons that there are logical forms in which the object argument 
remains in its place.106 It is thus desirable to formulate the operation DKP in 
such a way that it can also be used in cases where the kind level argument 
occurs in the object position (specifically for the reasons we indicated in the 
footnote 105). This can be accomplished by the following reformulation: 
Let  be a meaning of type <s,<ep,a>>, where a can be any of the types t, <e,t>, 
<e,<e,t>>, <e,<e,<e,t>>> … 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)), if a=t 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.λx.y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)(x)), if a=<e,t> 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.λx’.λx’’y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)(x’)(x’’)), if a=<e,<e,t>> 
…  
Now we are in a position to use DKP in dealing with 25d where the noun phrase 
mountain bikes which is taken to be a kind designator occurs in its original 
object position: 
                                                        
105 Yet, when interpreting this logical form he urges that the trace t1 left by the bare plural 
argument spots on the floor be interpreted as a kind level trace, so that he can explain the 
peculiar scope behavior of bare plural arguments in terms of their being kind designators. But 
then in the interpretation of [I did not see t1] we confront again the same problem: a kind level 
argument occurring as the object of a verb which admits only particular level arguments! In 
Chierchia’s analysis this problem remains inconspicuous because he immediately gives the 
following quasi-formal representation, λx.[∼see(I)(xk)]( ∩spots on the floor) without getting 
into the details of how see which as a transitive verb is commonly treated as of type 
<eobject,<esubject,t>> can compose with the subject I before composing with the trace in the 
object position that is assumed to be kind level. 
106 Chierchia (1998), pgs. 368-369. He even approvingly cites a paper by D. Fox according to 
which raising of arguments are banned when the logical form that would result from the raising 




25 d Alice repaired mountain bikes. 
  [Alice][[repaired][mountain bikes]] 
the interpretation of  25d according to the C-framework: 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[repaired]s,  ∩(λs’.pl_p[<e,t>mountain bikes]s’)}} 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[repaired]s,  λs.(λs’.i(pl_p[<e,t>mountain bikes]s’))}} misfit 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λzk.λx.y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & [repaired]s(y)(x)),  λs.the-mountain-bike-kind}} 
DKP triggered 
{λs.[Alice]s, λs.λzk.λx.y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & [repaired]s(y)(x))( the-mountain-bike-kind)} 
{λs.[Alice]s, λs.λx.y(I(s’)(y)( the-mountain-bike-kind) & [repaired]s (y)(x))} 
λs.λx.y(I(s’)(y)( the-mountain-bike-kind) & [repaired]s (y)(x)) ([Alice]s) 
λs.λx.y(I(s’)(y)( the-mountain-bike-kind) & [repaired]s (y)([Alice]s)) 
 The postulation of DKP to accommodate the occurrence of supposedly kind 
designating bare plurals in particular level sentential contexts may look ad hoc. 
However as previously indicated kind-phrases, which are uncontroversially 
thought to designate kinds, can sometimes occur in argument positions in such 
sentential contexts. And DKP can be used to account for such occurrences as 
well.  For example, DKP can be used to account for the occurrence of this model 
in the particular level sentential context Alice rode ___ in the following sentence 
in just the same way as it was used in the interpretation of 25d: 
26 Alice rode this model.  
[Alice][[rode][this model]] 
the interpretation of  26 according to the C-framework:  
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[rode]s, λs.[this model]s}} 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[rode]s,  λs.[this model]s}} misfit 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λzk.λx.y(I(s)(y)(zk) & [rode]s(y)(x)),  λs.[this model]s }} DKP triggered 
{λs.[Alice]s, λs.λzk.λx.y(I(s)(y)(zk) & [rode]s(y)(x))([this model]s)} 
{λs.[Alice]s, λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)([this model]s) & [rode]s(y)(x))} 
λs.y(I(s)(y)([this model]s) & [rode]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
So, from the standpoint of Chierchia (1998) who holds that bare plural 
arguments always designate kinds, the case of bare plurals arguments in 




phenomenon, which anyway has to be given an account even though one does 
not hold bare plural arguments to designate kinds in such contexts.  
Why to take bare Plural Arguments to be Kind Designators Even in 
Particular Level Sentential Contexts? 
In the previous chapter we have indicated that bare plural phrases in argument 
position in particular level sentential contexts seem to manifest a scope 
behavior which is unlike indefinite singular phrases and like kind phrases. In 
this vein we had compared the following examples: 
8 a Alice did not steal Cadillac Eldorados. 
9 a Alice did not steal a Cadillac Eldorado.  
10 a Alice did not steal this model of Cadillac. 
Whilst 9a is ambiguous, 8a and 10a do not appear to be so. The ambiguity of 9a 
was previously shown to be explainable as due to the different ways the 
indefinite noun phrase a Cadillac Eldorado interpreted as an existential 
quantified noun phrase can take scope relative to the negation. Given this 
explanation it follows that, if, as is generally held, bare plural arguments like 
Cadillac Eldorados too were to be interpreted as plural versions of indefinite 
phrases then a similar ambiguity should have obtained in 8a as well. But 
apparently 8a is not ambiguous and its sole reading appears to be similar to the 
sole reading of 10a; according to this reading there are not any Cadillac 
Eldorados stolen by Alice from Bob’s gallery. Chierchia (1998) argues that that 




Eldorados is a kind designating phrase like the kind-phrase argument this 
model of Cadillac figuring in 10a.  
10a has only one pre-theoretically distinguishable reading and according 
to that reading Alice stole no tokens of the Cadillac model in question. Yet, 10a 
can assume logical forms in which the kind phrase argument this model of 
Cadillac can take wide scope or narrow scope relative to not. That is, 10a can 
assume either one of the following logical forms: 
10aA [NP this model of Cadillac]1 [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]] 
10aB [not][S [Alice] [[stole] [NP this model of Cadillac]]] 
Since there is only one pretheoretically distinguishable reading for 10a the 
interpretation of both of these logical forms should yield the same truth 
conditions. Both of these logical forms inheres a sortal misfit. [NP this model of 
Cadillac] has a kind level designator meaning whereas the constituents with 
which it has to semantically compose with [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]] and 
[stole] require kind level arguments. Above we have formulated the operation 
DKP for the resolution of such misfits. 
According to Chierchia (1998) the interpretation of the 10aB where this 
model of Cadillac takes the narrow scope should then proceed along the 
following lines: 
10aB [not][S [Alice] [[stole] [NP this model of Cadillac]]] 
the interpretation of  10aB according to the C-framework:  
{ λs.~, { λs.p[e Alice]s, {λs.[<e,<e,t>>stole], λs.k[e this model of Cadillac]s}}} misfit 
{ λs.~,{ λs.p[e A.]s,{λs.λzk.λx.y(I(s)(y)(zk)&[s.]s(y)(x)),λs.k[ethis m. of C.]s}}}DKP trig. 
{ λs.~, { λs.p[e Alice]s, λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)([this model of C.]s) & [stole]s(y)(x))}} 
{ λs.~, λs.y(I(s)(y)([this model of C.]s)  & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 




So the interpretation of the logical form in which this model of Cadillac takes 
narrow scope relative to not along the lines of Chierchia (1998) successfuly 
yields the sole reading of 10a which is pretheoretically distinguishable.  
Now let’s consider from the standpoint of Chierchia’s theory the 
interpretation of the logical form in which this model of Cadillac takes wide 
scope relative to not. Prima facie it may be thought that this interpretation will 
proceed along the following lines: 
10aA [NP this model of Cadillac]1 [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]] 
{λs.k[ethis model of Cadillac]s, {1, { {λs.∼, { λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[stole]s, λs.[t1]s,g}}}}}} 
{λs.k[ethis model of Cadillac]s, λs.λx.∼[stole]s(tx)([Alice]s)} sortal misfit 
{λs.k[ethis m. of Cadillac]s, λs.λxk.∃y(I(s)(y)(xk) & ∼[stole](ty)([Alice]s))} DKP triggered 
λs.∃y(I(s)(y)(k[ethis model of Cadillac]s) & ∼[stole](ty)([Alice]s)) 
Note however that this way of interpreting 10aA too gave the reading which is 
consistent with there being some tokens of the Cadillac model in question stolen 
by Alice, a reading which 10a does not have. How then 10aA should be 
interpreted so as obtain 10a’s sole pre-theoretically ascertainable reading?  
In response to this problem Chierchia assumes that conflict resolution by 
DKP cannot take place outside the scope of any scope taking constitutent. And 
this is exactly what happens in the interpretation 10aA above. Yet, how else DKP 
can be used to render [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]] a sentential context 
which can compose with a kind level argument? This can be ensured by 
interpreting the trace t1 occuring in [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]] as a kind 
level designator. Chierchia supports this move by indicating that the trace left 
by a kind level designator moving to the wide scope should itself be treated as 




[[stole] [t1]]]]], which can internally be resolved via DKP, and this resolution will 
not take scope over any scope taking element. 
⟦[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]⟧ 
{ λs.~, { λs.p[e Alice]s, {λs.[<e,<e,t>>stole], λs.k[e t1]s,g}}} sortal misfit 
{ λs.~,{ λs.p[eA.]s,{λs.λzk.λx.y(I(s)(y)(zk) & [stole]s(y)(x)), λs.k[e t1]s,g}}} DKP is triggered 
{ λs.~, { λs.p[e Alice]s, λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g) & [stole]s(y)(x))}}  
{ λs.~, λs.y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g)  & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
λs.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
With [not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]] interpreted thus [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] 
[t1]]]]] will become a kind level applier: 
⟦[1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]]⟧ 
{1, λs.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
λs.λxk.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g(1/x)) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
λs.λxk.∼y(I(s)(y)(xk) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
And the interpretation of 10aA will proceed as follows: 
10aA [NP this model of Cadillac]1 [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]] 
the reconsidered interpretation of 10aA according to the C-framework:  
{λs.k[ethis model of Cadillac]s, λs.λxk.∼y(I(s)(y)(xk) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
 λs.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[ethis model of Cadillac]s) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
Finally we have been able to obtain the sole pretheoretically ascertainable 
reading of 10a. Now, let’s finish the topic we started. I previously indicated that 
the 8a like 10a and unlike 9a is unambiguous.   
8 a Alice did not steal Cadillac Eldorados. 
9 a Alice did not steal a Cadillac Eldorado. 
10 a Alice did not steal this model of Cadillac. 
9a has both a reading according to which Alice stole no Cadillac Eldorado tokens 
and another reading which is consistent with her having stolen some Cadillac 




which she did not steal. But 8a and 10a does not have readings which is 
consistent with Alice’s having stolen some Cadillac Eldorado tokens (assuming 
that this model of Cadillac is meant to refer to the Cadillac Eldorado). Chierchia 
(1998), on the basis of similar examples, argues that this state of affairs is hard 
to explain if the bare plural argument Cadillac Eldorados is treated as the plural 
version of a Cadillac Eldorado, namely as an existential quantifier. But that it 
gets a ready explanation if the bare plural argument Cadillac Eldorados is 
treated as a kind designator. And the way to treat the [NPCadillac Eldorados] as a 
kind designator is to apply the implicit operator ∩ to the meaning of the 
underlying plural common noun [NCadillac Eldorados]. Since the state of affairs 
illustrated by 8a, 9a and 10a very generally obtains in English, with the 
exception of certain special cases, Chierchia argues that in English bare plural 
arguments are always interpreted in this way: as having kind designating 
meanings (type <s,ek>) derived from the meanings of the underlying plural 
common nouns, which according to Chierchia are of type <s,<epl_p,t>>. 
Then according to Chierchia (1998) the interpretation of 8a when Cadillac 
Eldorados takes wide scope should proceed in the same way as the 
reconsidered interpretation of 10aA illustrated above: 
8aA [NP Cadillac Eldorados]1 [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]]   
the interpretation of  8aA according to the C-framework:  
{∩(λs.p_pl[<e,t>Cadillac Eldorados]s), {1, {λs.∼, { λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[stole]s, λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}}  
{λs.the-Cadillac-Eldorado-Model, {1, {λs.∼, { λs.[A.]s, {λs.[s.]s, λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}} sortal misfit 
{λs.the-C.-E.-M., {1,{λs.∼,{λs.[A.]s,{λs.λzk.λx.y(I(s)(y)(zk)&[stole]s(y)(x)),λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}} 
DKP is triggered  
{λs.the-C.-E.-M., {1, {λs.∼, { λs.[Alice]s, λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)( k[t1]s,g) & [stole]s(y)(x))}}}}  
{λs.the-C.-E.-M., {1, {λs.∼, λs.y(I(s)(y)( k[t1]s,g) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))}}}    
{λs.the-C.-E.-M., {1, λs.∼y(I(s)(y)( k[t1]s,g) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))}} 




{ λs.the-C.-E.-M., λs.λxk.∼y(I(s)(y)(xk) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
λs.∼y(I(s)(y)( the-C.-E.-M) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
The scope peculiarity manifested by non-taxonomic bare plural arguments in 
particular level contexts and the similarity of this peculiarity to the one 
manifested by kind phrases constitutes part of Chierchia’s main evidence for his 
view that non-taxonomic bare plural phrases operate as kind designators even 
in such contexts.107 
Can All Non-Taxonomic Bare Plural Arguments be Taken to be Kind 
Designators? 
The scope peculiarity of bare plural arguments is manifested by most bare 
plural arguments. Significantly it seems to be manifested even by bare plural 
phrases formed by modified common nouns: 
27 a Alice did not steal pink Eldorados. 
b Alice did not steal Eldorados which had a mileage over 100K. 
                                                        
107 This just part of the evidence the other part is the apparent suspension of the scope 
peculiarity in the case of such bare plural phrases as parts of this machine, people in the next 
room (to be covered in the next section). Chierchia argues that the latter bare plural phrases do 
not manifest scope peculiarity because they do not designate kinds as there can be no kinds 
corresponding to the indexicality involving common nouns that form them. Scope peculiarity 
and special cases in which the scope peculiarity is suspended combines to form Chiechia’s 
complete evidence. There is another piece of evidence related with the scope peculiarity of bare 
plurals given by Chierchia. It is the divergence illustrated in the following pair of sentences: 
Miles killed a rabbit repeatedly, Miles killed rabbits repeatedly  (cannot be read as There are 
some rabbits which Miles killed repeatedly), Miles killed people sitting in the next room 
repeatedly. The first sentence appears to have only the weird reading according which there is a 
rabbit which Miles killed repeatedly. So it seems that for some reason repeatedly is forced to be 
interpreted in narrowest scope in the closest position to the verb. The same should the case for 
in the second sentence. Yet, the sole reading the second sentence has sounds as if rabbits have 
taken narrow scope relative to repeatedly. Chierchia’s account can explain the divergence by 
indicating that rabbits is a kind designators, and leave a kind level trace which forces killed to be 
accommodated via DKP; in the resulting interpretation the existential quantification introduced 
by the DKP will be under the scope of repeatedly. The third sentence indicates that the scope 




If this type of scope peculiarity indeed supports assigning kind designation to 
bare plural phrases that manifest it, as Carlson (1980) and the Neo-Carlsonian 
authors argue, then not just bare plural phrases formed by simple common 
nouns but a considerable part of those formed by modified common nouns as 
well should be assigned kind designation. This outcome of the Neo-Carlsonian 
theory has been criticized. We have seen that in English besides bare plurals 
there are other means to designate kinds. One of them were the definite generic 
phrases –e.g. the tiger, the Iphone5s etc. Curiously one cannot form definite 
generics with modified common nouns like pink Cadillac: the pink Cadillac 
cannot be used to designate a kind. I will return to this point later when I 
comparatively assesss the C-framework which is being presented now and the 
K-framework which will be presented further below.  
Although Carlson (1980) and Chierchia (1998) accepts that most bare 
plural arguments formed by modified noun phrases are kind designators, they 
do not extend this claim to all bare plural arguments. For they think that some 
bare plural phrases formed by modified common nouns do not manifest the 
scope peculiarity which is seen as the hallmark of kind designation. Carlson and 
Chierchia thinks that such phrases as parts of that machine, boys sitting here do 
not manifest any scope peculiarity and that they behave like indefinite phrases: 
28 a John did not see parts of that machine. 
b John did not see boys sitting here. 
As far as 28a is concerned Chierchia appears to be right in that that sentence is 
ambiguous between the readings John did not see any parts of that machine and 




appear to me to be ambiguous in this way; it seems that its only reading is John 
did not see any boys sitting here. 
Notwithstanding my divergent intuition on this matter, let me briefly 
describe Chierchia’s proposal regarding such bare plural phrases which he 
thinks to behave like indefinite phrases. According to Chierchia common nouns 
such as parts of that machine, boys sitting here do not determine a kind, and for 
this reason the operation ∩ is not defined for them. Yet, bare plural phrases 
formed by such common nouns too can figure in argument positions which 
require contributions either of type <s,e> (designator) or <s,<<e,t>,t>> 
(quantifier); as such somehow a contribution of either of these types should be 
derived from the common nouns which are of type <s,<e,t>> according to 
Chierchia.  Chierchia postulates that in cases where ∩ does not apply there is 
another implicit operation termed as ∃ which plural common nouns that form 
bare plural noun phrases can undergo. This operation is defined thus: 
Let α be of the sorted type <s,<ep,t>> 
∃(⟦α⟧)=∃(λs.[α]s)=λs.λP.∃x([α]s(x) & P(x)) with x of type ep and P of type <ep,t>. 
Then according to Chierchia for example the interpretation of the logical form of 
28a where parts of the machine takes wide scope should proceed along the 
following lines: 
28aA  [NP parts of that machine]1 [1 [[not][S [John] [[see] [t1]]]]] 
As ∩ (λs. p[<e,t> parts of that machine]s) is not defined,  ⟦[NP parts of that machine]⟧ will 
have to  be interpreted as ∃(λs. p[<e,t> parts of that machine]s): 
{∃(λs.p[<e,t> parts of that machine]s), λs.λx.(∼[see]s([tx]s)([John]s))} 
{λs.λP.∃y(p[<e,t> parts of that machine]s(y) & P(y)), λs.λx.(∼[see]s([tx]s)([John]s))} 
λs.∃y(p[<e,t> parts of that machine]s(y) & λx.(∼[see]s([tx]s)([John]s))(y)) 




So, the bare plural phrase parts of the machine does not operate as a kind 
designator, but as a particular level existential GQ. And as such the reading that 
results when it takes wide scope relative to negation will be different than the 
one that results when it remains in the narrow scope. 
The postulation of the availability of such an operation as ∃ raise certain 
questions. First, if ∃ is available to derive argument denotations out of common 
nouns, then why in English we do not have bare singular nouns formed out of 
count nouns? Given ∃, such a singular count noun as tiger as well could be used 
to form a bare singular argument which has the meaning ∃(⟦[CN tiger]⟧ )with an 
existential GQ meaning. In response to this question Chierchia refers to a certain 
Blocking Principle which limits the postulation and applicability of type-shifting 
operations like ∃. According to this principle an implicit operation cannot be 
invoked if there is an explicit determiner in the language which is assigned the 
same operation as its meaning. As it happens, the operation termed as ∃ here is 
also assigned to the indefinite article a as its semantic contribution. For this 
reason, Chierchia argues, in English ∃ can be invoked only in relation with bare 
plural phrases as in English there is not a plural version of the indefinite article 
a. 
A second question raised by Chierchia’s resort to ∃ is the following. If ∃ is 
available at least for plural count nouns, then why it is not freely used in place of 
∩ ? For, if it could freely be used then any bare plural noun phrase, and not just 
those like parts of that machine,  could be interpreted as an indefinite phrase 
and could be expected to cause scope ambiguity. In response to this second 




applicable only if ∩ is not. The reason Chierchia gives for this supposed ordering 
between ∩ and ∃ is that ∩ is more meaning preserving than ∃, as the latter brings 
about existential import. This answer by Chierhia raises further questions, yet I 
cannot pursue them here.108  
Bare Plural Phrases under the C-framework: 
Taxonomic Bare Plural Arguments  
In the previous chapter we have seen that like some indefinite singular 
arguments some bare plural arguments too are used taxonomically. 
29 a Alice reviewed obsolete Japanese mobile models. 
b Alice has discovered extinct whale species. 
How will such taxonomic bare plural arguments be treated under the C-
framework? Unfortunately, neither Chierchia (1998) nor Dayal (2004) whom 
we follow in the formulation of the C-framework has anything to say about the 
treatment of taxonomic bare plural phrases (although as we will see their case 
is highly relevant for their theory regarding bare plural arguments). So, on this 
matter we will have to improvise ourselves. 
The C-framework, following Chierchia (1998), treated non-taxonomic bare 
plural arguments as kind designators, excepting some special bare plural 
phrases like parts of the machine which were treated as existential GQ’s. Which 
of these treatments are suitable for such taxonomic bare plural arguments as 
obsolete Japanese mobile models and extinct whale species?  
                                                        




First, let’s consider how we understand the sentences in 29. Their portent 
appears to be paraphrasable by the following respectively: 
Alice has reviewed some obsolete Japanese mobile models. 
Alice has discovered some extinct whale species. 
Thus, it appears that the NP’s obsolete Japanese mobile models and extinct 
whale species can be treated simply as existential GQ’s, just like the non-kind 
designating parts of that machine, that result from the application of the 
operation ∃ on the meanings of the taxonomic common nouns that form them. 
The difference from the case of the NP parts of that machine will be that, parts 
of the machine is formed by a particular level common noun of the sorted type 
<s, <ep,t>> and as a result the application of ∃ yields a particular level, non-
taxonomic existential generalized quantifier; whereas the NP’s obsolete 
Japanese mobile models and extinct whale species are formed by taxonomic 
common nouns which are of the sorted type <s,<ek,t>>, so the application of ∃ 
will yield a taxonomic existential generalized quantifier: 
⟦[NPobsolete Japanese mobile models]⟧ 
∃(⟦[N’ obsolete Japanese mobile models]⟧) 
∃(λs.k_pl[<e,t> obsolete Japanese mobile models]) 
λs.λP.∃x(k_pl[<e,t> o. Japanese mobile models]s(x) & P(x)) sorted type <s,<<ek,t> ,t>> 
Given this interpretation for [NPobsolete Japanese mobile models], 29a can be 
interpreted in the following way: 
29 a Alice reviewed obsolete Japanese mobile models. 
  [NP obsolete Japanese mobile models]1[1 [[Alice][[reviewed][t1]]]] 
{∃(λs.k_pl[<e,t> obsolete Japanese mobile models]), λs.λy.([reviewed]s([ty]s)([Alice]s))} 
{λs.λP.∃x(k_pl[<e,t>o. J. mobile models]s(x) & P(x)), λs.λy.([reviewed]s([ty]s)([Alice]s))} 
λs.∃x(k_pl[<e,t> o. J. mobile models]s(x) & λs.λy.([reviewed]s([ty]s)([Alice]s))(x)) 




However it seems that it will be more consistent and preferable for the C-
framework to take most taxonomic bare plural arguments to be kind 
designators along the lines of most non-taxonomic bare plural arguments. The 
reason is that the taxonomic bare plural NPs obsolete Japanese mobile models 
and extinct whale species, and arguably many other such NPs manifest the very 
scope related peculiarity which we have above seen to be manifested by their 
non-taxonomic kins: 
30 a Alice did not review obsolete Japanese mobile models. 
b Alice did not discover extinct whale species. 
The only available readings for 30a and b appear to be the following: 
Alice did not review any obsolete Japanese mobile models. 
Alice did not discover any extinct whale species. 
If the NP’sobsolete Japanese mobile models and extinct whale species were to 
be treated as existential GQ’s as described above 30a and b would be expected 
to be ambiguous. Remember this phenomenon was the principal reason which 
lead Chierchia (1998), whom we follow in the formulation of the C-framework, 
to take non-taxonomic bare plural arguments to operate as kind designators 
even when they occured in particular level contexts. So, it appears that 
Chierchia (1998)’s treatment of non-taxonomic bare plural arguments as kind 
designators should also be extended to the case of taxonomic ones as well. If this 
extension is possible, the bare plural arguments like obsolete Japanese mobile 
models and extinct whale species will have to designate higher order kinds (hk), 
the instances of which are themselves kinds. This kind designating meaning for 




that form them through the operation ∩. Furthermore, in the analysis of such 
sentences as 30a,b and 29a,b an operation like DKP will have to be invoked 
because as we understand these sentences what has been rewieved or 
discovered by Alice are not putative higher order kinds but the kinds which are 
instances thereof. Thus for example the interpretation of the logical form of 30a 
in which the NP obsolete Japanese mobile models take wide scope will proceed 
along the following lines: 
30 a Alice did not review obsolete Japanese mobile models. 
  [Obsolete Japanese mobile models]1[1 [not [[Alice][[review][t1]]]]  
{∩(λs.[O. Jap. m. m.]s), {1, {λs.∼, {λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[review]s, λs.hk[et1]s,g}}}}} 
{λs.the-obsolete-Jap.-mobile-model-kind, {1, {λs.∼, {λs.[A.]s, {λs.[r.]s, λs.hk[et1]s,g}}}}}109 
{λs.the-oJmmk.,{1,{λs.∼,{λs.[A.]s,{λs.λzhk.λx.∃y(I(s)(y)(zhk)&[r.]s(y)(x)),λs.hk[et1]s,g}}}}}  
{λs.the-oJmmk.,{1, {λs.∼, {λs.[Alice]s, λs.λx.∃y(I(s)(y)( hk[et1]s,g) & [review]s(y)(x))}}}}  
{λs.the- oJmmk., {1, {λs.∼, λs.∃y(I(s)(y)( hk[et1]s,g) & [review]s(y)([Alice]s))}}}  
{λs.the- oJmmk., {1, λs.∼∃y(I(s)(y)( hk[et1]s,g) & [review]s(y)([Alice]s))}} 
{λs.the- oJmmk., λs.λxhk.∼∃y(I(s)(y)( hk[et1]s,g(1/x)) & [review]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
{λs.the- oJmmk., λs.λxhk.∼∃y(I(s)(y)( xhk) & [review]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
λs.λxhk.∼∃y(I(s)(y)(the-oJmmk.)&[review]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
The idea of taking the scope peculiarity manifested by bare plural arguments as 
an indicator for kind designation by such arguments forces the Neo-Carlsonians, 
on pain of inconsistency, to assume higher level kinds and to take taxonomic 
bare plural arguments to designate such kinds. Yet, apart from this theory 
dependent pressure to accept that taxonomic bare plural phrases are 
designators for higher level kinds, there does not seem to be any piece of 
evidence that supports the admittance of higher level kinds into the ontology of 
natural language semantics (in contrast the case for non-taxonomic bare plural 
                                                        
109 Sortal misfit between [review]s which cannot take higher kinds as arguments and hk[et1]s,g which as the trace of 





arguments’ being kind designators was not just supported by their scope 
peculiarity but it was also supported also by their capacity to figure in kind level 
sentential contexts). Instead, there are reasons to think that taxonomic bare 
plural arguments cannot be designators for higher level kinds. I will consider 
these reasons later. What I want to point out now is that this forced 
commitment to higher level kinds can be seen as a further reason to doubt the 
Neo-Carlsonian way of explaining the scope peculiarity manifested by bare 
plural arguments by taking them to be kind designators. Later as we present the 
K-framework we will introduce an alternative way to explain these scope 
peculiarities which does not require the bare plurals to be kind designators. 
Definite Phrases under the C-framework 
1  j Surely, the whale should have been disoriented to come into these waters and 
  tore our nets off. 
 k Alice claims that the cladistic analysis shows that the whale should rather be put 
  under an altogether new genus. (about a contextually salient species of whale)  
 l The whale is a highly intelligent mammal. (about the whale kind as whole) 
 m The whales escaped by jumping off the pool into the sea. 
Previously we have seen that definite phrases can be used both to designate 
kinds and particulars. Singular definites are usually used to designate a 
contextually salient particular (1j), or if they are taxonomic they are used to 
designate a contextually salient sub-kind of the kind corresponding to the 
common noun that forms them (1k). Plural definites are taken to designate a 
contextually salient sum of particulars (1m), or if they are taxonomic they are 
taken to designate a contextually salient sum consisting of the sub-kinds of the 




phrase is used to designate a contextually salient entity that satisfies a certain 
description, we have seen that in kind level sentential contexts a definite 
singular can be used apparently like a name to designate the very kind 
corresponding to the common noun that forms it (1l). The definite singulars 
used in the latter way are termed as definite generics. Below I reproduce further 
examples of definite generics:  
17 a The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 has been launched at 2001. 
 b The iPad2 is out of stock within days of its launch in the country. 
 c The Anatolian leopard is now extinct in the Aegean region. 
 d At the time, the bicycle industry was not impressed with the mountain bike,  
  which many regarded as a short-term fad. 
Now I will present how this variety in the semantics of definite phrases formed 
by count common nouns will be accounted under the C framework. 
Definite Phrases under the C-framework: Particular Level Phrases 
 We had previously noted that definite phrases such as those figuring in the 
following sentences were usually taken to be particular level designators (type 
<s,ep>): 
16 a The biker irritated the passerby with his loud rev up. 
 b All of us saw the bear coming out of the woods, picking the basket and swiftly  
  disappearing into the woods again. 
 c The winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final is from Jamaica. 
 d The finalists of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final are black people. 
 e The self-absorbed cyclists knocked Alice down. 
Given an evaluation index s, some such definite phrases simply pick the entity 
which uniquely satisfies at s the descriptive conditions expressed by common 




and 16d. Yet the same cannot be said of the definite phrase arguments of the 
remaining sentences in 16; for example the biker in 16a can be successfully used 
to designate a person relative to an evaluation index s, although in that 
evaluation index there may be more than one biker. The interpretation of the 
latter type of definite phrases is sensitive to the context of utterance. 
First let’s cover how the definite phrase arguments such as those 
occurring in 16c and 16d will be treated under the C-framework. According to 
the standard approach common nouns have predicative meanings of type 
<s,<e,t>>, and the determiner the expresses a function of type <s,<<e,t>,e>> 
which involves the iota operator (i): 
Let  of type <e,t> 
 i()=the largest individual x (under ≪) such that (x)=1 
⟦the⟧=λs.λP.i(P) 
This standard analysis can be adopted under the C-framework as it is because 
the C-framework assigns predicative meanings to count common nouns. Then 
the analysis of 16c and 16d under the C-framework will be as follows: 
16 c The winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final is from Jamaica. 
[NP The [N’ winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final]][VP is from Jamaica] 
{{λs.λP.i(P), λs.[<e,t> w. of the 2012 L. Games’ 100m final]s}, λs.[<e,t> from Jamaica]} 
{λs.i([<e,t> winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final]s}, λs.[<e,t> from Jamaica]} 
λs.[<e,t> from Jamaica](i([<e,t> winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final]s)  
16 d The finalists of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final are black people. 
[NP The [N’ finalists of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final]][VP are black people] 
{{λs.λP.i(P), λs.[<e,t> finalists of the 2012 L. Games’ 100m final]s}, λs.[<e,t> black people]} 
{λs.i([<e,t> finalists of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final]s}, λs.[<e,t> black people]} 




In 16c [NP The [N’ winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final]] designates 
relative to each possible world w for which its meaning is defined the largest 
entity of type esg which is a winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final. Since 
[N’ winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final] is singular it truly applies 
only to atoms, and there can be a largest entity to which it truly applies only if 
there is only one atom to which it truly applies. 
In 16d [NP The [N’ finalists of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final]] 
designates relative to each possible world w for which its meaning is defined 
the largest entity of type epl which is the sum of the finalists of the 2012 London 
Games’ 100m final at w. 
Building on this analysis of the definite phrases, we can also formulate an 
account for the definite phrases the designatum of which is determined on the 
basis of contextual input. To this end we will suppose that an implicit predicate 
dc (type <s,<e,t>>) which is only true of the entities which are salient relative 
to the context utterance is implicitly involved in such definite phrases. So that 
the definite phrase subject the biker in 16a can for example be paraphrased as 
the biker who is salient at the moment. Then under the C-framework we can 
give the following analyses of 16a: 
16 a The biker irritated the passerby with his loud rev up. 
  [NPThe [Nbiker]] [VP irritated the passerby with his loud rev up] 
{{λs.λP.i(P), {λs.[<e,t>biker]s, λs.dc}}, λs.[<e,t>irritated the passerby with his loud rev up]s} 
{{λs.λP.i(P), λs.λx.([<e,t>biker]s(x) & dc(x))}, λs.[<e,t>i. the p. with his loud rev up]s} 
{λs.i(λx.([<e,t>biker]s & dc(x))), λs.[<e,t>irritated the passerby with his loud rev up]s}   




Definite Phrases under the C-framework:  
Taxonomic Definite Phrases 
We have previously seen that definite phrases can also be used to designate a 
contextually salient kind which satisfies a taxonomically interpreted common 
noun. 
21 a Alice invented a molecular transistor and sold the transistor to Intel for $ 100  
  millon. 
 b Alice invented new transistors and sold the transistors to Intel for $ 100 millon. 
 c A new whale species has been discovered in New Zealand and the team who  
  made the discovery proposed to name the whale as Tasmacetus shepherdi. 
In 21a the definite phrase the transistor does not designate a transistor token; 
nor does it designate the transistor kind. It designates a certain type of 
transistor which is contextually salient. 
Under the C-framework the analysis of such taxonomic definite phrases 
will be the same as those that designate particulars, except that the common 
nouns involved in them will be taxonomically interpreted (type <s,<ek,t>>).  
31 Alice sold the transistor. relative to a context c set by a sentence like 21a 
[Alice][[sold][[the][transistor]]] 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λy.λz.[sold]s, {λs.λP.i(P), {λs.k[<e,t>transistor]s, λs.dc}}}} 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λy.λz.[sold]s, {λs.λP.i(P), λs.λx.(k[<e,t>transistor]s(x) & dc(x))}}} 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λy.λz.[sold]s, λs.i(λx.(k[<e,t>transistor]s(x) & dc(x)))}} 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λz.[sold]s(i(λx.(k[<e,t>transistor]s(x) & dc(x))))} 
λs.[sold]s(i(λx.(k[<e,t>transistor]s(x) & dc(x))))([Alice]s) 
Definite Phrases under the C-framework: 
Definite Generics 
Besides taxonomic definite phrases, we have previously noted that there 




nouns are not used taxonomically and which rather simply designate kinds that 
correspond to the common nouns that forms them. Such definite phrases are 
commonly labelled as definite generics. The highlighted definite phrases in the 
sentences below are examples of definite generics: 
17 a The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 has been launched at 2001. 
 b The iPad2 is out of stock within days of its launch in the country. 
 c The Anatolian leopard is now extinct in the Aegean region. 
 d At the time, the bicycle industry was not impressed with the mountain bike,  
  which many regarded as a short-term fad. 
 e Edgar Lilienfeld has invented the transistor but did not construct any prototypes. 
The Neo-Carlsonians, Chierchia and Dayal, which the C-framework follow have 
different views about the analysis of definite generics. According to Chierchia 
(1998), definite generics designate kinds but the common nouns that form them 
are predicative and the denotation of the definite generic is derived from the 
predicative meaning of the common noun through a complicated chain of 
implicit operations. 110 According to Dayal (2004) definite generics are in fact 
taxonomic definite phrases involving taxonomically interpreted common nouns. 
The C-framework will adopt Dayal (2004)’s account, due to the overcomplexity 
of Chierchia (1998)’s account. 
According to Dayal a common noun such as camel has a taxonomic variant 
with a kind level predicative meaning of type <s,<ek,t>>. Dayal assumes that 
among the camel-kinds mapped to truth by the taxonomically interpreted 
camel, the genus Camelus  too is included, besides the camel species Camelus 
dromadeirus and Camelus bacterianus. This assumption then enables her to 
                                                        





interpret the definite generic as a taxonomic definite phrase which designates 
the genus Camelus, when that genus is the unique contextually salient kind to 
which camel truly applies. Thus according to Dayal the analysis of the definite 
generic the camel will be as follows: 
⟦[[Dthe][NP camel]]⟧ 
{λs.λP.i(P), {λs.dc, λs.sg_k[<e,t>camel]s}} 
{λs.λP.i(P), λs.λx.(dc(x) & sg_k[<e,t>camel]s(x))} 
λs.i( λx.(dc(x) & sg_k[<e,t>camel]s(x)))  
relative to a given index @ and a context c in which the unique salient kind to which 
camel truly applies is the genus Camelus: 
Camelus=i( λx.(dc(x) & sg_k[<e,t>camel]@(x)))=the largest individual x (under ≪) such 
that sg_ k[<e,t>camel]@(x)=1 and dc(x)=1  
According to this account definite generics are then just a special sorts of 
taxonomic definite phrases. Relative to a context of utterance where the salient 
kind level individuals include only mammal genera but not the mammal species 
the camel will designate the genus Camelus. Relative to another context of 
utterance where the salient kind level individuals are for example {Panthera 
tigris, Camelus bacterianus, Elephas maximus} the camel will designate Camelus 
bacterianus but not the genus Camelus. And relative to a context of utterance 
where both the Camelus bacterianus and the Camelus dromadeirus are salient, 
then the camel will not be able to pick a designatum. 
So, according to Dayal (2004) the analysis of 17a will be thus:  
17 a The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 has been launched at 2001. 
  [NP [DThe] [NTi Pro Race SC 1.3]] [VPhas been launched at 2001] 
{{ λs.λP.i(P), {λs.dc, λs.k[<e,t> Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s}}, λs.k[<e,t> has been l. at 2001]s} 
{λs.λP.i(P), λs.λx.(dc(x) & k[<e,t> Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s(x))}, λs.k[<e,t> has been l. at 2001]s} 
{λs.i(λx.(dc(x) & k[<e,t> Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s(x)), λs.k[<e,t> has been launched at 2001]s} 




Certain aspects of this analysis are problematic. First, such semantically simple 
count nouns as Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 can form definite generics. The peculiar thing 
about such common nouns as Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 is that they correspond to kinds 
which are infima species –i.e. kinds which do not have any taxa. Other examples 
of such common nouns are electron, tiger etc. So, Dayal (2004) has to assume 
that besides non-taxonomic variants which have particular level applier 
meanings, these common nouns also have taxonomic variants which have kind 
level applier meanings. Yet, given that the kinds that correspond to such 
common nouns are infima species, the meanings of their taxonomic variants will 
truly apply to a single kind relative to every possible world. That is, for example 
the common noun electron will have to have a taxonomic variant, and that 
taxonomic variant can only be true of the electron relative to any possible 
world.  Postulation of taxonomic common nouns that can truly apply to only one 
kind appears superfluous. 
Another problem with Dayal’s account is that it predicts that any 
taxonomic common noun, including modified ones can form definite generics. 
For example, it predicts that the definite phrase the extinct whale can be used as 
a definite generic to designate a single kind, the extinct-whale-kind, the 
instances of which are tokens of extinct whale species. Yet, this prediction does 
not materialize. Regardless the question whether such a kind exists, it is clear 
that in English the extinct whale can only be used to designate the unique whale 
sub-kind (in general or among the salient individuals) that is extinct. 
Despite these problems we will adopt Dayal (2004)’s account for the 




alternative, Chierchia (1998)’s account, is far too complicated and it has its own 
problems. 
Hereby I finish my presentation of the analyses of noun phrases formed by 
count common nouns from the standpoint of the C-framework. I will now pass 
to the presentation of an alternative framework, which differently from the C-
framework, will seek to account for the semantic variety of the noun phrases 
formed by count nouns on the by assigning kind designating meaning to 
semantically simple non-taxonomic common nouns.  
The K-framework 
At the beginning of the chapter we have indicated that the semantic literature 
presents different means to account for the semantic variety manifested by 
noun phrases formed by count nouns. And in particular it presents different 
means to account for the kind-level denotation/particular-level denotation 
variation manifested by these phrases.  Previously we presented the C-
framework which is defended by Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004). C-
framework assigns predicative meanings (type <s,<e,t>>) to all count common 
nouns; it takes count common nouns to be ambiguous between kind level 
taxonomic variants and particular level non-taxonomic variants; and it derives 
the variety in the meanings of the noun phrases formed by common nouns on 
this basis.  
Now I will present the K-framework which will assign kind designator 




Ipad2, Coke bottle; and given this fundamental difference its derivation of the 
variety in the meanings of the noun phrases formed by count common nouns 
will proceed differently than that of the C-framework.  
The Treatment of Common Nouns under the K-framework 
The K-Framework: Assigning Kind Designating Meanings to S imple 
Non-taxonomic Common Nouns 
In response to the kind designation related phenomena discussed in the 
previous chapter, Krifka et al. (1995) claims that non-taxonomic common nouns 
should fulfill at least two functions: referring to kinds and applying to instances 
of these kinds. They suggest that either of these functions can be taken as native, 
and in cases where it is needed the other function can be derived from the 
primary function by means of a semantic operation. The C-framework described 
above takes application to instances as the primary function and derives kind 
reference from that function. The other option will be to directly assign kind 
designating meanings of type <s,esg_k> to non-taxonomic simple common 
nouns, and to derive predicative meanings from them through semantic 
operations.111 The K-framework we set out describe now will follow the latter 
option. 
                                                        
111 Krifka et al. (1995), Krifka (1995), Zamparelli (2000) and Longobardi (2005) assign native 
kind designating meanings to simple common nouns. Krifka et al. (1995), Krifka (1995), 
Zamparelli (2000) account for the particular level denotations of the predicates or noun phrases 





According to the K-framework kinds will be sui generis individuals, 
members of the domain of individuals (De). The singular common noun dodo 
and the plural common noun dodos will have the same kind designating 
meaning.  The benefit of this option is that kind designation by such noun 
phrases as bare plurals (e.g. Dodos are extinct) and definite generics (e.g. the 
dodo is extinct) will get a straightforward derivation (I will discuss certain 
details later, when I discuss the analysis of the noun phrases below). 
The drawback of this approach is that simple non-taxonomic common 
nouns can also form quantiying noun phrases or predicates that denote 
particulars –e.g. Two dodos have been spotted in the area, What you spotted is 
definetely not a dodo. If we preserve the standard analysis of quantifiers as 
meanings of type <s,<<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>> then the meanings they semantically 
compose with has to be of type <s,<e,t>>. Moreover if we continue to regard 
the article a figuring in predicates as semantically vacuous then the common 
nouns occurring in predicates should somehow  contribute meanings of type 
<s,<e,t>>.  So, under the K-framework one will have to postulate a non-
vacuous operation that yields predicative meanings that apply to particulars 
from native simple common noun meanings that designate kinds.  
If the common nouns whale and whales are natively assigned a meaning of 
type <s,esg_k>, then predicative meanings that rather apply respectively to the 
instances and sums of the insances of the kind which is the designatum of 
whale(s) under its native meaning can be derived by using an operation such as 
the following: 








=λs.λx.(~ I(s)(x)(sg_k[e s]s) & ∀y((y≪x & Atom(y)) I(s)(y)(sg_k[e s]s))) 112 
Under the K-framework I will assume that simple common nouns which are 
native kind designators always have the option to undergo Pred. 
Taxonomic Uses of Simple Common Nouns According to K-framework 
 We have previosly seen that such phrases as every whale, a whale, some road 
bikes, two Cadillacs besides their ‘ordinary’ particular denoting uses can be 
used to denote to sub-kinds of the kind which supposedly corresponds to the 
common noun that forms them.  
To account for such taxonomic NP’s the C-framework posited an ambiguity 
at the level of common nouns. According to this for example the common noun 
Cadillac had a non-taxonomic applier meaning which applied to Cadillac tokens, 
and alongside it also had a taxonomic applier meaning which applied to Cadillac 
models. 
                                                        
112 Such an operation is proposed in Krifka et al. (1995) and Krifka (1995) for singular count 
nouns. For the non-intensional version see Krifka et al. (1995, 66); for the intensional version 
see Krifka (1995, 399); in relation with English common nouns Krifka (1995, 406) embeds this 
operation in the interpretation of number words –e.g. three. Krifka (1995) does not say 
anything about the interpretation of quantificational determiners such as every, some or the 
indefinite determiner a. It is possible for him and would be more coherent for him to embed the 
predicativizing operation in the interpretation of these determiners as well. But in the K-
framework I am describing I will not follow this path. I rather keep standard interpretation of 
quantificational determiners and of the indefinite article a as of semantic type 
<s,<<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>> and take pred to be a self-standing implicit operator. This is not a 
gratuitous divergence. If one takes simple common nouns to be kind designators and one 
embeds the predicativizing operator in the interpretation of determiners, then it becomes 





Having assigned kind designator meanings to simple common nouns 
under the K-framework, to account for the taxonomic interpretation of such 
common nouns we can posit a similar ambiguity. We can take such common 
nouns as Cadillac, whale which admit both a taxonomic reading and a non-
taxonomic reading to be ambiguous between two distinct kind designating 
meanings. For example under its non-taxonomic reading Cadillac will taken to 
designate a kind the instances of which are Cadillac tokens; whilst under its 
taxonomic reading the same common noun will be taken to designate a higher 
order kind the instances of which are rather Cadillac models. We will not follow 
this approach under the K-framework as it presents certain problems which we 
will consider later. 
Instead of positing such an ambiguity at the level of simple common 
nouns, we have the possibility to postulate an operation that derives taxonomic 
applier meanings from the kind designating meanings the K-framework assigns 
to simple common nouns.113 Such an operation can be formulated in the 
following way: 
Let  be a partial function of type <s,esg_k>, 
Let T(s)(x,y)=1 iff x is sub-kind of y relative to s 
K-pred()=λs’.λx.T(s’)(x,(s’)) 
 
K-pred(λs.sg_k[e whale]s)=λs.λxsg_k.T(s)(xsg_p, sg_k[ewhale]s) 
                                                        
113 For example in Krifka (1995) who assigns kind designating meanings to simple common 




An operation such as K-pred can be used to account for the use of a common 
noun to form noun phrases that denote the sub-kinds of the kind that 
corresponds to that common noun: 
Some endangered species are whales.  
Some whales are endangered species. 
This whale is on the brink of extinction.  
It will be triggered in sentential contexts where neither the interpretation of the 
common noun under its native kind designating interpretation nor the 
application of the particular level predicativizing operator pred previously 
described yields an interpretation. 
Under the K-framework we will adopt the account of taxonomically 
interpreted common nouns according to which the taxonomic interpretation is 
derived from the kind designating meanings of common nouns, and no higher 
order kind will be involved. For the sake of simplicity however in the formal 
derivations of the meanings under the K-freamework I will not indicate the 
involvement of the K-pred operation and take the taxonomically interpreted 
common nouns as if they were natively so. So, effectively these will look the 
same as the corresponding derivations under the C-framework. 
Before we go on I want to talk about a further implicit operation, detax. 
We had already introduced it under the C-framework and it applied to the 
meanings of taxonomically interpreted common nouns to derive predicative 
meanings that apply to the instances of these kinds. First, let me remind you 
why this operation was needed. Consider the following sentences: 
22 a Alice found the carcass of an extinct bison. 
 b The bird on that lower bough is an endangered game bird. 




 d Alice drove a Cadillac model designed by Damon. 
Such modified common nouns as endangered bird and extinct bison are formed 
by the modifying adjectives endangered and extinct that are kind level. These 
kind level modifiers force a taxonomic interpretation of the common nouns with 
which they combine. Consequently the resulting modified common nouns in 
question here have to be taxonomic appliers. It is implausible that these be kind 
designators for the same reason that it is implausible for the taxonomic variants 
of simple common nouns whale and Iphone to be kind designators (an issue 
which will be discussed later). Now, the sentential contexts in 22 where the 
noun phrases formed by these taxonomic common nouns figure are particular-
level. For example 22c and 22a  paraphrasable respectively as Alice shot a token 
of an endangered bird and Alice found the remains of an extinct bison. To 
account for these readings despite the indicated semantic discrepancy it will be 
useful to postulate an implicit operation that maps taxonomic applier meanings 
into non-taxonomic applier meanings in the following manner: 
Let  be a meaning of type <s,<ek,t>>, 
detax()=λs.λx.y((s)(y)& I(s)(x,y)) 
I have already illustrated how in the semantic interpretation of 22c under the C-
framework detax is involved. As both under the C-framework and the K-
framework taxonomically interpreted common nouns come out as kind-level 




Modified Common Nouns under the K-framework 
New common nouns can be obtained by modifying simple common nouns with 
adjectives, relative clauses or prepositional phrases: 
wounded whale, whale wounded by Japanese harpooners, extinct whale, new whale, 
whale from the arctic  
The meaning of a modified common noun should be a function of the 
denotations of the simple common noun and the modifiers that form it. In this 
section I will describe how the meanings of modified common nouns will be 
determined under the K-framework. Clearly this account will have to be 
different for non-taxonomic modified common nouns than the one given under 
the C-framework. For, according to the C-framework simple non-taxonomic 
common nouns were particular level appliers, whilst according to the K-
framework they are kind designators. However as regards the modification of 
taxonomic simple common nouns similar accounts will apply, since under both 
the K-framework and C-framework taxonomic common nouns are appliers for 
kinds. 
The K-framework we have been describing assigned kind designating 
meanings to simple common nouns. Such simple common nouns can be 
modified by adjectives, relative clauses or prepositional phrases to form 
modified common nouns. We may consider to assign kind designating meanings 
to these modified common nouns as well. But this approach is theoretically 
disadvantageous for a number of reasons. The derivation of kind designating 
meanings for modified common nouns out of the meanings of the modifiers and 




unnecessarily complicated; and the impossibility to form definite generic noun 
phrases with modified common nouns suggest that one should rather not take 
the modified common nouns to be kind designators. I will return to these points 
later.  
Instead of such an approach under the K-framework we will take the 
result of modification to be applier meanings of type <s,<e,t>>. For example, 
wounded whale will have a meaning type <s,<esg_p,t>>. One of its constituents, 
the simple common noun whale, will have a kind designating meaning of type 
<s,ek>. Its other constituent the adjectivewounded will be assigned a meaning 
of type <s,<esg_p,t>>.  As such the denotations for wounded and whale cannot 
semantically compose under any of the semantic composition clauses have 
assumed so far. We however already have introduced the operation pred which 
maps meanings of type <s,ek> into applier meanings of type <s,<esg_p,t>>. 
Applying pred to the native meaning of whale will thus result in a applier 
meaning of type <s,<esg_p,t>> the denotations of which will truly apply to token 
whales. This predicative meaning can then semantically compose with the 
meaning of wounded in accordance with the fourth clause of semantic 
composition we had introduced above to account for noun-modification under 
the C-framework. 
⟦[N’[Adj wounded] [N whale]]⟧ 
{λs.p[<e,t>wounded]s, λs.k[ewhale]s} type discrepancy, pred is triggered 
{λs.p[<e,t>wounded]s, pred(λs.k[ewhale]s)} 
{λs.p[<e,t>wounded]s, λs.λy.I(s)(y)(k[ewhale]s)} 
λs.λx.( p[<e,t>wounded]s(x) & λy.I(s)(x)(k[ewhale]s)) semantic composition clause IV 
The modification by relative clauses and prepositional phrases will proceed 




that can semantically compose with the predicative meanings assigned to 
relative clauses and prepositional phrases. 
We assumed that under the K-framework such common nouns as whale, 
transistor can also be interpreted taxonomically via the operation K-pred which 
yields kind level predicative meanings of type <s,<ek,t>>. The modification of 
such taxonomically interpreted common nouns by such modifiers as extinct, 
which is invented by Bell Laboratories will then proceed in the same way as 
under the C-framework and will not require the triggering of any other special 
operation. 
The Semantic Analyses of the Noun Phrases Formed by Count Common 
Nouns According to the K-framework 
Now, I turn to the description of how noun phrases formed by common nouns 
will be analysed under the K-framework drawing on the assumptions regarding 
the meanings of the common nouns and the semantic machinery introduced 
above. I begin with indefinite singular noun phrases. 
The Semantic Analyses of Indefinite Singular Noun Phrases under the 
K-framework: Non-Taxonomic Indefinite Singulars  
2  a The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday is a road bike. 
Non-taxonomic indefinite singular phrases in predicate positions, as in 2a, are 
standardly assigned predicative denotations of type <esg_p,t>. Under the K-




meanings of type <s,esg_k>. Then when such a common noun occurs in the 
predicate position it should be predicativised by undergoing pred. The 
indefinite article a occurring in predicates will be taken to be semantically 
vacuous: 
[[NP The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday][VP is [NP [Da] [Nroad bike]]]] 
2a interpreted according to K-framework: 
{λs’.[e The priciest g. A. r. in her b.]s’, {λs’.λP<e,t>.P<e,t>, λs’.k[er. b.]s’}} type discrepancy 
{λs’.[e The p. g. A. r. in her b.]s’, {λs’.λP<e,t>.P<e,t>, Pred(λs’.k[er. b.]s’)}} pred is triggered 
{λs’.[e The p. g. A. r. in her b.]s’, {λs’.λP<e,t>.P<e,t>, λs’.λx.I(s)(x) (k[eroad bike]s’)}}  
{λs’.[e The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday]s’, λs’.λx.I(s)(x)( k[eroad bike]s’)}  
λs’. I(s) ([e The priciest gift Alice received on her birthday]s’) (k[eroad bike]s’)  
Non-taxonomic indefinite singulars can also occur in argument positions: 
2 b A road bike stood locked next to Alice’s bike. 
We have already seen that under the Montague/Lewis treatment of indefinite 
singulars in argument positions the indefinite singular determiner a is given the 
following analysis: 
λs’.[<<e_sg ,t>,<<e_sg, t>,t>>a]s’=λs’.λQ <e_sg ,t>.λP<e_sg ,t>.x(Q(x)&P(x)) 
The determiner a occurring in indefinite singular arguments requires an applier 
meaning to combine with. The result, the meaning of the indefinite singular 
argument, will be an existential GQ meaning (type <s,<<e,t>,t>>. This GQ 
analysis of indefinite singular arguments can also be implemented in the K-
framework which takes simple non-taxonomic common nouns to be native kind 
designators (meaning type: <s,ek>). The semantic type discrepancy between 
the indefinite determiner a analyzed as a quantifier (semantic type: 




the application of the operation pred. Thus under the K-framework 2b will be 
assigned the following interpretation: 
2 b A road bike stood locked next to Alice’s bike. 
  [S[NP [D a] [N road bike]][VP stood next to Alice’s bike]] 
2b interpreted according to K-framework: 
{{λs’.[<<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>a]s’, λs’.k[e r. b.]s’}, λs’.[<e,t> s. n. to A.’s b.]s’} type disc. pred is triggered 
{{λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x) & P(x)), Pred(λs’.k[e road bike]s’)}, λs’.[<e,t> s. next to Alice’s bike]s’} 
{{λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x) & P(x)), λs’.λy.I(s’)(y)(k[e road bike]s’)}, λs’.[<e,t> s. n. to A.’s bike]s’} 
{λs’.λP.x(λy.I(s’)(y)(k[e road bike]s’)(x) & P(x)), λs’.[<e,t> stood next to Alice’s bike]s’} 
{λs’.λP.x(I(s’)(x,k[e road bike]s’) & P(x)), λs’.[<e,t> stood next to Alice’s bike]s’} 
λs’.x(I(s’)(x, k[e road bike]s’) & [<e,t> stood next to Alice’s bike]s’(x)) 
According to the K-framework only semantically simple non-taxonomic 
common nouns are kind designators; modified non-taxonomic common nouns 
are interpreted as particular level appliers (meanings of type: <s,<esg_p,t>>). 
Thus under the K-framework the interpretation of indefinite singular 
arguments formed by such common nouns will not involve the operation pred 
and will proceed in the same way as in the C-framework. 
The Semantic Analyses of Indefinite Singular Noun Phrases under the 
K-framework: Taxonomic Indefinite Singulars  
 We had seen that certain indefinite singular phrases that occurred in argument 
or in predicate positions were interpreted taxonomically, as pertaining to kinds 
rather than tokens: 
4 a  The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 is a road bike by the Czech maker Morati. 
 b  A road bike by the Czech maker Morati has been launched today. 




Under the K-framework the taxonomical interpretation of common nouns yields 
kind level applier meanings (sorted type <s,<ek,t>>). The meanings of 
taxonomic indefinite predicates or arguments formed by taxonomically 
interpreted common nouns can thus be accounted for as the result of the 
semantic composition of the indefinite determiner a, treated as semantically 
vacuous in predicates and as λs’.λQ<e_sg ,t>.λP<e_sg ,t>.x(Q(x)&P(x)) in indefinite 
arguments, with these kind level applier meanings. 4a where the indefinite 
singular a road bike by the Czech maker Morati figures in the predicate position 
will then be interpreted under the K-framework in the following way:  
4 a  The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 is a road bike by the Czech maker Morati. 
  [[NP The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3][VP is [NP [D a] [N’  r. b. by the Czech maker Morati]]]] 
{λs’.k[e The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s’, {λs’.λP.P, λs’.k[<e,t>   r. b. by the Czech maker Morati]}} 
{λs’.k[e The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s’, λs’.k[<e,t> road bike by the Czech maker Morati]} 
λs’.k[<e,t>  road bike by the Czech maker Morati](k[e The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s’) 
And 4b where the indefinite singular a road bike by the Czech maker Morati 
figures in the argument position will be interpreted in the following way:  
4 b  A road bike by the Czech maker Morati has been launched today. 
  [S[NP [D a] [N road bike by the Czech maker Morati]][VP has been launched today]] 
{{ λs’.[<<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>a]s’, λs’.k[<e,t> r. b. by the C. maker M.]s’}, λs’.[<e,t> has been l. today]s’} 
{{ λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)), λs’.k[<e,t> r. b. by the C. maker M.]s’}, λs’.[<e,t> has been l. t.]s’} 
{λs’.λP.x(k[<e,t> r. b. by the C. maker M.]s’(x) & P(x)), λs’.[<e,t> has been l. today]s’} 
λs’.x(k[<e,t> r. b. by the Czech maker Morati]s’(x) & [<e,t> has been launched today]s’(x)) 
Previously I had drawn attention to the possibility of having taxonomic 
indefinites in particular level contexts. The examples I had produced were the 
following: 
22 a Alice found the carcass of an extinct bison. 




 c Alice shot an endangered game bird. 
 d Alice drove a Cadillac model designed by Damon. 
To accommodate the occurences of such taxonomic phrases in particular level 
sentential contexts I had proposed that the following operator can optionally 
apply to the meanings of the taxonomic common nouns: 
Let α be a meaning of type <s,<ek,t>>, 
Detax(α)=λs.λx.∃y(I(s)(x,y) & α(s)(y)) 
As both under the C-framework and the K-framework taxonomic phrases are 
taken to be formed by taxonomically interpreted common nouns, and the latter 
are taken to be kind level appliers, the same treatment of taxonomic indefinites 
occurring in particular level contexts can be adopted under the K-framework as 
well. 
22 c Alice shot an endangered game bird 
  [[an] [endangered game bird]][1 [Alice][[shot][t1]]] 
{{λs.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)),detax(λs.k[<e,t>e. game bird]s)}, λs.λy.[shot]s(y)([Alice]s)} 
{{λs.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)),λs.λx.∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>e. g. b.]s(y))}, λs.λy.[shot]s(y)([A.]s)} 
{λs.λP.x(∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>e.g.b.]s(y))&P(x)), λs.λy.[shot]s(y)([Alice]s)} 
λs.x(∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>endangered game bird]s(y))& [shot]s(x)([Alice]s)) 
The Semantic Analyses of Bare Plural Phrases under the K-framework: 
Bare Plural Phrases in Predicate Positions 
Bare plural predicates are standardly assigned predicative meanings of type 
<s,<epl,t>>, that truly applies exclusively to sums of kinds or sums of 
particulars depending on whether they are taxonomically interpreted or not.  





However these frameworks differ about the type of meaning they assign to 
simple common nouns. For this reason the derivation of these meanings for 
bare plural predicates formed by simple plural common nouns will be different 
under the K-framework.  
The K-framework took both plural and singular simple common nouns to 
have kind designating meanings of type <s,ek>. Therefore, as in the case of 
indefinite singular predicates formed by simple singular common nouns, in the 
interpretation of bare plural predicates formed by simple plural common nouns, 
the meanings of the common nouns will have to undergo the operation pred. 
Thus, under the K-framework 6a will get the following interpretation: 
6 a The bikes at Alice’s room are road bikes. 
  [[NP the bikes at Alice’s room] [VP are [NP [N road bikes]]]]  
6a interpreted according to K-framework: 
{λs’.pl_p[e the b. at A.’s room]s’, λs’.k[e road bikes]s’} type discrepancy pred is triggered 
{λs’.pl_p[e the bikes at Alice’s room]s’, pred(λs’.k[e road bikes]s’)} 
{λs’.pl_p[e the bikes at Alice’s room]s’, PL(λs’.λx.I(s’)(x, k[e road bikes]s’))} 
{λs’.pl_p[etheb.at...]s’,λs’.λx.(∼I(s’)(x,k[erbs]s’)&∀y((y≪x&Atom(y))I(s’)(y,k[erbs]s’)))} 
{λs’.pl_p[etheb.at...]s’,λs’.λx.(~I(s’)(x, k[e rbs]s’)&∀y((y≪x&Atom(y))I(s’)(y,k[erbs]s’)))} 
λs’.(~I(s’)(pl_p[etheb.a...]s’,k[erbs]s’)&∀y((y≪pl_p[etheb.a…]s’&At.(y))I(s’)(y,k[e rbs]s’)))114 
With regard to the derivation of the meanings of the bare plural predicates 
formed by taxonomic common nouns or modified common nouns the C and the 
K frameworks’ approaches will be the same. Like the C-framework, the K-
                                                        
114 The analysis of 6a under the C-framework looks much less complex than the analysis of the 
same sentence under the K-framework. However the truth-conditions expressed by the 
resulting formula are the same. There is a difference in complexity because when I gave the 
analysis under the C-framework I spared the analysis of the meaning of the plural common noun 
road bikes in terms of the meaning of the singularroad bike. Had I not done so under the C-
framework as well we would end up with a rather long end formula which would have the same 




framework too assigns applier meanings to such common nouns. So, the 
meanings bare plural predicates formed by such common nouns can be 
straigforwardly identified with the meanings of the common nouns that form 
them, and the operation pred need not to be invoked. Below in 6b [N road bikes] 
is taxonomically interpreted and for this reason has an applier meaning of the 
sorted type <s,<ek,t>>, rather than a kind designating meaning as in 6a. 
6 b The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog are road bikes. 
  [[NP The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog] [VP are [NP [N road bikes]]]]  
{λs’.pl_k[e The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog]s’,λs’.pl_k[<e,t> road bikes]s’}  
λs’.pl_k[<e,t> road bikes]s’(pl_k[e The models reviewed this week in Alice’s blog]s’) 
The Semantic Analyses of Bare Plural Phrases under the K-framework: 
Non-taxonomic Bare Plural Arguments  
 The C-framework adopted the Neo-Carsonian theory of bare plural arguments 
defended by Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004). According to that theory bare 
plural arguments (with certain special exceptions) were treated as kind 
designators, even when they occurred in particular level episodic sentential 
contexts. Due to reasons to be clarified later the K-framework will not follow 
this theory. 
I will assume that under the K-framework bare plural NP’s will have the 
same meanings as the common nouns that form them. This is a natural 
assumption in so far as in the formation of bare plural NP’s no explicit 
determiners are involved. Now, according to K-framework, non-taxonomic 
simple common nouns have kind designating meanings, whilst modified non-




<s,<ep,t>>. Then, given the stated assumption under the K-framework the bare 
plural phrases formed by the former sort of common nouns will be kind 
designators wheras bare plural phrases formed by the latter sort of common 
nouns will be particular level appliers. 
Now let’s see how such an account of non-taxonomic bare plural 
arguments can be implemented in the K-framework by referring to the 
following sentences: 
32 a Mountain bikes have evolved from road bikes. 
 (in the sense of The mountain bike has evolved from the road bike) 
b Mountain bikes stand locked to next to Alice’s bike. 
c Red mountain bikes stand locked next to Alice’s bike. 
Let’s begin with 32a which will be the simplest case: 
32 a Mountain bikes have evolved from road bikes. 
  [NP [N Mountain bikes]][VP have evolved from road bikes] 
Here the NP [NP [N Mountain bikes]] designates a kind, namely the mountain 
bike. Under the K-framework bare plural NP mountain bikes’s having a kind 
designating meaning can easily be accounted for. The K-framework takes non-
taxonomic simple common nouns, be they plural or singular, to have kind 
designating meanings of type <s,ek>. Moreover we stipulated that according to 
the K-framework bare plural NP arguments formed by simple non-taxonomic 
common nouns have the same meanings as these common nouns. Then 32a can 
be given the following straightforward analysis under the K-framework.   
the interpretation of 32a according to the K-framework 
{λs.k[eMountain bikes]s, λs.k[<e,t> have evolved from road bikes]s} 
λs.k[<e,t> have evolved from road bikes]s(k[eMountain bikes]s) 




32 b Mountain bikes stand locked next to Alice’s bike. 
  [NP[N Mountain bikes]][VP stand locked next to Alice’s bike] 
The assumption that bare plural arguments have the same meanings as the 
common nouns that form them creates a complication in the case of 32b. The 
bare plural argument [NP[N Mountain bikes]] will have a kind designating 
meaning (type <s,ek>) as it is formed by the simple non-taxonomic common 
noun [Nmountain bikes] which according to the K-framework should have a 
kind designating meaning. In 32b this argument has to semantically compose 
with the VP [VP stand locked next to Alice’s bike] which requires either a 
particular level designator argument of type <s,ep> or particular level GQ 
argument of type <s,<<ep,t>,t>>. To resolve this discrepancy we can import 
the operation DKP already introduced under the C-framework to account for the 
interpretation of sentences in which a kind designating argument occurs in a 
particular level episodic sentential context: 
Let  be a meaning of type <s,<ep,a>>, where a can be any of the types t, <e,t>, 
<e,<e,t>>, <e,<e,<e,t>>> … 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)), if a=t 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.λx.y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)(x)), if a=<e,t> 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.λx’.λx’’y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)(x’)(x’’)), if a=<e,<e,t>> 
… 
Then we can derive the interpretation of 32b in a way very similar to C-
framework (the only difference is that under the K-framework the underlying 
plural common nouns is the ground of kind designation whereas under the C-
framework that common noun was a particular level applier and the kind 
designation for the bare plural NP was derived through the operation ∩):  




the interpretation of 32b according to the K-framework: 
{ λs.k[emountain bikes]s, λs.p[<e,t> s. l. next to Alice’s bike]s} sortal misfit DKP is triggered 
{λs.k[emountain bikes]s, DKP(λs.p[<e,t> stand locked next to Alice’s bike]s)}  
{ λs.k[emountain bikes]s, λs.λzk.x(I(s)(x)(zk) & p[<e,t> s. l. next to Alice’s bike]s(x))}  
λs.λzk.x(I(s)(x)(zk) & p[<e,t> s. l. next to Alice’s bike]s(x))(k[emountain bikes]s)  
λs.x(I(s)(x)( k[emountain bikes]s) & p[<e,t> stand locked next to Alice’s bike]s(x)) 
Third consider 32c: 
32 c Red mountain bikes stand locked next to Alice’s bike. 
  [NP[NRed mountain bikes]][VP stand locked next to Alice’s bike] 
Again the assumption that under the K-framework bare plural NP’s will have the 
same meanings as the common nouns that form them creates a complication for 
the interpretation of  32c, similar to but different than the one related with  32b. 
According to K-framework the bare plural argument [NP[NRed mountain bikes]] 
will have a particular level predicative meaning (type <s,<ep,t>>) as it is 
formed by the modified common noun [NRed mountain bikes], which according 
to K-framework’s previously set assumptions about modified common nouns is 
not a kind designator. However [NP[NRed mountain bikes]] has to semantically 
compose with the VP [VP stand locked next to Alice’s bike] which requires either 
particular level designator arguments of type <s,ep> or particular level GQ 
arguments of type <s,<<ep,t>,t>>. Now this discrepancy cannot be resolved 
via DKP as was the case in  32b. DKP is useful only in resolving sortal 
discrepancies where a kind designating NP (sorted type <s,ek>) has to 
semantically compose with with a particular level V or VP (sorted type 
<s,<ep,a>>, where a can be any of the types t, <e,t>, <e,<e,t>>, 
<e,<e,<e,t>>> etc. Here in the case of  32c, instead of a sortal misfit we have a 
type discrepancy where a particular level applier NP (sorted type <s,<ep,t>>) 




sorted type <s,<ep,t>>. To resolve such discrepancies under the K-framework I 
will introduce the operator DPP (derived property predication) which I will 
assume to be triggered when a V or VP has to semantically compose with a 
particular level applier in a particular level episodic sentential context, as is the 
case in 32c: 
Let  be a meaning of type <s,<ep,a>>, where a can be any of the types t, <e,t>, 
<e,<e,t>>, <e,<e,<e,t>>> … 
DPP()=λs’.λP<e,t>.y(P(y) & (s’)(y)), if a=t 
DPP()=λs’.λP<e,t>.λx.y(P(y) & (s’)(y)(x)), if a=<e,t> 
DPP()=λs’.λP<e,t>.λx’.λx’’y(P(y) & (s’)(y)(x’)(x’’)), if a=<e,<e,t>> 
Availing ourselves the operation DPP under the K-framework 32c’s 
interpretation will be as follows: 
32 c [NP[N red mountain bikes]][VP stand locked next to Alice’s bike] 
{ λs.p[<e,t> red mountain bikes]s, λs.p[<e,t> s. l. n. to A.’s bike]s} type misfit DPP is triggered 
{λs. p[<e,t> red mountain bikes]s, DPP(λs.p[<e,t> stand locked next to Alice’s bike]s)}  
{ λs. p[<e,t> red mountain bikes]s, λs.λP.x(P(x) & p[<e,t> s. l. next to Alice’s bike]s(x))}  
λs.λP.x(P(x) & p[<e,t> s. l. next to Alice’s bike]s(x))( p[<e,t> red mountain bikes]s)  
λs.x( p[<e,t>  red mountain bikes]s(x) & p[<e,t> stand locked next to Alice’s bike]s(x)) 
The operation DPP is not purely our invention. Van Geenhoven (1998) who 
suggests to interpret bare plural arguments of English as appliers, take verbs to 
have ‘incorporating’ versions which correspond to the DPP applied versions of 
the standard interpretations of verbs.115 And Chierchia (1998) refers to 
                                                        
115 Differently from DPP Van Geenhoven’s operation is a lexical operation. That is, theoretically 
it does not belong to the phrasal semantics, but to lexical semantics. A type discrepancy 
resolution strategy which is equivalent in its outcome is proposed by Krifka (2004) where bare 




Geenhoven’s mentioned proposal as involving an operation on predicate 
meanings which is “essentially very similar” to his DKP.116 
Explaining Bare Plural Phrases’ Scope Peculiarity without Having to 
Take Bare Plural Arguments to Be Kind D esignators 
Above in the first part of the present chapter we have seen that in particular 
level episodic sentences involving bare plural arguments (e.g. Cadilac 
Eldorados) bare plural arguments manifested a scope behaviour which was 
rather like the behavior of kind phrases (e.g. this model of Cadillac) than the 
behavior of indefinite singular phrases. 
8 a Alice did not steal Cadillac Eldorados. 
9 a Alice did not steal a Cadillac Eldorado. 
10 a Alice did not steal this model of Cadillac. 
Under the C-framework we adopted Chierchia (1998)’s theory of bare plural 
arguments which accounted for this peculiarity by assuming that bare plural 
NP’s which manifested the scope peculiarity in question were kind designators. 
According to Chierchia (1998) in logical forms in which kind designating bare 
plural arguments took wide scope the trace they left behind too will be kind 
level. Thus the accommodation of that kind level trace in a particular level 
episodic sentential context through DKP will take place in the narrow scope. I 
reproduce here the relevant derivation: 
                                                        
116 But Chierchia criticizes an operation like DPP by claiming that it cannot account for the 
behavior of bare plural arguments like parts of the machine and people sitting here which do 
not seem to manifest the scope peculiarity (see also note 107 above). It take us too far afield to 
address these criticism of Chierchia in the main text. I will restrain my self with the following 




8aA [NP Cadillac Eldorados]1 [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]]    
Interpretation of  8aA according to the C-framework: 
{∩(λs.p[<e,t>C. Eldorados]s’), {1, { {λs.∼, { λs.[A.]s, {λs.[stole]s, λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}}} sortal misfit  
{∩(λs.p[<e,t>C. E.s]s’), {1, { {λs.∼, { λs.[A.]s, {DKP(λs.[stole]s), λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}}}DKP triggered 
{∩(λs.p[<e,t>C.E.s]s’), {1, { { λs.~, { λs.p[e A.]s, λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g) & [stole]s(y)(x))}}}}} 
{∩(λs.p[<e,t>Cadillac Eldorados]s’), {1, λs.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))}} 
{∩(λs.p[<e,t>Cadillac Eldorados]s’), λs.λx.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[tx]s,g)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
{λs.the-Cadillac-Eldorado-Model,  λs.λx.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[tx]s,g)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
 λs.∼y(I(s)(y)( the-Cadillac-Eldorado-Model)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
Chierchia (1998) and following him the C-framework implemented this theory 
in a framework according to which all common nouns had applier meanings, 
from which kind designating meanings for bare plural arguments were derived 
through the operation ∩.   
The K-framework however adopted different views both as regards the 
contributions of common nouns and as regards the contribution of bare plural 
arguments. It took simple common nouns to be kind designators and modified 
common nouns to be appliers. And it took bare plural arguments to have the 
same meanings as the plural common nouns that form them. Given these 
differences, can the K-framework account for the scope peculiarity manifested 
by bare plural arguments? 
As far as bare plural arguments formed by simple common nouns are 
concerned the K-framework can explain their narrow scope behavior in the 
same way as the C-framework does. Given the assumptions in effect under the 
K-framework these bare plural arguments will be kind designators. And to 
account for the interpretability of such kind designating bare plural arguments 
occuring in particular level episodic contexts the K-framework too has adopted 




of kind level NP’s which take wide scope will also be kind level, then the 
apparent forced narrow scope interpretation of such NP’s can be accounted as 
due to the fact that DKP has to be applied in the narrow scope to accommodate 
the kind level trace occurring in a particular level sentential context. The only 
difference from the C-framework’s account will be that bare plural arguments 
will directly derive their kind designating meanings from the simple common 
nouns which are kind designators according to the K-framework, and thus no 
such operation as ∩ will be involved. 
8aA [NP Cadillac Eldorados]1 [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]] 
8aA interpreted according to the K-framework: 
{λs.k[eCadillac Eldorados]s, {1, { {λs.∼, { λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[stole]s, λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}}} sortal misfit  
{ λs.k[eC. Eldorados]s, {1, { {λs.∼, { λs.[A.]s, {DKP(λs.[stole]s), λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}}}DKP triggered 
{λs.k[eC.Eldorados]s, {1, { { λs.~, { λs.p[e A.]s, λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g) & [stole]s(y)(x))}}}}} 
{ λs.k[eCadillac Eldorados]s, {1, λs.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))}} 
{ λs.k[eCadillac Eldorados]s, λs.λx.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[tx]s,g)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
 λs.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[eCadillac Eldorados]s)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
This way of accounting for the scope peculiarity of bare plural arguments 
cannot however be extended to the case of bare plural arguments formed by 
modified common nouns. We have previously noted that these too manifest the 
scope peculiarity in question: 
27 a Alice did not steal pink Eldorados. 
According to the K-framework such bare plural arguments as pink Eldorados 
will be appliers rather than kind designators. They are formed by modified 
common nouns which are not kind designators but appliers according to the K-
framework, and they should have the same meanings as the common nouns that 




It seems that the crucial assumption which accounts for the scope peculiarity 
manifested by bare plural phrases is not their being kind designators (pace 
Chierchia and Carlson). To obtain an explanation it suffices to assume that bare 
plural arguments are not generalized quantifiers or particular level designators 
and that when they move to the wide scope they leave traces of the same sorted 
type as themselves. If these assumptions are granted, then under the K-
framework we can claim that the bare plural arguments which are not kind 
designators but appliers and which move to the wide scope will leave traces 
which are particular level appliers. To accommodate such traces when they 
figure in positions which require either designators or quantifiers, DPP will be 
triggered; as in the case of DKP, the application of DPP will take place in the 
narrow scope and thus the apparent narrow scope interpretation of bare plural 
arguments which are in fact in the wide scope will be accounted for even if these 
bare plural arguments are not taken to be kind designators: 
27aA [NP Pink Eldorados]1 [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]] 
27aA interpreted according to the K-framework: 
{λs.p[<e,t>P. Eldorados]s, {1, {λs.∼, { λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[stole]s, λs.p[<e,t> t1]s,g}}}}} type misfit  
{λs.p[<e,t>P. Eldorados]s, {1, {λs.∼,{ λs.[A.]s, {DPP(λs.[s.]s), λs.p[<e,t>t1]s,g}}}}}DPP triggered 
{λs.p[<e,t>P.Eldorados]s,{1,{λs.∼,{λs.[A.]s,{λs.λP.λx.∃y(P(y)&[s.]s(y)(x)),λs.p[<e,t> t1]s,g}}}}} 
{λs.p[<e,t>P. Eldorados]s,{1,{ λs.~,{ λs.p[e A.]s, λs.λx.y(p[<e,t> t1]s,g(y) & [stole]s(y)(x))}}}} 
{ λs. p[<e,t>Pink Eldorados]s, {1, λs.∼y(p[<e,t> t1]s,g(y) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))}} 
{ λs. p[<e,t>Pink Eldorados]s, λs.λQ.∼y(p[<e,t> tQ]s,g(y) & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
{ λs. p[<e,t>Pink Eldorados]s, λs.λQ.∼y(Q(y)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
 λs.∼y(p[<e,t>Pink Eldorados]s(y)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
So, it emerges that the nub of Chierchia’s derivation of forced narrow scope 
readings for bare plural arguments are the assumptions that bare plural NP’s 




and that these NP’s are not quantifiers or particular level designators. 117  
Ascribing kind designation to bare plural arguments is not essential to derive 
these narrow scope readings. As we have just seen even if we assume bare 
plural arguments are appliers we can derive the narrow scope readings on the 
basis of these assumptions using an operation like DPP, which is similar to 
Chierchia’s DKP.118  
The Semantic Analyses of Bare Plural Phrases under the K-framework: 
Taxonomic Bare Plural Arguments 
We know that bare plural arguments can also be used taxonomically. 
33 Alice reviewed Czech road bikes from the last century. 
In 33 the bare plural argument Czech road bikes from the last century may be 
used in such a way that it pertains to models of Czech road bikes rather than the 
tokens. That is, 33 can be used in such a way that it says that Alice has reviewed 
some Czech road bike models from the last century. 
K-framework will treat taxonomic bare plural arguments in the same 
manner as it dealt with the non-taxonomic ones. Under the K-framework we 
will assume that taxonomic bare plural arguments too have the same meanings 
as the common nouns that form them. These common nouns will be taxonomic 
                                                        
117 Krifka (2004) too illustrates that postulating kind designation is not essential to account for 
the scope peculiarity manifested by bare plural arguments. 
118 Then however there is a need to explain why such bare plural phrases like parts of this 
machine do not manifest the scope peculiarity in question. For, the DPP account adopted under 
the K-framework under its present form predicts that these bare plural phrases will appear to 




common nouns; and according to the K-framework taxonomic common nouns 
have kind level applier meanings. Thus under the K-framework taxonomic bare 
plural arguments will be kind level appliers.  
As argument positions require either designator or quantifier meaning 
types, the interpretation of taxonomic bare plural arguments under the K-
framework will require the involvement of the operation DPP. The 
interpretation of 33 will then proceed as follows: 
33 Alice reviewed Czech road bikes from the last century. 
 [S [Alice] [[reviewed] [Czech road bikes from the last century]]] 
33 interpreted according to the K-framework: 
 { λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[r.]s, λs.k[<e,t> Czech road bikes from the last century]s}}type misfit  
{ λs.[Alice]s, {DPP(λs.[reviewed]s), λs.k[<e,t> Czech road bikes from …]s}}DPP triggered 
{ λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λP.λx.∃y(P(y) & [r.]s(y)(x)), λs.k[<e,t> Czech road bikes from …]s}} 
{ λs.p[e Alice]s, λs.λx.y(k[<e,t> Czech road bikes from …]s(y) & [reviewed]s(y)(x))} 
 λs.y(k[<e,t> Czech road bikes from …]s(y)& [reviewed]s(y)([Alice]s))  
Remember that these bare plural arguments too, like their non-taxonomic kins 
and differently from taxonomic indefinite singulars, manifest the peculiarity of 
not producing a wide scope reading.  
34 a Alice did not review Czech road bikes from the last century. 
b Alice did not review a Czech road bike from the last century. 
The C-framework, was forced to account for this scope related peculiarity 
manifested by taxonomic bare plural arguments by ascribing them kind 
designation as well –albeit taking as designata higher order kinds, the instances 
of which were first order kinds. It was forced because it followed Chierchia 
(1998) in assigning kind designation to non-taxonomic bare plural arguments 
that manifested the scope peculiarity in question, and parity in reasoning 




manifested by taxonomic bare plural arguments as well. Now the K-framework 
can handily account for this phenomenon without any commitment to higher 
order kinds; this will proceed in the same way as in the previous section we 
accounted for the scope related peculiarity of such bare plural arguments as 
pink Eldorados (see sentence 27 above) which the K-framework took to be non-
taxonomic and non-kind-designating. Being a kind level applier the bare plural 
object argument Czech road bikes from the last century will leave a kind level 
applier trace when it moves to the wide scope. The trace which is an applier 
occurring in an argument position will have to be accommodated in the narrow 
scope via DPP. Thus the existential quantification introduced by DPP will 
remain in the narrow scope relative to the negation. 
34 a Alice did not review Czech road bikes from the last century. 
34aA  [NK Czech road bikes from the last century]1 [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[reviewed] [t1]]]]] 
34aA interpreted according to the K-framework: 
{λs.k[<e,t>C.r.b.f...]s, {1, { {λs.∼, { λs.[A.]s, {λs.[rev.]s, λs.k[<e,t> t1]s,g}}}}}} type misfit  
{λs.k[<e,t>C.r.b.f...]s, {1, { {λs.∼, { λs.[A.]s, {DPP(λs.[r.]s), λs.k[<e,t> t1]s,g}}}}}}DPP triggered 
{λs.k[<e,t>C.r.b.f...]s,{1,{{λs.∼,{λs.[A.]s,{λs.λP.λx.∃y(P(y)&[r.]s(y)(x)), λs.k[<e,t> t1]s,g}}}}}} 
{λs.k[<e,t>C.r.b.f...]s,{1,{{λs.~,{λs.k[e A.]s, λs.λx.y(k[<e,t> t1]s,g(y)&[reviewed]s(y)(x))}}}}} 
{λs.k[<e,t>C.r.b.f...]s, {1, λs.∼y(k[<e,t> t1]s,g(y)& [reviewed]s(y)([Alice]s))}} 
{λs.k[<e,t>C.r.b.f...]s, λs.λQ.∼y(k[<e,t> tQ]s,g(y)& [reviewed]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
 λs.∼y(k[<e,t>Czech road bikes from ...]s(y)& [reviewed]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
The Analysis of Definite Phrases under the K-framework 
1  j Surely, the whale should have been disoriented to come into these waters and 
  tore our nets off. 
 k Alice claims that the cladistic analysis shows that the whale should rather be put 
  under an altogether new genus. 
 l The whale is a highly intelligent mammal. 




Previously we have seen that definite phrases could be used both to designate 
kinds and particulars. Singular definites are usually used to designate a 
contextually salient particular (1j), or if they are taxonomic they are used to 
designate a contextually salient sub-kind of the kind corresponding to the 
common noun that forms them (1k). Plural definites are taken to designate a 
contextually salient sum of particulars (1m), or if they are taxonomic they are 
taken to designate a contextually salient sum consisting of the sub-kinds of the 
common noun that forms them. Apart from these uses where a definite singular 
phrase is used to designate a contextually salient entity that satisfies a certain 
description, we have seen that in kind level sentential contexts a definite 
singular can be used, apparently like a name, to designate the very kind 
corresponding to the common noun that forms it (1l). The definite singulars 
used in the latter way were termed as definite generics. I will now present how 
this variety in the semantics of definite phrases formed by count common nouns 
will be accounted under the K framework. 
Definite Phrases that Designate Particulars under the K-framework 
We had previously noted that definite phrases such as those figuring in the 
following sentences were usually taken to be particular level designators (type 
<s,ep>): 
16 a The biker irritated the passerby with his loud rev up. 
 b All of us saw the bear coming out of the woods, picking the basket and swiftly  
  disappearing into the woods again. 
 c The winner of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final is from Jamaica. 
 d The finalists of the 2012 London Games’ 100m final are black people. 




Given an evaluation index s, some such definite phrases simply pick the entity 
which uniquely satisfies at s the descriptive conditions expressed by common 
nouns that form them. This is the case for the definite phrase arguments in 16c 
and 16d. Yet the same cannot be said of the definite phrase arguments of the 
remaining sentences in 16; for example the biker in 16a can be successfully used 
to designate a person relative to an evaluation index s, although in that 
evaluation index there may be more than one biker. The interpretation of the 
latter type of definite phrases is sensitive to the context of utterance. 
The K-framework’s analysis of the definite phrase arguments occurring in 
16 will virtually be the same as the C-framework’s. The definite article will have 
the same definition, which is reproduced below: 
Let  of type <e,t> 
 i()=the largest individual x (under ≪) such that (x)=1 
⟦the⟧=λs.λP.i(P) 
And under the K-framework too the context dependency of certain definite 
phrases will be accounted by the presence of an implicit restrictor dc which 
maps to truth only entities that are salient relative to the context.  
The only difference between the analyses of the C-framework and the K-
framework will arise in the case of definite phrases formed by simple common 
nouns. The K-framework took simple common nouns to be kind designators. As 
such, the definite article the under the analysis assumed here cannot compose 
with simple common noun meanings. To compose with the under the above 
analysis the meanings of these common nouns will have to undergo the Pred 




16 a The biker irritated the passerby with his loud rev up. 
  [NPThe [Nbiker]] [VP irritated the passerby with his loud rev up] 
the interpretation of 16a under the K-framework 
{{λs.λP.i(P), {λs.k[ebiker]s, λs.dc}}, λs.[<e,t>irr. the passerby with his loud rev up]s} misfit 
{{λs.λP.i(P), {Pred(λs.k[ebiker]s), λs.dc}}, λs.[<e,t>irritated …]s} pred triggered 
{{λs.λP.i(P), { λs.λx.I(s)(x,k[ebiker]s), λs.dc}}, λs.[<e,t>irritated …]s} 
{{λs.λP.i(P), λs.λx.(I(s)(x,k[ebiker]s)& dc(x))}, λs.[<e,t>irritated …]s} 
{λs.i(λx.(I(s)(x,k[ebiker]s)& dc(x))), λs.[<e,t>irritated …]s} 
 λs.[<e,t>irritated the passerby with his loud rev up]s(i(λx.(I(s)(x,k[ebiker]s)& dc(x)))) 
Taxonomic Definite Phrases According to the K-framework 
Taxonomic definite phrases designate a contextually salient sub-kind of the kind 
corresponding to the common nouns that form them. 
21 a Alice invented a molecular transistor and sold the transistor to Intel for $ 100  
  millon. 
In 21a the definite phrase the transistor does not designate a transistor token; 
nor does it designate the transistor kind. It designates a certain type of 
transistor which is contextually salient. 
As was the case under the C-framework, under the K-framework too the 
analysis of such taxonomic definite phrases will be the same as those that 
designate particulars, except that the common nouns involved in them will be 
taxonomically interpreted (type <s,<ek,t>>). 
31 Alice sold the transistor. relative to a context c set by a sentence like 21a 
 [Alice][[sold][[the][transistor]]] 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λy.λz.[sold]s, {λs.λP.i(P), {λs.k[<e,t>transistor]s, λs.dc}}}} 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λy.λz.[sold]s, {λs.λP.i(P), λs.λx.(k[<e,t>transistor]s(x) & dc(x))}}} 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λy.λz.[sold]s, λs.i(λx.(k[<e,t>transistor]s(x) & dc(x)))}} 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λz.[sold]s(i(λx.(k[<e,t>transistor]s(x) & dc(x))))} 




Definite Generics According to the K-framework 
Besides taxonomic definite phrases, we have previously noted that there 
apparently are definite phrases of another sort where the underlying common 
nouns are not used taxonomically and which rather simply designate the kinds 
that correspond to the common nouns that form them. Such definite phrases are 
commonly labelled as definite generics. The highlighted definite phrases in the 
sentences below are examples of definite generics: 
17 a The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 has been launched at 2001. 
 b The iPad2 is out of stock within days of its launch in the country. 
 c The Anatolian leopard is now extinct in the Aegean region. 
 d At the time, the bicycle industry was not impressed with the mountain bike,  
  which many regarded as a short-term fad. 
 e Edgar Lilienfeld has invented the transistor but did not construct any prototypes. 
The K-framework will adopt the account of Krifka et al. (1995). According to 
that account definite generics operate as the names of the kinds corresponding 
to simple count common nouns. Simple non-taxonomic common nouns 
designate kinds. And apparently only such common nouns can form definite 
generic phrases. The role of the definite article the figuring in these definite 
generic phrases however will be different than the one figuring in other types of 
definite phrases covered above. It is taken to be expletive article which is also 
present in certain names in English that designate particulars: The Sudan, the 
Sun, The Earth etc. Although the singular non-taxonomic count common nouns 
by themselves natively designate kinds, in English they cannot be used 
determinerless in argument positions. For this reason, they take the expletive 
the when they do so and the expletive does not have any semantic effect. So for 




17 a The Ti Pro Race SC 1.3 has been launched at 2001. 
17a interpreted according to the K-framework: 
[NP The [NTi Pro Race SC 1.3]] [VPhas been launched at 2001] 
{λs.k[e Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s, λs.k[<e,t> has been launched at 2001]} 
λs.k[<e,t> has been launched at 2001]( k[e Ti Pro Race SC 1.3]s) 
We have previously noted not all count common nouns can form definite 
generics. For example, coke bottle can be used to form the definited generic the 
coke bottle. But apparently one cannot use the green bottle as kind designating 
definite generic, at least so long as green bottle is regarded as a modified, 
semantically complex common noun. Under the K-framework this difference 
among count common nouns receives a neat explanation. The common noun 
coke bottle is semantically simple though syntactically it consists of two words. 
We can ascertain that coke does not operate as a modifier in the noun coke 
bottle by noting that bottle which contains coke is not a possible paraphrase of 
coke bottle. As a semantically simple common noun, coke bottle should have a 
kind designating meaning according to the K-framework. For this reason it can 
be used to form a definite generic. In contrast the common noun green bottle is 
semantically complex. Here green operates as a modifier; green bottle can be 
paraphrased by bottle which is green. So, according to the K-framework green 
bottle does not have a kind designating meaning, and for this reason it cannot be 
used to form a definite generic phrase. 
Besides semantically complex common nouns taxonomically interpreted 
common nouns, even if they are semantically simple, cannot form definite 
generic phrases. For example, the phrases the halogen, the metal, the species 




the metal-kind, the species-kind. These phrases can apparently only be used as 
taxonomic definite phrases which designate a contextually salient halogen, 
metal or species. Under the K-framework this again gets a straightforward 
explanation. Metal, halogen, species are natively taxonomic common nouns; 
they do not have non-taxonomic variants. And according to the K-framework 
taxonomic common nouns are kind level appliers (type <s,<e,t>>). Since they 
are not designators taxonomic common nouns cannot form definite generic 
phrases. 
Here I finish my presentation of the K-framework. In the next section I will 
deal with a loose end pertaining to the interpretation of taxonomic noun 
phrases in particular level contexts, and which will be relevant in interpreting 
the examples to be considered in the next chapter’s discussion on common 
nouns’ rigidity. Then in the subsequent section I will give a comparative 
assesssment of the frameworks presented in the present chapter. 
Kind Denoting Phrases in Particular Level Contexts: Detax vs. DKP 
Above we have seen examples of sentences in which a kind denoting noun 
phrase occurred in a particular level context. Mainly there were two sorts of 
cases. First we had kind designating phrases such as bare plural arguments or 
kind phrases (e.g. This species, this model etc.) occurring in particular level 
episodic contexts: 
8 a Alice did not steal Cadillac Eldorados from Bob’s gallery. 




Second we have seen cases where taxonomic indefinites (or for that matter any 
taxonomic phrase interpreted as a generalized quantifier) occur in particular 
level episodic contexts: 
22 a Alice found the carcass of an extinct bison. 
 b The bird on that lower bough is an endangered game bird. 
 c Alice shot an endangered game bird. 
 d Alice drove a Cadillac model designed by Damon. 
 e Alice found the carcassess of two extinct bisons. 
 f Alice shot no/many/few/two endangered game birds. 
For the resolution of the first of type cases we adopted the implicit semantic 
operator DKP under the C and the K-frameworks to accommodate such 
occurences by way of modifying the meanings of the verbs/verb phrases which 
took the kind designating arguments. For the resolution of the cases of the 
second type we have formulated the operator detax which rather targeted the 
meanings of the common nouns that formed the taxonomic quantified 
arguments. One may think that perhaps in both type of cases a similar approach 
should have been adopted: either one that targets the meanings of the 
verbs/verb phrases or one which targets the meanings of the arguments.  In this 
section I will first review the relevant examples. Then I will show that both DKP 
and detax are needed to obtain all the pretheoretically ascertainable readings of 
certain sentences involving scope taking elements like negation. 
Accomodating Kind Designating Phrases in Particular Level Contexts  
The most striking examples of kind denoting phrases occurring in particular 




particular level sentential context. We have seen two sorts of such cases: bare 
plural arguments and kind phrases occurring in particular level episodic 
contexts. The C-framework and the K-framework dealt with both of these cases 
in the same way.  
10 a Alice did not steal this model of Cadillac from Bob’s gallery. 
The C-framework and the K-framework has the operation DKP, introduced by 
Chierchia (1998), to deal with this model of Cadillac’s occurrence in the 
particular level context of 10a: 
Let  be a meaning of type <s,<ep,a>>, where a can be any of the types t, <e,t>, 
<e,<e,t>>, <e,<e,<e,t>>> … 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)), if a=t 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.λx.y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)(x)), if a=<e,t> 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.λx’.λx’’y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)(x’)(x’’)), if a=<e,<e,t>> 
… 
Let us remember how DKP operated. 10a can assume different logical forms in 
which the phrase this model of Cadillac takes wide scope or narrow scope 
relative to not.  
10 a Alice did not steal this model of Cadillac from Bob’s gallery. 
10aA [NP this model of Cadillac]1 [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]] 
10aB [not][S [Alice] [[stole] [NP this model of Cadillac]]] 
Yet, these logical forms should lead to the same reading for we pretheoretically 
know that 10a is not ambiguous. In the logical form 10aB there is a sortal 
discrepancy between the kind designator [NP this model of Cadillac]1 and the 
particular level verb stole. In the resolution of this discrepancy DKP is triggered 
and maps the meaning of stole into a suitable meaning that can combine with 




10aB [[not][[NP this model of Cadillac]1 [1 [S Alice stole t1 from Bob’s gallery]]] 
the interpretation of  10aB according to the C-framework and the K-framework:  
{ λs.~, { λs.p[e Alice]s, {λs.[<e,<e,t>>stole]s, λs.k[e this model of Cadillac]s}}} misfit 
{ λs.~, { λs.p[e Alice]s, { DKP(λs.[<e,<e,t>>stole]k), λs.k[e this model of C.]s}}} DKP triggered 
{ λs.~, { λs.p[e Alice]s, { λs.λzk.λx.y(I(s)(y)(zk) & [stole]s(y)(x)), λs.k[e this m. of C.]s}}}  
{ λs.~, { λs.p[e Alice]s, λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)([this model of C.]s) & [stole]s(y)(x))}} 
{ λs.~, λs.y(I(s)(y)([this model of C.]s)  & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
λs.∼y(I(s)(y)([this model of C.]s)  & [stole]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
In the logical form 10aA a similar semantic discrepancy obtains between the 
trace t1 of the kind designator [NP this model of Cadillac] and the particular level 
applier verb stole. Remember that following Chierchia we have crucially 
assumed that when non-quantificational NP’s move to the wide scope they leave 
behind a trace of the same sorted type as themselves. The said semantic 
discrepancy between suitable assignments to t1  and the verb stole triggers DKP; 
and the resolution which introduces an existential quantification occurs within 
the scope of not; thereby it becomes possible to explain the non-ambiguity of 
10a: 
10aA [NP This model of Cadillac]1 [1 [[not][S [Alice] [[stole] [t1]]]]] 
the interpretation of  10aA according to the C-framework and the K-framework:  
{λs.k[eThis m. of Cadillac]s, {1, { {λs.∼, { λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[stole]s, λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}}} sortal misfit  
{λs.k[eThis m. of C.]s, {1, { {λs.∼, { λs.[A.]s, {DKP(λs.[stole]s), λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}}}DKP triggered 
{λs.k[eThis m. of C.]s, {1, { { λs.~, { λs.p[e A.]s, λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g) & [stole]s(y)(x))}}}}} 
{λs.k[eThis model of Cadillac]s, {1, λs.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))}} 
{λs.k[eThis model of Cadillac]s, λs.λx.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[tx]s,g)& [stole]s(y)([Alice]s))} 




Accomodating Taxonomic Indefinite Phrases Occuring in Particular 
Level Contexts 
To resolve sortal conflicts that obtain in such sentences as those in 22 we have 
introduced the operator detax that optionally applies to taxonomic applier 
meanings to map them into particular level applier meanings.  
22 a Alice found the carcass of an extinct bison. 
 b The bird on that lower bough is an endangered game bird. 
 c Alice shot an endangered game bird. 
 d Alice drove a Cadillac model designed by Damon. 
 e Alice found the carcassess of two extinct bisons. 
 f Alice shot no/many/few/two endangered game birds. 
Let α be a meaning of type <s,<ek,t>>, 
Detax(α)=λs.λx.∃y(I(s)(x,y) & α(s)(y)) 
Detax maps a kind level applier meaning α into a particular level applier 
meaning λs.λx.∃y(I(s)(x,y) & α(s)(y)) which relative to a given evaluation index 
s will map a token x to truth iff x is an instance of a kind y to which α applies 
truly relative to s. 
I have assumed such inherently taxonomic common nouns as endangered 
game bird, extinct bison, Cadillac model designed by Damon can undergo the 
operation detax to yield particular level predicative meanings which is then fed 
to the functions expressed by determiners to yield the meanings of the 
quantified noun phrases or indefinite noun phrases they form. Under this 
assumption 22c was interpreted thus: 
22 c Alice shot an endangered game bird. 




Interpretation of 22c via detax: 
{{λs.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)), detax(λs.k[<e,t>e. game bird]s)}, λs.λy.[shot]s(y)([Alice]s)} 
{{λs.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)), λs.λx.∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>e. g. b.]s(y))}, s.λy.[shot]s(y)([A.]s)} 
{λs.λP.x(∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>endangered …]s(y))&P(x)), λs.λy.[shot]s(y)([Alice]s)} 
λs.x(∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>endangered game bird]s(y))& [shot]s(x)([Alice]s)) 
Note that in the logical form that is the basis for the above interpretation we 
have the NP an endangered game bird not in its original surface form position 
but in the wide scope. This move is necessitated because the NP an endangered 
game bird has an existential quantifier meaning and we cannot interpret logical 
forms in which quantified NP’s remain in the object position under the general 
semantic composition framework we adopted in the present work –i.e. that of 
Heim & Kratzer (1998).119 
Can DKP Do the Job Done by Detax? 
In the interpretation of 22c through detax the NP an endangered game bird was 
in fact interpreted as particular level, although it is formed by a common noun 
which is inherently taxonomic. This was possible due to the assumption that 
taxonomic common nouns’ meanings can optionally undergo detax.  
Now it appears that the interpretation of 22c can as well proceed through 
the application of DKP and the interpretation of an endangered animal as a 
kind-level indefinite. We have a moment ago noted that under the paradigm of 
semantic composition adopted here we cannot interpret the logical forms in 
which there are NP’s with quantifier meanings figuring in object positions; 
                                                        





instead we have to consider logical forms in which such NP’s have moved 
outside the verb phrase, even if in the surface form of the sentences they figure 
in the object position: 
22cA   [Alice][[shot][[an] [endangered game bird]]] is not interpretable 
 
22cB   [[an] [endangered game bird]][1 [Alice][[shot][t1]]] is interpretable 
If we did not have the option of detaxification or simply if that option is not 
selected then an endangered game bird in 22c will be interpreted as a kind level 
indefinite argument; and when it moves to the wide scope it is plausible to think 
that it will leave a kind level trace t1 (22cB). But then a sortal conflict will obtain 
between that the kind level trace t1 and the particular level verb shot for which 
t1 constitutes the argument. This conflict can be resolved via DKP, in a manner 
similar to what took place for example in the interpretation of the logical form 
10aA. I now present how this envisaged interpretation via DKP will work out: 
22 c Alice shot an endangered game bird. 
  [[an] [endangered game bird]][1 [Alice][[shot][t1]]] 
Interpretation of 22c via DKP: 
{λs.λP.x(k[<e,t>e.g.b.]s(x)&P(x)), {1, {λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[shot]s, λs.k[et1]s,g}}}} sortal misfit  
{λs.λP.x(k[<e,t>e.g.b.]s(x)&P(x)), {1, { λs.[A.]s, {DKP(λs.[s.]s), λs.k[et1]s,g}}}}DKP triggered 
{λs.λP.x(k[<e,t>e.g.b.]s(x)&P(x)), {1, { λs.p[e A.]s, λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)(k[et1]s,g) & [s.]s(y)(x))}}} 
{λs.λP.x(k[<e,t>e.g.b.]s(x)&P(x)), {1, λs.y(I(s)(y)(k[et1]s,g) & [shot]s(y)(p[e Alice]s))}} 
{λs.λP.x(k[<e,t>e.g.b.]s(x)&P(x)),  λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)(k[etx]s)& [shot]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
λs.x(k[<e,t>endangered g. b.]s(x) &y(I(s)(y)(k[tx]s)& [shot]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
λs.x(k[<e,t>endangered g. b.]s(x) &y(I(s)(y)(x) & [shot]s(y)([Alice]s)) 
Note that as a result we have obtained the same truth conditions as we did 
when we interpreted 22c using detax. This result may be taken to suggest there 
is no need to adopt detax as an optional operator, provided that we have DKP. 




designating arguments occur in particular level contexts and do not give rise to 
scope ambiguity. 
I will give three reasons showing that we infact need the detax option 
alongside the DKP. First, indefinite phrases formed by inherently taxonomic 
common nouns can constitute nominal predicates for particular level subjects: 
The bird in the lower bough is an endangered bird 
The second car in the left row is a rare model 
Alice’s Cadillac is a pre-1970 model, as the tail light chrome cover indicates 
There is no straightforward way to use DKP in the interpretation of such 
sentences. Second the following sentence appears to be ambiguous: 
35 Alice filmed two birds that were long thought to be extinct. 
It can either be read as saying that Alice filmed two tokens of a bird species that 
was long thought to be extinct or as saying that Alice filmed tokens of two bird 
species that were long thought to be extinct. Now, this ambiguity cannot be 
scope related, as there is not any constituent which can take narrow or wide 
scope relative to the NP two birds that were long thought to be extinct to affect 
the interpretation of the sentence. Then, the sentential ambiguity in 35 should 
be due to the ambiguity of some constituent. The only possible candidate 
appears to be the NP two birds that were long though to be extinct. This 
ambiguity can readily be explained by the adoption of detax. Third, if we did not 
have the detax option then we cannot account for all the pre-theoretically 
ascertainable readings of such sentences as the following: 




Note that 36 has a variety of readings. Among these, one says (i) that there is a 
bird species which was long thought to be extinct such that Alice did film any 
token of it. Another one says (ii) that there is a token, of a bird species that was 
thought to be extinct, which Alice did not film. Surely both of these readings 
follow from a logical form in which the taxonomic indefinite singular a bird that 
was long tought to be extinct takes wide scope over the negation.  
36A [NP [D a] [N’ bird that was long thought to be extinct]]1 [1 [[not] [Alice film t1]]] 
If detax was not an option and we only had DKP to interpret the logical form 
36A we could capture only one of the indicated readings (specifically the 
reading 36Ai): 
36A [NP [D a] [N’ bird that was long thought to be extinct]]1 [1 [[not][Alice][[film][t1]]]] 
36Ai obtained from the interpretation of 36A via DKP : 
{λs.λQ.∃x(k[<e,t>b.that...]s(x)&Q(x)),{1,{{λs.∼,{λs.[A.]s,{λs.[f.]s,λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}}} sortal  misfit  
{λs.λQ.∃x(k[<e,t>b.that...]s(x)&Q(x)),{1,{{λs.∼,{λs.[A.]s,{DKP(λs.[f.]s),λs.k[t1]s,g}}}}}}DKP  
{λs.λQ.∃x(k[<e,t>b]s(x)&Q(x)),{1,{{λs.~,{λs.p[eA]s,λs.λx.y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g)&[f]s(y)(x))}}}} 
{λs.λQ.∃x(k[<e,t>b.that...]s(x)&Q(x)), {1, λs.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[t1]s,g)& [film]s(y)([Alice]s))}} 
{λs.λQ.∃x(k[<e,t> bird that …]s(x)&Q(x)), λs.λx.∼y(I(s)(y)(k[tx]s,g)& [film]s(y)([Alice]s))} 
λs.∃x(k[<e,t> bird that …]s(x)& ∼y(I(s)(y)(k[tx]s,g)& [film]s(y)([Alice]s))) 
λs.∃x(k[<e,t> bird that ...]s(x)& ∼y(I(s)(y)(x)& [film]s(y)([Alice]s))) 
If we have the detax option however a bird that was long thought to be extinct 
can be interpreted as a particular level indefinite phrase. Thereby the reading 
(36Aii) can as well be derived out of 36A.  
36A [NP [D a] [N’ bird that was long thought to be extinct]]1 [1 [[not][Alice][[film][t1]]]] 
36Aii obtained from the interpretation of 36A via detax: 
{{λs.λP.λQ.∃x(P(x)&Q(x)),detax(λs.k[<e,t>b.]s)},{1,{λs.∼,{λs.[A.]s,{λs.[f.]s,λs.p[t1]s,g}}}}} 
{{λs.λP.λQ.∃x(P(x)&Q(x)),detax(λs.k[<e,t>b.]s)}, {1, {λs.∼, λs.[f.]s(p[t1]s,g)([Alice]s)}}} 
{{λs.λP.λQ.∃x(P(x)&Q(x)),detax(λs.k[<e,t>b.]s)}, {1, λs.∼[film]s(p[t1]s,g)([Alice]s)}} 
{{λs.λP.λQ.∃x(P(x)&Q(x)),detax(λs.k[<e,t> b.]s)}, λs.λx.∼[film]s(p[tx]s)([Alice]s)} 





 λs.x(∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>b.]s(y)) & ∼[film]s(p[tx]s)([Alice]s)) 
λs.x(∃y(I(s)(x,y) & k[<e,t>bird that ...]s(y)) & ∼[film]s(x)([Alice]s)) 
So we see that in the case of such sentences as 36 all the pretheoretically 
ascertainable readings can be obtained only if it is possible for the indefinite 
NP’s formed out of inherently taxonomic common nouns to be interpreted as 
particular level indefinites. Here we ensure that possibility by adopting the 
optional operator detax. 
In the next chapter we will consider sentences similar to 36 where we will 
have to deal with scope related ambiguities generated by the involvement of 
modal auxillaries. In the analysis of these sentences too we will see that both 
DKP and detax are needed to capture all the pre-theoretically ascertainable 
readings. 
Conclusion of the Analyses of Noun Phrases Formed by Count 
Common Nouns 
In the present chapter I presented two frameworks, fashioned out of the 
literature on semantics of noun phrases, destined to account for the variety in 
the semantic output of the noun phrases as a function of the meanings of the 
common nouns. One of these frameworks assigned applier meanings to simple 
common nouns and the other assigned kind designator meanings to them. 
The variety to be accounted for concerned both variation with regard to 
the mode denotation (quantification, designation, application) and variation as 
regards whether the denotata were kind-level or particular level. It went 




different types of meanings in different sentential contexts (e.g. the whale can 
be used as a definite generic, taxonomic definite and particular level definite). 
There was also a need to account for the not so few cases of kind level 
arguments combining with particular level predicates (e.g. Alice did not steal 
this model of Cadillac). Moreover, among the noun phrases types that have been 
considered bare plural phrases manifested some peculiar behavior, the 
explanation of which is still a point of controversy in the semantic literature 
(some bare plural phrases designated kinds in kind level contexts, and most 
bare plural phrases appeared forced to take narrow scope in particular level 
episodic contexts). All these points recounted here inevitably lead to complex 
accounts. Not the least because it was not possible to account for them without 
watering the principle of the compositonality by the introduction of several 
types of implicit operators.  
Now in the present section I will review the theoretical options adopted by 
the frameworks presented in response to these points and assesss their relative 
advantages and disadvantages.  
The Assessment of K-framework’s Theoretical Decisions Regarding 
the Semantics of the Count Common Nouns 
The K-framework distinguishes between three types of common noun 
meanings. Simple non-taxonomic common nouns are kind designators. Modified 
non-taxonomic common nouns are particular level appliers. Taxonomic 




Two questions arises regarding this position of the K-framework. Why to 
assign kind designation to simple non-taxonomic common nouns? How can the 
division of common nouns into appliers and designators be justified? 
Assigning Kind Designation to Simple Common Nouns 
The main motivation behind K-framework’s assigning kind designating 
meanings to semantically simple non-taxonomic common nouns is to be able to 
give a straightforward account of the semantics of bare plural phrases and 
definite generics. In the first part of the present chapter we have seen that such 
phrases can be used to designate kinds. I produce a few more examples below: 
37 The MacBook Air was greeted with a mixed reception when it was introduced. 
Dodos have become extinct in the 19th Century. 
The K-framework accounts for kind designation by definite generics and bare 
plural pharese simply by identifying their meaning with the kind designating 
common nouns they are formed by. 
Another reason for taking semantically simple non-taxonomic common 
nouns to designate kinds is that, they appear to be able to support kind 
designating pronouns although they themselves figure in particular level noun 
phrases. In this vein we had previously given the following example: 
38 Bill trapped a bald eagle last night although he knows full well that they are on the 
verge of extinction. 
The pronoun they figuring in the second clause apparently designates the bald 
eagle. A straightforward explanation of this phenomenon is that previously in 




designatum again. When we consider the sentence above we see that the noun 
phrase a bald eagle cannot be the source of that designatum. The indefinite 
argument a bald eagle rather operates as a particular level existential GQ, as 
such it can only introduce particular level objects into discourse. So that kind 
level designatum of the pronoun should have been provided by the common 
noun bald eagle itself. 
Assigning Applier Meanings to Modified Common Nouns and 
Taxonomic Common Nouns 
Now let’s turn to the postponed question as to why the K-framework takes only 
non-taxonomic simple common nouns to have kind designator meanings. The 
basic reason is that apparently only semantically simple common nouns appear 
to be able to form definite generic phrases. 
39 a The dodo has become extinct in the 19th century. 
b *The wounded dodo has become extinct in the 19th century. 
If the modified common noun wounded dodo too could designate a kind then it 
too should be able to form a definite generic phrase; and if the dodo kind can be 
ascribed extinction as in 39a, the wounded-dodo-kind too should be able to be 
ascribed extinction via a sentence like 39b. Yet, the latter does not appear to be 
an acceptable sentence. The same considerations apply to the bare plural 
phrases dodos and wounded dodos. 
40 a Dodos have become extinct in the 19th Century. 




Only the former appears acceptable in kind level sentential context, and thus to 
be capable of designating a kind. 
Taxonomic common nouns too appear not capable of forming definite 
generic phrases: 
41 a The dodo will soon become extinct. 
b *The endangered bird will someday become extinct. (not possible with the   
 endangered bird taken to designate something like the-endangered-bird- 
 kind, even if such a kind is supposed to exist) 
Apart from the the kind level sentential contexts, definite generics can figure as 
the subjects of generic sentences. Yet again, in such sentences we cannot have 
definite generics formed by modified common nouns: 
42 a The coke bottle has a well-known shape. 
b *The half-full coke bottle has a well-known shape. 
This division among common nouns regarding their capacity to form definite 
generics gets a simple explanation if it is assumed that not all common nouns 
are kind designators. 
Notwithstanding this it may look as if it would be more desirable to assign 
the same type of meanings to all non-taxonomic common nouns at least; and to 
take them all to be kind designators. This idea is further supported by the fact 
that there are certain predicates which appear to be able to combine both with 
kind designating phrases and also with bare plural phrases formed by modified 
common nouns. Yet according to K-framework the latter are not kind 
designators: 
43 a The dodo was common in this island. 
b This kind of bird is widespread in this island. 
c The blue diamond is very rare. 




e Weirdly shaped rocks are common along this shore. 
f Houses painted red are very rare. 
If, judging from the ability of these predicates to combine with kind designating 
arguments, we take them to be predicates that exclusively require kind 
designating arguments then we should take such bare plural phrases as decrepit 
houses, houses painted red too to be kind designators. And if we furthermore 
wish to continue to identify the meanings of the kind designating bare plural 
phrases with that of the common nouns that form them then we will have to 
admit that modified common nouns too can be kind designators. Then we may 
seek to explain the impossibility to form definite generics with such modified 
common nouns on syntactic or pragmatic grounds. 
Yet there are reasons to think that unlike extinct predicates such as rare, 
widespread, common are not exclusively kind level, although somehow they can 
accommodate kind designating arguments. To see this consider the following 
sentences, in which these predicates receive arguments that are non-
controversially treated as particular level phrases:120 
44 a A blue diamond is very rare. 
b A female lion with three cubs is quite common. 
c The effects of the year without the summer were widespread and lasted beyond 
 the winter. 
d The elephantbirds were widespread as late as the tenth century. 
Besides, if modified common nouns too are taken to be kind designators then 
there will be need for a complicated account to derive the kind designator 
meanings for modified common nouns out of the meanings of the modifiers and 
                                                        
120 Such predicates are taken to have quantificational meanings rather than ordinary kind level 




kind designating simpler common nouns that constitute them. For example, if 
decrepit houses is taken to have a kind designating meaning then we should be 
able to derive that meaning from the meanings of the adjective decrepit and the 
common noun houses. This cannot happen via the semantic composition 
operations as we defined them. Because while the adjective has a predicative 
meaning of type <s,<e,t>>, the common noun has a kind designating meaning 
of type <s,ek>. Moreover we want the result to be another kind designating 
meaning. This will require a more complicated account of noun modification 
than the one deployed under the K-framework. Under the K-framework decrepit 
houses is assigned a particular level applier meaning. Its meaning is derived by 
the application of the operation pred to the kind designating meaning of houses 
and the semantic composition of the resulting applier meaning with that of 
decrepit which is again considered to be an applier (type <s,<e,t>>). Now, if 
we furthermore wish that decrepit houses too has a kind designator meaning 
then we have to embed an additional implicit operation that maps particular 
level applier meanings of type <s,<ep,t>> to kind designator meanings of type 
<s,ek> (exactly like the C-framework’s ∩) into the semantic composition rule of 
noun modification. An alternative approach would be to assign meanings of the 
sorted types <s,<ek,ek>> to the modifiers. For example if decrepit is assigned 
such a meaning, it can semantically compose with houses taken as a kind 
designator (sorted type <s,ek>) and yield as result a kind designator meaning 
for decrepit houses. Yet, such modifiers as decrepit can also form predicates 
which apply to particulars (This house is decrepit). Then we will need an 




the meanings of such adjectives as decrepit (which according to the suggestion 
under consideration will be of the sorted type <s,<ek, ek>>). 
Note also that by way of taking modified common nouns to be kind 
designators, however we do it, we ditch the K-frameworks’ simple account as to 
why not all common nouns can form definite generic phrases –this advantage 
was acquired at the cost of taking only non-taxonomic simple common nouns to 
have kind designating meanings. For example, the alternative C-framework 
which takes all common nouns to be appliers is not able to give a semantic 
explanation for this difference among common nouns. If we are willing to ditch 
this advantage of the K-framework, then rather than adding futher 
complications pertaining to noun modification it will be simpler to just assume 
that all common nouns are appliers, and to explain kind designation by bare 
plural phrases and definite generics along the lines of the C-framework.  
The Assessment of C-framework’s Theoretical Decisions Regarding 
the Semantics of the Count Common Nouns 
According to the C-framework all common nouns are appliers. The taxonomic 
ones apply to kinds and the non-taxonomic ones apply to particulars. This is the 
standard treatment for common nouns, and it fits quite well with the standard 
treatment of determiners, with the capacity of common nouns to form 
predicates etc. 
Yet, the C-framework has to give an account how such predicative 




definite generics. The C-framework gives different accounts for these types of 
kind designating phrases. 
Following Dayal (2004) the C-framework treats definite generics phrases 
as taxonomic definite phrases. Here, the definite article the is assigned its usual 
interpretation of the iota operator, and that definite article semantically 
composes with a taxonomic common noun to pick the unique kind which 
satisfies both the taxonomic common noun and contextually determined 
constraints. And following Chierchia (1998) the C-framework derives kind 
designating meanings for bare plural noun phrases via the implicit operation ∩ 
which is partially defined over particular level plural predicative meanings and 
map these meanings into the corresponding kinds if there exists such a kind. 
These accounts by the C-framework are not without problems, to which I 
now turn. 
Excessive Permissibility about the Kinds that can be Designated by 
Bare Plural Phrases 
According to C-framework’s account kind designating bare plural arguments 
can be formed even by such heavily modified common nouns as broken red 
bikes.  This is regarded as a welcome consequence by the authors whom the C-
framework follows. Because bare plural phrases, including ones such as broken 
red bikes appear to behave in particular level episodic contexts more like the 
kind phrases such as this bike model than the indefinite and the quantified 
phrases (remember the issue of scope peculiarity). Yet, we have seen that that 




designation to bare plurals formed by modified noun phrases. The problem with 
the view that even such common nouns as broken red bikes can form kind 
designating bare plural phrases is that such bare plurals can hardly figure in 
genuine kind level contexts set by such adjectives and verbs as extinct, out of 
production, invent, review, launch etc.  
Another problem is that the singular common noun broken red bike 
cannot form a definite generic phrase, the other important type of kind 
designating noun phrase: the broken red bike can hardly be used as a definite 
generic like the Trek Madone 6, the electron can. If there is a kind 
corresponding to the common noun broken red bike why cannot it be used a 
definite generic?  
Can the Selectivity of the Definite Generic Formation be Explained in 
Pragmatic Terms 
In response to this last issue, Dayal (2004) argues that the inability manifested 
by such modified common nouns as broken red bike has a pragmatic 
explanation rather than a semantic one (like the one given under the K-
framework). According to her given an elaborate context setting it is possible to 
use for example the green bottle as a definite generic. She believes that in such 
context as the following, 
45 The factory produces two kinds of bottles, a green one for medicinal purposes 
and a clear one for cosmetics. The green bottle has a long neck. The clear bottle . . . 
the green bottle is used as a definite generic. Yet, this appears to be an ordinary 




designate a type of bottle made salient by the context, and nothing like the-
green-bottle-kind of which all green bottles are instances. In contrast, for 
instance the definite generic the coke bottle designates the kind of which all 
coke bottles are instances.  
Dayal can insist that here green bottle too corresponds to a special kind of 
bottle, which does not cover all bottles which are green but only those special 
ones produced by the factory in question. That is, just as not all bottles containg 
coke are coke bottles, not all bottles that are green are green bottles, in the 
sense intended here. But then we can no longer identify the common noun 
green bottle figuring in the putative definite generic the green bottle with the 
ordinary modified common noun green bottle, the extension of which covers 
every bottle that is green.  
It appears that it is not impossible for the green bottle to be used as 
definite generic in English, provided that a special sort of bottle which is usually 
green acquires a particular relevance in our lives. Yet, then the common noun 
involved in the definite generic the green bottle will not be the modified 
common noun green bottle but a new, semantically simple common noun.  
Higher order Kinds? 
We have seen that the argument the C-framework gives to support assigning 
kind designating meanings to almost all non taxononomic bare plural pharases 
can as well be extended to the cases of taxonomic bare plurals arguments. That 




plural arguments in particular level contexts was exactly like that of kind 
phrases like this model of Cadillac: notwithstanding whether they stood in the 
wide scope or in the narrow scope they yielded the same reading (a reading 
which corresponds to the narrow scope interpretation of an existential 
quantified phrase). Yet we have seen that the same behavior is manifested also 
by bare plural arguments which clearly have to be interpreted taxonomically: 
30 a Alice did not review obsolete Japanese mobile models. 
30a appears to have only the reading Alice did not review any obsolete Japanese 
mobile models. Then the C-framework to preserve its coherence has to give an 
account of taxonomic bare plural arguments which is similar to its account of 
non-taxonomic bare plural arguments. But this will then commit the C-
framework to such higher order kinds as obsolete-Japanese-mobile-kind. This is 
not a desirable consequence in so far as there is not any other piece of evidence 
indicating that natural languages require in their ontology such higher order 
kinds. And whether we accept the scope peculiarity of taxonomic bare plural 
arguments as an evidence depends on whether we are ready to accept 
Chierchia’s general way of explaining bare plural phrases’ scope peculiarity by 
way of assigning them kind designation. Yet,  as we have seen while presenting 
the K-framework, that peculiarity could very well be explained without taking 
the bare plural phrases involved to be kind designators. 
Moreover if there are such higher order kinds in the ontology and they 
correspond to taxonomic common nouns’ intensions, the C-framework is again 
due an explanation as to why we cannot form with taxonomic common nouns 




Problems with the C-framework’s Account of Definite Generics 
C-frameworks’s account of definite generics too result in more definite generic 
phrases than we would like to acknowledge. Remember that according to that 
account definite generics were merely taxonomic definite phrases formed by 
taxonomically interpreted common nouns. To make the accout work Dayal 
supposes that the taxonomically used whale for example has in its extension not 
just the various whale species and genera, but also the-whale-kind of which any 
whale is an instance. The whale, as a taxonomic definite phrase, designates the-
whale-kind rather than a species or genus when among the contextually salient 
kinds we do not have any particular species or genera of whales. 
Now, since the account is treating definite generics as mere taxonomic 
definite phrases formed by taxonomic common nouns it predicts that even such 
modified taxonomic common nouns as Cadillac which is out of production, road 
bike reviewed by Alice’s blog can form definite generics like the Cadillac which 
is out of production and the road bike reviewed by Alice’s blog that respectively 
designate such kinds as out-of-production-Cadillac-kind and road-bike-
reviewed-by-Alice’s-blog kind. A prediction which is not materialized. 
A second problem related with the C-framework’s treatment of definite 
generics is that to account for such definite generics as the electron it is forced 
to take such common nouns as electron which correspond to infima species to 
have taxonomic variants. Yet such a taxonomic variant for electron can truly 
apply only to the electron. For instance Dayal acknowledges that her account 




that the-electron-kind itself is a kind of electron, will be acceptable. But it is not 
clear whether there indeed are such simple taxonomic common nouns which 
can only truly apply to a single kind –namely the kind corresponding to their 
non-taxonomic variant.  
Kind Level Anaphora  
Apart from the issues pertaining to C-framework’s accounts about bare plural 
and definite generic phrases, another problem for the C-framework is to explain 
what is going on in such sentences as 38: 
38 Bill trapped a bald eagle last night although he knows full well that they are on the 
 verge of extinction. 
Here it appears that the common noun bald eagle which figures in a particular 
level indefinite noun phrase supports the kind designating pronoun they. As we 
have seen the K-framework which takes simple common nouns to be kind 
designators, can simply take this appearance at face value. But the C-framework 
cannot give such an account in so far as it takes non-taxonomic common nouns 
to be particular level appliers. One possible option for the framework may be to 
introduce a double denotation theory for common nouns. According to such a 
theory a common noun will both be an applier and a kind designator. But then 
all the meanderings of the C-framework to derive kind designation for the 
paradigmatic kind designating NP’s, the definite generic phrases and bare plural 
phrases, will appear needless and unmotivated. A better option, more consistent 




pronoun they inheres the composition of the operations PL and ∩. According to 
this suggestion they will be dependent on the count noun bald eagle: its 
designatum will be ∩(PL⟦bald eagle⟧). Yet, it is beyond me to work out the 
details and to motivate on independent grounds such a proposal. 
Final Assessment and Interlude before Passing to the Rigidity 
Investigation 
In this chapter we have considered the semantics of common nouns together 
with the semantics of noun phrases formed by them. We have strived to show 
that there are plausible reasons to assign kind designation to simple, non-
taxonomic common nouns.  
This was relevant for the question about the de jure rigidity of common 
nouns in the following way. We had previously seen that the general consensus 
in the relevant philosophical literature was that unless common nouns are 
taken to be kind designators the property of de jure rigidity will apply to 
virtually no common nouns. But the literature did not involve any attempt to 
justify the view that common nouns should be kind designators. Furthermore, if 
common nouns are generally taken to be kind designators then it appeared that 
the de jure rigidity will have to apply to all of them, with the consequence of 
reducing the theoretical significance of that property in relation with the 
common nouns.   
Now acknowledging the existence of noun phrases that denote kinds 
warrants the assignment of kind designation to common nouns as a means to 




denotations. Furhermore the observation that some important types of kind 
designating phrases cannot be formed by modified and taxonomic common 
nouns, warrants the idea that assigning kind designation to all common nouns is 
not the optimal way to go. The K-framework, which partially followed Krifka et 
al. (1995), has been formulated bearing on these warrants. It assigned kind 
designation only to semantically simple non-taxonomic common nouns, while it 
treated modified common noun and taxonomic common nouns as appliers. On 
that basis, and introducing certain implicit operations to fix things, the K-
framework is able to give plausible accounts for the variety in the semantics of 
the noun phrases formed by common nouns. 
Yet we have also seen that the warrants on which the K-framework draw 
did not amount to a full justification. Even if it is granted that certain noun 
phrases are best analysed as denoting kinds one can as well give a defensible 
account for all of them in terms of common nouns that are taken to be appliers. 
The C-framework we have formulated in this chapter did so by adopting the 
standard treatment of common nouns as appliers and following such works as 
Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2004). We have seen that the C-framework has its 
problems, but these may be thought to be balanced by its uniformly assigning 
applier meanings to all common nouns. 
Now returning to our main subject of investigation which is whether the 
property of de jure rigidity has any theoretical significance in relation with 
common nouns, we can cite the preliminary prospects in the following way.  
On intuive grounds it is clear that under the K-framework de jure rigidity 




taxonomic common nouns such as road bike, electron, Iphone4s, transistor 
which are taken to be kind designators will all be de jure rigid designators. 
Consider the case of transistor. When it is used to talk about possible 
circumstances it will continue to designate the same device type as as it did 
when it is used to talk about actual circumstances. As for the other common 
nouns, the modified ones and taxonomic ones which are treated as appliers, 
most of them cannot be de jure rigid appliers. It is intuitively clear that broken 
road bike cannot be a rigid applier. It is also clear that the taxonomic variant of 
transistor which is an applier according to the K-framework should apply to 
different types of transistors relative to different possible circumstances; a 
transistor model that actually exists might not have been invented at all, and 
vice versa a transistor model that is not as yet invented might have been 
invented. 
However, from the standpoint of the C-framework according to which all 
common nouns are appliers de jure rigidity will not be significant for common 
nouns. Virtually all of them will be non-rigid appliers. For virtually every non-
abstract common noun the kinds and particulars which it truly applies to will 
shift if things had been different then they actually are. 
Notwithstanding the intuitive certainity of our assesssment of the 
prospects, in the next chapter I will painstakingly strive to show they are indeed 
correct. In the fourth chapter I have illustrated the way to give a proper 
justification of the intuitively certain view that proper names are de jure rigid 
designators. I will do the same for the common nouns in the next chapter on the 





COMMON NOUNS AND RIGIDITY 
In the previous chapter we have described two frameworks to explain the 
semantic variety of the noun phrases formed by count common nouns. The K-
framework contained three distinct types of common nouns. Semantically 
simple non-taxonomic common nouns that designated kinds, modified non-
taxonomic common nouns that had particular level predicative denotations, and 
taxonomic common nouns that had kind level predicative denotations. Under 
this framework the meanings of the kind designating noun phrases were the 
same as the meanings of the kind designating common nouns that formed them. 
As regards the denotations of noun phrases that denoted particulars, these were 
derivable through the application of the operator pred to the meanings of the 
kind designating common nouns. 
The C-framework acknowledged only two semantically distinguishable 
types of common nouns: non-taxonomic common nouns that had particular 
level predicative denotations and taxonomic common nouns that had kind level 
predicative denotations. This framework did not have kind designating common 
nouns, and accounted for the kind designating noun phrases by having recourse 
to an appropriately defined operator which mapped the meanings of the 
predicative common nouns into kind designating meanings. 
In this chapter I will explore, relative to each of these frameworks, 




will take the rigidity of a term to be constancy of denotation across evaluation 
indexes for which the term has a defined denotation. 
We have already discussed what sorts of reasons would entitle one to take 
a class of expressions to be rigid, and illustrated such reasons in relation with 
the singular terms. The existence of a reason for taking a class of expressions to 
be de jure rigid depends on whether assigning constant denotations to that class 
of expressions is needed to explain the pre-theoretically observed truth 
conditions of the sentences in which these expressions occur. 
Now, are there sentences the truth-conditions of which are best explained 
only if a specific class of common nouns are assigned constant denotations 
across evaluation indexes? 
Previously when we sought the reasons for taking proper names among 
singular terms to be de jure rigid, we found such reasons in relation with two 
phenomena. First, modal sentences involving proper name arguments did not 
manifest a certain type of ambiguity manifested by the sentences which had 
definite description arguments in place of proper names. Second, any identity 
sentence which involved two proper name arguments were non-contingent, but 
this was not the case for identity sentences which instead involved at least one 
definite description. 
I will now seek reasons for assigning de jure rigidity to some class of 
common nouns or other by considering similar phenomena. I will therefore first 
look into modal sentences and explore whether we can find a class of common 




certain type of ambiguity which normally obtains when they are replaced by 
common nouns of another class.  
Second I will look into identity sentences involving common nouns. The 
consideration of identity sentences that are non-contingent cannot directly give 
a reason to assign rigidity to common nouns involved is such sentences. In 
English count common nouns cannot figure as arguments in sentences, a fortiori 
they cannot figure as arguments in identity sentences. Count common nouns 
rather occur in definite noun phrases which in turn can be arguments in identity 
sentences. Thus, even if some such identity sentences were found to be non-
contingent that can at best indicate the rigidity of the definite noun-phrases 
involved, and may have no implications regarding the rigidity of the common 
nouns that form these definite noun phrases; this is so however unless in 
addition the rigidity of certain such definite noun phrases depended on the 
rigidity of the common nouns that formed them.  
Common Nouns in Modal Sentential Contexts 
One piece of argument that establishes that proper names are rigid designators 
and definite descriptions are not derives from the following observation. Modal 
sentences involving definite descriptions have multiple truth-conditionally non-
equivalent readings, whereas when these definite descriptions are replaced by 
proper names, while keeping the modal sentential context the same, the 




The multiple readings of the modal sentences involving definite 
descriptions is explained by the possibility for the definite descriptions to take 
wide scope or the narrow scope relative to the modal operator and by their 
being non-rigid designators. 
The same scope taking options should be available for proper names that 
replace the definite descriptions in the same modal sentential contexts. 
However, the modal sentences with the proper names in place of the definite 
descriptions do not have non-equivalent readings corresponding to the different 
ways proper names take scope relative to the modal operator. Thus it is 
concluded we should assume proper names to be rigid designators. 
In this section I will explore whether a similar piece of argument can be 
given for a rigid/non-rigid distinction among common nouns. I will compare the 
sets of readings that result when common nouns of different classess are used in 
the same modal sentential context. I will look whether there is any difference in 
the resulting sets of readings the explanation of which would require assigning 
de jure rigidity to one the classess of common nouns to be considered. 
Specifically my discussion will be laid as an examination and comparison 
of the different readings of the following pair of sentences (clearly there are 
many such pairs of sentences, and the points of the discussion to follow will 
equally apply to them): 
1 a [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Japanese mobile which is out of 
 production. 
b [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Sharp SH903i. 
Each of these sentences has a multiplicity of readings due to the different 




related with the existence of logical forms in which certain constituents take 
scope in different ways relative to must.  Some other options derive from the 
availability of different ways of resolving sortal discrepancies that obtain 
between the denotations of certain elements. I will distinguish between the non-
equivalent readings that can be associated with 1a and 1b, and describe how 
they derive from possible logical forms cum possible sortal discrepancy 
resolving strategies. 
In considering these readings I will specifically be interested in differences 
that result from the way the highlighted common nouns of 1a and 1b take scope 
with regard to must. I will explore whether as a consequence of this parameter 
both 1a and 1b yield similar sets of readings, or there are discrepancies in this 
respect. I will discern one such discrepancy between 1a and 1b.  
I will argue that under the K-framework to the semantics of common 
nouns, the explanation of this discrepancy will require to assume that Sharp 
SH903i is a rigid designator. However I will also show that the same 
discrepancy can be explained under the C-framework without any such 
assumption. 
Readings in Which Noun-phrases Formed by Common Nouns Take 
Wide Scope or Narrow Scope 
It is well known that indefinite noun phrases formed by common nouns 
generate sentential ambiguities when they occur in modal sentential contexts. 
Consider 1b. We can distinguish between two non-equivalent readings of 1b: 




First there is a reading of 1b under which it will be true relative to @ (the actual 
world) if and only if for all worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied 
there is a token at w of Sharp SH903i which is used by Alice in w. This is the so 
called de dicto reading. According to this reading there is not an actual specific 
Sharp SH903i token which Alice must use to satisfy Claire. Any SH903i token 
will do. 
Then there is also a reading of 1b according to which it will be true relative 
@ if and only if there is token of Sharp SH903i at @ such that for all worlds w in 
which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses at w that token. This is the so 
called de re reading according to this second reading there is a specific Sharp 
SH903i token which Alice must use to satisfy Claire. Not any token of Sharp 
SH903i will do. 
Clearly there will be situations in which these two readings of 1b will get 
different truth values. If for example, Claire just asked Alice to acquire and use a 
Sharp SH903i rather than any other model and brand without specifying a 
token, then the first reading will be true, but the second reading will be false. 
There is not any specific Sharp SH903i token which Alice must use.  
The illustrated ambiguity of 1b is explained as the result of scope 
ambiguity. The first reading results from a logical form in which the noun 
phrase a Sharp SH903i is in the narrow scope relative to the modal operator; 
whereas the second reading results from a logical form in which a Sharp SH903i 
takes the wide scope relative to the modal operator. The resulting logical forms 




1bA [S[T must] [S[NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]] 
 
1bB [S[NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]] 
The interpretations of these logical forms will be a little bit different under the 
K-framework and the C-framework, as these frameworks differ on the 
denotation-type of simple non-taxonomic common nouns like Sharp SH903i. 
The former takes such common nouns to designate kinds natively, and derives 
particular level predicative denotations via the type shift pred; whilst the latter 
assigns them predicative denotations that apply to particulars. But as a result 
under both approaches we end up with the same pair of non-equivalent truth-
conditions. 
I will first consider the interpretations of 1bA and 1bB under the K-
framework. Let’s first remember how indefinite noun phrase arguments such as 
the a Sharp SH903i  of 1bA and 1bB,  which are formed by a kind designating 
common like Sharp SH903i  were interpreted. 
Under the K-framework simple common nouns such as Sharp SH903i are 
kind designators; they are of the sorted-type <s,ek>. But indefinite noun phrase 
forming a has the following analysis: 
⟦a⟧=λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x) & P(x)), 
with P and Q variables ranging over functions of type <e,t> 
The indefinite article a is of type <s,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>. And as such it can 
semantically combine only with constituents of the predicative semantic type 
<s,<e,t>>. Thus it cannot directly semantically combine with the kind 




operator Pred to type-shift the meaning of a designator from type <s,ek> into 
type <s,<ep,t>>: 
Let  be a meaning of type <s,ek>: 
Pred()=λs’.λx.I(s’)(x,(s’)) 
So, the meaning of the indefinite noun phrase a Sharp SH903i as the semantic 
composition of a with Sharp SH903i will have the following derivation under the 
K-framework: 
λs’.[NP [D a] [N Sharp SH903i]]s’ 
{λs’.[a]s’, λs’.[ Sharp SH903i]s’} 
{ λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x) & P(x)), λs’.[ Sharp SH903i]s’}  unapplicable due to type discrepancy 
{ λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x) & P(x)), pred(λs’.[ Sharp SH903i]s’)}  Pred is triggered 
{ λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x) & P(x)), λs’.λy.I(s’)(y,[ Sharp SH903i]s’)}   
λs’.λP.x(λy.I(s’)(y,[ Sharp SH903i]s’)(x) & P(x))   
λs’.λP.x(I(s’)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s’) & P(x)) 
Now implementing this analysis of the indefinite noun phrase a Sharp SH903i , 
under the K-framework 1bA and 1bB will be interpreted in the following way, 
leading to the readings of 1biK and 1biiK. 
1bA [S[T must] [S[NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]] 
1biK, obtained from 1bA: 
λs’.[[T must] [S[NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]]s’ 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)), {λs’.λP.x(I(s’)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s’) & P(x)), λs’.λy.[A. u. ty]s’}} 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)  S(s)), λs’.x(I(s’)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s’) &  [Alice uses tx]s’)} 
λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s)  x(I(s)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s)  &  [Alice uses tx]s))  
when evaluated relative to @: 
∀s(R(@)(s)  x(I(s)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s)  &  [Alice use tx]s))  
1bB [S [NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1 [1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]]  
1biiK, obtained from 1bB: 
λs’.[S [NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1 [1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]]s’ 
{λs’.λP.x(I(s’)(x,[Sharp SH903i]s’) & P(x)), {1, {λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)), λs’.[A. u. t1]s’}}} 
{λs’.λP.x(I(s’)(x,[Sharp SH903i]s’) & P(x)), {1, {λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use t1]s)}} 




λs’.x(I(s’)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s’)& ∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
x(I(@)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]@)& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s))  
Note that the meaning determined by the logical form B will be true relative to 
@ iff there is a token of SharpSH903i at @ which Alice uses in all worlds that 
conform to Claire’s wishes at @. On the other the evaluation of the logical form 
A relative to @ does not require that there be such a token. The logical form A 
will be true relative to @ iff at all worlds w which conform to Claire’s wishes at 
@ there is a token of SharpSH903i which Alice uses at w. Relative to different 
worlds w these tokens can be different. 
The semantic interpretation of the logical forms 1bA and 1bB will be very 
similar under the C-framework; and the same truth conditions that differ in the 
same way as described in the previous paragraph will obtain. The only 
difference will be that under the C-framework the contribution of the indefinite 
noun phrase a SharpSH903i will be represented by 
λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x)&P(x)) 
in place of  
λs’.λP.x(I(s’)(x,k[e Sharp SH903i]s’) & P(x)) 
due to the fact that differently from the K-framework, under the C-framework 
the common noun SharpSH903i has particular level predicative denotations of 
type <e,t>. 
1 b [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Sharp SH903i. 




1bic , obtained from 1bA: 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)), {λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x)&P(x)), λs’.λy.[A. use ty]s’}} 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)  S(s)), λs’.x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x)&  λy.[Alice use ty]s’(x))} 
λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s)  x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s(x)&  [Alice use tx]s))  
when evaluated relative to @: 
∀s(R(@)(s)  x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s(x) &  [Alice use tx]s))  
1bB λs’.[S[NP a Sharp SH903i]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]]s’ 
1biic , obtained from 1bA: 
{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x)&P(x)), {1, {λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)), λs’.[A. u. t1]s’}}} 
{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x)&P(x)), {1, {λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use t1]s)}} 
{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x)&P(x)), λs’.λy.∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use ty]s)} 
λs’.x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x)& λy.∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use ty]s)(x)) 
λs’.x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x)& ∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]@(x)& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
I label the derived readings that resulted from the interpretations of the logical 
forms A and B of 1b respectively as 1bi and 1bii, instead of simply putting 1bA 
and 1bB. The reason for this shift is that as we will see later when we consider 
other readings of 1a and 1b, there is not a one to one correspondence between 
logical forms and pre-theoretically distinguishable readings. Some logical forms 
of these sentences will support two pre-theoretically distinguishable 
readings.121  
Now let’s consider 1a. 
1a [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Japanese mobile which is out of  
 production. 
                                                        
121 For example, eventually we will distinguish between five readings of 1a, which derive from 
three distinct logical forms. First we will see how two logical forms that can be assumed by 1a 
give rise to the three readings to be described just below. Later we will discern one more logical 




1a too has distinguishable readings which depend on the way the noun phrase a 
Japanese mobile which is out of production takes scope relative to must.  
First, 1a has a reading which will be true if and only if at all worlds w in 
which Alice satisfies Claire’s wishes Alice uses a token at w of a Japanese mobile 
model which is out of production at w. This is the de dicto reading of 1a which 
corresponds to the reading i of 1b. According to this reading there is neither an 
actual specific out of production Japanese model nor an actual specific token, 
which Alice must use to satisfy Claire. Claire is satisfied in a world w, provided 
only that Alice uses at w a token at w of a Japanese model out of production at 
w.  
Second, 1a has a reading which will be true if and only if there is an actual 
token of an actually out of production Japanese model such that at all worlds w 
in which Claire’s wishes are satisfied Alice uses that token of that model. This is 
the de re reading of 1a which corresponds to the reading ii of 1b. According to 
this reading there is a specific actual token of a specific actually out of 
production Japanese model which Alice must use to satisfy Claire. 
Now, in the case of 1a a further de re reading can be distinguished from 
the previous two readings. According to this reading 1a is true if and only there 
is a Japanese mobile actually out of production such that at all worlds w in 
which Claire’s wishes are satisfied Alice uses a token at w of that model. This is a 
de re reading which does not have a parallel in the case of 1b. This is so because 
unlike a Sharp SH903i, a Japanese actually out of production can also be 
interpreted as a taxonomic indefinite singular, the denotations of which apply to 




a specific Japanese model actually out of production such that Alice must use its 
tokens to satisfy Claire; but differently from the second reading of 1a  described 
above, there is not a specific actual token of that model which Alice must use. 
There are different worlds w, w’ in which Claire is satisfied although Alice uses 
different tokens of that model at w and at w’. 
The first two readings of 1a can get different truth-values. If Claire asks 
Alice just to acquire and use a token of an out of production Japanese model 
without specifying a model or a token, then the first reading will be true but the 
second reading will be false. There will not be any specific actual token which 
Alice must use to satisfy Claire.  
Again under the same scenario that Claire asks Alice just to acquire and 
use a token of an out of production Japanese model without specifying a model 
or a token, the first reading will be true but the third reading will be false. As 
there will not be any specific actually out of production model such that Alice 
must use its tokens to satisfy Claire.  
The second and the third readings of 1a too can get different truth values. 
If for example Claire specifically asks Alice to use a token of Sharp SH903i, 
which is Japanese and actually out of production, but without specifying any 
specific token of that model then the third reading will be true but the second 
reading will be false. As there will not be any specific actual token which Alice 
must use to satisfy Claire. 
These three non-equivalent readings of 1a too depend on the existence of 




mobile which is out of production takes narrow or wide scope relative to must. 
These logical forms are the following: 
1 a [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Japanese mobile which is out of   
  production. 
  
1aA [S[T must] [S[NP a J. mobile which is out of production]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]] 
 
1aB [S[NP a Japanese mobile which is out of production]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]] 
In the case of 1a however this scope ambiguity gives way to three, rather than 
two non-equivalent readings. This can be explained in the following way. The 
exclusively kind-level relative clause which is out of production forces a 
taxonomic interpretation for the common noun Japanese mobile which is out of 
production. As we have seen in the previous chapter regardless we adopt the C-
framework or the K-framework taxonomic common nouns are assigned 
predicative denotations that apply to kinds. Thus the indefinite noun phrase a 
Japanese mobile which is out of production is formed by a taxonomic common 
noun. So long as this indefinite singular phrase is used in kind level sentential 
contexts, it will be interpreted as a taxonomic indefinite phrase. For example as 
in, 
The product manager plans to relaunch a Japanese mobile which is out of production 
But in 1aA and 1aB it semantically composes with constituents that are 
originally particular level due their being formed around the particular level 
verb use:  
[1 [S Alice uses t1]]  




To get a sensible interpretation this discrepancy should somehow be resolved. 
The theoretical machinery of both the K-framework and the C-framework 
regarding the taxonomic common nouns is the same and it allows two ways of 
resolving such discrepancies. One by lowering the meaning of [N a Japanese 
mobile which is out of production] from kind level into particular level and the 
other by raising the meanings [1 [S Alice uses t1]] and [1 [[T must][S Alice uses 
t1]]] into kind level. 
The first way will be the interpretation of a Japanese mobile which is out 
of production as a particular level indefinite phrase. In the previous chapter we 
have assumed that taxonomic appliers always have the option to be interpreted 
as particular level appliers through the application of detax to their meaning. If 
the meaning of the taxonomic common noun Japanese mobile which is out of 
production undergoes detax, it will yield a particular level predicative meaning 
which applies to the tokens of the kinds it originally denotes.  Then a Japanese 
mobile which is out of production will be a particular level indefinite and its 
meaning can sensibly compose with the meanings of [1 [S Alice uses t1]] and [1 
[[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]. 
 The other way to set things straight will be to keep the indefinite phrase 
[a Japanese mobile which is out of production] kind level but highering up the 
meanings of [1 [S Alice uses t1]] and [1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]] into kind level. 
This will be accomplished by interpreting the trace t1 as kind level and applying 




As indicated in the first scenario under both the C-framework and the K-
framework the operator detax, already introduced and motivated in the 
previous chapter, will be involved.  
let  be a kind level meaning of type <s,e>: 
detax()=λs’.λx.z((s’)(z) & I(s’)(x,z)) 
And via the application of detax to the meaning of the taxonomic common noun 
the indefinite a Japanese mobile which is out of production will be interpreted 
as a particular level phrase in the following way: 
 ⟦[[D a] [N Japanese mobile which is out of production]]⟧ 
{λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)),detax(λs’.k[<e,t>J. mobile which is out of production]s’)} 
{λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)),λs’.λy.z(k[<e,t>J. m. which is out of p.]s’(z)&I(s’)(y,z))} 
λs’.λP.x(z([Japanese mobile which is out of production]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z)) & P(x)) 
In the second scenario [1 [S Alice uses t1]] and [1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]] will 
receive kind level interpretations through the interpretation of [S Alice uses t1] 
in in such a way that the trace t1 is interpreted as a kind designator and the 
meaning of use is DKP’ed.: 
Let  be a meaning of type <s,<ep,a>>, where a can be any of the types t, <e,t>, 
<e,<e,t>>, <e,<e,<e,t>>> … 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)), if a=t 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.λx.y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)(x)), if a=<e,t> 
DKP()=λs’.λzk.λx’.λx’’y(I(s’)(y)(zk) & (s’)(y)(x’)(x’’)), if a=<e,<e,t>> 
…  
⟦[S Alice uses t1]⟧ 
⟦[[Alice][[uses][t1]]⟧ 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.[uses]s, λs.k[e t1]s,g}} sortal discrepancy 
{λs.[Alice]s, {DKP(λs.[uses]s), λs.k[e t1]s,g}} 
{λs.[Alice]s, {λs.λx.λzk.∃y(I(s)(y,zk) & [uses]s(y)(x)), λs.k[e t1]s,g}} 
{λs.[Alice]s, λs.λx.∃y(I(s)(y,[t1]s,g) & [uses]s(y)(x))} 




When in 1a a Japanese mobile which is out of production takes narrow scope 
relative to must  (1aA) the described two ways of resolving the sortal 
discrepancy gives exactly the same truth conditions, and thus no non-equivalent 
pair of de dicto readings results. 
1aA  [S[T must] [S[NP[D a] [N J. mobile which is out of production]]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]] 
1ai, obtained from 1aA by interpreting [NP a Japanese mobile which is out of 
production] as a particular level phrase through the application of Detax to [NJapanese 
mobile which is out of production]: 
⟦[must] [[[ a][Japanese mobile which is out of production]]1 [1 [S Alice uses t1]]]⟧ 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{{λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)),detax(λs’.k[<e,t>J.])},λs’.λy.[A.u.ty]s’}} 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{{λs’.λQ.λP.x(Q(x)&P(x)),λs’.λx.z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z))}, λs’.λy.[A.u. ty]s’}} 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.x(z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z)) & P(x)),λs’.λy.[A.u. ty]s’}} 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)), λs’.x(z(k[<e,t>Japanese …]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s’)} 
λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(z(k[<e,t>Japanese …]s(z)&I(s)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
∀s(R(@)(s) x(z(k[<e,t>Japanese …]s(z)&I(s)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
∀s(R(@)(s) xz((k[<e,t>Japanese …]s(z)&I(s)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
  
1ai, obtained from 1aA by interpreting both [NP a Japanese mobile which is out of 
production] and  [1 [S Alice uses t1]] as  kind level constituents treating t1 as kind level 
and using DKP:   
⟦[T must] [S[NP a Japanese mobile which is out of production]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]⟧ 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&P(z)),{1,λs’.∃y(I(s’)(y,[t1]s’,g)&[u.]s’(y)( [A.]s’))}}} 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&P(z)),λs.λx.y(I(s’)(y,x)&[u.]s(y)([A.]s))}} 
{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),λs’.z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z) & y(I(s’)(y, z) & [uses]s’(y)([Alice]s’)))} 
λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) z(k[<e,t> Japanese...]s(z) & y(I(s)(y, z) & [uses]s(y)([Alice]s)))) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
∀s(R(@)(s) z(k[<e,t> Japanese…]s(z) & y(I(s)(y, z) & [uses]s(y)([Alice]s)))) 
∀s(R(@)(s) y z((k[<e,t> Japanese…]s(z) & I(s)(y, z)) & [uses]s(y)([Alice]s))) 
With innocuous rearrangements in the end formulas it can be seen that both of 
these ways of interpreting 1aA yields the same truth-conditions. The 
determined truth conditions can be expressed as, 
truth at @ iff all worlds w in which the wishes Claire has at @ are realized are such that 
there is an instance at w of a Japanese mobile model out of production at w which Alice 




These truth conditions are exactly the truth conditions corresponding to the 
reading we have above singled out as the de dicto reading or the first reading of 
1a (heretofore we will label it as 1ai). 
Now let’s consider the interpretation of the logical form 1aB, the one in 
which a Japanese mobile which is out of production takes wide scope relative to 
must: 
1aB [S[NP a Japanese mobile which is out of production]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]] 
In this case, the two ways of resolving the discrepancy between  [NP a Japanese 
mobile which is out of production] and [1[[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]] will give 
rise to different truth-conditions. Whence will be explained the non-equivalent 
second and third readings of 1a, both of which are de re. I first consider the 
interpretation of 1aB in which a Japanese mobile which is out of production is 
interpreted as a particular level indefinite phrase with Japanese mobile which is 
out of production’s meaning undergoing detax: 
1aB [S[NP a Japanese mobile which is out of production]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]]
  
1aii, obtained from 1aB by interpreting [NP a Japanese mobile which is out of 
production] as a particular level phrase through the application of Detax to [NJapanese 
mobile which is out of production]: 
⟦[NP [Da] [NJapanese mobile which is out of production]]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]⟧ 
{{λs’.λQ.λP.x((Q(x)&P(x)),detax(λs’.k[<e,t>J.]s’)},{1,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),λs’.[A.u. t1]s’}}} 
{{λs’.λQ.λP.x((Q(x)&P(x)),λs’.λx.z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z))},{1,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),λs’.[A. u. t1]s’}}} 
{λs’.λP.x(z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z))&P(x)),{1,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),λs’.[A.u. t1]s’}}} 
{λs’.λP.x(z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z)) & P(x)), {1, {λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use t1]s)}} 
{λs’.λP.x(z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z)) & P(x)), λs’.λy.∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use ty]s)} 
λs’.x(z(k[<e,t>Japanese …]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z)) & ∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
x(z(k[<e,t>Japanese …]@(z)&I(@)(x,z)) & ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
xz((k[<e,t>Japanese …]@(z)&I(@)(x,z)) & ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 




truth relative to @ iff there is an instance x at @ of a Japanese mobile model z out of 
production at @ such that for all worlds w in which the wishes Claire has at @ is 
realized Alice uses x at w 
These truth-conditions are the same as those associated with the previously 
described second reading of 1a. 
Now I consider the interpretation of 1aB in which [NP a Japanese mobile 
which is out of production]1 is interpreted as kind level and t1 is treated as a 
kind level trace: 
1aB [S[NP a J. mobile which is out of production]1[1 [[T must] [[Alice][[uses][t1]]]]]] 
1aiii, derived from 1aB by interpreting [NP a Japanese mobile which is out of 
production]1 as kind level and treating the trace t1 as a kind designator: 





{λs’.λP.z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&P(z)), λs’.λx.∀s(R(s’)(s) ∃y(I(s)(y,x) & [uses]s(y)( [Alice]s)))} 
λs’.z(k[<e,t>Jap…]s’(z)& ∀s(R(s’)(s) ∃y(I(s)(y,z) & [uses]s(y)([Alice]s)))) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
z(k[<e,t> Japanese…]@(z)& ∀s(R(@)(s) ∃y(I(s)(y,z) & [uses]s(y)([Alice]s)))) 
The truth-conditions 1aiii derived above through the interpretation of 1aB 
where   [1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]] is interpreted as a kind level constituent 
can be expressed in the following way: 
truth relative to @ iff there is a Japanese mobile model z out of production at @ such 
that for all worlds w in which the wishes Claire has at @ is realized there is a token y of 
z at w and Alice uses y at w 
These truth-conditions (1aiii) are the same as those associated with the third 
reading of 1a, previously described. And they are different from the truth 
conditions 1aii that resulted from the previous interpretation 1aB where the 




mobile which is out of production as a particular level indefinite phrase. To 
compare these two truth conditions I reproduce the formulas that represent 
their evaluation relative to @ together below: 
1aB [S[NP a Japanese mobile which is out of production]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]] 
   
1aii xz((k[<e,t>Japanese …]@(z)&I(@)(x,z)) & ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
 
1aiii z(k[<e,t> Japanese…]@(z) & ∀s(R(@)(s) ∃y(I(s)(y,z) & [uses]s(y)([Alice]s)))) 
1aii is true if and only if there is an actual token of an actually out of production 
Japanese mobile such that Alice uses that in all worlds that satisfy Claire’s 
wishes. 1aii is responsible for the previously described second reading of 1a. 
1aiii on the other hand is true if and only if there actually is an out of production 
Japanese mobile model such that in all worlds that satisfy Claire’s wishes Alice 
uses a token of that model. According to 1aiii, differently from 1aii, there need 
not be a specific actual token which Alice must use. 1aiii, is responsible for the 
previously described third reading of 1a. 
Implications of the Preceding Discussion on the Rigidity of Common 
Nouns 
Remember that we wanted to compare the sets of readings that result for 1a 
and 1b when the common nouns Japanese mobile which is out of production 
and Sharp SH903i involved in them take wide scope or narrow scope relative to 
must. We wanted to see whether there is any dissimilarity in these sets, for 
example a reading among the readings of 1a which does not have any 




non-rigidity of Japanese mobile which is out of production and the rigidity of 
Sharp SH903i. To this end we have considered the readings of 1a and 1b that 
result when the indefinite noun phrases a Japanese mobile which is out of 
production and a Sharp SH903i take wide scope or narrow scope relative to 
must. These indefinite phrases are formed by the common nouns Japanese 
mobile which is out of production and Sharp SH903i, and thus when they take 
narrow scope or wide scope relative to must these common nouns that form 
them as well take wide scope or narrow scope relative to must . We have seen 
that each of 1a and 1b have non-equivalent readings that result from the 
different ways a Japanese mobile which is out of production and a Sharp SH903i 
respectively takes scope relative to must. As a matter of fact we have discerned 
a dissimilarity between the readings of 1a and 1b. 1a had two non-equivalent 
readings in which the indefinite noun phrase a Japanese mobile which is out of 
production took wide scope, instead of one such reading in the case of 1b. But 
this difference was explainable by reference to the different available ways of 
resolving the sortal discrepancy that obtains between the kind level denotation 
of a Japanese mobile which is out of production and the particular level 
sentential context in which its trace t1 occured. Apart from this difference there 
was no difference significant for us between the readings of 1a and 1b so far 
considered. Both indefinite noun phrases’ taking wide scope or narrow scope 
relative to must produced non-equivalent readings. Thus, the comparison of 
these readings of 1a and 1b does not give us a reason to assume that one of 
Japanese mobile which is out of production and Sharp SH903i  is rigid and the 




Prima facie, the non-equivalent readings resulting from the different ways 
the noun phrases a Japanese mobile which is out of production and a Sharp 
SH903i take scope may nonetheless be taken to indicate that the common nouns 
forming these noun phrases should be non-rigid. However this is not the case. 
Even if we assume for example that Sharp SH903i is rigid, the reading of 1b 
when a Sharp SH903i takes wide scope will not be equivalent to its reading 
when it takes narrow scope. And this  is so regardless whether we interpret 
Sharp SH903i according to the K-framework or the C-framework. To see this, 
let’s first fix under the K-framework the denotation of Sharp SH903i to be the 
kind k for all possible worlds. Then the previously given interpretations of 1b 
corresponding to logical forms in which a Sharp SH903i takes wide scope and 
narrow scope will be thus: 
1 b [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Sharp SH903i. 
 
1bA [[T must] [S[NP a Sharp SH903i]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]] 
1biK λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s)  x(I(s)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s)  &  [Alice uses tx]s))  
  when evaluated relative to @: 
  ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(I(s)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s)  &  [Alice use tx]s)) 
  when evaluated relative to @ with k as the designatum of ‘Sharp SH903i’ for all 
  possible worlds: 
  ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(I(s)(x,k)  &  [Alice use tx]s))  
 
1bB [S[NP a Sharp SH903i]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]] 
1biiK λs’.x(I(s’)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s’)& ∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
  when evaluated relative to @: 
  x(I(@)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]@)& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
  when evaluated relative to @ with k as the designatum of ‘Sharp SH903i’ for all 
  possible worlds: 
  x(I(@)(x,k)& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s))    
Note that when the meanings 1biK and 1biiK are evaluated relative to @ and 





1biK ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(I(s)(x,k)  &  [Alice use tx]s)) 
1biiK x(I(@)(x,k)& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
1biK will be true if and only if for all w in which Claire’s wishes at @ are realized 
there is a token x of k at w which Alice uses at w. Note that the x’s which Alice 
uses in the worlds w in which Claire is satisfied may be different. On the other 
hand 1biiK will be true if and only if there is token x of k at @ such that for all 
worlds w in which Claire is satisfied Alice uses x at w. Note that for the truth of 
1b under the interpretation 1biiK, in all the worlds w in which Claire is satisfied 
Alice must use the very same x. 
Now, let’s consider whether 1b will still have the non-equivalent readings 
1biC and 1biiC if we assume, per impossible, that Sharp SH903i is a rigid applier 
under the C-framework.  Let’s fix Q, a function of type <e,t>,  to be denotation of 
Sharp SH903i for all possible worlds. 
1 b [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Sharp SH903i. 
   
1bA [[T must] [S[NP a Sharp SH903i]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]] 
1biC λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s)  x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s(x)&  [Alice use tx]s))  
  when evaluated relative to @: 
  ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s(x) &  [Alice use tx]s))  
  when evaluated relative to @ with Q as the denotation of ‘Sharp SH903i’ for all 
  possible worlds: 
  ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(Q(x) &  [Alice use tx]s))  
 
  
1bB [S[NP a Sharp SH903i]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]] 
1biiC λs’.x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x)& ∀s(R(s’)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
  when evaluated relative to @: 
  x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]@(x)& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
  when evaluated relative to @ with Q as the denotation of ‘Sharp SH903i’ for all 
  possible worlds: 
  x(Q(x)& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
Again when 1biC and 1biiC are evaluated relative to @ and with Sharp SH903i 




1biC ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(Q(x) &  [Alice use tx]s)) 
1biiC x(Q(x)& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
1biC is true if and only if for all worlds w in which Claire’s wishes at @ are 
realized there is a member x of extQ which Alice uses at w.  Note that this 
interpretation will be true even if in different worlds w in which Claire is 
satisfied Alice uses different x’s. 
1biiC is true if and only if there is a member x of ExtQ such that in all 
worlds w in which Claire’s wishes at @ are realized Alice uses x at w. Note that 
this interpretation will be true only if in all worlds w in which Claire is satisfied 
Alice uses the same x in w. 
So the rigidity or the non-rigidity of Sharp SH903i of 1b does not make any 
difference with regard to the non equivalence of the readings that result from 
the logical forms 1bA and 1bB; and this is so regardless whether Sharp SH903i 
is interpreted as an applier (Neo-Carlsonian) or kind designator (Krifka). 
Clearly the same will hold also for the readings that spawn from 1aA and 1aB 
and Japanese mobile which is out of production. When the indefinite noun 
phrases a Japanese mobile which is out of production and a Sharp SH903i take 
wide scope they yield readings which are not equivalent to the readings that 
result when they take narrow scope regardless the rigidity or the non-rigidity of 
the common nouns Japanese mobile which is out of production and Sharp 
SH903i that form them.  
Thus, from a consideration of the readings of 1a and 1b which result from 
the indefinite phrases a Japanese mobile which is out of production and a Sharp 




the common nouns Japanese mobile which is out of production and Sharp 
SH903i to be rigid or non-rigid. This is so because in the logical forms of 1a and 
1b which we have taken into account so far Japanese mobile which is out of 
production and Sharp SH903i  takes wide scope or narrow scope together with 
the indefinite noun phrases they form. The non-equivalent readings that result 
from both 1aA and 1ab, and 1bA and 1bB are due to the different ways the 
existential operators involved in the interpretation of indefinite phrase 
arguments interact with must when the indefinite phrases take narrow scope or 
wide scope. And we have seen that the rigidity or non-rigidity of the common 
nouns that form the indefinite phrases has no effect on that interaction. 
To get an evidence about the rigidity or non-rigidity of the common nouns 
themselves through a comparison of the readings of 1a and 1b we should rather 
look for and compare the readings that result from logical forms in which the 
common nouns themselves take wide scope independently of the indefinite 
noun phrases which they form. That is, we should compare the readings that 
result from the interpretations of such logical forms as the following:  
1 a [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Japanese mobile which is out of   
  production. 
  
1aA [[T must] [S[NP a Japanese mobile which is out of production]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]] 
1aC [S[J. m. which is out of production]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
 
1 b [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Sharp SH903i. 
 
1bA [[T must] [S[NP a Sharp SH903i]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]] 
1bC [S[Sharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
Yet the question is, are there such logical forms and readings corresponding to 




themselves. And scope taking (movement) is commonly thought to be a 
capability of arguments alone. If this is indeed the case then 1a and 1b cannot 
assume the indicated logical forms in which a common noun takes wide scope 
independently of the noun phrase which it forms. And thus we cannot have a 
chance to construe an evidence about the rigidity or non-rigidity of common 
nouns on the basis of a comparison of the different readings of modal sentences 
in which they figure. In the next section I will relate the evidence that modal 
sentences involving indefinite singular arguments indeed have readings which 
can be thought to result from logical forms in which the common nouns that 
form indefinite singular phrases take wide scope over the modal operator 
independently of the indefinite noun phrases that they form. 
The Third Reading: Non-specific de re 
There is plausible evidence that there are readings of modal sentences involving 
indefinite noun phrase arguments which can explained by logical forms in 
which the common nouns forming these indefinite noun phrases take wide 
scope over the modal operator independently of the noun phrases that they 
form. 
In this vein Heim and Fintel (2011) cites and discuss examples similar to 
the one below:122 
                                                        
122 This sentence is combined from the different parts of two sentences which Heim and Fintel 
(2011) actually discuss in this vein (“A Problem: Additional Readings and Scope Paradoxes”). 
Namely, Mary wants to buy a hat just like mine and Mary hopes that a friend of mine will win the 
race . I could but I did not discuss these examples. Because hat just like mine can  be 




2 Mary wants to marry a friend of mine. 
This sentence has three non-equivalent readings. First it can be used to state 
that what Mary wants is to marry a friend of mine, whoever my friends may be. 
This is the de dicto reading. According to this reading, if I had friends other than 
the ones I actually have, Mary would be satisfied only if she married one of these 
hypothetical friends rather than the ones I actually have. Second, 2 can be used 
to state that there actually is a specific friend of mine such that Mary wants to 
marry him. This is the familiar de re reading. According to this second reading, 
there is an actual friend of mine such that even if I had friends completely 
different than the ones I actually have, Mary would be satisfied only if she 
married that actual friend of mine.  
In addition to these familiar de re and de dicto readings, one can discern a 
third reading of 2. It seems that 2 can also be used to state that what Mary wants 
is to marry one or another of my actual friends. According to this third reading 
there is not a specific actual friend of mine such that she would be satisfied only 
if she married him. Still, if my friends were completely different than the ones I 
actually have, Mary would still be satisfied only if she married one or another of 
my actual friends, rather than any of my hypothetical friends. This third reading 
is called non-specific de re reading. The reading is about my actual friends but it 
is not about any specific ones among them. 
Assuming modal quantification analysis of want we can state the truth 
conditions of these readings in the following way. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the second example by Heim & Fintel, it involves the verb hope and I did not want to get 




The de dicto reading is true relative to @ if and only if for all worlds w in which what 
Mary’s desires at @ is realized Mary marries in w a person x who is a friend of mine at 
w.  
 
The ordinary de re reading is true relative to @ if and only if there is a friend of mine x 
at @ such that for all worlds w in which Mary’s desires at @ is realized Mary marries x  
at w.  
 
The non-specific de re reading is true relative to @ if and only if for all worlds w at 
which Mary’s desires are satisfied she marries at w one or another of my friends 
relative to @.  
The existence of these non-equivalent readings of 2 can be ascertained by 
considering scenarios in which they will get different truth values. Suppose that 
Mary actually wants to marry the guy who actually is at the door with a glass of 
martini at his hand, and that that guy actually happens to be a friend of mine. 
Then, the second reading will be true, because there is an actual friend of mine x 
such that at all worlds w in which Mary is satisified she is married with x. 
However then the first reading will be false because there surely will be worlds 
w’ such that Mary is satisfied in w’ as she is married with x at w’, but x is not a 
friend of mine at w’.  
Now to distinguish between the second and third readings, and the first 
and the third readings of 2 consider the following scenario. Suppose Mary wants 
to marry one of the people who are actually in the next room, just anyone would 
do, and all of these people actually happen to be my friends. Then the third 
reading is true. At all worlds w in which Mary is satisified, she is married to one 
or another of my actual friends. But then the second reading is false: there 
surely are two worlds w’ and w’’ such that Mary is satisfied in both of w’ and w’’, 
and she is married to different actual friends of mine at w’ and w’’; so it is not 




which Mary is satisfied she is married with x. The first reading will also be false: 
surely there is a world w’such that Mary is satisfied at w’ and she is married at 
w’ with x, one of my actual friends who actually happens to be in the next room, 
but x is not a friend of mine at w’; so it is not the case that at all worlds w in 
which Mary is satisified Mary is married with a person who is my friend at w. 
There is nothing novel for us in accounting for the first and the second 
readings of 2. These respectively happen to be the readings that result from the 
narrow scope interpretation of a friend of mine and wide scope interpretation 
of a friend of mine relative to the modal want.123 
2A [S [Marry]2 [[want] [S[NP a friend of mine]1[1 [S PRO2 [ marry t1]]]]]] 
2i, derived from 2A: 
⟦[S [Marry]2 [[T want] [S[NP a friend of mine]1[1 [S PRO2 [ marry t1]]]]]]⟧ 
{λs’.[M.]s’,{λs’.λS.λz.∀s(D(z)(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>f]s’(x)&P(x)),λs’.λy.[M.m.ty]s’}}} 
{λs’.[M.]s’,{λs’.λS.λz.∀s(D(z)(s’)(s)S(s)),  λs’. x(p[<e,t>f…]s’(x)&  λy.[ M. marry ty]s’(x))}} 
{λs’.[Mary]s’,  λs’.λz.∀s(D(z)(s’)(s) x(p[<e,t>friend …]s (x)&  [ Mary marry tx]s)} 
 λs’.∀s(D([Mary]s’)(s’)(s) x(p[<e,t>friend …]s (x) &  [ Mary marry tx]s) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
∀s(D([Mary]@)(@)(s) x(p[<e,t>friend …]s (x) &  [ Mary marry tx]s)  
2B [S[NP a friend of mine]1 [1 [S [Marry]2 [[ want] [S PRO2 [ marry t1]]]]]]  
2ii, derived from 2B: 
λs’. [S[NP a friend of mine]1 [1 [S [Marry]2 [[ want] [S PRO2 [ marry t1]]]]]] 
{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>f.]s’(x)&P(x))’,{1,{λs’.[M.]s,{λs’.λS.λz.∀s(D(z)(s’)(s)S(s)),λs’.[M.m.t1]s’}}}} 
{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>f.]s’(x)&P(x))’,{1,{λs’.[M.]s, λs’.λz.∀s(D(z)(s’)(s) [Mary marry t1]s)}}} 
{ λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>f.]s’(x)&P(x))’,  {1,  λs’.∀s(D([Mary]s)(s’)(s) [Mary marry t1]s)}} 
{ λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>friend …]s’(x)&P(x))’,   λs’.λy.∀s(D([Mary]s)(s’)(s) [Mary marry ty]s)} 
                                                        
123 The purpose of the semantic analysis of 2 is to show that there may after all be logical forms 
in which common nouns like friend of mine takes the wide scope independently of its indefinite 
noun phrase casing. Whether common nouns are primarily kind designators or not is not 
relevant for the time being. For this reason in the analysis of 2 we simply assume that friend of 
mine is an applier. Later, in the next section when we return to the analysis of 1a and 1b, we will 





 λs’.x(p[<e,t>friend …]s’(x)& λy.∀s(D([Mary]s)(s’)(s) [Mary marry ty]s)(x)) 
 λs’.x(p[<e,t>friend …]s’(x)& ∀s(D([Mary]s)(s’)(s) [Mary marry tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
 x(p[<e,t>friend …]@(x)& ∀s(D([Mary]@)(@)(s) [Mary marry tx]s)) 
As for the third reading of 2, the non-specific de re reading, Heim and Fintel 
(2011) suggests that it can be derived if we allow the common noun friend of 
mine to be interpreted in the wide scope relative to want, whilst the indefinite 
singular it forms is interpreted in the narrow scope relative to want. Thus, they 
suggest that the desired reading can be derived if 2 can assume a third logical 
form like the following:124  
2C [[friend of mine]3 [3 [S [Mary]2 [[want] [S[NP a t3 ]1[1 [S PRO2 [ marry t1]]]]]]]]  
2iii, derived from 2C: 
⟦[[friend of mine]3 [3 [S [Mary]2 [[want] [S[NP a t3 ]1[1 [S PRO2 [ marry t1]]]]]]]]⟧ 
{λs’.[f.]s’,{3,{λs’.[M.]s’,{λs’.λS.λz.∀s(D(z)(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>t3]s’(x)&P(x)),λs’.λy.[M.m.ty]s’}}}}} 
{λs’.[f.]s’,{3,{λs’.[M.]s’,{λs’.λS.λz.∀s(D(z)(s’)(s)S(s)),λs’.x(p[<e,t>t3]s’(x)&[M.m.tx]s’)}}}} 
{λs’.[f.]s’, {3, {λs’.[Mary]s’,  λs’.λz.∀s(D(z)(s’)(s) x(p[<e,t>t3]s(x) & [ Mary marry tx]s)}}} 
{λs’.[friend …]s’, {3, λs’.∀s(D([Mary]s’)(s’)(s) x(p[<e,t>t3]s(x) &  [ Mary marry tx]s)}} 
{λs’.[friend …]s’,  λs’.λQ.∀s(D([Mary]s’)(s’)(s) x(Q(x) &  [ Mary marry tx]s)} 
 λs’.∀s(D([Mary]s’)(s’)(s) x([friend …]s’(x) &  [ Mary marry tx]s) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
 ∀s(D([Mary]@)(@)(s) x([friend …]@(x) &  [ Mary marry tx]s) 
                                                        
124 Heim and Fintel (2011) presents also the standard account for the so called non-specific de 
re reading. According to this standard account common nouns do not move to the wide scope 
position whilst the noun phrases they form are interpreted in the narrow scope, but they are 
interpreted in situ by an evaluation index which is different than that of the noun phrase which 
they form, whilst the evaluation index of the noun phrase is bound by want. For our purposes, 
which is to construe an argument for a rigid/non-rigid division among common nouns, these 
different options to derive the non-specific de re reading do not present a difference. In both 
type of account the effect of the rigidity/non-rigidity of the common nouns to the readings of 




Note that, provided that the common noun friend of mine is not a rigid applier, 
2iii can yield a reading which is not equivalent to the de dicto reading 2i.125   
Heim and Fintel (2011) gives a number of examples of modal sentences 
which have a non-specific de re reading besides the familiar de dicto and de re 
readings. And it is clear that one can produce many other such examples. In all 
these cases the non-specific de re reading can be derived if one allows for logical 
forms in which a common noun takes the wide scope relative to the modal 
predicate whilst the noun phrase which it forms in the surface form is 
interpreted in the narrow scope. To this account we should critically add that 
this explanation works if one assumes that the common nouns involved are not 
rigid appliers. 
                                                        
125 Heim and Fintel do not explicitly reckon that both the scope based explanation of non-
specific de re readings proposed by Heim and Fintel and the standard world-variable account 
they discuss will work only if the common nouns involved are assumed to be non-rigid appliers. 
They probably do not mention this requirement because they generally assign particular level 
predicative denotations to common nouns and such denotations are usually not constant across 
evaluation indexes. However, as we here are specifically interested in the rigidity or non-rigidity 
of common nouns, it is important for us to reveal this implicit assumption. Furthermore, we 
here do not take for granted that all common nouns have predicative denotations (the K-
framework, which we here follow alongside the C-framework, assign kind designation to simple 
common nouns); and as we will see below, kind designating common nouns should rather be 
assumed to be rigid, since modal sentences involving such terms do not have a non-specific de 




Readings in which Common Nouns Are Interpreted in the Wide Scope 
Independently of the Noun phrases They Form 
Non-specific de re Readings of 1a 
Now let’s go back to the sentences in 1 to see that these too have non-specific de 
re readings in addition to the de dicto and de re readings which we have 
previously considered. Let’s first consider 1a: 
1 a [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Japanese mobile which is out of   
  production. 
Previously we have singled out three non-equivalent readings of 1a. We 
explained the existence of these readings in the following way. The first one was 
the de dicto reading which resulted from the interpretation of the logical form 
1aA where the indefinite singular noun phrase a Japanese mobile which is out of 
production was in the narrow scope relative to must (1ai). The second and third 
readings were de re readings which resulted from the logical form 1aB where 
the indefinite singular a Japanese mobile which is out of production was in the 
wide scope relative to must. We explained that 1aB gave rise to two distinct 
readings because the sortal discrepancy that obtained between the originally 
kind level indefinite singular a Japanese mobile which is out of production and 
the particular level sentential constituent with which it would semantically 
compose could be resolved in two different ways which lead to two non-
equivalent interpretations. 1aA did not result in two distinct readings although 
the same discrepancy obtained there as well, because the two different ways of 




1aA. I reproduce below the formulas that represent evaluation of these readings 
relative to @ and the logical forms from which they were derived. 
1aA [S[T must] [S[NP a J. mobile which is out of production]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]] 
1ai  ∀s(R(@)(s) xz((k[<e,t> Japanese…]s(z) & I(s)(x, z)) & [uses]s(x)([Alice]s))) 
 
1aB [S[NP a Japanese mobile which is out of production]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]] 
1aii xz((k[<e,t>Japanese …]@(z)&I(@)(x,z)) & ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
1aiii z(k[<e,t> Japanese…]@(z)& ∀s(R(@)(s) ∃x(I(s)(x,z) & [uses]s(x)([Alice]s))))  
Now, in addition to these three readings, it seems that 1a has at least further 
two readings. Fourth, counting on from the previously considered three 
readings, 1a can be used to say that to satisfy Claire Alice must use one or 
another of the actual tokens of one or another of Japanese mobile models which 
are actually out of production. Adopting as before the universal modal 
quantification analysis of must, the truth conditions for this reading can be 
stated thus:  
Fourth reading of 1a: 
true relative to @ if and only if the tokens X at @ of Japanese mobile models K out of 
production at @ are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s wishes at @ are 
satisfied Alice uses one of X at w.  
Note that according to this reading there need neither be a specific actual token 
nor a specific model of actually out of production Japanese mobiles which Alice 
must use. Still, again according to this reading, Alice must use one or another of 
actual tokens of one or another of actually out of production Japanese models. 
To distinguish this fourth reading of 1a from the previously considered 
three readings consider the following scenario. Suppose Claire has actually 
asked Alice to use one or another of the mobiles actually kept in a certain 




production Japanese models. Then the fourth reading we have just considered 
will be true. The actual tokens of actually out of production Japanese mobile 
models are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s actual desires are 
satisfied Alice uses one of those tokens at w. However under this scenario 1ai, 
the de dicto reading, will be false. 
1ai  ∀s(R(@)(s)  xy((k[<e,t> Japanese…]s(y) & I(s)(x,y)) &  [Alice use tx]s)) 
Because, relative to our scenario there surely will be worlds w’ such that, 
Claire’s actual desires are satisfied at w’, as at w’ Alice uses only x one of the mobiles 
which are actually in the said drawer. Thus, x was an actual token of an actually out of 
production Japanese model y. But y is not out of production at w’. 
But then, contrary to what is asserted by 1ai, there is a world w’ in which 
Claire’s actual desires are satisfied, yet Alice is not using at w’ a token at w’ of a 
Japanese model which is out of production at w’.  
Again under the same scenario the 1aii, the de re reading in which a Japanese 
mobile which is out of production was interpreted in the wide scope as a 
particular level phrase, will be false.  
1aii xy ((k[<e,t> Japanese…]@(y) & I(@)(x,y))& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
Because relative to our scenario there surely are two worlds w’ and w’’ such 
that, 
Claire’s actual desires are satisfied both at w’ and w’’, as Alice uses only x in w’, Alice 
uses only y in w’’, x≠y, and both x and y are actually in the said drawer. Thus x and y 
are actual tokens of actually out of production Japanese mobile models. 
But then, contrary to what is asserted by 1aii,  it is not the case that there is an 
actual token z of an actually out of production Japanese mobile model such that 




Finally, under our scenario 1aiii too, the de re reading of 1a in which a 
Japanese mobile which is out of production was interpreted in the wide scope as 
a kind level phrase, will be false. 
1aiii z(k[<e,t> Japanese…]@(z)& ∀s(R(@)(s) ∃x(I(s)(x,z) & [uses]s(x)([Alice]s))))  
Because relative to our scenario there surely are two worlds w’ and w’’ such 
that, 
Claire’s actual desires are satisfied both at w’ and w’’, as Alice uses only x in w’, Alice 
uses only y in w’’, x is actually of model k, y is actually of model l,  x≠y, k≠l, and both x 
and y  are actually in the said drawer. Thus, x and y are actual tokens of two actually 
out of production Japanese mobile models k and l. 
But then, contrary to what is asserted by 1aiii, it is not the case that there is an 
actually out of production Japanese mobile model m such that for all worlds w 
in which Claire’s actual desires are satisfied Alice uses a token of m. 
In addition to the previously considered three readings (1ai, 1aii, 1aiii) 
and to the fourth reading just considered, 1a can also be used in a fifth way. It 
can be used to say that to satisfy Claire Alice must use a token of one or another 
actually out of production Japanese mobile model.  
Fifth reading of 1a: 
1a will be true relative to @ if and only if the Japanese mobile models which are out of 
production at @ are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are 
satisfied Alice uses at w a token at w of one of those models.  
Note that according to this fifth reading too there is neither a specific mobile 
token nor a specific out of production Japanese mobile model which Alice must 
use to satisfy Claire. Again, note that according to this fifth reading, unlike the 
fourth reading, Claire will be satisfied in a world w, even if Alice does not use at 




provided that Alice uses at w a token of an actually out of production Japanese 
model. 
In order to distinguish this fifth reading of 1a from the previously 
considered four readings let’s consider this second scenario. Suppose Claire 
does not have any specific mobile token or tokens in mind but she cares only 
that Alice uses a token of one or another of the three mobile models listed in a 
certain document, say m1,m2, and m3; unbeknownst to her, each of these happen 
to be Japanese models that actually are out of production. Then the fifth reading 
that has just been described will be true. The Japanese mobile models which are 
actually out of production are such that for any world w in which Claire’s actual 
desires are realized Alice uses at w a token in w of one of these. However under 
this last scenario each of the previously considered four readings will be false. 
The 1aii and 1aiii, the usual de re readings will be false. 
1aii xy ((k[<e,t> Japanese…]@(y) & I(@)(x,y))& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
1aiii x(k[<e,t> Japanese…]@(x)& ∀s(R(@)(s) z([Alice use tz]s & I(s)(z,x)))) 
Because this second scenario allows that there be two worlds w’ and w’’ such 
that, 
Claire’s actual desires are satisfied both at w’ and w’’, as Alice uses only x at w, Alice 
uses only y at w’’, x is a token of m1 at w’, y is a token of m2 at w’’, x≠y.  
Then contrary to what is asserted by 1aii, it is not the case there is an actual 
token z of an actually out of production Japanese mobile model such that for all 
worlds w in which Claire’s actual desires are satisified Alice uses z at w. And 
contrary to what is asserted by 1aiii it is not the case there is an actually out of 




actual desires are satisified Alice uses at w a token of m at w. Under the same 
scenario, 1ai the de dicto reading too will be false. 
1ai  ∀s(R(@)(s)  xy((k[<e,t> Japanese…]s(y) & I(s)(x,y)) &  [Alice use tx]s)) 
Because our second scenario allows that there be a world w’ such that, 
Claire’s actual desires are satisfied at w’, as Alice uses only x at w’, x is a token of m1 at 
w’, but m1 is not out of production at w’. 
Then contrary to what is asserted by 1ai, it is not the case that for all worlds w 
in which Claire’s actual desires are satisfied Alice uses at w a token z at w of a 
Japanese mobile model m out of production at w.  
Finally, according to the scenario in question the recently introduced 
fourth reading of 1a is false too:  
Fourth reading of 1a: 
true relative to @ if and only if the tokens X at @ of Japanese mobile models K out of 
production at @ are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s wishes at @ are 
satisfied Alice uses one of X at w.  
For according to our second scenario surely there is a world w’ such that, 
Claire’s actual desires are satisfied at w’, as Alice uses only x at w’, x is a token of m1 at 
w’, but x is not actual token of m1. 
The existence of a world w’ as described above also gainsays the fourth reading: 
it is not the case that the actual tokens of actually out of production Japanese 
mobile models are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s actual desires are 
satisfied Alice uses one of those at w. 
The lastly described fourth and fifth readings of 1a can be accounted for as 
examples of non-specific de re readings the existence of which was discussed in 




The Derivation of the Non-specific de re Readings of 1a  
The fourth and the fifth readings of 1a can be derived in the same way as such 
readings were derived in the case of 2. Namely from a logical form in which the 
common noun Japanese mobile model which is out of production takes the wide 
scope relative to must, while its indefinite noun phrase ‘encasing’ remains in the 
narrow scope.    
1aC [S[J. m. which is out of production]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
Remember that Japanese mobile model which is out of production is forced a 
native taxonomic interpretation due to the kind-level modifier which is out of 
production. Thus, originally Japanese mobile model which is out of production is 
a taxonomic common noun that applies to models of Japanese mobiles that are 
out of production. However in 1aC it has to semantically compose with a 
constituent which is particular level as it is formed around the particular level 
verb use: 
 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
Previously in interpreting the logical forms 1aA and 1aB we had to deal with a 
similar type of discrepancy. There we noted that the theoretical machinery of 
both the C-framework and the K-framework enabled two different ways of 
resolving those discrepancies: one lowering the taxonomic constituent into 
particular level and another raising the particular level constituent to kind level. 
In the case of 1aA these two options lead to the same interpretation and thus to 
the same reading of 1a. However in the case of 1aB the first option gave 1aii, a 




This was a welcome consequence though, because it was pre-theoretically 
ascertainable that 1a had distinct readings that corresponded to the 
interpretations 1aii and 1aiii. 
In the case of 1aC too under the C-framework and the K-framework there 
are two options to resolve the discrepancy. And as in the case of 1aB these two 
options will lead to different interpretations. And again this result will be an 
auspicious one, because these different interpretations will respectively 
correspond to the non-specific de re fourth and fifth readings of 1a.   
1aC [S[NJ. m. which is out of production]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
One way to resolve the discrepancy in 1aC will be the interpretation of the kind 
level taxonomic common noun [N Japanese mobile which is out of production] as 
particular level common noun via the operator detax. 
1aiv, derived from 1aC by interpreting [N Japanese mobile which is out of production] 
as a particular level applier via detax: 
⟦[S[N J. mobile which is out of production]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]]⟧ 
{detax(λs’.k[<e,t>J.]s’),{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x)&P(x)),λs’.λy.[A.u.ty]s’}}}} 
{λs’.λy.z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&I(s’)(y,z)),{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x)&P(x)),λs’.λy.[A.u.ty]s’}}}} 
{λs’.λy.z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&I(s’)(y,z))’,{2,λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s)x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x)&[A. use tx]s))}} 
{ λs’.λy.z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&I(s’)(y,z))’,  λs’.λQ.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(Q(x) & [Alice use tx]s))} 
λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(z(k[<e,t>Japanese…]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
∀s(R(@)(s) x(z(k[<e,t>Japanese…]@(z)&I(@)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
∀s(R(@)(s) xz((k[<e,t>Japanese…]@(z)&I(@)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
The other way to resolve the discrepancy in 1aC will be to keep the original kind 
level meaning of [N Japanese mobile which is out of production] but to interpret 
[2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] as kind level. This can be done by 
interpreting the trace t2 as a kind level applier and using the operation detax in 




get an interpretation that can sensibly semantically compose with the 
taxonomic applier [N Japanese mobile which is out of production]. 
1aC [S[NJ. m. which is out of p.]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP [Da][ t2]]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
1av, derived from 1aC by interpreting [NJapanese mobile which is out of production] 
and t2 as kind level appliers: 





{λs’.k[<e,t>J.]s’,{2, λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(z(I(s)(x, z) & k[<e,t>t2]s,g(z))& [Alice use tx]s))}} 
{λs’.k[<e,t>J.]s’, λs’.λQ.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(z(I(s)(x, z) & Q(z))& [Alice use tx]s))} 
λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(z(I(s)(x, z) & k[<e,t>Jap...]s’(z))& [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
∀s(R(@)(s) x(z(I(s)(x, z) & k[<e,t>Jap...]@(z))& [Alice use tx]s)) 
∀s(R(@)(s) xz(([Jap…]@(z) & I(s)(x,z))&[Alice use tx]s)) 
Now note that 1aiv and 1av, are not the same meaning. The former has been 
derived from 1aC by resolving the discrepancy by lowering [N Japanese mobile 
which is out of production] to particular level and the latter is derived by 
resolving the discrepancy by raising [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]] 
into kind level.  Compare their evaluation relative to @: 
1aiv ∀s(R(@)(s) xz(([Japanese…]@(z) & I(@)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
1av ∀s(R(@)(s) xz(([Japanese..]@(z) & I(s)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
1iv and v accounts respectively for the fourth and the fifth readings of 1a. These 
readings were previously described in the following way: 
Fourth reading of 1a: 
true relative to @ if and only if tokens X at @ of Japanese mobile models K out of 
production at @ are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s wishes at @ are 
satisfied Alice uses one of X at w. 
 
Fifth reading of 1a: 
true relative to @ if and only if Japanese mobile models K which are out of production 
at @ are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses 




Nor has any of 1aiv and 1av the same meaning as any of 1ai-iii derived 
previously from the logical forms 1aA and 1aB: 
1ai  ∀s(R(@)(s) xz( (k[<e,t>Japanese …]s(z)&I(s)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
1aii xz((k[<e,t>Japanese …]@(z)&I(@)(x,z)) & ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
1aiii z(k[<e,t> Japanese…]@(z)& ∀s(R(@)(s) x(I(s)(x,z)&[Alice uses tx]s))) 
1aiv ∀s(R(@)(s) xz((k[<e,t>Japanese…]@(z) & I(@)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
1av ∀s(R(@)(s) xz((k[<e,t>Japanese..]@(z) & I(s)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
There is one caveat though. Note that if Japanese mobile which is out of 
production is a kind level rigid applier, that is if λs’.sg_k[<e,t>Japanese mobile 
which…]s’ is a constant function, then 1av will be the same meaning as 1ai, the 
de dicto reading of 1a. This indicates at least that Japanese mobile which is out 
of production cannot be a de jure rigid applier. If it were we would not pre-
theoretically be able to distinguish a fifth reading for 1a. 
The Implications of the Derivation of the Non -specific de re Readings 
of 1a Regarding Rigidity 
Let’s recap what went on so far in the present section.  Remember that in the 
previous section we set out to discuss non-specific de re readings of modal 
sentences to see that modal sentences indeed have logical forms, and 
corresponding readings, in which common nouns are interpreted in the wide 
scope independently of the noun phrases in which they figure in the surface 
form of the sentences. And the existence of such logical forms and 
corresponding readings were important for us because only on the basis of such 
logical forms we have a chance to get an evidence about the rigidity or non-




from their interpretation in the wide scope and their interpretation in the 
narrow scope.  
In the case of 1a we have found out that that sentence has not just one but 
two non-specific de re readings. As is generally the case with non-specific de re 
readings, these readings can be explained as the result of the interpretation of 
the common noun Japanese mobile which is out of production in the wide scope, 
independently of the noun phrase it forms (logical form 1aC). We explained the 
existence of two such readings for 1a in place of one by reference to the special 
nature of the common noun Japanese mobile which is out of production. It is a 
taxonomic common noun but the sentential context in which it figures is 
particular level. There are two available ways to resolve such a sortal 
discrepancy. These two ways when adopted in interpreting 1aC lead to two non-
equivalent interpretations: 1aiv and 1av which corresponded to the two non-
specific de re readings we sought to explain. 
Have we got any evidence regarding the rigidity or the non-rigidity of the 
common noun Japanese mobile which is out of production in the process? Yes 
we did. The fifth reading of 1a that was pre-theoretically distinguished from the 
other four readings, is explained by the existence of the logical form 1aC and its 
interpretation by resolving the sortal discrepancy in 1aC in one of the available 
two ways. That gave the interpretation 1av. But we noted that 1av will be the 
same meaning as 1ai that corresponded to the de dicto reading of 1a, if Japanese 
mobile which is out of production is a rigid applier. So, provided that the fifth 
reading exists and that the 1av explains it, then our analyses indicates that it 




rigid applier. For, otherwise the interpretations 1ai and 1av would be the same 
meaning, and then our analysis would predict that we would not be pre-
theoretically able to distinguish the fifth reading. Given that we can distinguish 
the fifth reading, 1ai and 1av should at least have the linguistic-semantic 
potential to be different meanings. And this is possible only if Japanese mobile 
which is out of production is not a de jure rigid applier. 
The Non-specific de re Reading of 1b 
Now, let’s return to 1b to see whether it too has non-specific de re readings that 
are non-equivalent to its de dicto reading. 
1 b [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Sharp SH903i. 
Prima facie the stakes appear to be as follows. If 1b has non-specific de re 
readings that are non-equivalent to its de dicto reading, then these readings will 
be explainable by the wide scope interpretation of the common noun Sharp 
SH903i. That is by the interpretation of the following logical form: 
1bC [S[Sharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
And possibly such an explanation will provide evidence that Sharp SH903i is not 
de jure rigid. However if it turns out that 1b does not have any non-specific de 
re readings distinguishable from its de dicto reading, this will indicate that 
Sharp SH903i is de jure rigid. Because to explain cases of non-specific de re 
readings, following Heim and Fintel (2011), we have been assuming that wide 
scope interpretation of common nouns relative to modal expressions are 




distinguishable from its de dicto reading, this will be the case despite the 
existence of 1bC according to which Sharp SH903i should be interpreted in the 
wide scope. This then is possible only if the interpretation of Sharp SH903i in 
the wide scope relative to must yields an interpretation of 1b which is by 
linguistic-semantic design equivalent to the de dicto reading resulting from its 
interpretation in the narrow scope relative to must. This last circumstance in 
turn can obtain only if Sharp SH903i has by linguistic-semantic design the same 
denotation relative to possible worlds, that is, only if it is de jure rigid. 
Now, it appears that indeed 1b has a third, non-specific de re, reading that 
is not equivalent to its previously considered de dicto reading. Apparently 1b 
can be used to say that to satisfy Claire Alice must use one or another actual 
token of Sharp SH903i. According to this third reading to satisfy Claire Alice 
must use an actual token of Sharp SH903i but there is not any specific actual 
token which she must use, any will do. For example, if Claire asks Alice to use 
one or another of the mobiles kept in a certain drawer, all of which happen to be 
tokens of Sharp SH903i, then 1b can truly and adequately be used under this 
third reading. The truth-conditions for this reading can be stated thus: 
Third reading of 1b: 
true relative to @ if and only if the tokens of Sharp SH903i at @ are such that for all 
worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses at w one of those.  
To distinguish this third, non-specific de re reading from the previously 
considered de dicto reading, derived as 1bi, consider the following scenario. 
Suppose Claire desires that Alice uses some or other token of Sharp SH903i, and 
it does not matter for her which token she uses provided that it is a token of 




actual tokens, and Alice had used it, Claire would still be satisfied. Then the de 
dicto reading of 1b will be true: 
First reading of 1b (the de dicto reading): 
true relative to @ if and only if for all worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are 
satisfied there is a token at w of Sharp SH903i which is used by Alice in w.    
The representations of the first reading of  1b according to the K and C-frameworks: 
1biK ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(predsg_p(s)(k[eSharp SH903i]s)(x) &  [Alice use tx]s))  
1bic ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(p[<e,t>Sharp SH903i]s(x) &  [Alice use tx]s)) 
But the third reading of 1b, the non-specific de re reading, will be false under 
such a scenario. For according to our scenario there are worlds w’ such that: 
Claire’s actual desires are satisfied at w’, as Alice uses at w’ a token x at w’ of Sharp 
SH903i but x is not an actual token of Sharp SH903i. 
Then contrary to what is asserted by the third reading of 1b it is not the case 
that the actual tokens of Sharp SH903i are such that for all worlds w in which 
Claire’s actual desires are satisfied Alice uses at w one of those. 
To distinguish this third, non-specific de re reading from the previously 
considered specific de re reading, 1bii, consider the following scenario. Suppose 
Claire has asked Alice to use either one of the mobiles actually kept in a certain 
drawer, and each of these mobiles happen to be tokens of Sharp SH903i. Then 
the third reading of 1b will be true: according to this second scenario for all 
worlds w in which Claire’s actual desires are satisfied Alice uses at w one of the 
mobiles which are actually kept in the said drawer; as each one of these mobiles 
is an actual token of Sharp SH903i, the actual tokens of Sharp SH903i will be 
such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s actual desires are satisfied Alice uses 





Second reading of 1b (the specific de re reading): 
true relative @ if and only if there is token of Sharp SH903i at @ such that for all 
worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses at w that token. 
The representations of the second reading of  1b according to the K and C-frameworks: 
1biiK x(predsg_p(@)(sg_k[e Sharp SH903i]@)(x)& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s) 
1biiC x(sg_p[<e,t> Sharp SH903i]@ (x)& ∀s(R(@)(s) [Alice use tx]s)) 
For, according to this second scenario there surely will be two worlds w’ and w’’ 
such that, 
Claire’s actual desires are satisifed both in w’ and w’’ as Alice uses only x in w’ and only 
y in w’’, x≠y and both x and y are actually in the drawer in question. Thus x and y are 
actual tokens of Sharp SH903i. 
But then, contrary to what is asserted by 1bii, it is not the case that there is an 
actual token z of Sharp SH903i such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s actual 
desires are satisfied Alice uses z at w. 
Is There a Second Non-specific de re Reading for 1b? 
Remember that 1a had two non-specific de re readings. One of them pertained 
only to the actual tokens of actually out of production Japanese mobile models, 
and the other pertained only to the actual Japanese mobile models, and but not 
just to the actual tokens of these models: 
1 a [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Japanese mobile which is out of   
  production. 
Fourth reading of 1a: 
true relative to @ if and only if tokens X at @ of Japanese mobile models K out of 
production at @ are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s wishes at @ are 





Fifth reading of 1a: 
true relative to @ if and only if Japanese mobile models K which are out of production 
at @ are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses 
at w a token at w of one of those models. 
One may think that the same may be the case for 1b. Given the similarity of the 
sentences 1a and 1b, we may expect that 1b too will have two non-specific de re 
readings; one which pertains only to the actual tokens of the actual Sharp 
SH903i model and another pertaining only to the actual Sharp SH903i model 
but not just to its actual tokens. This is so, especially when 1b is considered 
from the standpoint of the K-framework according to which such semantically 
simple common nouns as Sharp SH903i are primarily kind designators: 
1 b [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Sharp SH903i. 
third reading of 1b: 
true relative to @ if and only if tokens X at @ of the Sharp SH903i model at @ are such 
that for all worlds w in which Claire’s wishes at @ are satisfied Alice uses one of X at w. 
 
presumed fourth reading of 1b: 
true relative to @ if and only if the Sharp SH903i model at @ is such that for all worlds 
w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses at w a token at w of that model. 
The first reading given above is the already distinguished third reading of 1b. As 
for the latter reading, the presumed fourth reading, it does not seem to say 
anything different than the de dicto reading of 1b, already accounted for by the 
interpretations 1biC and 1bik of the logical form 1bA.  
1bA [S[T must] [S[NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]] 
1biC ∀s(R(@)(s) x sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]s(x) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
1biK ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(I(s)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s)  &  [Alice use tx]s))  
First reading of  1b (the de dicto reading): 
true relative to @ if and only if for all worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are 
satisfied there is a token x at w of the Sharp SH903i model at w such that x is used by 




It seems both the de dicto reading and the presumed fourth reading of 1b 
pertain to the same model of mobile phone, namely the Sharp SH903i. Now this 
difference between 1a and 1b as regards the number of their non-specific de re 
readings will be of crucial importance from the perspective of the K-framework 
regarding the de jure rigidity of the common noun Sharp SH903i. According to 
the K-framework both Japanese mobile which is out of production and Sharp 
SH903i are kind denoting common nouns (though one is an applier and the 
other is a designator). For this reason the logical forms in which they take wide 
scope should equally be capable of giving rise to two distinguishable non-
specific de re readings: one pertaining only to the kind(s) denoted relative to 
the actual world; and another pertaining only to the actual instances of the 
kind(s) denoted relative to the actual world. Unless of course, unlike Japanese 
mobile which is out of production, the denotation of Sharp SH903i is not 
variable across possible worlds. 
The Derivation of the Non-specific de re Reading of 1b under the C-
framework 
The only pre-theoretically distinguishable non-specific de re reading of 1b can 
be derived, in the same way as the other cases of non-specific de re readings we 
have considered so far. There has to be a logical form in which the common 
noun Sharp SH903i takes wide scope relative to must but leaves the indefinite 
phrase in the narrow scope. 




Sharp SH903i is a semantically simple non-taxonomic common noun. So, the 
interpretation of the logical form above will be different under the K-framework 
and the C-framework. Under the C-framework relative to a possible world w 
Sharp SH903i will be taken to apply to tokens of Sharp SH903i at w. But under 
the K-framework relative to a possible world w, Sharp SH903i will be taken to 
designate a kind. Let’s first consider the interpretation of the logical form 1bC 
under the C-framework: 
1biiiC derived from 1bC under the C-framework: 
⟦[S[Sharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2]]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]]⟧ 
{λs’.sg_p[<e,t>S.]s’,{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x)&P(x)),λs’.λy.[A.u.ty]s’}}}} 
{λs’. sg_p[<e,t>S.]s’, {2, {λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)), λs’.x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x) & [Alice use tx]s’)}}} 
{λs’. sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’, {2, λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x) & [Alice use tx]s))}} 
{λs’. sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’,  λs’.λQ.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(Q(x) & [Alice use tx]s))} 
 λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
 ∀s(R(@)(s) x sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]@(x) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
This interpretation yields the truth-conditions that were associated with the 
non-specific de re reading of 1b: 
Third reading of 1b: 
true relative to @ if and only if the tokens of Sharp SH903i at @ are such that for all 
worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses at w one of those 
Note that 1biiiC will be the same meaning as the de dicto 1biC if Sharp SH903i 
were a rigid applier.  
1biC  ∀s(R(@)(s) x sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]s(x) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
1biiiC  ∀s(R(@)(s) x sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]@(x) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
So, when under the C-framework Sharp SH903i is interpreted as an applier it 
cannot be taken to be a de jure rigid applier. For otherwise, assuming that our 




to a reading that is equivalent to the de dicto reading, and thus there would not 
exist a pre-theoretically distinguishable non-specific de re reading such as the 
third reading of 1b. 
Above we have indicated that unlike 1a, 1b does not seem to have a 
further non-specific de re reading other than the one that has just been 
considered: a fourth reading that pertains only to the actual Sharp SH903i 
model but not only to the actual tokens of that model. This difference between 
1a and 1b is easily accounted for under the C-framework. According to this 
framework, unlike the taxonomic common noun Japanese mobile which is out of 
production, the common noun Sharp SH903i is a particular level applier for 
tokens; it does not denote any model or models. For this reason, the logical 
forms of 1b in which Sharp SH903i occurs in the wide scope can pertain only to 
the actual tokens of Sharp SH903i, and only through them to the actual Sharp 
SH903i model. 
The Derivation of the Non-specific de re Reading of 1b under the K-
framework 
We will now consider the interpretation of 1bC under the K-framework.  
1bC [S[NSharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2] ]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
Under the K-framework [NSharp SH903i] is originally interpreted as a kind 
designator. But in 1bC it has to semantically compose with [2 [[T must] [S[NP a 
[t2] ]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]. Now this latter in turn ought normally be interpreted 




verb use.  Then it will have a particular level GQ meaning (type 
<s,<<ep,t>,t>>) and therefore can compose only with particular level applier 
meanings. 
We have dealt with a similar discrepancy in the case of the logical form of 
1aC which lead to the non-specific de re fourth and fifth readings of 1a: 
1 a [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Japanese mobile which is out of   
  production. 
1aC [S[NJ. m. which is out of production]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
That discrepancy could be resolved either by interpreting the originally kind 
level taxonomic common noun [NJapanese mobile which is out of production] as 
a particular level common noun via the use of the operator detax; or by keeping 
it taxonomic but instead by interpreting the originally particular level [2 [[T 
must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]] as kind level, by interpreting t2 as a kind 
level applier and by using detax on it inside the scope of must. 
Now, unlike the case of 1aC, the discrepancy that initially obtains in the 
interpretation of 1bC under the K-framework is not just a discrepancy of sorts 
(particular/kind) but also a discrepancy of semantic type 
(designator/quantifier). [NSharp SH903i] is kind level and as a designator has 
the semantic type <s,ek>, but [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]] is 
particular level and has the quantifier semantic type <s,<<ep,t>,t>>. And 
designators cannot semantically compose with quantifiers. Yet still under the K-
framework, which has the operation pred, there still are two ways to resolve 
this discrepancy by adjusting one or the other of the semantically incongruent 
constituents to the semantic type of the other, which parallel the resolution of 




interpreting [NSharp SH903i] as a particular level applier (semantic type 
<s,<ep,t>>) by the application of pred to its meaning in the wide scope; or by 
interpreting [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]] as a kind level applier 
(semantic type <s,<ek,t>>) by interpreting t2 as a kind designator and applying 
pred to it in the narrow scope so that can compose with the indefinite 
determiner a. 
We indicated that the first way of resolving the discrepancy will go 
through via the application of the operator pred on the meaning of [NSharp 
SH903i] to yield a meaning of type <s,<e,t>>: 
Let  be a partial function of type <s,e>, Pred()=λs’.λx.I(s’)(x,(s’)) 
pred(λs’.[ Sharp SH903i]s’)= λs’.λy.I(s’)(y,[ Sharp SH903i]s’) 
Then under the K-framework 1bC will get the following interpretation: 
1biiiK, derived from 1bC under the K-framework by interpreting [NSharp SH903i] as a 
particular level applier via Pred: 
⟦[S[NSharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2] ]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]]⟧ 
{pred(λs’.k[eS.]s’),{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x)&P(x)),λs’.λy.[A.u.ty]s’}}}} 
{λs’.λy.I(s’)(y,k[eS]s’),{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x)&P(x)),λs’.λy.[A.u.ty]s’}}}} 
{λs’.λy.I(s’)(y,k[eS.]s’),{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),λs’.x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x)&[Alice use tx]s’)}}} 
{λs’.λy.I(s’)(y, k[e S.]s’), {2, λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x) & [Alice use tx]s))}} 
{λs’.λy.I(s’)(y, k[e Sharp SH903i]s’),  λs’.λQ.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(Q(x) & [Alice use tx]s))} 
 λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x (λy.I(s’)(y, k[e Sharp SH903i]s’)(x) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
 λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x (I(s’)(x, k[e Sharp SH903i]s’) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
 ∀s(R(@)(s) x (I(@)(x, k[e Sharp SH903i]@) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
The second way of resolving the discrepancy that obtains in 1bC under the K-
framework will be the reinterpretation of [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use 
t1]]]]] as kind level applier so that it can semantically compose with the kind 
level designator [NSharp SH903i]. This can be accomplished by interpreting t2 as 




however there will arise a semantic misfit inside [NP a t2], with t2  interpreted as 
a kind designator (type <s,e>) and the indefinite article a which demands for 
arguments of type <s,<e,t>>. This latter discrepancy can be resolved again via 
pred. Then, the interpretation of 1bC under the K-framework by way of 
interpreting [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]] as a kind level applier by 
interpreting the trace t2 as a kind designatorr will go as follows: 
1bC  [S[NSharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2] ]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
1biv, derived from 1bC under the K-framework by interpreting both t2  and [NSharp 




{λs’.k[e S.]s’, {2, {λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)), λs’.∃x(I(s’)(x, k[et2]s’,g)& [Alice uses tx]s’)}}} 
{λs’.k[e SharpSH903i]s’, {2, λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) ∃x(I(s)(x, k[et2]s,g)& [Alice uses tx]s))}} 
{λs’.k[e SharpSH903i]s’, λs’.λz.∀s(R(s’)(s) ∃x(I(s)(x,z)& [Alice uses tx]s))} 
λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) ∃x(I(s)(x, k[e SharpSH903i]s’)& [Alice uses tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
∀s(R(@)(s) x(I(s)(x,[Sharp SH903i]@)& [Alice uses tx]s))  
Note that 1bivK is not equivalent to 1biiiK; thus the two available ways of 
interpreting 1bC under the K-framework do not yield the same truth conditions: 
1biiiK ∀s(R(@)(s) x(I(@)( x, sg_k[ e Sharp SH903i]@) & [Alice use tx]s))  
1bivK ∀s(R(@)(s) x(I(s)(x, sg_k[ e Sharp SH903i]@)& [Alice use tx]s))  
1biiiK is true relative to @ iff for all worlds w which are accessible from @ there is a 
token x at @ of the designatum of  Sharp SH903i at @ such that Alice uses x at w 
 
1bivK is true relative to @ iff for all worlds w which are accessible from @ there is a 
token x at w of the designatum of Sharp SH903i at @ such that Alice uses x at w 
1biiiK precludes but 1bivK does not preclude the existence of a world w’ 
accessible from @ such that, 
Alice uses at w’ only y, y is a token at w’ of the designatum of Sharp SH903i at @ but y is 




Note that 1biiiK represents the same truth-conditions as 1biiiC, the Neo-
Carlsonian interpretation of the logical form 1bC: 
1biiiC  ∀s(R(@)(s) x sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]@(x) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
1biiiK ∀s(R(@)(s) x(I(@)( x, sg_k[ e Sharp SH903i]@) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
Thus 1biiiK is the interpretation of 1bC under the K-framework that accounts for 
the truth-conditions of the non-specific de re reading of 1b singled out above as 
the third reading of 1b: 
true relative to @ if and only if the tokens of Sharp SH903i at @ are such that for all 
worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses at w one of those  
But then what about 1bivK, which is not equivalent to 1biiiK?  
1bivK ∀s(R(@)(s) x(I(s)(x,k[eSharp SH903i]@)& [Alice use tx]s)) 
1bivK does not yield the truth conditions associated with the pre-theoretically 
distinguished non-specific de re reading of 1b. And we have argued that unlike 
1a, 1b does not seem to have another non-specific de re reading which pertains 
only to the actual Sharp SH903i model without pertaining only to the actual 
tokens thereof. Yet, it is clear that if it existed such a reading would be 
accounted by 1bivK. 
The Significance of 1bivK Regarding the Question Whether Sharp 
SH903i is de jure Rigid under the K-framework 
First note that the interpretation 1bivK of the logical form 1bC is simply the 
counterpart of interpretation 1av of the logical form 1aC. 




1av, derived from 1aC by interpreting [NJapanese mobile which is out of production] 
and t2 as kind level appliers: 
∀s(R(@)(s) x(z([Japanese..]@(z)&I(s)(x,z)) & [A. use tx]s)) 
1bC [S[NSharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2] ]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
1bivK, derived from 1bC under the K-framework by interpreting both t2  and [NSharp 
SH903i] as kind designators: 
∀s(R(@)(s) x(I(s)(x,[Sharp SH903i]@)& [Alice use tx]s)) 
Both 1aC and 1bC are logical forms in which the common nouns take wide scope 
relative to must while leaving their indefinite singular ‘encasing’ in the narrow 
scope. Following the suggestion of Heim and Fintel (2011), the postulation of 
such logical forms has been motivated in the previous section to explain the 
general phenomenon of non-specific de re readings. Furthermore, from the 
perspective of the K-framework these logical forms manifest a similar semantic 
discrepancy: The common nouns that take wide scope are kind level whereas 
the sentence abstracts with which they are to semantically compose are 
particular level. Under the K-framework such discrepancies can be resolved in 
two ways, each of which adjusts the meaning of one or the other of the 
semantically incongruent constituents. Both 1av and 1bivK are the 
interpretations of their respective logical forms, 1aC and 1bC, in which the 
adjustment took place through the reinterpretation of the sentence abstract [2 
[[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]  as kind level.  
Previously we have noted that on the assumption that [NJapanese mobile 
which is out of production] is not de jure rigid 1av accounts for one of the two 
pre-theoretically distinguishable non-specific de re readings of 1a. But if 




equivalent to the interpretation 1ai which accounted for the de dicto reading of 
1a: 
1aA  [S[T must] [S[NP a J. mobile which is out of production]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]] 
1ai  ∀s(R(@)(s) xz((k[<e,t>Japanese …]s(z)&I(s)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
   
1aC [S[NJ. m. which is out of production]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]]  
1av ∀s(R(@)(s) xz((k[<e,t>Japanese..]@(z) & I(s)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
Since the non-specific de re reading in question was pre-theoretically 
distinguishable as the fifth reading of 1a. We had concluded that [NJapanese 
mobile which is out of production] cannot be a de jure rigid applier.  
Now likewise, the K-framework, in which 1bivK is derivable from 1bC, 
predicts the existence of a certain non-specific de re reading for 1b on the 
assumption that Sharp SH903i is not a de jure rigid designator. But if Sharp 
SH903i is a de jure rigid designator then 1bivK will be equivalent to the 
interpretation 1biK which accounted for the de dicto reading of 1b, and the K-
framework will thus not predict any new reading that is pre-theoretically 
distinguishable from the de dicto reading of 1b.  
1bA [S[T must] [S[NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]] 
1biK ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(I(s)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s)  &  [Alice use tx]s)) 
   
1bC [S[NSharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2] ]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
1bivK ∀s(R(@)(s) x(I(s)(x,[Sharp SH903i]@)& [Alice use tx]s)) 
Above we were able to pre-theoretically distinguish a non-specific de re reading 
for 1b (the third reading of 1b). And we have seen that under the K-framework 
that reading was accounted for by the interpretation 1biiiK derived from 1bC.   
1bC [S[NSharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2] ]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
1biiiK ∀s(R(@)(s) x(I(@)( x, sg_k[ e Sharp SH903i]@) & [Alice use tx]s)) 




true relative to @ if and only if tokens of Sharp SH903i at @ are such that for all worlds 
w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses at w one of those  
But that one is not a non-specific de re reading that can be accounted by the 
interpretation 1bivK in question here: 
1bC [S[NSharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2] ]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
1bivK ∀s(R(@)(s) x(I(s)(x, sg_k[ e Sharp SH903i]@)& [Alice use tx]s)) 
The reading predicted by the derivability of 1bivK from 1bC under the K-
framework and under the assumption that the common noun Sharp SH903i is 
not a de jure rigid designator can rather be paraphrased in the following way. 
A fourth reading for 1b according to K-framework under the assumption that Sharp 
SH903i is not de jure rigid: 
true relative to @ if and only if the model Sharp SH903i at @ is such that for all worlds 
w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses at w a token at w of that model.  
If Sharp SH903i  is not de jure rigid, then this reading has to be pre-theoretically 
distinguishable from the usual de dicto reading of 1b which was accounted by 
1biK: 
1bA [S[T must] [S[NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]] 
1biK ∀s(R(@)(s)  x(I(s)(x,[ Sharp SH903i]s)  &  [Alice use tx]s)) 
the first reading of 1b (the de dicto reading): 
true relative to @ if and only if for all worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are 
satisfied there is a token at w of Sharp SH903i which is used by Alice in w. 
That is, if Sharp SH903i  is not a de jure rigid designator, the analysis of 1b 
under the K-framework predicts that 1b will have two non-equivalent readings 
that could be more plainly paraphrased thus: 
the reading predicted by the K-framework’s derivation of 1bivK under the assumption 
that Sharp SH903i  is not de jure rigid: 
the actual Sharp SH903i model is such that to satisfy Claire it is necessary that Alice 





the first reading of 1b (the de dicto reading): 
to satisfy Claire it is necessary that Alice uses a token of Sharp SH903i 
However, 1b does not seem to have two such non-equivalent readings. The de 
dicto reading of 1b was accounted by the interpretation 1biK. And we’ve already 
indicated that 1biK will be equivalent to 1bivK provided that Sharp SH903i is a 
rigid designator. So, given the absence of a reading that has the content of 1bivK 
and that is pre-theoretically distinguishable from the de dicto reading of 1b we 
conclude that under the K-framework Sharp SH903i should be a de jure rigid 
designator. 
Summary and Assesssment of the Foregone Discussion on the 
Behavior of Common Nouns in Modal Contexts  
Recall that our overall objective is to see whether there are any significant 
reasons to maintain that a certain class of common nouns are de jure rigid. To 
this end we sought to follow the model of an argument given to establish the de 
jure rigidity of proper names. That argument compared the readings of pairs of 
modal sentences that are identical except that one had a definite description in 
an argument position where the other had a proper name. Usually in such pairs, 
the sentences which involve the definite descriptions have a de re and a de dicto 
reading that are truth-conditionally distinguishable from one another, whereas 
the sentences which involve the proper name arguments never have two such 
distinguishable readings. The multiplicity of the readings in the former case is 
explained by the possibility of the definite description to take wide scope or 




description. The exceptionless absence of multiple readings in the latter case, 
despite the fact that just like a definite description a proper name too should 
presumably be able to take wide scope or narrow scope, is explained by the de 
jure rigidity of the proper names in general.  
We thus set out to consider the truth-conditionally distinguishable 
readings of 1a and 1b reproduced below to seek a similar argument for the case 
that some common nouns are de jure rigid. 
1 a [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Japanese mobile which is out of   
  production. 
 b [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Sharp SH903i. 
We have seen that each of 1a and 1b had an ordinary de re reading and a dicto 
reading, truth conditionally distinguishable from one another. The existence of 
these readings can be explained by the capacity of these sentences assuming 
such logical forms as the following, 
1 a [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Japanese mobile which is out of   
  production. 
1aA [S[T must] [S[NP a J. mobile which is out of production]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]] 
1aB [S[NP a Japanese mobile which is out of production]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]] 
 
1 b [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Sharp SH903i  
1bA [S[T must] [S[NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1[1 [S Alice uses t1]]]]] 
1bB [S[NP a [N Sharp SH903i]]1[1 [[T must][S Alice uses t1]]]] 
Logical forms in which the noun phrases formed by common nouns take wide 
scope relative to must lead to different readings than those in which they 
remain in the narrow scope. However we noted that distinguishable de re and 
de dicto readings result regardless whether the common nouns that form the 
noun phrases in question are de jure rigid or not. Thus the consideration of the 




the de dicto readings did not have any implication about the rigidity or non-
rigidity of the common nouns involved.  
To get implications about the rigidity or non-rigidity of the common nouns 
involved what we needed to look for were rather readings that would be 
explained by the wide scope interpretation of the common nouns independently 
of the noun phrases they form. That is, we needed readings which would be 
accounted for by such logical forms as those below: 
1aC [S[J. m. which is out of production]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2]]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
 
1bC [S[Sharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2]]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
The existence of such readings will indicate that the wide-scope interpretation 
of the common noun does not yield the same sentential truth-conditions as its 
narrow scope interpretation, which in turn will be possible only if the common 
noun were not rigid.  
The sort of readings we sought were the readings that have been 
recognized as non-specific de re readings in the literature. Such readings were 
manifested by modal sentences involving noun phrases formed by common 
nouns and they could in general be explained by wide scope interpretation of 
the common nouns whilst the noun phrases they formed were interpreted in the 
narrow scope (Heim and Fintel, 2011). 
Therefore we then looked into whether any of 1a and 1b had non-specific 
de re readings. We found out that 1a had not one but two such readings (the 
fourth and fifth readings of 1a): 
1 a [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Japanese mobile which is out of   




Fourth reading of 1a: 
true relative to @ if and only if tokens X at @ of Japanese mobile models K out of 
production at @ are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s wishes at @ are 
satisfied Alice uses one of X at w. 
 
Fifth reading of 1a: 
true relative to @ if and only if Japanese mobile models K which are out of production 
at @ are such that for all worlds w in which Claire’s desires at @ are satisfied Alice uses 
at w a token at w of one of those models. 
For the existence of two such readings we gave the following explanation. The 
common noun Japanese mobile which is out of production in the wide scope is a 
kind level applier but the sentence abstract with which it semantically 
composes with in the logical form 1aC requires particular level appliers. Under 
the C-framework and the K-framework motivated in the previous chapter this 
misfit can be resolved either by adjusting the denotation of the common noun or 
that of the sentence abstract. And these different paths lead to non-equivalent 




1aC [S[NJ. m. which is out of production]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a t2]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
1aiv, derived from 1aC by interpreting [N Japanese mobile which is out of production] 
as a particular level applier via detax: 




{λs’.λy.z(k[<e,t>J.]s’(z)&I(s’)(y,z))’,  λs’.λQ.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(Q(x) & [Alice use tx]s))} 
λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(z(k[<e,t>Japanese…]s’(z)&I(s’)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
∀s(R(@)(s) x(z(k[<e,t>Japanese…]@(z)&I(@)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
∀s(R(@)(s) xz((k[<e,t>Japanese…]@(z)&I(@)(x,z)) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
 
1av, derived from 1aC by interpreting [NJapanese mobile which is out of production] 
and t2 as kind level appliers: 





{λs’.k[<e,t>Jap...]s’,{2, λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(z(I(s)(x, z) & k[<e,t>t2]s,g(z))& [Alice use tx]s))}} 
{λs’.k[<e,t>Jap...]s’, λs’.λQ.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(z(I(s)(x, z) & Q(z))& [Alice use tx]s))} 
λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(z(I(s)(x, z) & k[<e,t>Jap...]s’(z))& [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
λs’.∀s(R(@)(s) x(z(I(s)(x, z) & k[<e,t>Jap...]@(z))& [Alice use tx]s)) 
∀s(R(@)(s) xz(([Japanese…]@(z) & I(s)(x,z))&[Alice use tx]s)) 
The interpretation 1aiv of 1aC accounted for the fourth reading of 1a. And the 
interpretation 1av accounted for the fifth reading of 1a, provided that Japanese 
mobile which is out of production was not de jure rigid. Thus we concluded that 
it is not.  
When we considered 1b we found out that it too had a non-specific de re 
reading (the third reading of 1b), albeit only one:  
1 b [to satisfy Claire’s wish] Alice must use a Sharp SH903i. 
third reading of 1b: 
true relative to @ if and only if tokens of Sharp SH903i at @ are such that for all worlds 




The K-framework and the C-framework did not differ about the interpretation 
of taxonomic common nouns such as the Japanese mobile which is out of 
production involved in 1a, but they differed about the interpretation of the 
semantically simple and non-taxonomic common nouns such as the Sharp 
SH903i involved in 1b. According to the Neo-Carlsonian framework such 
common nouns had predicative denotations that applied to particular tokens. 
According to the K-framework these rather originally designated kinds. Thus we 
had to consider the derivation of the non-specific de re reading of 1b from the 
standpoints of these two frameworks separately. 
When considered from the standpoint of the C-framework, the derivation 
was straightforward as it did not involve any semantic discrepancy. The 
interpretation 1biiiC derived from the logical form 1bC in accordance with the C-
framework accounted for the pre-theoretically distinguishable non-specific de 
re reading of 1b provided that Sharp SH903i was assumed to be a non-rigid 
applier. 
1bC [S[Sharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2]]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
1biiiC derived from 1bC under the C-framework: 
⟦[S[Sharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2]]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]]⟧ 
{λs’.sg_p[<e,t>S.]s’,{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λP.x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x)&P(x)),λs’.λy.[A.u.ty]s’}}}} 
{λs’. sg_p[ <e,t>S.]s’,{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),λs’.x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x) & [A.u. tx]s’)}}} 
{λs’. sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’,{2, λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s)x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x) & [Alice use tx]s))}} 
{λs’. sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’,λs’.λQ.∀s(R(s’)(s)x(Q(x) & [Alice use tx]s))} 
 λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]s’(x) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
 ∀s(R(@)(s) x sg_p[ <e,t>Sharp SH903i]@(x) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
That 1b had only one non-specific de re reading instead of two like 1a, could be 




level denotation of Sharp SH903i. Given its native particular level denotation 
there arose no semantic discrepancy in the interpretation of 1bC, which could 
then be dealt with in two non-equivalent ways.  
However Sharp SH903i is a kind designator according to the K-framework. 
For this reason from the perspective of that framework the logical form 1bC was 
like 1aC in that it inhered a semantic discrepancy that obtained between its 
immediate constituents. Thus, like 1aC, 1bC too was interpretable in two ways 
under the K-framework: one interpretation proceeding by way of adjusting the 
denotation of the kind designator Sharp SH903i, and another that proceeds 
rather by  way of adjusting the denotation of the sentence abstract [2 [[T must] 
[S[NP a [t2]]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]]. 
1bC [S[NSharp SH903i]2 [2 [[T must] [S[NP a [t2] ]1[1 [S Alice use t1]]]]]] 
1biiiK, derived from 1bC under the K-framework by interpreting [NSharp SH903i] as a 




{λs’.λy.I(s’)(y, k[e S.]s’), {2, λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(p[<e,t>t2]s’,g(x) & [Alice use tx]s))}} 
{λs’.λy.I(s’)(y, k[e Sharp SH903i]s’),  λs’.λQ.∀s(R(s’)(s) x(Q(x) & [Alice use tx]s))} 
 λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x (λy.I(s’)(y, k[e Sharp SH903i]s’)(x) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
 λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) x (I(s’)(x, k[e Sharp SH903i]s’) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 
 ∀s(R(@)(s) x (I(@)(x, k[e Sharp SH903i]@) & [Alice use tx]s)) 
1bivk, derived from 1bC under the K-framework by interpreting both t2  and [NSharp 
SH903i] as kind designators:  
{λs’.k[eS.]s’,{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{{λs’.λP.λQ.∃x(P(x)&Q(x)),pred(λs’.k[et2]s’,g)},λs’.λy.[A.u.ty]s’}}}} 
{λs’.k[eS.]s’,{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{{λs’.λP.λQ.∃x(P(x)&Q(x)),λs’.λy.I(s’)(y, k[et2]s’,g)}, λs’.λy.[A.u.ty]s’}}}} 
{λs’.k[eS.]s’,{2,{λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)),{λs’.λQ.∃x(I(s’)(x,k[et2]s’,g)&Q(x)),λs’.λy.[A.u.ty]s’}}}} 
{λs’.k[e S.]s’, {2, {λs’.λS.∀s(R(s’)(s)S(s)), λs’.∃x(I(s’)(x, k[et2]s’,g)& [Alice uses tx]s’)}}} 
{λs’.k[e SharpSH903i]s’, {2, λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) ∃x(I(s)(x, k[et2]s,g)& [Alice uses tx]s))}} 
{λs’.k[e SharpSH903i]s’, λs’.λz.∀s(R(s’)(s) ∃x(I(s)(x,z)& [Alice uses tx]s))} 
λs’.∀s(R(s’)(s) ∃x(I(s)(x, k[e SharpSH903i]s’)& [Alice uses tx]s)) 
when evaluated relative to @: 




The interpretation 1biiiK accounted for the pre-theoretically distinguished non-
specific de re reading of 1b (the third reading). What however the derivability 
of the interpretation 1bivK under the K-framework meant depended on the 
rigidity or non-rigidity of the noun SharpSH903i. On the assumption that 
SharpSH903i was not a de jure rigid designator, the interpretation 1bivK implied 
the existence of a second non-specific de re reading for 1b. However on the 
assumption that SharpSH903i was a de jure rigid designator, the meaning 
described by 1bivK would simply correspond to the dicto reading of 1b, and no 
further reading for 1b would have been implied. Since in fact no pre-
theoretically distinguishable non-specific de re reading other than the third 
reading accounted for by 1biiiK existed, we had to conclude that SharpSH903i 
should be a de jure rigid designator according to the K-framework.  
1b had only one non-specific de re reading whilst 1a had two of them. 
They differed in that they involved two different common nouns occurring in 
the same sentential context. From the perspective of the K-framework both of 
these common nouns denoted kinds, albeit under different modes: 1b had the 
kind designator SharpSH903i where 1a had the kind applier Japanese mobile 
which is out of production. The K-framework can account for the existence of 
two non-specific de re readings for 1a provided that Japanese mobile which is 
out of production is a non-rigid applier. And the K-framework can account for 
the existence of only one non-specific de re reading for 1b provided that 
SharpSH903i is a de jure rigid designator. 
From the perspective of the C-framework Japanese mobile which is out of 




the K-framework, the C-framework can account for the existence of two non-
specific de re readings of 1a provided that Japanese mobile which is out of 
production is a non-rigid applier. And it can account for the existence of one 
non-specific de re reading for 1b provided that considered as a native applier 
SharpSH903i is non-rigid. 
So a consideration of the non-specific de re readings 1a and 1b from the 
standpoints of the C-framework and the K-framework gave the following results 
about the rigidity/non-rigidity of the common nouns Japanese mobile which is 
out of production and Sharp SH903i  involved in 1a and 1b. The taxonomic 
common noun Japanese mobile which is out of production cannot be a de jure 
rigid applier according to both these frameworks. For otherwise, contrary to the 
pre-theoretical semantic judgments about the matter, 1a would have only one 
non-specific de re reading, instead of two.  As for the rigidity of the semantically 
simple common noun Sharp SH903i however these frameworks yielded 
different conclusions. According to the C-framework which takes such nouns to 
be token-level appliers, Sharp SH903i too cannot be a de jure rigid applier. It 
should be able to denote different functions of type <e,t> at different evaluation 
indexes. Otherwise 1b would not have a pre-theoretically distinguishable non-
specific de re reading, but it does have one such reading. According to the K-
framework which took such terms as Sharp SH903i to primarily designate 
kinds, Sharp SH903i should however be a de jure rigid designator: it should 
designate the same model at every evaluation index by linguistic-semantic 




just one but two pre-theoretically distinguishable non-specific de re readings. 
But it actually has only one such reading. 
Now the points of the foregone discussion and its results can be 
generalized to cover other taxonomic common nouns and semantically simple 
non-taxonomic common nouns. Consider the following pairs of sentences that 
are similar to the pair 1a and 1b in all the respects relevant here: 
3 a No one can speed up to 150 km/h on a car designed by Damon. 
b No one can speed up to 150 km/h on a Kia Picanto 1.0.1. 
4 a Alice does not want to drive a car designed by Damon. 
b Alice does not want to drive a Kia Picanto 1.0.1. 
5 a Alice cannot shoot at any bird held sacred by the natives. 
b Alice cannot shoot at any Red crowned crane . 
6 a Alice does not want to shoot at any bird held sacred by the natives. 
b Alice does not want to shoot at any red crowned crane. 
Each sentence in the pairs 3-6 have non-specific de re readings. The a-sentences 
involve taxonomic common nouns, they thus have two different non-specific de 
re readings. The b-sentences have only one non-specific de re reading.  
According to the C-framework both the taxonomic common nouns in the a-
sentences and semantically simple non-taxonomic common nouns in the b-
sentences cannot be rigid appliers. The b-sentences’ having only one non-
specific de re reading is explained by the simple non-taxonomic common nouns’ 
being token level appliers, and thus not generating any sortal discrepancy that 
can be resolved in two different ways.   
The K-framework will be in agreement with the C-framework as regards 
the taxonomic common nouns in the a-sentences. They are appliers but cannot 
be rigid appliers. But as regards the non-taxonomic semantically simple 




framework. According to the K-framework these latter are rather kind 
designators, and they should be de jure rigid as designators. For, if they were 
not de jure rigid, the b-sentences would have two non-specific de re readings 
instead of one; but they only have one such pre-theoretically distinguishable 
reading. 
Clearly it is possible to produce many pairs of sentences like 1 and 3-6. 
And the same points will equally apply to them. Thus, on the basis of the 
foregone discussion we can make the following generalizations. Taxonomic 
common nouns cannot be de jure rigid appliers both from the standpoint of the 
C-framework and the K-framework. Non-taxonomic semantically simple 
common nouns are token-level appliers according to the C-framework, and as 
such they too cannot be de jure rigid appliers; however according to the K-
framework non-taxonomic semantically simple common nouns are kind 
designators and as such they should be de jure rigid designators. 
So, with regard to the de jure rigidity of one important family of common 
nouns, namely semantically simple non-taxonomic common nouns, we reach 
divergent conclusions depending on whether we adopt the C-framework or the 
K-framework with regard to the general semantics of common nouns.  
This is not a surprising difference however. According to the C-framework 
non-taxonomic common nouns do not designate kinds but have predicative 
denotations that apply to particulars. If such common nouns contribute nothing 
but predicative denotations then for most of the ordinary common nouns, it is 
natural that they be non-rigid, that they have different predicative denotations 




non-taxonomic common nouns primarily designate kinds, but they can also 
contribute predicative denotations in particular level sentential contexts, which 
are derived through the application of the operator pred. The particulars which 
satisfy the predicative denotations derived through pred from the meaning of 
the simple common noun are different across possible worlds. However, all of 
these different particulars which satisfy these denotations are united in being 
the instances of the single kind constantly designated by the common noun 
relative to all possible worlds. 
We had set out to consider the behavior of common nouns in modal 
sentences to find a support for the view that one class of common nouns are 
distinctively de jure rigid. Whether we have been able to find such a support 
depend on whether we adopt the C-framework which assigns particular level 
predicative denotations to simple non-taxonomic common nouns or the K-
framework which take them to designate kinds. If we adopt the latter 
framework then the consideration of the behavior of common nouns in modal 
sentences gives us a linguistic-semantic reason to hold that simple non-
taxonomic common nouns are de jure rigid. Under C-framework however the 
consideration of the behavior of common nouns in modal sentences gives us no 
reason to single out some common nouns as de jure rigid.  
The choice between the K-framework and the C-framework relative to the 
interpretation of common nouns however depend on various issues left open in 




Now, I pass to the consideration of identity sentences with kind 
designating arguments which too prima facie have the potential to give 
linguistic-semantic reasons to single out some common nouns as de jure rigid. 
Identity Sentences 
One argument for the de jure rigidity of proper names and the non-rigidity of 
the definite descriptions was based on the identity sentences. Identity sentences 
whose arguments were proper names were found to be non-contingent. But this 
was not case for most of the strict identity sentences which had at least one 
ordinary definite description as an argument. The former type of sentences’ 
being non-contingent could be explained by the rigidity of proper names; the 
latter type of sentences’ capacity to be contingent could be explained by the 
non-rigidity of definite descriptions. Now I will consider whether a similar 
argument can be raised for a rigid/non-rigid distinction among common nouns. 
In English sentences singular count common nouns cannot figure as bare 
arguments, they should rather combine with determiners or get pluralized to 
form noun phrases that can occur as arguments. A fortiori count common nouns 
cannot figure as bare arguments of strict identity sentences. Therefore in the 
case of count common nouns it is not possible to give an argument based on 
identity sentences which is strictly similar to the one used in the case of proper 
names. Still, noun phrases formed by count common nouns can be arguments of 




argue for a rigidity/non-rigidity distinction among count common nouns, 
depending how we propose to analyze such noun phrases. 
It appears that the contingency/non-contingency divergence among 
identity sentences extend to the identities whose arguments are formed by 
noun phrases that designate kinds. Consider the following pair of sentences: 
7 a The groundhog is the rodent that has its own holiday. 
b The groundhog is the woodchuck. 
7a sounds contingent but 7b does not. This contrast is better discerned when 
these sentences are conjoined with clauses that express the relevant 
counterfactual possibilities: 
The groundhog is the rodent that has its own holiday but it might not have been so. 
The groundhog is the woodchuck but it might not have been so. 
The first one does not sound inconsistent but the second does. The non-
contingency of 7b can be explained by the rigidity of the noun phrases that 
constitute its arguments. If the groundhog has the same denotation at every 
evaluation index s and if the same is the case for the woodchuck, and moreover 
if both phrases have the same denotations at some index @, then their 
denotations should be identical at every other index as well.  The contingency 
on the other hand of 7a can be explained by the non-rigidity of one its 
arguments. Namely, if the phrase the rodent that has its own holiday does not 
have the same denotation at every evaluation index s, then even if its denotation 
at one evaluation index @ is identical to that of the groundhog, there will be 
evaluation indexes s’ at which its denotation at s’ will be different than that of 




7aA [the groundhog][[is][the rodent that has its own holiday]] 
7ai derived from 7aA: 
{λs.[the groundhog]s, {λs.λy.λx.x=y, λs.[the rodent that has its own holiday]s}} 
{λs.[the groundhog]s, λs.λx.x=[the rodent that has its own holiday]s} 
λs.[the groundhog]s=[the rodent that has its own holiday]s 
7bA [the groundhog][[is][the woodchuck]] 
7bi derived from 7bA: 
{λs.[the groundhog]s, {λs.λy.λx.x=y, λs.[the woodchuck]s}} 
{λs.[the groundhog]s, λs.λx.x=[the woodchuck]s} 
λs.[the groundhog]s=[the woodchuck]s 
Thus the contingency/non-contingency difference between the two sentences 
can be explained by the rigidity of the noun phrases the woodchuck and the 
groundhog, and the non-rigidity of the noun-phrase the rodent that has its own 
holiday. These rigidity/non-rigidity assumptions involved in these explanations 
can be further corroborated by considering the divergent behavior in modal 
sentential contexts of the woodchuck and the groundhog on the one hand and of 
the rodent that has its own holiday on the other.  
The consideration of this pair of sentences and similar such pairs support 
a rigid/non-rigid distinction among definite noun-phrases. But it is not clear 
whether it also gives us any reason to hold that the common nouns that form 
the rigid definite phrases should be rigid and those that form non-rigid definite 
phrases are non-rigid. This depends on the analysis of definite phrases, on how 
they are taken to derive their meanings from the meanings of the common 
nouns that form them. Recall from the previous chapter that the C-framework 




kind designating definite phrases, namely the definite generics; and such 
definite phrases as the groundhog and the woodchuck are definite generics.  
Now, if according to any of these analyses it turns out that the rigidity of 
definite generics depended on the rigidity of the common nouns that formed 
them, then 7a and 7b and similar such pairs can also be used to mount an 
argument for a rigid/non-rigid distinction among common nouns as well.  
Examination of the Kind-level Identity Sentences  
According to the K-framework 
Indeed relative to the K-framework the rigidity of definite generics depends on 
the rigidity of the common nouns that form them. In the previous chapter we 
have seen that such definite noun phrases as the groundhog and the woodchuck 
are kind designating definite generics. Under the K-framework non-taxonomic 
simple common nouns have kind designator meanings and the definite generics 
formed by such common nouns have the same meanings as the common nouns 
that form them. Thus under the K-framework we have, 
λs.k[the groundhog]s=λs.k[groundhog]s 
λs.k[the woodchuck]s=λs.k[woodchuck]s 
Thus for the definite generics to be rigid, the underlying common nouns have to 
be rigid. On the other hand the singular definite noun phrase the rodent that has 
its own holiday is not a definite generic. It is a taxonomic definite singular 
phrase formed by the taxonomic common noun rodent that has its own holiday. 




meanings that applied to kinds, and the article the in definite phrases other than 
definite generics were interpreted in the following manner: 
Let  of type <e,t> 
 i()=the largest individual x (under ≪) such that (x)=1 
⟦the⟧=λs.λP.i(P) 
Thus under the K-framework, 
[NP the rodent that has its own holiday]=[NP[Dthe][Nrodent that has its own holiday]] 
receives the following interpretation, 
{λs.λP.i(P),  λs.k[<e,t> rodent that has its own holiday]s} 
λs.i(k[<e,t> rodent that has its own holiday]s) 
λs.as, where for a given s, as is the largest individual x (under ≪) such that k[<e,t> rodent 
that has its own holiday]s(x)=1 
λs.as, where for a given s, as is the unique individual x such that k[<e,t> rodent that has its 
own holiday]s(x)=1, since k[<e,t> rodent that has its own holiday]s can only be satisfied 
by atoms and no atom can be larger than any other atom 
Assuming these analyses for the definite phrases involved in 7a and 7b, lets 
reconsider the interpretation of these sentences from the perspective of the K-
framework. 
7aA [NP [D the][N groundhog]][VP [V is][NP[D the][N rodent that has its own holiday]]] 
7aiK derived from 7aA under the K-framework: 
{{λs.λx.x, λs.k[e groundhog]s},{λs.λy.λx.x=y,{λs.λP.i(P),  λs.k[<e,t> r. that has its own h.]s}}} 
{λs.k[e groundhog]s, {λs.λy.λx.x=y, {λs.i(k[<e,t> rodent that has its own holiday]s)}} 
{λs.k[e groundhog]s, λs.λx.x=i(k[<e,t> rodent that has its own holiday]s)} 
λs. k[e groundhog]s=i(k[<e,t> rodent that has its own holiday]s) 
when evaluated relative to @: 





7bA [NP [D the][N groundhog]][VP [V is][NP[D the][N woodchuck]]] 
7biK derived from 7bA under the K-framework: 
{{λs.λx.x, λs.k[e groundhog]s}, {λs.λy.λx.x=y, {λs.λx.x,  λs.k[ewoodchuck]s}}} 
{λs.k[e groundhog]s, {λs.λy.λx.x=y, λs.k[e woodchuck]s}} 
{λs.k[e groundhog]s, λs.λx.x=k[e woodchuck]s} 
λs. k[e groundhog]s=k[e woodchuck]s 
when evaluated relative to @: 
 k[e groundhog]@=k[e woodchuck]@ 
Under this more detailed analysis of 7b according to the K-framework, it is seen 
that under the K-framework the non-contingency of 7b depends on the rigidity 
of the common nouns groundhog and woodchuck. On the other hand the 
contingency of 7a requires that the rodent that has its own holiday is non-rigid. 
Under the K-framework the non-rigidity of the rodent that has its own holiday is 
made plausible by the fact that the K-framework analyses it as an ordinary 
definite phrase formed by a taxonomic applier rodent that has its own holiday. 
Clearly the points made above in relation with 7a and 7b and the common 
nouns involved in them will apply also to many other similar sentence pairs. 
Thus under the K-framework consideration of the modal properties of identity 
sentences with kind level definite singular arguments gives a result that 
corroborates our previous result: according to K-framework non-taxonomic 
simple common nouns should be rigid designators. 
Examination of the Kind-level Identity Sentences According to the C-
framework 
Remember that the C-framework adopted an analysis of definite generics such 




framework. It followed Dayal (2004), according to which definite generics were 
just a special sort of taxonomic definite singular noun-phrases. 
I will now consider the contrasting pair 7a and 7b from the standpoint of 
the C-framework. I will examine whether explanation of the contrast between 
7a and 7b in terms of the rigidity/non-rigidity of the definite phrase arguments 
of the identity clauses works under the C-framework as well, and if it works 
whether it requires also to assume a rigid/non-rigid distinction among common 
nouns that form these definite phrases. 
C-framework analyses definite generics as ordinary definite taxonomic 
phrases. Let’s recall that analysis by considering the case of the groundhog. Here 
the common noun groundhog forming the definite phrase is assumed to be 
taxonomic. That is, it is assigned a kind level predicative meaning (type 
<s,<ek,t>>). According to this analysis it is assumed that the denotation of the 
taxonomic groundhog truly applied to the groundhog itself (Marmota monaxis), 
as well as its sub-species (Marmota monax candensis, Marmota monax ignava, 
Marmota monax rufescens) . That is, both Marmota monaxis is a groundhog and 
The groundhog is a groundhog are acceptable and true as well as Marmota 
monax rufescens is a groundhog . The article the in the definite generic the 
groundhog is assigned its standard interpretation, namely: 
Let  of type <e,t> 
 i()=the largest individual x (under ≪) such that (x)=1 
⟦the⟧=λs.λP.i(P) 
We have indicated that usually definite phrases manage to designate a unique 
individual although the common nouns they involve are in fact satisfied by 




predicate dc (type <s,<e,t>>) which is only true of the entities which are 
salient relative to the context utterance is implicitly involved in such definite 
phrases. 
Bearing on this contextual sensitivity of definite phrases, the C-framework 
supposes that the definite phrase the groundhog is used as a definite generic 
when such contextually determined constraints rule out the sub-species of the 
species corresponding to the common noun groundhog. Thus, when this 
happens the groundhog comes to designate the super-species Marmota monax, 
which becomes the only kind that satisfies both the taxonomic common noun 
groundhog and the contextual constraints. According to the C-framework the 
analysis of the definite generic use of the groundhog will be thus: 
[NP[Dthe][Ngroundhog]] 
{λs.λP.i(P), {λs.k[<e,t>groundhog]s, λs.dc}} 
{λs.λP.i(P), λs.λx.(k[<e,t>groundhog]s(x) & dc(x))} 
λs.i(λx.(k[<e,t>groundhog]s(x) & dc(x))) 
λs.as, where for a given s,  as is the largest individual x (under ≪) such that 
(k[<e,t>groundhog]s(x) & dc(x))=1 
λs.as, where for a given s, as is the unique individual x such that (k[<e,t>groundhog]s(x) & 
dc(x))=1, since k[<e,t> groundhog]s can only be satisfied by atoms and no atom can be 
larger than any other atom 
The assumption that in the definite generic use the contextually determined 
constraints rule out the sub-species of the groundhog amounts to the 
supposition that in the definite generic use for every possible world w, dc and 
k[<e,t>groundhog]w can be satisfied only by the super-species Marmota monax, 
the groundhog.  This in turn implies that regardless whether the underlying 
taxonomic common noun groundhog is a rigid applier or not, the definite phrase 




These same considerations will clearly apply to the woodchuck as well. 
Let’s now consider the contrast between 7a and 7b in accordance with Dayal’s 
theory of definite generics.  
Given the contextually induced rigidity of the definite phrases used as 
definite generics the C-framework can adopt an explanation of the 
contingency/non-contingency contrast between 7a and 7b in terms of 
rigidity/non-rigidity difference of the definite phrases that constitute the 
arguments in these sentences. That is, like the K-framework it too can explain 
the non-contingency of 7b in terms of the rigidity of the groundhog and the 
woodchuck which are the arguments of the identity clauses in 7b; and it can 
explain the consistency of 7a in terms of the non-rigidity of the rodent that has 
its own holiday. However under the C-framework’s analysis of definite generics 
there is no need to assume that the common nouns groundhog and woodchuck 
be rigid so as to ensure that the definite generics they form be rigid. According 
to the C-frameworks’ account the rigidity of definite generics is induced 
pragmatically.  
The idea of pragmatically induced rigidity may look implausible. But its 
validity can be confirmed, independently of the controversial case of the 
analysis definite generics, in relation with non-kind designating ordinary 
definite phrases.  Consider the following examples: 
8 a [to accomplish her assignment] Alice must interview Bob. 
b [to accomplish her assignment] Alice must interview the Google shareholder. 





8c is ambiguous. Its ambiguity can be explained due to its capacity to assume 
logical forms in which the definite phrase the youngest Google shareholder 
takes narrow scope or the wide scope relative to must and the non-rigidity of 
that definite phrase. In contrast 8a and 8b are not ambiguous, although they too 
should be able to assume similar logical forms. In the case of 8a this is explained 
by the fact that the proper name Bob is a de jure rigid designator. The same 
explanation can be extended to 8b as well, if the Google shareholder is rigid. 
That the Google shareholder can be rigid despite being a definite phrase can in 
turn be explained by reference to contextual constraints that induces rigid 
designation. Although the common noun Google shareholder is not a rigid 
applier and it can truly apply to more than one individual, it may be thought that 
in a certain use of the Google shareholder, the contextual constraints rule out 
any one which is not actually at a certain room next to the place of utterance, 
where it happens to be the case that there is only one Google shareholder. 
Conclusion of the Examination of Kind Level Identity Sentences 
In this section we have considered differences in the modal properties of 
identity sentences formed by kind level definite phrases; specifically we 
examined whether the explanation of these differences in terms of the 
rigidity/non-rigidity difference of the definite phrases required us to assume a 
rigidity/non-rigidity difference among the common nouns that formed these 
definite phrases. It turned out that if the K-framework is adopted, the 




K-framework definite generics (the groundhog, the woodchuck) were formed 
by simple non-taxonomic common nouns that had kind designator meanings 
and they had the same meanings as the common nouns that form them. 
However under the C-framework such an assumption was not required. Under 
C-framework’s analysis, definite generics are merely taxonomic definite phrases 
formed by taxonomic common nouns, and they are rigid for pragmatic reasons, 
regardless whether the taxonomic common nouns that formed them are rigid or 
not. 
So, in conformity with the previous results gathered from the examination 
of the behavior of common nouns in modal sentential contexts, provided that a 
framework like the K-framework is adopted, an argument for a rigidity/non-
rigidity distinction among common nouns can be mounted on the basis of the 
differences in the modal properties of strict identity sentences whose 
arguments are definite phrases that designate kinds. Such an argument however 
cannot be obtained if the C-framework is adopted. So, to use the differences in 
the modal properties of identity sentences to support a rigid/non-rigid 
distinction among common nouns we have to find independent reasons that 
favor the K-framework over the C-framework.  
Conclusion of the Chapter 
The result reached at the seventh chapter about the rigidity of common nouns is 
unfortunately not a strong one. At the end of the sixth chapter we singled out 




common nouns. The C-framework which assigned applier meanings to all 
common nouns and the K-framework which did the same to all common nouns 
but the semantically simple ones. Then when we tested these frameworks 
relative to sentence types which in the case of particular level noun phrases 
supported the claim that proper names are de jure rigid designators. Namely, 
modal sentences and identity sentences. The result has not been unequivocal. 
The K-framework supported a rigidity division among common nouns which 
lined along the applier/designator division adopted in that framework. But the 
C-framework could as well account for the semantics feautures of the same 
types of sententces without invoking rigidity. 
So, it indeed seems a rigidity division among common nouns sinks or 
floats depending on whether common nouns are primarily divided among 
themselves as appliers and designators. Yet, albeit inconclusive, there are 
reasons to hold the view that simple non-taxonomic common nouns and only 







The present work sought to investigate whether there is a linguistically relevant 
rigid/non-rigid division among common nouns. As such this investigation is 
closely related with the philosophical literature on the extension of the notion of 
rigidity to the case of general terms, in so far as common nouns are usually 
regarded as general terms. In the first two chapters I have described that 
literature and identified certain shortcomings and confusions. In the remaining 
chapters I pursued the goal of setting linguistic semantic arguments to justify 
ascription of de jure rigidity to some common nouns. Such arguments were 
finally set up in the seventh chapter. The discussion of the chapters from the 
third to the sixth were indispensable preliminaries to this end, but they also 
gave me occasion to improve upon the shortcomings and correct the confusions 
I previously identified in the literature. 
The main motivation behind this work has been the literature on the 
rigidity of general terms: the third lecture in Naming and Necessity and the 
subsequent literature on it. Among singular terms proper names are de jure 
rigid designators, and in that they differed from definite phrases that designated 
particulars. I wondered, like many others who contributed to that literature, 
whether among the so called general terms as well there is a similar difference, 
especially among common nouns which were at the center of Naming and 
Necessity’s third lecture. Yet, I was not convinced by any of the views defended 




these views. For this reason I myself undertook the task of determining, to my 
satisfation at least, whether the notion of de jure rigidity has any relevance with 
regard to count common nouns –an important family of terms included in the 
category of general terms.  
The literature in question focused on the issue of the rigidity of general 
terms. A semantic question about what presumably is considered as a syntactic 
category –given that whether general terms are appliers or designators was as 
well at issue. Besides common nouns and adjectives, some works have included 
nominal verb phrases (is a tiger) into the general terms and some other works 
included noun phrases (the honeybee, the color of the sky).  Now the problem 
was that the category of general terms as is understood in the literature did not 
correspond to any acknowledged linguistic-syntactic category. But the 
puzzlement generated by Naming and Necessity’s third lecture, and which 
motivated the controversy on the rigidity of general terms, was a real one. I 
believe that this puzzlement primarily pertained to Kripke’s ascription of 
rigidity to some common nouns (mainly natural kind common nouns) and his 
implicit suggestion that not all common nouns were like these. In the present 
work of the different types of terms included to the category of general terms, I 
focused on the syntactic category of common nouns (or to be more precise the 
class N-bar), I carefully and clearly distinguished them from noun phrases and 
nominal verb phrases, both syntactically and semantically.  
The literature sought to find a notion of general term rigidity which can be 
claimed to divide general terms into rigid and non-rigid parts. Most desirably 




representative works of this literature was discussed in the second chapters. 
Here is a reminder of the outlooks of the three principal camps of the literature 
on general term rigidity: 
Neither rigid application, nor rigid*-application (Devitt’s concept), nor rigid 
designation can distinguish natural kind terms among general terms in the 
appropriate way. Therefore, there is no notion of rigidity which is significant for 
general terms. 
 
If general terms are taken to include noun phrases like the color of the sky, the insect 
species typically farmed for honey then rigid designation will be a suitable notion of 
rigidity for general terms as even if all count nouns are rigid there will be such general 
terms as the color of the sky andthe insect species typically farmed for honey which are 
not rigid. 
 
If the notion of rigidity which is applicable to appliers is tweaked a little bit from 
constancy of extension to constancy of application to an individual, then the resulting 
notion –Devitt’s rigid*-application- will be a suitable notion of rigidity for general terms 
as it more or less covers all terms considered as natural kind terms, and excludes 
nominal kind terms like bachelor, hunter etc. 
The literature appears to have set finding a notion of rigidity which will divide 
general terms in some significant manner as its primary objective. The principal 
arguments were given for or against different notions of rigidity according to 
whether they divide general terms in some significant way. Yet the contributors 
have not worked as hard to justify their anwers to the questions which mode of 
denotation should be ascribed to general terms and whether some are indeed 
rigid relative to that mode of denotation (in the plain sense of constancy of 
denotation relative to different indexes of evaluation). Either the answers given 
to these questions were not justified at all; or they were justified on an intuive 
ground in a way that considered general terms in abstraction from the different 
types of sentential contexts in which they may occur.  However, without 




rigidity which is intuitively judged to divide general terms in some significant 
way is semantically relevant at all? It might turn out that, although rigid 
designation gives a division of general terms, wider consideration of the 
compositional semantics of sentences rule out the presupposition that general 
terms are designators. Or it might turn out that, although rigid*-application 
gives a significant division of general terms, there is no reason to ascribe rigid*-
application to any term to account for the truth-conditions of any sentence. 
In the present work rather than defending one or another notion of 
rigidity according to whether it divides general terms or not, I wanted to focus 
on the indicated principal questions. I did this in relation solely with common 
nouns. The fifth and the sixth chapters of the present work were concerned with 
the question which mode of denotation should be ascribed to common nouns. 
Although I have’t been able to reach a conclusive answer I have described two 
potential answers in detail, the C-framework and the K-framework; and I have 
indicated the pros and cons for these frameworks. The details pertained to the 
semantics of noun phrases formed by common nouns and they were inevitable. 
For common nouns’ contribution to the determination of truth condition is 
effected via different types of noun phrases which they headed. When a mode of 
denotation is assigned to common nouns one needs to show that this can 
support in a plausible way the types of denotations assigned to the noun 
phrases they head – a matter which was not raised at all in the literature on 
general terms’ rigidity. The seventh chapter of the present work focused in turn 




relative to the modes of denotation they have been assigned under the C-
framework and the K-framework which had been described in the sixth chapter. 
In proposing different notions of rigidity as the sought for general term 
rigidity, or in rejecting such proposals, the contributors to the literature 
inevitably made claims of rigidity or non-rigidity relative to different notions of 
rigidity. These claims have been justified merely on intuitive grounds. By 
focusing on the target term itself, in abstraction from the different types of 
sentential contexts in which the term may occur. I am not sure whether any 
claims about a supposed sub-sentence level syntactic class regarding the rigidity 
of its members can yield properly justified results by eschewing compositional 
semantic analyses grounded on syntactic theory. In relation with sub-sentential 
constituents whether rigidity obtains or not is hardly a matter that can be 
decided on intuitive grounds. For one thing how to divide different types of 
sentences into classess of recurrent syntactic constitutents is a theoretical 
matter. For another while judgements about the sentence level semantic 
features truth/falsity, ambiguity, entailement, contingency constitute the pre-
theoretical data, judgments about the semantic features of different types of 
constituents are theoretical judgments to be tested against the sentential 
semantic data.  
These matters pertaining to the justification of semantic claims about 
subsentential elements were covered in the third chapter of the present work. 
There I described how in formal semantics in the Montague tradition semantic 
claims are justified. These justifications proceed by way of induction to the best 




the semantic claims are considered to be justified to the extent that they can 
explain truth-conditions related matters better than their alternatives.  In that 
same chapter I also described the basics of a general formal semantic 
framework based on transformational generative syntax (that of Heim and 
Kratzer (1998) and Heim and Fintel (2011)). In the rest of the present work I 
adopted that framework and the methodology of formal semantic literature in 
investigating ways to justify certain semantic claims. In constructing such 
arguments I have ascribed explicit syntactic analyses to sentences, and semantic 
intepretations followed the syntactic structure in accordance with the 
compositionality principle. On the matter of these syntactic analyses I deferred 
to Heim & Kratzer (1998) and Heim & Fintel (2011), who themselves as far as 
possible aimed to follow the transformational syntax tradition. In this way, in 
the fourth chapter, I gave proper linguistic-semantic arguments to justify the 
commonly held view that proper names are de jure rigid designators – in 
relation with proper names I had not ever seen such arguments being given in 
the literature before. The arguments consisted of showing that assigning de jure 
rigidity to proper names explains an ambiguity divergence that obtains among 
modal sentences and a contingency divergence that obtains between identity 
sentences. The principal objective of the rest of the present work was to 
investigate the prospects of raising similar arguments in the case of common 
nouns. This has been done in the seventh chapter; again we considered whether 
some common nouns should be assigned de jure rigidity to explain an ambiguity 
divergence that obtains between modal sentences and a contingency divergence 




presented difficulties which did not have any counterpart in the case of proper 
names. Common nouns did not contribute to the determination of the truth-
conditions of sentences directly but by forming different types of noun phrases 
which themselves had quite variety of different types of semantic outputs. 
Hence it was not straightforward to determine neither the mode of denotation 
that should be ascribed to common nouns nor whether under that mode some 
can be claimed to be de jure rigid. After considering the variety in the semantics 
of noun phrases formed by common nouns in the fifth chapter, in the sixth 
chapter I described two ways to accommodate variety and presented arguments 
for and against them: the C-framework and the K-framework. 
Now, in concluding this work, what have I learned? I have not been able to 
determine in absolute terms that rigidity makes a difference among common 
nouns.  I have reached a conditional result. In the sixth chapter I have promoted 
the K-framework which assigns designator meanings to simple non-taxonomic 
common nouns but applier meanings to taxonomic common nouns and 
modified common noun. In the seventh chapter I have shown that if the 
semantics of noun phrases formed by common nouns are best explained by the 
K-framework or something like it, then the simple common nouns should be de 
jure rigid designators. Yet, I have not been able to establish that the K-
framework is the best game in town. The C-framework which assigns applier 
meaning to all common nouns can as well explain the semantics of noun phrases 
formed by common nouns; moreover in doing this the C-framework need not 




frameworks have certain advantages over one another, but I don’t think that 
these should lead to a conclusive vindication of the one over the other. 
Still this result, is not uninformative with regard to the question that 
motivated this work. The result suggests that either all common nouns should 
be treated appliers and rigidity does not make a difference among them; or 
among common nouns only simple common nouns should treated as 
designators and as such only them are de jure rigid; and both treatments of the 
common nouns are reasonably well supported in equal extent. And I think we 
can be confident in this result. In working out the semantics of noun phrases 
formed by common nouns using the acknowledged general approach of formal 
semantics one will have to ascribe either kind designator meanings or applier 
meanings to common nouns. The C-framework and the K-framework are 
considerably worked out and reasonably supported ways to this. And the 
consideration of modal sentences’ ambiguity divergence and identity sentences’ 
contingency divergence appear to be the sure ways to determine whether 
rigidity makes a difference among terms of any syntactic class. 
The reader who is versed in the relevant literature may yet question the 
value of this conclusion. All parties of the controversy on the rigidity of general 
terms were already considering a similar view and reacting to it. In the second 
chapter I have reported that almost every work contributing to the controversy 
begun by stating the following: either general terms are designators and as such 
they are all rigid, or they are appliers and as such virtually none are rigid (I 
mean, in the sense of rigid application, and not in the sense of Devitt’s rigid*-




inheres the important problems stated in the introduction and in the second 
chapter, and again briefly recounted above. And relative to that literature which 
motivated it, I believe that the present work represents a clear improvement for 





DETAILED CRITICAL PRESENTATION OF PAPERS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
PRINCIPAL VIEWS DEFENDED IN THE CONTROVERSY ON GENERAL TERM 
RIGIDITY 
In this appendix I will give detailed discussions of five much cited papers 
representing the three main positions in the controversy on general terms. 
These are Schwartz (1980), LaPorte (2002), Salmon (2005), Devitt (2005) and 
Schwartz (2002).  Each discussion will touch some of the critical points already 
raised in the second chapter. But now I will argue for these points in a more 
detailed manner.  
In my discussion of Schwartz (1980) I will consider the issue whether the 
rigidity property to be extended to the case of common nouns should 
distinguish natural kind common nouns from the rest as is commonly expected. 
I will claim that this expectation requires us to take being a natural kind noun to 
be a linguistic semantic property which is determined by language itself. But if 
this is the case then we should be ready to acknowledge the possibility of there 
being natural kind nouns which do not referentially correspond to genuine 
natural kinds. 
In my discussion of LaPorte (2000) I will argue that from rigidity/non-
rigidity of such noun phrases as the honeybee/the insect species typically 
farmed for honey one cannot directly derive any conclusions as to the 
rigidity/non-rigidity of the common nouns that form them honeybee/insect 




In discussing Salmon (2005) I will consider the question whether such 
noun phrases as the color of the sky can be considered to be general terms. In 
relation with this question I will problematize the dichotomy general 
term/singular term, and suggest that we will be better off without it. 
In discussing Devitt (2005) I will argue that rigid* application that is 
instantiated due to the metaphysical profiles of the entities an applier denotes 
(de facto rigid* application) is not of interest in relation with the controversy on 
the rigidity of general terms. I will consider the question whether there are de 
jure rigid* appliers. I will argue that this is in principle possible, but that it is 
unlikely that we have any in natural languages.   
Finally in my discussion on Schwartz (2002) I will have occasion to argue 
against Schwartz’ criticisms that kinds as designata have no place in semantic 
theorizing and that those who, like Salmon (2005) and LaPorte (2002), take 
common nouns to be kind designators and ascribe rigidity to them are 
mistaking constancy of meaning across evaluation indexes for rigid designation. 
Natural Kind Nouns and Rigidity: Schwartz (1980) 
We have above related that in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity  Kripke 
claimed that common nouns for natural kinds are like proper names, and also 
that he explicitly assigned the property of rigid designation to the common 
nouns light, heat and gold. Given the overall discussion in which these explicit 
claims were laid, Kripke has been taken to imply to claim the existence of a 




water, heat  and other common nouns such as bachelor, sailor, and to take rigid 
designation to be a part of this difference. In fact, the paper we are about to 
present, Schwartz (1980), go as far as to suggest that according to Kripke the 
difference between natural kind common nouns and other common nouns 
amounts to nothing but a linguistic-semantic difference (195-196). 
Schwartz (1980) is a criticism of an earlier paper by Fabrizio Mondadori 
(1978), which discusses and formally attempts to capture two common ways in 
which the alleged semantic difference between common nouns for natural kinds 
and other common nouns has been conceived. 
One of these ways is to take natural kind common nouns to be rigid 
designators. The other way is to take natural kind common nouns to be rigid*-
appliers. (A rigid*-applier is to be understood as a term T such that if T applies 
truly (falsely) to x relative to a possible world w then T truly applies to x 
relative to any possible world w’ relative to which x exists. Count common 
nouns for natural kinds such as tiger, cow, cat appear to be rigid*-appliers, in 
contrast with other common nouns such as bachelor, sailor, conductor etc.)126  
Mondadori seeks to formally capture these two alleged distinctive 
properties of natural kind common nouns simultaneously. He describes a formal 
way couched in possible world semantics to interpret natural kind common 
nouns both as de jure rigid designators and as de jure rigid*-appliers. 
                                                        
126 By referring to a footnote in Naming and Necessity Schwartz (1980) suggests that Kripke 
might as well have entertained such a difference alongside rigid designation. Later, the property 
of rigid*-application has been adopted by Cook (1980) and Devitt (2005) as the property of 




First, Mondadori proposes to associate with common nouns for natural 
kinds constant semantic intensions of type <s,<s,<e,t>>> and to identify kinds 
with intensions of type <s,<e,t>>. Given these assumptions, the semantic 
intension of a natural kind common noun like tiger will yield as its denotation 
the same kind relative to each possible world (and that kind will be an intension 
of type <s,<e,t>>). Thus, natural kind nouns will be rigid designators.127  
Note that according to Mondadori’s proposal, in the interpretation of a 
natural kind common noun relative to an evaluation index s, the index s will 
function as an argument twice. Let’s illustrate this relative to the case of the 
noun tiger. First, s will be an argument for the intension of tiger to yield tigers’s 
designatum relative to s, which will be an intension of type <s,<e,t>>. Second, s 
will be an argument for the designatum of tiger relative to s, to yield a 
predicative function of type <e,t> which determines which tokens tiger is true 
of relative to s. 
Second, to get the result that natural kind common nouns also be rigid*-
appliers, Mondadori assigns a peculiar property to the intensions of type 
<s,<e,t>> identified with natural kind: for each such intension N of type 
<s,<e,t>>, there is a set ΩN such that that relative to any evaluation index s, N 
yields a predicative function of type <e,t> which maps to truth only the 
entitites which are in the ΩN∩D(s) (D(s) is the quantification domain for the 
                                                        
127 Although I have resolved to use designate for denotations of type e, and according to 
Mondadori’s proposal natural kind common nouns’ denotations are of of type <s,<e,t>>, to 
keep my terminology in line with that used by Mondadori and Schwartz in this section I will use 
designate to express the denotation relation that holds between a Mondadori-kind and a natural 




evaluation index s).  To see what will be the upshot of assigning this property to 
natural kinds taken as intensions, let’s consider the case of the kind panthera 
tigris (assuming it that it is a natural kind). According to Mondadori’s proposal x 
is an instance of panthera tigris relative to s if and only if relative to s panthera 
tigris yields a predicative function that maps x to truth. If relative to s panthera 
tigris yields a predicative function that maps x to truth, then x∈ (Ωpantheratigris ∩ 
D(s)) and a fortiori x∈ Ωpantheratigris. Now, let s’ be another evaluation index such 
that x∈ D(s’). Then, if x is an instance of panthera tigris relative to s, then it 
follows that x is an instance of panthera tigris relative to s’ as well. So, if 
something might be an instance of panthera tigris, then it cannot fail to be an 
instance of panther tigris so long as it exists.  
Now, given that according to Mondadori tiger rigidly designates the kind 
panthera tigris it follows that if tiger truly applies to a thing x relative to an 
evaluation index s, then it will as well truly apply to x relative to any other 
evaluation index s’ in which x exists (i.e. x∈D(s’)); and thus tiger will be a rigid*-
applier. For, tiger truly applies to a thing x relative to an evaluation index s if 
and only if x is an instance of panthera tigris relative to s; and given Mondadori’s 
assumption about natural kinds, an instance of panthera tigris relative to an 
evaluation index s cannot fail to be panthera tigris relative to another evaluation 
index s’ so long as it exists at s’.  
What Schwartz finds fault with Mondadori (1978) is not as much 
Mondadori’s formalization attempt targeting natural kind common nouns that 
are both rigid designators and rigid*-appliers as Mondadori’s supposition that 




two respects. Accordingly, Schwartz gives separate criticisms of the 
suppositions that natural kind common nouns are distinctively rigid designators 
and that natural kind common nouns are distinctively rigid*-appliers. 
First let’s consider Schwartz’ objection to distinguish between natural 
kind common nouns and other common nouns in terms of rigid designation. 
Schwartz questions whether there is any semantic-theoretic reason for 
stipulating a difference with respect to rigid designation between natural kind 
common nouns and other common nouns. If rigid designation is to be a 
distinctive feature of natural kind common nouns among common nouns then 
other common nouns should not be rigid designators. Mondadori himself rightly 
points out that the valid theoretic reason to stipulatively assign to a category of 
terms the property of rigid designation should be the need to make such a 
stipulation to give a satisfactory explanation of the way we evaluate talk about 
possible state of affairs (specifically, the counter factual talk). But Schwartz 
argues that that both natural kind common nouns and other common nouns can 
be taken to be rigid designators without thereby failing to explain anything 
about the way we evaluate counterfactual talk. 
In line with what we have already pointed in previous section on Kripke, 
Schwartz indicates that if all common nouns are taken to designate kinds, then 
there seems to be no semantic reason to assign non-natural kind common nouns 
variable intensions.  There seems to be no counterfactual sentential contexts 
which will require us to say for example that the non-natural kind common 
noun bachelor should be taken to denote a kind which is different than the kind 




that in any description of a counterfactual situation bachelor will designate the 
same kind as it does relative to the actual states of affairs. Schwartz’ argument 
for rigid designation’s failure to distinguishing natural kind common nouns 
from other common nouns consist of the consideration of such examples as If I 
have been a lawyer I would be richer; he points that in such sentences the non-
natural kind common noun lawyer should be taken to designate the same kind 
as in sentences that pertains to the actual states of affairs. 
Now let’s consider Schwartz’ objection to distinguishing between natural 
kind common nouns and other common nouns in terms of rigdi*-application. If 
there is such a distinction then non-natural kind common nouns such as lawyer 
should not be rigid*-appliers. As Schwartz notes which type of intension is to be 
assigned to non-natural kind common nouns such as lawyer is left unspecified 
by Mondadori; but however this is done, it should be stipulatively ensured that 
there is not a set Ωlawyer associated with lawyer such that lawyer is true of some 
x relative to an evaluation index s, if and only if x∈ Ωlawyer∩D(s). Clearly whether 
a noun  is a rigid*-applier or not crucially depends on the existence of such a 
set Ω. Under Mondadori’s proposal, the existence of such a set associated with 
each natural kind common noun is a consequence of Mondadori’s assumptions 
that such common nouns are rigid designators for natural kinds and that natural 
kinds each have such sets associated with them which determines their 
extensions relative to possible worlds. This last assumption is a strong 
metaphysical thesis that entails that any instance of a natural kind is necessarily 




First, Schwartz indicates that it might be plausibly argued that that 
assumption is trumped by the kinds corresponding to such nouns as frog and 
butterfly. Neither a frog nor a butterfly are necessarily so, as it is possible that 
they perish before turning into a frog or butterfly. This criticism can however be 
responded by denying that frog and butterfly are natural kind terms when they 
are used to refer to the mature stage in the lives of the corresponding species, 
rather than the species themselves.  
The second criticism of Schwartz targeting the metaphysical assumption 
in question is that granting it would make whether a kind is a natural kind and a 
fortiori whether a noun is a natural kind noun matters dependent on non-
linguistic facts. To decide whether K is a natural kind or not we have to 
ascertain whether it is possible for instances of K not to be K. According to 
Schwartz this is objectionable because he thinks that whether a common noun 
is a natural kind noun or not should solely be a linguistic matter (195-196).  
This last criticism by Schwartz appears on the face of it an implausible one. 
It seems that whether a kind we pre-theoretically identify on the basis of 
phenomenal properties is a natural kind or merely a nominal kind that consists 
of prima facie similar instances of disparate natural kinds is of course an 
empirical matter. A fortiori whether a noun designates a natural kind, and thus 
is a natural kind noun, clearly depends on empirical facts –a case in point would 
be the noun jade which turned out to be used in relation with two distinct 
minerals, and is still used in this way. 
However Schwartz appears to attack the right bush, if not exactly from the 




kind it corresponds to is a natural kind or not, and if whether a kind is a natural 
kind or not depends on non-linguistic facts then whether a noun is a rigid*-
applier or not cannot be a matter that is of interest for semantic theorizing. 
Rigid*-application that depends on non-linguistic facts would be de facto rigid*-
application, whereas semantic theorizing is primarily interested in de jure 
semantic properties. De jure semantic properties, like the rigid designation for 
proper names, are instantiated by a category of terms solely due to the general 
design of the language: proper names are not rigid designators because of the 
nature of the entities they designate; the instantiation of de facto linguistic 
properties like the rigidity of the even prime number on the other hand does not 
solely depend on the design of the language: that definite phrase is a rigid 
designator because the entity it designates, the integer 2, is necessarily even and 
prime. 
This should suffice as a critical presentation of what Schwartz (1980)’s 
discussion of Mondadori (1978). Mondadori’s paper was an interesting attempt 
to formulate how natural kind common nouns can simultanously bear two 
semantic properties that were commonly attributed to them and thought to 
distinguish them from other common nouns. Mondadori simply assumed these 
commonly held views and did not endeavor to argue that natural kind common 
nouns indeed had these properties and had them distinctively. Schwartz 
(1980)’s criticism rather aims what has been simply assumed by Mondadori, 
namely the view that natural kind common nouns are distinctively rigid 





Schwartz’s discussion of Mondadori’s paper does not show that rigidity, 
understood as rigid designation or rigid*-application or as the conjunction of 
both is theoretically significant from a linguistic point of view. It only shows that 
these properties fail to determine the putative class of natural kind nouns. 
Perhaps, from a linguistic semantic point of view there is no difference between 
nouns that are categorized as natural kind nouns and those which are not 
categorized as such. Or perhaps, as Schwartz holds there is such a difference but 
it is not one that can be captured by means of the formal semantics. It may still 
very well be the case that rigidity under one formulation or another may be a 
semantically significant property. A more extensive investigation of the 
semantics of common nouns may reveal that a certain class of nouns which does 
not just include natural kind nouns should be assumed to be de jure rigid so that 
we can explain certain aspects of the truth-conditions assigned to modal 
sentences. Even if it turns out that all nouns have to be attributed de jure 
rigidity to account for the truth-conditions patterns that obtain, rigidity will not 
be completely devoid of semantic significance, in so far as it will still be relevant 
in the explanation of the way we evaluate modal sentences. 
Surprisingly however, Schwartz (1980) thinks that his discussion on 
Mondadori (1978) which demonstrates that rigid designation and rigid*-
application fail to capture the category of natural kind nouns discredits also the 
ascriptions of these properties to common nouns.  
Schwartz’ negative verdict concerning the relevance of rigid designation 
and rigid*-application in relation with the semantics of common nouns depends 




Kripke’s discussion in Naming and Necessity that just as in the realm of singular 
terms de jure rigid designation distinguishes proper names from definite 
description, in the realm of general terms some sort of rigidity distinguishes 
natural kind nouns from nominal kind nouns. This impression strengthened by 
the authority of Kripke is responsible for the supposition that any proposal of a 
rigidity property applicable to general terms, and specifically to common nouns 
should be able to distinguish natural kind nouns from nominal kind nouns, and 
otherwise it will not be warranted.  
This supposition has the following interesting corollary. If some sort of de 
jure rigidity determines the category of natural kind terms, then being a natural 
kind term should be linguistic semantic property that can be ascertained a 
priori on linguistic grounds. Schwartz explicitly accepts this corollary. We have 
seen that interestingly Schwartz (1980) assumes that being a natural kind 
common noun is a de jure linguistic property and for this reason rejects 
Mondadori’s proposal to identify that property as rigid*-application; because 
Mondadori makes the instantiation of that last property by a noun dependent 
on the non-linguistic question whether the kind it designates can be 
contingently instantiated.  
Often proposals of rigidity properties are assesssed as to whether they can 
distinguish the so called natural kind nouns such as tiger, gold from such nouns 
as bachelor, hunter due to the commonly held opinion that de jure rigidity is the 




common nouns.128 As a result proposals for general term rigidity are being 
rejected without any regard to as to whether the rejected proposals present a 
theoretical value in the explanation of the way we evaluate sentences. 
To problematize this opinion let’s now briefly consider its corollary that 
being a natural kind noun should be a linguistic-semantic property 
ascertainable on linguistic grounds. 
It seems that each natural kind common noun should have a unique 
corresponding genuine natural kind with which it is referentially related. Such a 
correspondence can be formulated in different ways depending on the mode of 
denotation we ascribe to common nouns. If common nouns are designators then 
we can take a common noun to correspond to a natural kind if and only it rigidly 
designates it. Or if common nouns are appliers we can take a common noun to 
correspond to a natural kind if and only if its intension is the same as the 
metaphysical intension of a natural kind (setting the metaphysical intension of a 
natural kind to be the actual and possible tokens of that kind). Yet it appears 
that to maintain, like Schwartz does, the view that being a natural kind noun is a 
linguistic semantic property, we have to forego to require that natural kind 
common nouns have corresponding natural kind. For, whether a common noun 
has a corresponding natural kind does not seem to be a merely linguistic-
semantic matter; and many nouns which Schwartz, and many philosophers of 
language are prone to label as natural kind nouns may be argued on non-
linguistic grounds to lack corresponding natural kinds.  
                                                        




Nouns for kinds of living beings are typically regarded as natural kind 
nouns. For example, the noun tiger is a stable fixture in discussions about 
natural kind nouns and rigidity. Apparently the noun tiger has a corresponding 
natural kind, namely the species Panthera tigris. Yet, there are plausible reasons 
not to regard biological taxa as natural kinds.129 Moreover even if we take 
scientific taxa to be genuine natural kinds no matter what, then whether a noun 
has a natural kind that referentially corresponds to it becomes a matter of hard 
science. For example, from a linguistic perspective the noun hawk  does not look 
much different that the noun tiger. Yet there is not a biologically acknowledged 
taxon that corresponds to it. The noun hawk happens to apply to tokens of 
species that fall under different genera. And there are many nouns like hawk 
which look like a natural kind noun but fails to correspond to a scientifically 
recognized taxon. 
If being natural kind noun is a linguistic semantic property, then whether a 
noun instantiates that property or not should be determined on the basis of 
linguistic semantic judgments deriving from linguistic competence, and 
metaphysical or scientific issues about natural kinds should be irrelevant. But 
then in so far as whether a noun referentially corresponds to a natural kind is 
not a matter that can be resolved by reference to judgments deriving from 
linguistic competence, we cannot simultaneously hold that being a natural kind 
noun is a linguistic semantic property and that each natural kind noun has to 
have a natural kind that referentially corresponds to it. 
                                                        
129 On this matter the reader can check the SEP entry, ‘Species’ (Ereshefsky 2010) and the 




If, due to regarding being a natural kind noun a linguistic semantic 
property, we cannot require a natural kind noun to referentially correspond to a 
natural kind we should be ready to acknowledge that some natural kind nouns 
may not have corresponding natural kinds. So be it one may think. But then 
what we will have to include under the category of natural kind nouns may not 
be limited with such nouns as hawk and jade. We should be open to the 
possibility that such nouns as Iphone4s, wine, kykeon130 and more 
controversially even such nouns as bachelor, pallbearer, hunter may have to be 
included. If being a natural kind noun is a linguistic semantic property the 
arbiter will be whether nouns like the latter examples manifest the same 
linguistic semantic profile as the one common to nouns like gold, tiger, electron, 
frog, butterfly and one cannot appeal to considerations regarding whether the 
noun referentially corresponds to a natural kind.  
We indicated that the expectation that the property of de jure rigidity 
should underlie the determination of the class of natural kind nouns obliges one 
to accept that that class is determined solely on linguistic semantic grounds. 
Once this is accepted however one cannot require that natural kind nouns 
referentially correspond to genuine natural kinds. Then, the criticism raised 
against the rigid designation proposal for general term rigidity131 by pointing 
that it fails to determine the putative class of natural kind nouns is weaker than 
it appears to be. That criticism cannot proceed for example by indicating that 
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131 The proposal defended by Salmon (1981), LaPorte (2000) and Salmon (2005) besides 




that proposal attributes rigidity to such a noun as bachelor but that noun is not 
a natural kind noun because it does not referentially correspond to a natural 
kind. It has to show that such a noun as bachelor, regardless whether it 
referentially corresponds to a natural kind or not, have a different semantic 
profile than the putatively clear examples of natural kind nouns such as tiger, 
gold, electron.  
Returning to Schwartz (1980), let me conclude with the following 
remarks. That paper aimed to show that neither rigid designation nor rigid*-
application nor their conjunction can be the de jure semantic property that 
allegedly distinguished natural kind common nouns from other common nouns; 
but other authors whose works we will present below do not all share or at 
least are not primarily motivated by the view that that there is linguistic-
semantic difference between natural kind nouns and other nouns; they rather 
simply seek to find a theoretically significant de jure semantic difference among 
general terms that is analogous to the one generated by rigid designation among 
the so called singular terms –names, definite phrases and pronouns. 
Still as natural kind common nouns are generally regarded as general 
terms Schwartz (1980) belongs to the controversy on the rigidity of general 
terms, and has often been cited in other works that belonged to that 
controversy. Moreover the property of rigid designation or the property of 
rigid*-application with which Schwarz’ paper was concerned continued to be 
proposed by other authors as the rigidity property that gives a theoretically 




regardless whether that division corresponded also to the alleged division 
between natural kind common nouns and other common nouns. 
General Terms Are Designators, Some Are Rigid, Some Are Not: 
LaPorte (2000)  
Joseph LaPorte (2000) appears to be motivated by the issues raised by Kripke’s 
extension of the application of the property of rigid designation to the cases of 
common nouns and adjectives. LaPorte (2000) seems to give a defense of the 
view that nouns such as honeybee, bumblebee, water are rigid designators, 
against the criticism that under this view rigidity ceases to be a semantically 
significant property for common nouns. Remember that according to that 
criticism if we take such terms as honeybee, bumblebee, water to be designators 
for kinds, we should do the same for any common noun including such nouns as 
bachelor, unmarried male etc., and if we do so, any common noun will have to 
be admitted as rigid designators, as they do not seem to designate different 
kinds when they are used to talk about possible states of affairs than those they 
designate relative to the actual states of affairs.   
LaPorte formulates the criticism he argues against and his own position 
not exactly in the terms we did here however. Strikingly, he does not use the 
semantically neutral labels such as general term, general noun, common noun at 
all to refer to such terms as honeybee, bumblebee, water.  Instead he lays out 
the position he argues against and his own position by using the label kind 
designator to refer to such terms. According to his formulation, the position he 




trivializes the property of rigidity in relation with kind designators. He cites the 
Schwartz (1980) as a proponent of that position.132  LaPorte’s own position is 
that rigidity is not trivialized thereby, because there are kind designators which 
are not rigid. 
LaPorte admits that rigid kind designators do not only include natural 
kind nouns but also such nouns as bachelor, soda which rigidly designate 
nominal kinds. Still he argues that there are non-rigid kind designators as well. 
In this vein, by way of example, he contrasts the honeybee and with the insect 
species that is typically farmed for honey. He argues, on intuitive grounds, that 
latter term is not a rigid designator: relative to the actual states of affairs the 
honeybee is the insect species that is typically farmed for honey; thus, relative 
to the actual states of affairs the insect species that is typically farmed for honey 
designates the honeybee; but it might have been the case that the insect species 
that is typically farmed for honey was not the honeybee, but the bumblebee; 
relative to such a possible state of affairs, the insect species that is typically 
farmed for honey will designate the bumblebee. Another pair of kind 
                                                        
132 Strictly speaking Schwartz (1980)’s position was that there is a linguistic-semantic 
distinction between natural kind nouns and other nouns and that rigid designation does not 
capture that difference. The way LaPorte presents Schwartz (1980)’s position it sounds as if 
Schwartz (1980) held that there was a notion of rigidity, different from rigid designation, and 
which corresponded to the alleged semantic difference between natural kind nouns and other 
nouns; and that Schwartz argued against taking natural kind nouns to be rigid designators 
because rigid designation cannot be the appropriate rigidity and thus is theoretically 
insignificant. In fact Schwartz (1980) considers the possible view that that rigid designation be 
considered as the property that distinguishes common nouns (natural kind or not) from other 
general terms; Schwartz (1980) dismisses this view because he thinks that common nouns seem 
to form a heterogenous category, and that further arguments dealing with different types of 
common nouns are needed to extend rigid designation beyond the case of natural kind common 
nouns to other nouns, as “until such arguments are given we have no reason to suppose that 
since it is helpful to think some nouns as rigid designators that it is illuminating to see all nouns 
in this way” (197). Note that the stated reason for the dismissal is not that under the dismissed 




designators he contrasts in this vein are soda and the beverage my uncle 
requests at Superbowl parties. 
LaPorte also notes that the rigid/non-rigid division among kind 
designators has the same level of theoretical interest as the rigidity of proper 
names and the non-rigidity of definite descriptions for particulars. Given that 
such kind designators as the honeybee and Apis mellifera are rigid, we can 
argue that the identity sentence Apis mellifera is the honeybee is necessary, 
given that it is true. But the same is not case for the none the less true Apis 
mellifera is the insect species that is typically farmed for honey.  
In relation with LaPorte (2000) I will here consider two objections. One is 
an objection which was in fact anticipated and responded to by LaPorte, and 
which due its recurrence in the literature I cannot ignore here, although as I will 
argue below it is completely ineffective. The other objection is one which I 
curiously have not seen raised in the relevant literature concerns the very 
relevance of LaPorte (2000)’s discussion to the issues raised by Kripke 
extension of the property of rigidity to the case of common nouns and 
adjectives. 
LaPorte formulates the following objection against his position, which 
later have been taken up by its opponents. In formulating it he uses the term the 
beverage my uncle requests at Superbowl parties which he argues to be non-
rigid. This objection begins by supposing there that is a kind which is 
instantiated in any world w exactly by the beverage my uncle requests at 
superbowl parties at w. This kind is termed as BMURASP. More specifically, 




instantiated by x at w iff x is requested at Superbowl parties by my uncle at w. 
Then, it is asserted that the beverage my uncle requests at Superbowl parties 
mat be taken to designate BMURASP and to do so rigidly. Since the same can be 
said of other kind designators which LaPorte claims to be non-rigid, it is argued 
that LaPorte’s claim that rigidity is not a trivial property in relation with kind 
designators is untenable, unless LaPorte shows that there are not such kinds as 
BMURASP.  
LaPorte response to this argument is two-tiered. First he notes that a 
similar argument can be raised against the rigid/non-rigid division among 
concrete object designators –i.e. against the rigidity/non-rigidity difference 
between proper names and definite descriptions for particulars. In this vein, he 
refers to Sidel (1992)’s suggestion that there might be an entity, named Prez  
which at any time t is constituted by the temporal part at t of the person who is 
the president of US during t. Then LaPorte indicates that given such an entity, 
the president of US  can be taken to rigidly designate it. The point LaPorte 
intends to mark with this example is that if metaphysical oddities are to be 
allowed, it is not just the rigid/non-rigid division among kind designators that 
becomes objectionable, but also the more intuitively compelling difference in 
that respect between the proper names and definite descriptions.  
In the second part of his response, LaPorte notes that it is evident that we 
can use such terms as the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties to 
designate a specific kind of beverage such as coke or soda or coffee, instead of 
BMURASP; thus if it is accepted there are such kinds as BMURASP, then such 




taken to be ambiguous. So, even if BMURASP is accepted to exist, LaPorte would 
have shown that there are some kind designators which under one established 
way of using them are not rigid designators. 
I think that this objection is responded very concisely, effectively and even 
granting that such kinds as BMURASP exists, by pointing at how we evaluate 
sentences which involve the term the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl 
parties: 
1 a The beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties is coffee. 
Evidently 1a can be used to produce a true utterance. In the mouth of someone 
whose uncle prefers to drink coffee at superbowl parties 1a will be true. But if, 
as the hypothetical objector against LaPorte’s position holds, the beverage my 
uncle requests at superbowl parties designated BMURASP there would not be 
such a reading; coffee is clearly a different kind than the abstruse BMURASP. So, 
as LaPorte points out in the second part of its response it is beyond doubt that 
the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties is not always used to 
designate BMURASP. Now, is it ever used to designate BMURASP? At this point 
the ball is back at the objector. She has to give us examples the truth-conditions 
of which cannot be accounted for unless the beverage my uncle requests at 
superbowl parties designates such a kind as BMURASP. None of the objectors 
who later have taken up this objection which LaPorte has raised against himself 
has ever given such an example. I don’t know of any such examples myself, apart 
from the sentences which these objectors use to formulate this very objection. 
But as Inan (2008) points out, in these formulations these objectors do not use 




rather resort to italicized or hypheaneated forms of it so that the reader can 
figure out that something other than the usual designatum is intended. So, 
arguably, even in their formulation of the objection the usual English definite 
phrase the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties is not ever used to 
designate BMURASP. 
So, LaPorte is certainly right as regards the definite phrase the beverage 
my uncle requests at superbowl parties. Even if such an abstruse kind as 
BMURASP is accepted to exist the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl 
parties will rarely, and I dare say never, be used to designate it. However, note 
that the same cannot be said of the modified common noun beverage my uncle 
requests at superbowl parties drawing on the arguments LaPorte deploys. 
LaPorte is committed to the thesis that any common noun, including natural 
kind common nouns such as tiger, water as well as nominal kind common nouns 
such bachelor, hunter are kind designators. Moreover he is ready to 
acknowledge that all common nouns are rigid designators. He does not say 
anything explicit about modified common nouns such as unmarried adult male. 
However, unless he finds cogent reasons to semantically distinguish between 
the denotation types of simple common nouns and modified common nouns, it 
will apparently be more consistent for him treat bachelor and unmarried adult 
male alike and thus take both to be rigid designators. But then he apparently has 
to do the same about the common noun beverage my uncle requests at 
superbowl parties; and what else will this common noun rigidly designate other 




This may be thought to be a non-problem for LaPorte. He anyway did not 
ever claim that there were non-rigid common nouns. He only has contended 
that some kind designators are non-rigid, and on this point he is definitely right, 
the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties is certainly a non-rigid 
kind designator. However, is not there supposed to be a relation between the 
denotation of the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties under its 
non-rigid use and the denotation of the modified common noun beverage my 
uncle requests at superbowl parties that forms it? What is this relation exactly? 
Obviously LaPorte cannot claim that they will have the same denotation –i.e. 
designate the same entity- if the latter designates BMURASP. But the pair 
honeybee and the honeybee are readily taken by LaPorte to designate the same 
kind. LaPorte’s account runs here into issues the resolution of which will 
require a deeper and more extensive consideration of the semantics of common 
nouns and the noun phrases formed by them than he deploys in his article 
Now, I return to my main objection against LaPorte (2000) which 
concerns the extent of its relevance with regard to the intriguing issues raised 
by Kripke’s extension of the property of rigidity to cases adjectives and common 
nouns. Let’s first remember these issues. Kripke apparently hold the view that 
natural kind nouns such as tiger, cat, lightning, light, gold, cow ,heat  and some 
related adjectives such as hot  are rigid designators. He did not however make 
any explicit claim to that effect. He ascribed rigid designation explicitly only to 
the nouns heat, light and gold. But he claimed that natural kind common nouns 
and some corresponding adjectives were name like. This claim has been, 




highlighted in his discussion were semantically different from other nouns and 
adjectives, and that difference was de jure rigid designation. Setting aside the 
absence of a clear proper justification for it, this implied claim seemed 
problematic in itself. If such nouns and adjectives were taken to be rigid 
designators for the appropriate type of kinds/properties then there does not 
seem to be any reason to avoid to make the same stiplulation with regard to all 
nouns and adjectives, and not just those for natural kinds and properties (in talk 
about possible states of affairs any adjective or common noun prima facie 
appear to pertain to the same kinds or properties they supposedly pertain to in 
talk about the actual states of affairs). If on the other hand natural kind common 
nouns were taken to be appliers then apparently none of the natural kind nouns 
singled out as rigid by Kripke would be rigid appliers (remember, There might 
have been a tiger different than every tiger ).  
On this background let’s reconsider what LaPorte has argued for? He 
argued that such noun phrases as the Honeybee and Soda are rigid designators 
whereas such definite noun phrases as the insect species typically harmed for 
honey and the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties are not. He 
concluded that the property of rigidity is therefore not without significance in 
relation with kind designators as there are rigid ones as well as non-rigid ones.  
Now, it seems that LaPorte discussion does not target the right sort of 
terms to be relevant with regard to the issues raised by Kripke’s implied claim 
in question. That claim is about a semantic difference among common nouns 
and among adjectives, and identifies that semantic difference as de jure rigid 




syntactic predicates but cannot form syntactic arguments. Whereas what 
LaPorte argues for is a semantic difference among noun phrases; that is terms 
that can form syntactic arguments but, usually cannot form syntactic predicates.  
LaPorte would have relieved us of what primarily intrigued us about 
Kripke’s implied claim, if he had shown a rigidity/non-rigidity contrast between 
the common noun honeybee and the modified noun insect species typically 
farmed for honey or the common noun soda and the modified common noun 
beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties  but he instead set out to 
contrast the noun phrases the honeybee and the insect species typically farmed 
for honey, and soda and the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties.  
He would have relieved us also, if the distinction between common nouns 
and the noun phrases formed by them was only a syntactic matter with no 
semantic dimension; then what LaPorte (2000) accomplished would directly 
have relevance about what primarily interested us. But as I have already 
indicated that syntactic distinction is not devoid of semantic dimension. This is 
more blatantly so in relation with definite noun phrases such as the honeybee 
and the common nouns that form them such as honeybee. For example, the 
definite noun phrase the honeybee can be used to designate the contextually 
salient honeybee token. But the common noun honeybee whether it be taken to 
be a designator or an applier cannot be used to designate contextually salient 
honeybee tokens. Of course, LaPorte focuses on a different established way of 
using the definite noun phrase the honeybee: its so called definite generic use to 
designate a kind. Yet still, from the fact that the definite generic the honeybee 




designates the same kind. It is possible to maintain that honeybee is an applier 
with unsaturated predicative denotations of type <e,t>, while taking the 
definite generic the honeybee to be a rigid kind designator. In the literature on 
the semantics of noun phrases formed by common nouns, there are several 
different accounts of definite generic phrases that exactly do this.133 For 
example, it can be argued that besides the the occurring in ordinary definite 
phrases, there is another the occurring in definite generics. This latter the can 
be taken to be an operator on the intensions of appliers, that is on intensions P^ 
of type <s,<e,t>>:  
the(P^)= the kind k such that ∀s∀x(x instantiates k at s ≡P^(s)(x)) 
the(λs.[honeybee]s)= the kind k such that ∀s’∀x(x instantiates k at s’ 
≡[honeybee]s’(x)) 
That is, the can be taken to be an operator that maps the predicative intension 
of a common noun to the kind the metaphysical intension of which coincides 
with that predicative intension. Note that under such a treatment, definite 
generic phrases will still be rigid designators, as what they designate will solely 
depend on the intension of the common nouns that form them, and the 
intensions of nouns do not vary relative to evaluation indexes (they rather 
encapsulate how the denotations vary relative to these indexes). So, to return to 
LaPorte, the honeybee’s being a rigid designator, does not by itself entail that 
the common noun that forms it is a rigid designator too.  
                                                        
133Chierchia (1998) proceeds in the way described above in the main text. In the sixth chapter 




Nor does the insect species that is typically farmed for honey ‘s being a 
non-rigid designator entail that the modified noun insect species that is typically 
farmed for honey is not a rigid designator. Here is the reason. I have above 
noted that besides the definite generic use of the honeybee to designate a kind, 
it can be used to designate the unique contextually salient honeybee token. So, 
even if we take honeybee to be a rigid kind designator we also have to be able to 
account for this use of the honeybee to designate a salient token. That is, one 
way or another we have to describe a way of deriving a token level designation 
for the honeybee from the purported kind level designation of honeybee. Now, 
having such a way at hand, we can also claim that insect species that is typically 
farmed for honey rigidly designates a second-order kind whose instances are 
themselves insect species, and that the insect species that is typically farmed for 
honey non-rigidly designates relative to an evaluation index w, the unique first-
order kind instance of that second-order kind at w, if there is such a unique 
first-order kind instance at w. 
Of course the gimmicks described above, to derive a rigid kind designating 
definite noun-phrase from a non-rigid applier common noun and to derive a 
non-rigid kind designating noun phrase from a rigid designator common noun, 
cannot be simultaneously adopted. But, there is nothing in LaPorte’s discussion 
that shows that neither can be adopted, and the apparent possibility to adopt 
any of these ways cuts the relevance of LaPorte’s discussion to the primarily 





Let me also note that I do not think that the approaches that adopt anyone 
of the gimmicks described above or equivalent gimmicks are unobjectionable. 
But their criticism requires a broader perspective. Because as I will later 
illustrate, formulating one or another such gimmick, or as they are called in the 
semantic literature type-shifting operations, is unavoidable when one sets out 
to account for the semantics of common nouns and the noun phrases formed by 
them, notwithstanding whether we take common nouns to be designators or 
appliers. 
It may be objected to my questioning of LaPorte (2000)’s relevance to the 
issues raised by Kripke’s ascription or rigid designation to certain common 
nouns and adjectives in the following way. Kripke’s discussion in the third 
lecture of Naming and Necessity raises the question whether there is a 
semantically significant rigid/non-rigid division among general terms; this 
question is what the so called controversy on the rigidity of general terms is 
really about; such noun phrases as the honeybee¸ the insect species that is 
typically farmed for honey which LaPorte focused on are arguably general 
terms; thus LaPorte (2000) is commonly and rightly regarded as a contribution 
to this controversy.  
First let me note that that such definite phrases as the honeybee, the insect 
species that is typically farmed for honey, the beverage my uncle requests at 
superbowl parties can be regarded as general terms alongside common nouns 
and adjectives appears to be a very tenuous assumption. Now there does not 
seem to be an established definition of what a general term is. But it seems that 




capable of forming syntactic predicates, and thus have the potential to be 
semantically related, in one way or another, with many individuals 
simultaneously; these terms also appear to be regarded as the terms whose 
semantic contribution can be rendered in formal languages by formal 
predicates. Judging from these desiderata it is not clear what the verdict on 
LaPorte’s kind designating noun phrases should be, especially the definite ones. 
As kind designators they can be regarded to be semantically related only with 
one individual, the kind they designate, but through it they are also related with 
many individuals as well. Some of them apparently cannot function as syntactic 
predicates (?This crushed insect on the table is the insect species typically 
hunted for honey), but some apparently can (The lukewarm brown liquid in this 
container is the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl parties ). Still, it 
remains true that generally adjectives and common nouns can form syntactic 
predicates but cannot form syntactic arguments; in contrast, generally definite 
noun phrases cannot form syntactic predicates but can always form syntactic 
arguments; and these differences in syntactic distribution arguably correspond 
to semantic differences. Thus, it seems best we did not gather such semantically 
and syntactically disparate categories under the label general term; unless of 
course there is a clear theoretical (syntactic or semantic) benefit to do so. But is 
there?134 I will retake this issue below when I present Salmon (2005) where 
Salmon argues at length that the definite noun phrase the color of the sky 
                                                        





should be regarded as a general term in so far as it can function as a syntactic 
predicate in such a sentence as The eyes of my beloved are the color of the sky. 
In fact the issue whether the definite noun phrases examined by LaPorte 
(2000) are general terms, is not relevant with regard to my questioning of 
LaPorte (2000)’s relevance to the issues raised by Kripke’s singling out some 
common nouns and adjectives as rigid designators. Now, admittedly if we are 
intent to include such noun phrases as the honeybee, the insect species that are 
typically farmed for honey, soda, the beverage my uncle requests at superbowl 
parties as general terms then LaPorte (2000) can be taken to have indeed 
shown that some general terms are rigid and some are not, and that rigidity is 
thus not a property that makes no difference among general terms, so 
understood. If there really were unclear issues about the rigidity/non-rigidity of  
kind designating definite noun phrases and if the so called controversy on the 
rigidity of general terms did really pertain to these issues, then LaPorte (2000) 
has undeniably contributed to that controversy.  However, LaPorte’s points are 
then relevant only for an isolated and rather queer subset of general terms, the 
general terms that are noun phrases. After reading LaPorte we still do not know 
whether there is a rigid/non-rigid division among general terms that are 
common nouns or adjectives –as we have shown the rigidity/non-rigidity of the 
definite nouns phrases does not entail the rigidity/non-rigidity of the common 
nouns that form them. And I think what primarily intrigued people about 
Kripke’s singling out some common nouns and adjectives as rigid designators 
was that last point; and not whether there is a rigid/non-rigid division among 




Moreover I do not think there ever was any question whether there is a 
rigid/non-rigid division among noun phrases that designated kinds, as their 
case was very similar to the case of proper names and definite descriptions 
which was compellingly dealt with by Kripke on intuitive grounds. 
General Terms Are Designators, Some Are Rigid, Some Are Not: 
Salmon (2005) 
Salmon (2005) too is motivated by the issues raised by Kripke’s singling out 
certain common nouns and adjectives, specifically those that correspond to 
natural kinds and types of natural phenomena, as rigid designators. He reckons 
that if common nouns and adjectives are attributed designation then all will be 
rigid designators, and that if they are attributed application then virtually none 
will be rigid appliers. Notwithstanding these points Salmon (2005) holds that 
general terms are designators, and that some are rigid designators whilst some 
are not.  
Basically, Salmon contrasts the definite noun phrase the color of the sky 
with blue (equivocating blue’s use as a noun, as an adjective and its use as a 
noun phrase) on the basis of their occurences in the following sentences: 
2 a My true love’s eyes are blue. 
b  Blue is the color of the sky. 
c My true loves’s eyes are the color of the sky. 
He claims that the color of the sky is non-rigid designator whereas blue is a rigid 
designator; he also crucially claims that both blue and the color of the sky are 




general terms that are rigid as well as some general terms that are not rigid, and 
that rigid designation is not a property that makes no difference among general 
terms.  
Salmon (2005)’s argumentation  mainly focuses on establishing that in all 
their occurrences in the sentences in 2 the terms blue and the color of the sky 
function as designators and that both of these terms are general terms. He does 
not give an argument for the point that as designators blue is rigid but the color 
of the sky is not; nor does he give any argument for the points that all common 
nouns be they simple or modified are designators and that they are rigidly so.  
Salmon’s main argument for holding that in all their occurrences in the 
sentences in 2 the terms blue and the color of the sky function as designators is 
that then we can get a simple explanation of the fact that 2a and 2b together 
entail 2c. Salmon proposes to analyze the predicative is as a semantic predicate 
forming operator that maps a kind level designatum k (type e) into a predicative 
denotation of type <e,t> that truly applies only to the instances of k. 
is(k)=λx.{x is an instance of k} 
Given this analysis of the predicative is, he goes on to analyze the sentences in 2 
in the following way: 
2 a My true love’s eyes are blue. 
  are([blue])([My true love’s eyes]) 
  λx.{x is an instance of [blue]}([My true love’s eyes]) 
 
 b  Blue is the color of the sky. 




 c My true loves’s eyes are the color of the sky. 
  are([the color of the sky])([My true love’s eyes]) 
  λx.{x is an instance of [the color of the sky]}([My true love’s eyes])135 
Indeed when these sentences are analyzed in this way we obtain a rather neat 
explanation of the entailment relation that holds between 2a and 2b, and 2c.  
And Salmon’s main reason for holding that not just  blue but also the 
definite noun phrase the color of the sky should be counted as a general term is 
that, as illustrated in 2a and 2c it can combine with the predicative is to form a 
syntactic predicate.  
Now I will first briefly assess Salmon’s defense for the claim that blue, the 
color of the sky and his claim that in general all adjectives and common nouns 
are designators. Then, I will explore the complications generated by Salmon’s 
analysis of the predicative is as a semantic predicate forming operator. This 
analysis plays a crucial role in his argument that the color of the sky should be 
counted as a general term in so far as it can combine with is interpreted as a 
predicativizing operator. Third, I will assesss his claim that the color of the sky 
should be counted among general terms. Finally, I will question whether it is 
beneficial to discuss the questions generated by Kripke’s ascription of rigid 
designation to some common nouns and adjectives in terms of the category of 
general terms, and more generally whether it is beneficial at all to keep the 
                                                        
135 Given a denoting expression α, I here take [α] to be the denotation of α. Here, apart from 
innocuous notational differences, I faithfully render Salmon’s analysis of these sentences. That 
analysis is extensional. That is, the semantic representations he gives do not have the capability 
to represent the variability of denotations relative to different possible worlds. Below, while 





categorization singular term/general term or we will be better off by dropping 
the general term/singular term  terminology all together. 
Salmon’s Reasons for Taking Common Nouns and Adjectives to be 
Designators 
Salmon does not give much by way of argument for the claims that adjectives 
and common nouns are designators. This can be condoned as the main thrust of 
that paper is that if general terms are designators, there will be some general 
terms that are rigid designators like adjectives and common nouns, and some 
like the color of the sky which are not rigid designators. But the decision 
whether common nouns and/or adjectives are designators or not is not one that 
can be made solely on an intuitive basis, disregarding the theoretical advantages 
one view may have over the other. A comparison between possible views 
regarding the interpretation of adjectives and common nouns has to take into 
consideration the numerous syntactic environments they can occur and the 
various aspects of the ways in which these environments contribute to the truth 
conditions of sentences. The theoretical advantages to hold that common nouns 
are appliers were briefly touched in the section on Kripke’s Naming and 
Necessity and will be more amply illustrated in the sixth chapter of the present 
work.  The alternative view that common nouns are designators has also certain 
apparent theoretical advantages to be discussed later again in the sixth chapter 
of the present work (as regards the interpretation of adjectives however not 




Notwithstanding the wide extent of the critical comparison required to 
decide between the alternatives, the relevance of such a comparison and of its 
result to the controversy about the rigidity of general terms and in particular to 
the case defended by Salmon (2005) should be obvious.  If all the semantic and 
syntactic phenomena that can be explained by treating common nouns and 
adjectives as designators, and then some more can be explained for example by 
assigning common nouns and adjectives applier denotations of type <e,t>, we 
will have to conclude that common nouns and adjectives are not designators. In 
this case however there will be no point in asking whether they will be rigid 
designators, if they are designators.  
Anyway as previously indicated there is some argument in Salmon (2005) 
at least in support of the view that adjectives are designators. Salmon’s 
explanation of the entailment relation in 2 presupposes that the adjective blue is 
a designator. If an alternative view with regard to the interpretation of blue 
cannot give any explanation for this entailment or cannot give an explanation as 
neat as Salmon’s, this will be a positive point for the view that the adjective blue 
is a designator. Of course this positive point can be weighed down by the 
complications generated elsewhere, or by the advantages presented elsewhere 
by the alternative view. 
Here I will limit my self with briefly exploring the possible complications 
generated by Salmon’s taking the adjective blue to be a designator, and 
considering whether the entailment relation in 2 can be explained by taking the 




I begin by reformulating Salmon’s analysis of the sentences in 2 using the 
predicativizing operator Pred defined thus, 
Let  be an designator intension of type <s,e>, the values of which are properties or 
kinds, let I(s)(x,y)=Truth iff x instantiates y relative to s. 
Then, Pred(s)()=λx.I(x,(s)) 
Note that this reformulation does not affect the essence of Salmon’s original 
analysis, it only improves it by introducing an evaluation index variable s to 
make the probable sensitivity of the denotations of the denoting elements to the 
evaluation indexes.136 As indicated Salmon believes that the operator Pred is 
just the predicative is; further below we will see that it is a better idea to rather 
take Pred to be an implicit operator and not to identify it with the predicative is. 
Anyway, here is Salmon’s analysis of the sentences in 2 reformulated using 
Pred: 
2 a My true love’s eyes are blue 
  (Pred(s)([blue]s))([My true love’s eyes]s) 
 
 b  Blue is the color of the sky 
  [blue]s=[the color of the sky]s 
 
 c My true loves’s eyes are the color of the sky 
  (Pred(s)([the color of the sky]s))([My true love’s eyes]s)137 
                                                        
136 This improvement is needed because I will below consider how Salmon explains the 
entailment in 2 and how else it can be explained. The alternative way will require a meaning 
postulate and such postulates cannot be formulated in extensional term. Also, I will indicate that 
Salmon too has to have recourse to similar meaning postulates, if not to account for the 
entailment in 2, for quite similar entailments. 
137 For en expression α, [α]s is the denotation of α relative to the evaluation index s (a possible 
world). I will in general use s, s’,s’’,s’’’…as variables ranging over possible worlds. I will use @ to 




According to this analysis the term blue that occurs in 2a receives the same 
semantic interpretation as the term blue that occurs in 2b. Namely both are 
interpreted as property designators. There however are reasons to think that 
these two occurrences are occurrences of distinct syntactic elements. The noun 
blue is standardly distinguished from the adjective blue. The occurence in 2a is 
an occurrence of the adjective blue in an adjective phrase that in turn forms the 
syntactic predicate. The occurrence in 2b is an occurrence of the noun blue in a 
noun phrase that in turn forms a syntactic argument. And if they are 
occurrences of distinct syntactic elements then it is not evident that they will 
receive the same semantic interpretation and that we will have the identity,  
λs.[blueA]s=λs.[blueN]s. And in this case, we cannot account for the entailment 
without some extra assumptions linking the interpretation of blueN with that of 
the blueA.  
Why would we like to distinguish the blueN from blueA? A comparison of 
general syntactic distribution of adjective nominalizations and adjectives lead to 
the following generalizations. Adjective nominalizations (with or without 
determiners) can form noun phrases that in turn function as syntactic 
arguments, adjectives cannot; adjectives can combine with nouns as their 
modifiers, but adjective nominalizations cannot. Adjectives can form syntactic 
predicates but adjective nominalizations cannot. 
3 Alice manifested no alertness that morning. 
Her alertness was palpable that morning. 
Alertness is the primordial quality required in this line of work. 
*Alice manifested no alert that morning. 
*Her alert was palpable that morning. 
*Alert is the primordial quality in this line of work. 




That morning in the work station an alert woman sat. 
*That morning Alice was alertness. 
*That morning in the work station an alertness woman sat. 
When it comes to blue and other color terms we see that they apparently 
behave both as mass nouns and adjectives; they can apparently occur both in 
environments that typically ask for nouns and in environments that typically 
ask for adjectives. 
4 There was no blue on that carpet. 
Alice used some blue to show the reflection of the sea on the wall. 
Its blue did not go well with the color of the walls. 
No part of that carpet was blue. 
The blue carpet did not look good on the stone floor. 
So, to preserve the stated generalizations that are in fact held to be definitional 
of for the categories adjective and noun, blueN is best distinguished from blueA.  
Salmon is aware of these matters and points that this distinction neither 
implies that blueN and blueA are two distinct words nor that they will have 
different semantic interpretations. He presumably thinks that occurrences of 
blueN and blueA can be regarded as occurrences of the same word under 
different syntactic functions, and that it need not be the case that the semantic 
interpretation will change with the change in syntactic function.  
Surely we can hold like Salmon that the adjective blue receives the same 
semantic interpretation as the mass noun blue and take both to designate the 
color blue. This move will however require us to postulate appropriate semantic 
operators to account for blue’s capability to function as a syntactic predicate 
and as a noun modifier.  
But we can as well take only the blueN to designate the color blue. As 




common noun modifier role of adjectives as primary, we can either assign it 
applier denotations of type <e,t>, or modifier denotations of type 
<<e,t>,<e,t>>. Then depending on this choice we can postulate an implicit 
semantic operator to derive denotations suitable for the other use of the 
adjective. 
The advantage of Salmon’s approach will be that we will have to postulate 
one less semantic variant of the word blue. The advantage of the latter approach 
will be a more uniform general syntactic and semantic account of adjectives and 
nouns. Unlike color terms most adjectives have morphologically different nouns 
that correspond to them –e.g. alert/alertness. We have above illustrated that 
these adjectives are not grammatically interchangeable with the nouns 
corresponding to them; and this non-interchangeability arguably has a semantic 
dimension as well.  
Salmon criticizes the latter approach that assigns different types of 
denotations to the blueN and the blueA in relation with the task of explaining the 
entailment in 2. It apparently does not yield as neat an explanation as the one 
Salmon proposes drawing on his assumptions. So, let’s see for ourselves how we 
can explain that entailment if we interpret blueA as an applier and the blueN as a 
designator. We can give sentences in 2 the following semantic analyses (here we 
suppose that Pred is an implicit operator that is triggered only when the need 
arises, and that it is not contributed by is):  
2 a My true love’s eyes are blue. 
  [<e,t>blueA]s([eMy true love’s eyes]s) 
 
 b  Blue is the color of the sky. 





 c My true loves’s eyes are the color of the sky. 
  (Pred(s)([the color of the sky]s))([My true love’s eyes]s) 
Unlike Salmon’s approach, under the present approach the semantic analysis of 
the sentences in 2 does not by itself yield the entailment. As rightly noted by 
Salmon, to explain the entailment under this approach we have to have recourse 
to a meaning postulate linking the designatum of the blueN with the predicative 
denotation of the adjective blueA.  We may think that the following postulate will 
do: 
5 λs.λx.pred(s)([color noun]s)(x)=λs.λx.[color adjective]s(x) 
Now, Salmon finds fault with the postulate in 5, because this it apparently has 
the potentially unwelcome consequence that the following sentence can have 
two distinct interpretations which nonetheless determine exactly the same 
truth conditions: 
6 Something is blue. 
i. (λP.xP(x))([<e,t>blueA]s) 
ii. (λP.xP(x))(pred(s)([eblueN]s)) 
This objection depends on the assumption that the sole availability of a 
predicativizing operator like Pred allows any noun phrase to occur in syntactic 
predicate positions. I am not here in a position to question or defend this 
assumption. But I will just note that this assumption hits back at Salmon’s own 
position which identifies Pred as the semantic contribution of the predicative is. 
If we grant this identification we should predict that Someone is alertness or 
Someone is the primordial quality required for this task will be acceptable 




Someone is alert. Clearly, this prediction does not materialize. So, Salmon should 
rather avoid the assumption in question. But, if that assumption is dropped then 
we can simply hold that the noun blue cannot occur in syntactic predicate 
positions, and that consequently 6 can never have the given analysis ii. 
Another point that may be found objectionable in relation with the 
approach in question may simply be the fact that it requires a meaning postulate 
to explain the entailment in 2. In comparison Salmon’s approach is not in need 
of any such meaning postulate to explain the same entailment.  
Now, although in relation with the entailment in 2 Salmon’s approach does 
not have to recourse to a meaning postulate, the explanation of many other 
similar entailments under Salmon’s approach will require a meaning postulate . 
Consider the following three sentences, and their probable analysis under 
Salmon’s approach according to which adjectives should designate properties: 
7 Alice is alert. 
Alertness is the primary quality required in this job. 
Alice has the primary quality required in this job. 
 
Pred(s)([e alert]s)([e Alice]s) 
[e alertness]s=[e the primary quality required for this job]s 
I(s)([e Alice]s)([e the primary quality…]s)  
The above analysis of the sentences in 7 does not by itself explain this 
entailment. But the entailment will obtain, if the following postulate is 
introduced: 
λs.[e alert]s=λs.[e alertness]s 
So we conclude that Salmon’s defense of his approach that semantically 




of making his approach recommendable over the alternative that takes only 
blueN to designate the color blue and assigns predicative denotations to blueA. 
The latter approach pays heed to the difference in the syntactic distribution of 
adjectives and the corresponding nouns, and has the capacity to give a semantic 
explanation of their different syntactic distribution patterns. In contrast 
Salmon’s approach does not present such a capacity.  The approach criticized by 
Salmon has some apparent disadvantages in relation with explanation of the 
entailment in 2: it has to recourse to a meaning postulate which appears to 
entail that the same English sentences can receive two different interpretations 
that eventually determine the same truth conditions.  However when 
scrutinized more closely it turns out that (i) Salmon’s own approach too has to 
have recourse to meaning postulates in relation with many other entailments 
similar to the one 2 and (ii) the unwelcome consequences of the meaning 
postulate criticized by Salmon follows only if one makes an assumption which 
will have objectionable corollaries when conjoined with Salmon’s own 
approach. 
‘Is’ as a Predicativizing Operator  
Salmon’s analysis of the predicative is as a predicate forming operator out of 
kind level designata plays a role in his analyses of the sentences in 2.  It also 
plays a role in his argument that the color of the sky should be counted as a 
general term in so far as it can combine with is interpreted as a predicativizing 




the predicative is. Later, I will assesss the dependence of Salmon’s claim that the 
color of the sky is a general term to this analysis. 
Salmon proposes to analyse the predicative is as a semantic predicate 
forming operator that maps a kind level designatum k (type e) into a predicative 
denotation of type <e,t> that truly applies only to the instances of k.  
Is(k)=λx.{x is an instance of k} 
This analysis enables him to analyse the sentences in 2 in the following way: 
2 a My true love’s eyes are blue. 
  are([blue])([My true love’s eyes]) 
  λx.{x is an instance of [blue]}([My true love’s eyes]) 
 
 b  Blue is the color of the sky. 
  [blue]=[the color of the sky] 
 
 c My true loves’s eyes are the color of the sky. 
  are([the color of the sky])([My true love’s eyes]) 
  λx.{x is an instance of [the color of the sky]}([My true love’s eyes]) 138 
He also extends this analysis to cover cases of nominal predication such as the 
following: 
8 Alice is a proud mother. 
Clearly here too we have a predicative is but it combines with the noun phrase a 
mother. If the predicative is is a function that takes kind level designata to map 
them into particular level predicative denotations, then a proud mother too 
should be taken to contribute a kind level designatum. Salmon avoids this 
potentially undesirable result by further stipulating that, the predicative is has a 
                                                        




variant is a that combines with common nouns, which too according to Salmon 
designate kinds: 
is-a(k)=λx.{x is an instance of k} 
is-a([proud mother])= λx.{x is an instance of [proud mother]} 
But there are indefinitely many different types of noun phrases in store which 
too can apparently combine with the predicative is: 
9 Alice, Carol and Dorothy are three proud mothers. 
It is not clear how Salmon would treat this last example as no consideration is 
given to such examples in Salmon (2005). Of course Salmon can stipulate that 
three proud mothers is a kind designator. But given that he could have done the 
same with a proud mother as well and he did not, I surmise that he would reject 
that three proud mothers is a kind designator. In this case one way to deal with 
9 would be to follow the precedent set by his analysis of is a proud mother, and 
stipulating that are three is a further variant of the predicative is, alongside is a. 
But then clearly there will be a need for indefinitely many non-equivalent 
variants of the predicative is. –are two, are four, … etc.  
Another way to deal with 8 and 9 will be to claim that, they are different 
from 2a and 2c in that the is occurring in the former is the is of identity. Indeed 
Salmon (2005) indicates in a footnote that in relation with such sentences as 8 
he wants to remain non-commited whether they involve the is of predication or 
the is of identity.139 If the latter option is adopted a proud mother and three 
proud mothers will have to be interpreted as quantified noun phrases. But given 
                                                        




that Salmon holds that common nouns including the modified ones are kind 
designators he has to explain how they can combine with the quantificational 
determiners a and three. This can be done either by adopting a non-standard 
interterpretation for quantifiers which allows them to operate on kind level 
designate (type e) or by postulating an implicit predicativizing operator. In the 
mentioned footnote Salmon explores the latter option. He suggests an implicit 
predicativizing operator which he labels as –izes that maps a kind k into a 
predicative denotation which truly applies only to the instances of k:  
(k)-izes=λx.{x is an instance of k} 
([proud mother])-izes= λx.{x is an instance of [proud mother]} 
Given this predicativizing operator 8 and 9 can be given analyses along the 
following lines: 
8 Alice is a proud mother. 
 λP.x(([proud mother])-izes(x) & P(x))(λy.[Alice is= ty]) 
 x(([proud mother])-izes(x) &  λy.[Alice is= ty](x)) 
 x(([proud mother])-izes(x) &  [Alice is= tx]) 
 
9 Alice, Carol and Dorothy are three proud mothers. 
 λP.x((three(x) & ([p. m.])-izes(x)) & P(x))(λy.[Alice, Carol and Dorothy are= ty]) 
 x((three(x) & ([p.m.])-izes(x)) &  λy.[Alice, Carol and Dorothy are= ty](x)) 
 x((three(x) & ([proud mothers])-izes(x)) &  [Alice, Carol and Dorothy are= tx]) 
So, even if 8 and 9 are analyzed as identity sentence there will be a need for an 
implicit predicativizing operator that does the same job as the explicit 
predicative is. Probably for this reason, in that same footnote Salmon (2005) 
writes that it will be preferable to regard the article a figuring in nominal 
predications as in 8 to be a semantically vacuous element. Thus, according to 
this last suggestion of Salmon it is better if we drop the idea of  treating 8 as an 




predicativizing operator and a as a semantically vacuous element. But in making 
this last suggestion Salmon does not take into account such sentences as 9, 
where the determiner three cannot be regarded as semantically vacuous 
element.  
To recapitulate, Salmon is officially non-commited with regard to whether 
sentences like 8 are identity sentences or predications, but tentatively thinks 
that it will be better to interpret them as predications; with regard to such 
sentences as 9 he does not express any opinion as he does not take them into 
consideration at all; and it is not clear whether Salmon would have revised his 
opinions about sentences like 8 in favor of a identity sentence treatment, had he 
considered sentences like 9.  
All possible options with is interpreted as a predicativizing operator has 
undesirable consequences. If sentences like 8 and 9 are treated as identity 
sentences, there will be a need for an implicit predicativizing operator that does 
exactly the same job as the explicit predicative is. Or if sentences like 8 are 
treated as predications with semantically vacuous determiner a then this 
treatment cannot be extended to sentences like 9 although 8 and 9 sound 
syntactically and semantically very similar. And finally if both 8 and 9 are 
treated as predications with non-vacuous a and three, unless one wants to hold 
that a proud mother and three proud mothers are kind designators alongside 
the noun proud mother(s), then one has to postulate alongside is an indefinite 
amount of other explicit predicativizing operators like is a, is two, is three …etc.  
Moreover, as we have noted if one wants to hold that common nouns are 




operator is anyway needed to account for such quantificational noun phrases as 
every proud mother,  unless one is willing to adopt a non-standard 
interpretation of the quantificational determiners. We have previously indicated 
that common nouns are standardly taken to be appliers because apparently this 
choice very neatly explains the different syntactic distribution of common nouns 
from kind designating noun phrases and pronouns on grounds of semantic 
interpretability. We mentioned that one area where this differential syntactic 
distribution is observed was quantified noun phrases. Common nouns can 
combine with quantificational determiners, but designators such as pronouns, 
proper names, definite phrases cannot. In relation with this last point, 
quantifiers are standardly assigned denotations of type <<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>> 
that take predicative denotations of <e,t> (the denotation type of appliers) and 
yield quantified noun phrase denotations of type <<e,t>,t>.  So, If Salmon 
wants to hold that common nouns designate kinds (that is, they are of type e) 
either he has to adopt a non-standard interpretation for quantifiers which will 
enable them to semantically combine with the designata of the common nouns. 
Or, if he wants to keep the standard interpretation of the quantifiers he has to 
introduce an implicit predicativizing operator that map kind level designata of 
common nouns into particular level denotata that can then combine with the 
denotata of the quantifiers standardly interpreted. Given that is does not play a 
part when quantifiers combine with common nouns, is will not be of help to 
explain how kind designating common nouns can combine with quantifiers 




There are further problems with the identification of is as predicativizing 
operator. Consider the following sentences: 
10 a Alice is plump and strong. 
b Alice is plump, strong and the mother of Bob’s children. 
c Alice is the mother of Bob’s children. 
The syntactic predicates of these sentences are formed by conjunctive phrases. 
If the predicative is is a predicate forming operator that maps kind level 
designata into predicative denotations then the conjunctive phrase plump and 
strong figuring in the predicate of 10a should be interpreted as a kind 
designator. But this phrase is semantically complex; it is the conjunction of two 
adjectives which according to Salmon designate kinds, and its designatum ought 
to be a function of the designata of these two adjectives. This can be ensured by 
postulating a variant of and to be interpreted along the following lines: 
[and](k1)(k2)=k, such that for any evaluation index s, x is an instance of k at s iff both x 
is an instance of k1 at s and x is an instance of k2 at s 
But note that this approach will not be of help in relation with 10b. Here, the 
conjunctive phrase occurring in the syntactic predicate involves the definite 
phrase the mother of Bob’s children which cannot possibly be taken to 
designate a kind.  
Salmon appears to be aware of this problem. For example, in a footnote he 
cites Graff (2001) who partly on the basis of such examples as 10b argues that 
definite phrases occurring in syntactic predicates are not designators but 
appliers and that such sentences as 10c should be interpreted as nominal 
predications (p. 123). Graff (2001) follows the common wisdom that both 




be conjoined with common nouns and adjectives in conjunctive phrases that 
occur in syntactic predicates, she infers that definite phrases too should be 
appliers (considering with what sorts of constituents a certain expression E can 
grammatically and meaningfully form conjunctive phrases is a standardly used 
test to determine the syntactic and semantic category of E). Under Graff’s 
approach the conjunctive phrase plump, strong and the mother of Bob’s 
children occurring in 10b will be an applier whose denotation will derive from 
the denotations of its constituents which are themselves interpreted as appliers 
under the function expressed by and which can be formulated as such: 
Let P, Q, R be predicative denotations (type <e,t>) 
[and](P)(Q)(R)=λx.((P(x) & Q(x)) & R(x)) 
 
[and]([plump])([strong])([the mother of Bob’s children])=λx.(([plump](x) & 
[strong](x)) & [the mother of …](x)) 
And under Graff’s approach there is no need for an implicit or explicit 
predicativizing operator in so far as adjectives, common nouns, and even 
definite nouns phrases as appliers have native predicative denotations; thus 
under this approach the predicative is will be semantically vacuous apart from 
indicating tense. 
Returning to Salmon now, in the same footnote where he cites Graff 
(2001) he suggests that in cases where a definite phrase that pertains to 
particulars, like the mother of Bob’s children, combines with the is of 
predication the definite phrase should be interpreted predicatively rather than 
as a singular term. I take this to mean that such definite phrases should be 
interpreted as appliers but not as designators. But it is not clear how this 




mother of Bob’s children is to be interpreted as an applier than we will have a 
conjunctive phrase in which plump and strong, treated as designators per 
Salmon, are conjoined with the applier the mother of Bob’s children which 
seems impossible. Furthermore, given that is is still treated as a predicativizing 
operator it has to combine with a kind designator, and under this suggestion it 
is still not clear how a kind designatum will be derived for the whole 
conjunctive phrase plump, strong and the mother of Bob’s children from the 
denotata of its constitutents. 
In the next footnote Salmon comes with another suggestion. To stipulate 
that there is a further predicativizing operator is the, alongside is and is a and 
probably indefinitely many others. The predicativizing operator is the will have 
the following definition: 
is-the([author of Waverly])= is-a([unique author of Waverly]) Salmon’s original 
proposal 
is-the(k)=is-a(the kind k’ such that necessarily for any x k’ is instantiated by x iff k is 
intantiated uniquely by x) 
Here is-the is defined in terms of is-a. According to the previously given 
definition of is a, it is supposed to be a function that applied to kinds. Then, 
unique author of Waverly too should be taken to designate a kind. Salmon does 
not give a definition for is-the that does not refer to verbal expressions, but I 
above tentatively added such a definition as well (viz. the second identity 
clause).  
Now the operator is the can be of help in relation with such sentences as 




identity sentences. But in relation with 10b it appears to be of no use. In 10b we 
do not have any occurrence of the string is the.  
Perhaps, one may try to deal with 10b by distributing the is inside the 
conjunctive phrase, plump,strong and the mother of Bob’s children, so that 
contrary to appearances the conjunction will have scope over the predicative is: 
10 b  Alice is plump, strong and the mother of Bob’s children. 
  Alice is plump, is strong and is the mother of Bob’s children. 
But then the predicative is that occurs in the surface form has to be taken to 
express different operators simultaneously. The predicativizing operator is that 
applies to plump and strong cannot be the same operator as the one that applies 
to the definite phrase the mother of Bob’s children. Neither can the operator is 
be considered to be a constitutent of the operator is the under their current 
definitions. Maybe we can drop the operator is the and revise the definition of is 
in such a way that the operator it expresses combines two distinct operations, 
and effects one or the other according to whether the designatum it applies to is 
a property/kind or a particular. 
Let  be a designator (denotation type e), 
Let I(x,y)=Truth iff x instantiates y  
is([])=λx.I(x,[]), if [] is a property/kind 
is([])=λx.x=,   if  [] is a particular140 
But will all this gerrymandering worthwhile? Especially if it is not only possible 
to simply drop the idea of analyzing is and such strings as is a and is the  as 
predicativizing operators, but also it is more appropriate to do so. In fact, there 
                                                        
140 This last suggestion can in fact work in relation with 10b; but Salmon cannot adopt it and 





is one further very compelling reason to do so which I delayed to mention so far. 
In certain modal contexts predication can take place without any occurrence of 
is or its variants. 
11 Bob found Alice ill. 
Bob considered Alice a lawyer. 
Bob considered Alice a proud mother. 
Bob found Alice a stern mother. 
So, if one wants to account for these cases of predication while also holding that 
common nouns and adjectives designate kinds, one has no choice but postulate 
an implicit predicativizing operator. And if such an implicit operator has to be 
postulated anyway then there is no need to burden oneself with the 
complications generated by taking the predicative is to express such an 
operator. 
So, if like Salmon we want to hold that adjectives and common nouns are 
designators to account for their capacity to form syntactic predicates we should 
rather postulate an implicit operator that map the designata of adjectives and 
common nouns into predicative denotations that truly apply only to the 
instances of these designata. And to account for the capacity of such definite 
noun phrases as the mother of Bob’s children to figure in syntactic predicates, 
we should postulate another implicit syntactic operator that maps their 
designata into predicative denotations that truly applies only to their designata. 
Or even better we can postulate only one implicit predicativizing operator 
combining these two operations, and effects one or the other operation 
depending on whether the designatum to which it applies is a particular or 




Let  be a designator (denotation type e), 
Let I(x,y)=Truth iff x instantiates y  
Pred*([])=λx.I(x,[]), if [] is an kind/property 
Pred*([])=λx.x=,   if  [] is a particular 
Given this operator we can now represent 10b in the following way: 
10 b Alice is plump, strong and the mother of Bob’s children. 
  [and](Pred*([plump]))(Pred*([strong]))(Pred*([the mother of …]))([Alice]) 
  λx.((Pred*([plump])(x) & Pred*([strong])(x)) & pred*([the m. of …])(x))([A.]) 
Now, we can account also for kind designating common nouns’ combining with 
quantificational determiners interpreted in the standard way without the 
intermediacy of is.   




Furthermore, under the proposed revision we can analyze of such sentences as 
Alice, Carol and Dorothy are three mothers in the following way: 
Alice, Carol and Doroth are three mothers. 
λx.([three](x) & PL(Pred*([mother]))(x))([Alice, Carol and Dorothy]) 
Thereby we don’t have to postulate indefinitely many non-equivalent operators 
supposedly expressed by the strings are two, are three, or alternatively to take 
such terms as three mothers to designate kinds. 
I conclude that Salmon should rather have postulated one (or two) 
implicit predicativizing operator, instead of identifying is, the strings is a, is the  
and probably some other strings too with predicativizing operators.  
As we have seen previously Salmon’s way of explaining the entailment in 2 




regardless whether we postulate an implicit operator such as Pred* or take is 
and its variants to express such operators. Thus, Salmon’s argument that both 
blue and the color of the sky should be taken to be kind designators because 
thereby we can neatly explain the entailment in 2, is not affected by the 
considerations raised here against the identification of is with a predicativizing 
operator. 
However we cannot say the same for Salmon’s contention that the color of 
the sky should be a general term in so far as, like blue, it can combine with the 
predicative is. Below I will argue that unless Salmon treats the string is the that 
occurs in such sentences as 10c as a unit that expresses a special predicativizing 
operator he cannot demarcate the category of general terms in such a way that 
it includes such definite phrases as the color of the sky but excludes such 
phrases as the mother of Bob’s children. 
Can Salmon Maintain a Category of General Terms that Include ‘the 
color of the sky’ But Excludes Some Other Odd Balls? 
We indicated that the point most forcefully defended by Salmon (2005), is the 
inclusion of such terms as the color of the sky into the category of general term. 
Salmon defends this inclusion on the basis of the usability of the color of the sky 
as a syntactic predicate in place of the adjective blue, and apparently with the 
same denotation: 
2 a My true love’s eyes are blue. 
 b Blue is the color of the sky. 




Salmon claims that any term that forms a syntactic predicate combining with 
the predicative is must be a general term. Now considered as sufficient 
condition for being a general term this condition generates a number of 
problems. When this is taken literally, such a noun phrase as a proud mother 
which can form the syntactic predicate in a nominal predication should too 
count as a general term. On the other hand the modified common noun proud 
mother may not count as a general term, because it can never combine with the 
is without the indefinite determiner: 
12 Alice is a proud mother. 
*Alice is proud mother. 
Presumably in response to this problem, Salmon proposes to take the string is a 
as a single syntactic constituent which is a variant of the is. We have previously 
indicated that Salmon takes both is and is a to express a predicativizing 
operator that maps properties/kinds, the designata of adjectives and common 
nouns, into appropriate predicative denotations of type <e,t>. So, according to 
Salmon is a counts as a syntactic unit and a variant of the predicative is, and it 
combines with common nouns. Therefore singular common nouns such as 
proud mother too should count as general terms, and a proud mother should 
not be treated as a syntactic unit in syntactic predicates in English.   
So far so good, but we have already seen examples of nominal predications 
in which such a phrase as three proud mothers can combine with the 
predicative is to form the syntactic predicate: 




Will then three proud mothers count as a general term alongside proud 
mothers? Perhaps Salmon would accept this. But given the way he deals with 
the phrase a proud mother, it seems more consistent for him to add are three to 
his variants of predicative is and reject that three proud mothers is a general 
term. Of course if he takes this course he cannot simply stop with are three, he 
has to add are two, are four … as well. Note also that unlike is a, are three and its 
kin cannot be semantically equivalent variants of the simple predicative is. Are 
three should be taken to be an operator that maps a kind u into predicative 
denotations that truly applies to triplets of the instances of u. 
Another problematic aspect of Salmon’s stated criterion for being a 
general term follows from the fact that definite noun phrases that apparently 
designate particulars can quite often figure in syntactic predicates, conjoined 
with common nouns or adjectives. We have already seen such examples as well: 
10 a Alice is plump and strong. 
 b Alice is plump, strong and the mother of Bob’s children. 
Salmon would probably regard the conjunctive plump and strong  10a as a 
general term combining the two simple general terms plump and strong.  But 
then what would be his verdict about the plump, strong and the mother of Bob’s 
children in 10b? Would he be ready to regard this too as a general term formed 
through the conjunction the adjectives plump and strong, and the definite 
phrase the mother of Bob’s children? If he did he would have to regard the 
mother of Bob’s children as a general term. But the mother of Bob’s children 
designates a concrete particular, if it is a designator at all; and in that case it 




general term/singular term terminology. Note that the mother of Bob’s children 
can be grammatically replaced in 10b by many other definite phrases as well –
e.g. the torment of Bob’s life, the lifelong head of mother truckers association 
etc. Are all these definite phrases both general terms and singular terms?  
We have seen that Salmon is apparently aware of such examples as 10b, 
and that in a footnote he takes into account the possibility that such sentences 
as 10c can be interpreted as nominal predications rather than as identity 
sentences: 
10 c  Alice is the mother of Bob’s children. 
In response to such a possibility we have seen that Salmon suggested to take the 
string is the too to constitute a syntactic unit and as such to express the 
following predicativizing operator: 
is-the () = is-a (unique )   
Presumably, with the implicit condition that  be a term that pertains to 
particulars –such as author of Waverly, mother of Bob’s children etc. This 
proposal entails that there cannot be any particular designating definite phrase 
in syntactic predicate positions, in so far as according to this analysis the article 
the has to function as a constituent of the predicate forming operator, and not as 
a determiner that combines with a noun to form a definite noun phrase. Thus, 
there cannot be any question as to whether the definite phrases the torment of 
Bob’s life and the mother of Bob’s children which apparently can form syntactic 
predicates by combining with the predicative is  are general terms or not, since 




But this last move will not be of help in relation with 10b and is even 
rendered objectionable by it. In 10b there is no occurrence of the string is the 
and the definite article the appears to form a syntactic unit rather with the noun 
mother of Bob’s children. Is it viable to hold that the belongs to different 
syntactic units in 10b and 10c. Especially when the string the mother of Bob’s 
children so strongly appears to form a single syntactic and semantic unit 
wherever it occurs in a sentence and to make the same semantic contribution 
both in 10b and 10c. 
Above we have speculated that one possibility to deal with 10b while 
keeping the analysis of is as a predicativizing operator of is to drop the idea of 
treating the string is the as a constituent expressing an operator and revise the 
definition of the is in such a way that the operator it expresses combines two 
distinct operations, and effects one or the other according to whether the 
designatum it applies to is a kind/property or a particular. This can be done by 
taking the predicative is to express Pred* defined above: 
Let  be a designator (denotation type e), 
is([])=Pred*([]) 
 
Let I(x,y)=Truth iff x instantiates y  
Pred*([])=λx.I(x,[]), if [] is a property/kind 
Pred*([])=λx.x=[], if  [] is a particular 
If furthermore we assume that in 10b is under its revised definition is 
distributed inside the conjunctive phrase, plump,strong and the mother of Bob’s 
children, and that contrary to appearances the conjuction has scope over the 
predicative is, then we can analyze 10b in the following way: 
10 b Alice is plump, strong and the mother of Bob’s children. 




  λx.((Is([plump])(x) & Is([strong])(x)) & Is([the mother of …])(x))([Alice]) 
  Is([plump])([Alice]) & Is([strong])([Alice]) & Is([the mother of …])([Alice]) 
Ignoring for the time being other problems discussed above pertaining to the 
idea taking is to express a predicativizing operator, we see that 10b can after all 
be successfully analyzed in accordance with this idea. Yet, Salmon cannot 
forsake is the as an operator and adopt this analysis according to which is 
expresses Pred*. For then he has to admit that the definite phrase the mother of 
Bob’s children as a particular designating phrase can combine with the same is 
as the adjectives plump and strong combines with; and given his stated 
sufficient condition for being a general term, he will then have to face the 
undesirable consequence that the mother of Bob’s children and many other 
similar particular designating definite phrases are general terms.  
Again it is for this same reason that Salmon cannot drop altogether the 
problematic idea of taking predicativizing operators to be expressed by explicit 
elements such as is, is a, is the and rather postulate an implicit operator like 
Pred*. For then again he will have to admit that besides adjectives, common 
nouns and kind/property designating definite phrases such as the color of the 
sky particular designating phrases such as the mother of Bob’s children too can 
form syntactic predicates by combining with is –where is will now be treated as 
semantically vacuous apart from expressing tense.  
The problematic consequences of Salmon’s claim that any expression that 
combines with the predicative is must be a general term does not however stop 
here. Among the types of phrases that can apparently combine with the 




13 a Alice is some kind of lunatic  [she lets her kids drive trucks unattended] 
b Alice has been every kind of woman [to satisfy Bob but to no effect] 
c Alice has been every type of warrior [but she always prefers to be a mage over 
 other classess]141 
Shall Salmon count the highlighted phrases above among general terms? If he 
does then there will be some general terms which are not designators but rather 
are quantifiers. I am not sure whether Salmon would like to make the category 
of general terms such an eclectic category, involving not just common nouns, 
adjectives, definite noun phrases that designate kinds, but also quantified noun 
phrases that quantify over kinds. 
If Salmon wanted to avoid general terms of the latter kind, one option to 
follow would be to inflate further the collection of explicit predicate forming 
operators, by adding operators like is some kind of, is every kind of etc.  
Another option for Salmon in response to such examples will be to argue 
that these sentences are interpreted relative to an implicit logical form which is 
not reflected in the surface form of these sentences, and that combinining with 
the predicative is is a sufficient condition for being a general term only relative 
to the underlying logical form of sentences. Accordingly it may be argued that 
the logical form of 13a and its interpretation relative to that logical form is as 
follows: 
13 a  Alice is some kind of lunatic. 
   [Some kind of lunatic]1 [Alice is t1] 
  λP.x.([kind of lunatic](x) & P(x))(λy.[Alice is ty]) 
  x.([kind of lunatic](x) & λy.[Alice is ty] (x)) 
  x.([kind of lunatic](x) & [Alice is tx]) 
                                                        




In the purported logical form the phrase some kind of lunatic does not function 
as a syntactic predicate. Rather that phrase stands as a syntactic argument and 
binds a trace (a pronoun like theoretical category), and it is that trace which 
functions as the syntactic predicate. Thus, in the logical form what combines 
with the predicative is is not some kind of lunatic , but a trace (pronoun) that 
designates the kinds over which some kind of lunatic  range. And in so far as 
relative to the logical form some kind of lunatic does not combine with the 
predicative is, it need not be regarded as a general term. 
Note however that the quantifying phrases that occur as syntactic 
predicates in the surface forms of the sentences in 13 are rather similar to the 
color of the sky of 2b. They all are noun phrases formed through the 
combination of a determiner (some, every, the) with a taxonomic noun which 
can only meaningfully apply to a kind/property (kind of lunatic, kind of woman, 
color of the sky). Most probably, the logical form the sentences in which they 
superficially occur as syntactic predicates will also be similar, and these 
sentences will all be interpreted in a similar manner. So, it is likely that 2b too 
has a logical form like the logical form we above ascribed to 13a and that it is 
interpreted in a similar manner. 
 2 b My true loves’s eyes are the color of the sky. 
  λP.x(([color of …]s(x) & P(x)) & ∀y([color of …]s(y)  x=y))(λz.[my … are tz]s) 
  x(([color of… ]s(x) & λz.[my … are tz]s(x)) & ∀y([color of the sky]s(y)  x=y)) 
  x(([color of …]s(x) & [my…are tx]s) & ∀y([color of the sky]s(y)  x=y)) 
According to this analysis of 2b, in the logical form the definite phrase the color 
of the sky does not combine with the is of predication. It rather binds a trace 




sky is on the same footing as some kind of lunatic of 13a; and there is no more 
reason to label the former phrase as a general term than there is for the latter. 
Furthermore, given that this analysis of 2b is just a special case of a general 
approach for analyzing kind denoting noun phrases that superficially occur as 
syntactic predicates, which can also satisfactorily applied in the case of the 
sentences like those in 13, it is preferable to other approaches that 
differentiates without any explicit reason between cases like 2b and cases like 
those in 13. 
Salmon argues that capability to combine with the predicative is, which he 
takes to express a predicativizing operator, is a sufficient condition for being a 
general term. Thereby, on the basis of such examples as 2b he can include such 
kind/property designating definite noun phrases the color of the sky among 
general terms. Setting aside the implausibility of taking the predicative is to 
express a predicativizing operator, we have seen that this sufficient condition 
generates further complications. First such phrases as a tiger, a proud mother, 
four tigers, eleven proud mothers etc. will count as general terms, but the stated 
condition will not entail anything about the status of the underlying common 
nouns tiger, proud mother etc. Second, in so far as definite phrases that 
designate particulars can combine with the same is as the adjectives, then they 
too have to count as general terms. Third, not just kind/property designating 
definite phrase but also quantiying phrases such as some kind of lunatic  that 
pertain to kinds can combine with the is of predication.  
We have indicated that Salmon is aware of some of these complications 




seen that Salmon proposes to treat is the as a constituent that expresses a 
predicativizing operator different than the one allegedly expressed by is to 
address the issue regarding the possibility of particular designating definite 
phrases such as the mother of Bob’s children to form syntactic predicates. But, 
such phrases can be conjuncts alongside adjectives in conjunctive predicates 
that arguably combine with the predicative is in such a way that there is no 
occurrence of the string is the. There are possible ways to account for such 
cases, yet they require to drop the idea of treating the string is the as a 
constituent that expresses a predicativizing operator. And they are no avail to 
Salmon, as these entail that such definite phrases the mother of Bob’s children 
can combine with the same is as adjectives do. 
In relation with some other complications following from his stated 
sufficient condition Salmon does not have anything to say. Quantified phrases 
such as some kind of lunatic too can combine with the predicative is, should 
they then count as general terms? The sensible way to treat such cases appears 
to be claiming that when the underlying logical form is considered it is not 
quantified phrases that combine with the predicative is but traces that are 
bound by them. But if this path is followed then given the clear similarity 
between such definite phrases as the color of the sky and quantified phrases 
such as some kind of lunatic, the same treatment should be extended to the 
occurences of such phrases as the color of the sky in syntactic predicate 
positions. Then the color of the sky may be interpreted as quantified phrase in 
the Montague way, which binds a trace that combines with predicative is. The 




sky does not combine with the predicative is when in the surface form it occurs 
in the position of syntactic predicate. 
 So, we conclude that Salmon’s proposal to maintain a category of general 
terms that includes the phrase the color of the sky by taking the capacity to 
combine with the predicative is as a sufficient condition, and some additional 
fixes, founders. It cannot exclude particular designating definite phrases, which 
are rather standardly regarded as singular terms, unless he adopts the 
problematic fix of treating is the as a consititutent that expresses a special 
predicativizing operator. It cannot exclude quantifying phrases such as some 
kind of lunatic unless he further extends his bloated collection of explicit 
predicativizing operators to include such strings as some kind of, every kind of 
etc. 
All these problems will of course disappear if we don’t regard the capacity 
to combine with the predicative is as a sufficient condition for being a general 
term. Instead we can adopt a lexical-enumerative demarcation of the category of 
general terms, which is also in line with the standard usage of the label general 
term, by taking only common nouns, including the modified ones, and adjectives 
to be general terms.  
However then we will also have to regard the main contention of Salmon 
(2005) as a non-starter. Remember that Salmon (2005) aimed to show that if 
general terms are generally taken to be designators, there will after all be some 
general terms like the color of the sky that are not rigid designators and rigid 




this reason that the claim that the color of the sky should be counted as a 
general term constitutes the most extensively argued point of Salmon (2005).  
General Term/Singular Term Dichotomy 
Now, although I have already said a lot problematizing Salmon’s inclusion of 
such terms as the color of the sky among general terms, I think that this issue is 
a diversion given that what motivated the so called controversy on the rigidity 
of general terms was principally Kripke’s extension of the property of rigid 
designation to the case of common nouns and adjectives.  
Even if terms like the color of the sky are granted the general term status, 
and thereby it is shown that some general terms are not rigid after all and that 
rigidity is not a vacuous property that for general terms, it still remains the case 
that the issue we initially and primarily wondered about Kripke’s extension of 
the property of rigidity to the case of adjectives and common nouns was 
whether that property made any difference among adjectives and common 
nouns. Kripke’s discussion in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity was 
principally about common nouns; the literature that responded to Kripke’s 
discussion, including Salmon’s previous work, again exclusively focused on 
adjectives and common nouns. Moreover it seems to me that not everything that 
can said about the extension of the property of rigidity to the case of common 
nouns has already been said. And further scrutiny about the extent of the 
general term category will be of no help in this respect, as there is not any 




It seems that prior to Salmon’s scrutiny about the extension of the 
category of general terms there was not a clear, more or less established 
semantic and/or syntactic characterization of the category. Common nouns and 
adjectives were regarded as typical general terms, although syntactically these 
two types of terms do not have exactly the same syntactic distribution. On the 
one hand, adjectives can combine with common nouns to form modified 
common nouns, but common nouns cannot, on the other hand common nouns 
can combine with determiners, including quantifiers but adjectives cannot. The 
only syntactic overlap between the adjectives and common nouns is their 
figuring in syntactic predicates. But again even in this respect there is a 
difference, as singular count nouns cannot figure in predicates without taking 
the indefinite determiner. Neither could adjectives and common nouns have 
been singled out as typical general terms on semantic grounds, as both the 
parties that took common nouns to be designators for kinds and the parties that 
took them to be appliers for particulars still applied them the label general term. 
From a semantic point of view the most we can say is that the denotation of 
both the adjectives and the common nouns, be they treated as appliers or 
designators of kinds/properties, potentially pertained to a plurality of entities, 
and they were singled out as general terms for this reason. So, when it comes to 
the inclusion of such kind/property designating noun phrases the color of the 
sky into the category of general terms, everything depends on whether we want 
the label general term to cover a group of terms which we have discovered to 




other respects. We can specify the hitherto unscrutinized criteria for inclusion 
in such a way that they be included, or we can do otherwise to exclude them. 
But do we really need the category of general terms; or more precisely the 
dichotomy singular term/ general term? The established linguistic categories of 
noun phrase, common noun, adjective phrase, adjective already give us clearly 
defined classess that overlap with important syntactic differences and that 
cover all the terms covered by the singular term/general term dichotomy. It can 
be objected that these linguistic categories cross over important semantic 
differences which we would like to be reflected in a semantic classification and 
the singular term/general term dichotomy yields such a classification. In 
response to this objection let me note the following points. First, it is not true 
that this dichotomy has been a purely semantic one. As already indicated both 
the people that took common nouns to be designators for kinds and those who 
took them to be appliers regarded them as general terms. Second, semantic 
classess are less established than the syntactic classess. Although syntactic 
classifications too are theory dependent and occasionally change, they are 
relatively more stable and more commonly accepted than the semantic ones. 
Consequently, if one makes the singular term/general term dichotomy 
dependent on semantic differences, then it will not be useful to compare and 
assesss different semantic theories. For such purposes a syntactic classification 
will be more suitable as it will be neutral with regard to semantic views that are 
being compared and assesssed. Third, if there is indeed a need for a semantic 




terms designator, applier, quantifier to divide terms according to their semantic 
differences. 
General Terms Are Appliers, Some Are Rigid Appliers, Some Are Not: 
Devitt (2005) 
Devitt (2005) is another response to Kripke’s assigning rigid designation to 
natural kind common nouns and adjectives, commingled together as natural 
kind general terms. It is also a response to the two pronged argument against it 
that challenges the very significance assigning to some general terms rigid 
designation or an analogue of it.  
Devitt accepts the two pronged argument, but still argues that there is a 
property of rigidity that gives a theoretically significant rigid/non-rigid 
difference among general terms. He takes general terms to be appliers 
(denotation type <e,t>). He argues that some are rigid appliers and some are 
not, and that this difference does some significant theoretical work. 
Devitt’s Rigid*-application 
Obviously Devitt’s rigid application has to be different than what we have been 
taking in this work to be the default meaning of rigid application. We had 
proposed a generalized property of rigidity as constancy of denotation relative 
to every evaluation index. Accordingly rigidity can apply to expressions of any 
type regardless their mode of denotation, be they designators (type e), appliers 




above definition  is a rigid applier if and only if it has the same denotation of 
type <e,t> relative to every evaluation index. Yet, rigid application understood 
in this way cannot be a property that marks a significant difference among 
common nouns and adjectives. Except common nouns such as number, triangle 
and adjectives such as even, equilateral that truly applies solely to abstract 
objects, no common noun or adjective is a rigid applier in this sense.  
Devitt (2005) defines rigid application in the following way (heretofore 
rigid*-application): 
Let  be an applier, []s be ’s denotation at s, and De(s) be the domain of entities of 
type e at s, then, 
 is a rigid*-applier 
iff  
If there is s’ such x∈De(s’) and []s’(x)=1,then for every s if x∈De(s) then []s(x)=1 
Yet, following Mondadori (1978) it can equivalently be formulated in the 
following way: 142 
Let  be an applier, []s be ’s denotation at s, and De(s) be the domain of entities of 
type e at s, then 
 is a rigid*-applier  
iff   
there is a set Ω such that Ω ⊆ De and for every x ∈ De(s),  []s(x)=1 iff  x∈ Ω ∩ De(s) 
                                                        
142 satisfies the second definition →  satisfies the first definition: Suppose that there is set Ω 
associated with an applier  such that, for every evaluation index s,   for every x ∈ De(s),  
[]s(x)=1 iff  x∈ Ω ∩ De(s). And suppose that there is an evaluation index s’ and an entity x of 
type e such that,  x∈De(s’) and  applies to x at s’ (i.e. []s’(x)=1). Let s’’ be such that, s’’≠s’ and 
x∈De(s’’). Then  applies to x at s’’ as well (i.e. []s’’(x)=1).  satisfies the first definition →  
satisfies the second definition:Conversely suppose that  is an applier such that, If there is s’ 
such x∈De(s’) and []s’(x)=1,then for every s if x∈De(s) then []s(x)=1.Then there is a set Ω 
defined in the following way: Ω= {x∈De: there is an s such that x∈De(s) and []s(x)=1}.  Now , 
let x be an entity, let s’’ be an evaluation index such that,  x∈De(s’’) and []s’‘(x)=1. Then, x∈ Ω∩ 
De(s’’). Conversely suppose that, x∈ Ω∩ De(s’’). Then,  given the definition of Ω there is a s’’’ 
such that, x∈De(s’’’) and []s’‘’(x)=1. Then, given the supposition about , []s’’(x)=1. Thus, Ω is 




But are there rigid*-appliers? Devitt claims that such natural kind common 
nouns as tiger, gold are rigid*-appliers. He also claims that such nominal kind 
common nouns as bachelor, hunter and such artifact kind common nouns as TV 
set, transistor  are not rigid*-appliers. 
Devitt’s argument that some general terms are rigıd*-appliers and some are not: 
What is Devitt’s justification of his claim that such common nouns as gold and 
tiger are rigid*-appliers? In this vein he says the following in relation with the 
common noun gold: 
Consider ‘gold’, for example. As we use ‘gold’ it applies to lots of stuff in the 
actual world with atomic number 79 and will apply to any of that actual 
stuff in another possible world should it exist there. Furthermore, should it 
apply to nonactual stuff in a possible world it will apply to that very stuff in 
every other world in which the stuff exists. Any piece of gold is essentially 
gold and ‘gold’ is a rigid applier. 
The purport of this seems to be that we use such terms gold, tiger  in our talk 
about possible states of affairs in such a way that if we apply them to an actual 
or possible entity we stick to that application in so far as that same entity is in 
question, and this is so even if we shift to talk about another possible 
configuration of states of affairs than the one we started with. This seems 
indeed to be the case with such natural kind nouns as gold, tiger . For example 
sentences such as the following appear to be necessarily false: 
Something might have been gold but it might also not have been so. 
Something might have been a tiger but it might also not have been so. 
If we accept this judgment of necessary falsity as a datum and give a semantic 




appliers, we will then have to conclude that these common nouns satisfy the 
given definition of rigid*-application. 
In contrast such common nouns as bachelor, hunter, wounded tiger, 
projectile will apparently fail this test. The following sentences appear to be 
true: 
Someone might have been a bachelor but he might also not have been so. 
Someone might have been a hunter but she might also not have been so. 
Something might have been wounded tiger but it might also not have been so. 
Something might have been a projectile but it might also not have been so. 
The truth of these sentences entail that the nouns bachelor, hunter, wounded 
tiger, projectile does not satisfy the definition for rigid*-application. 
Yet, Devitt more controversially claims that artifact nouns such as PC, 
automobile, TV set too fail to be rigid*-appliers. Such nouns rather appear to 
pass the test however: 
Something might have been a TV set but it might also not have been so. 
Something might have been a PC but it might also not have been so. 
The above sentences prima facie appear to be necessarily false. It seems that a 
TV set might not ever fail to be a TV set. Devitt’s intuitions on this matter points 
otherwise, so he is ready to claim that the above sentences are true. To support 
this claim he rather suggests us to consider a noun such as paperweight that 
corresponds to a less complicated artifact than TV sets, computers. Indeed 
paperweight appears to pass the test: 




A hand-sized stone indifferently waiting on the shore might indeed have been a 
paperweight if someone had picked it and used it thus, or might not ever have 
been a paperweight until it is grinded out of existence by wear and tear.  
To extend the morale of the paperweight  to the case of such artifact nouns 
as TV set Devitt claims that there might have been a natural species, whose 
instances could be used as TV sets. And according to Devitt any such individual 
apparently might be a TV set and it might not be a TV set, depending on whether 
it is domesticated for that use or not. For a less far-fetched scenario Devitt 
claims that it is also possible that objects that have the full functionality of a TV 
set are produced by people that use it for another purpose –we can enliven 
Devitt’s scenario here by adding that the people in question might be of a  
species that altogether lack the faculty of vision and produce these objects that 
have the TV functionality with the sole purpose of using them as components of 
larger technological devices of theirs. According to Devitt any of these 
components might be TV sets or they might not be TV sets, depending whether 
some one uses them to watch TV. 
Are There De Jure Rigid*-appliers? 
Devitt is a proponent of the so called causal theory of denotation determination 
with respect to natural kind common nouns. According to this theory, very 
roughly, the denotations across all possible worlds of such a common noun as 
tiger is fixed by the fact that in the origin of the causal chain that lead to the 




Panthera Tigris. Given this, the noun tiger comes to truly apply to anything that 
is of the same kind as the original specimen and only to them. This is the case 
even if some of the individuals which it can truly apply might not look like the 
stereotypical tiger at all –this consequence of the causal theory is often lauded 
as its superiority over very simplistically conceived descriptive theories of 
denotation fixing which allegedly take the instantiation of certain stereotypical 
properties as the necessary and sufficient condition for the true application of 
the noun tiger. 
In the previous paragraph I produced a crude aside into theories of 
denotation fixing because I want to quote a passage from Devitt (2004) which 
refers to the causal theory of denotation fixing. The passage in question runs as 
follows, the emphasis is mine: 
A kind term covered by the causal theory applies to all objects that are of 
the same kind as the actual sample in which the term was grounded 
(allowing perhaps for a few “errors” in the sample). So, wherever being a 
member of that kind is essential to any member, the term will be a rigid 
applier. So the rigid application of a natural kind term like ‘gold’ is 
explained partly by the semantic fact that it is covered by a causal theory 
and partly by the metaphysical fact that each piece of gold is essentially 
gold.  Perhaps all kind terms covered by a causal theory are rigid but, we 
are a long way from establishing this. 
According to this passage the rigidity* of a natural kind common noun is not 
stipulatively fixed in the introduction of the noun, but it depends on whether the 
causally relevant target kind happens to be of a sort that is essentially 
instantiated by all of its instances, actual or possible. If that is not the case, the 
introduced noun will not be a rigid*-applier. So, according to Devitt whether a 
noun is a rigid*-applier is not a parameter that is fixed by language as a 




parameter that is stipulatively fixed by those who introduce a certain noun. 
Rather it is a parameter that is fixed, possibly unbeknownst to us, by the 
metaphysical profiles of the individuals to which the noun is to truly apply.  
This has the consequence that if we change our opinions about the 
metaphysical profile of individuals of a certain type, we might be obliged to 
revise our views as to whether certain nouns that applied to those inviduals are 
rigid*-appliers or not. For example, Devitt apparently holds a view of tigers that 
is similar to the view that has been defended by Aristotle and his followers: 
according to this view tiger tokens are substances qua tigers, and the moment 
they fail to be tigers they will not exist. But he does not hold the same view 
about TV set tokens: TV set tokens are not substances qua TV sets but are 
substances qua something else (say qua plant tokens or animal tokens as Devitt 
thinks that it is possible for some plants or animals to be TV sets); thus they can 
subsist without being TV sets. Now, if Devitt changes his Aristotelian view of 
living things, and say adopts a view about them according to which a tiger, or 
any animal for that matter, is not a substance qua a tiger, or qua an animal but 
rather animals are substances qua souls, then Devitt will be obliged to revise his 
ascription of rigidity* to the noun tiger. I am not sure whether such a view is 
ever held, but at least it seems that some schools of Hinduism and Buddhism 
hold views that entail that some thing which actually is a tiger might not have 
been a tiger.  
Now, if all rigid*common nouns are like tiger, that is if their rigidity* is not 
a linguistic design feature or is not stipulatively fixed but depends on the 




significance of rigid*-application from the point of views of semantic theorizing 
and philosophy of language will be greatly reduced.  
A rigidly denoting expression might be thought to be rigid in two ways. In 
the case of some expressions the rigidity is arguably a semantic-design feature 
of the language they belong to. In the case of some other rigid expressions 
rigidity is not linguistically fixed design feature, but these expressions acquire 
this feature in virtue of the metaphysical profile of the entity (or entities) they 
denote. 
This difference is most easily seen in the case of designators. The rigidity 
of proper names and indexical pronouns is believed to be a semantic-design 
feature of natural languages. If this is true then their rigidity does not depend on 
the metaphysical profiles of the entities they denote, and will thus not be open 
to revision in relation with our changing opinions about the metaphysical 
profiles of the entities they are used to designate. This appears indeed to be the 
case: the name Saul Kripke will be a rigid designator however we opine about 
the metaphysical profile of the entity it designates: regardless whether that 
entity is a soul or a body or a process or a bundle of tropes the name will track 
that same entity in every talk about possible states of affairs. The same is the 
case for indexical pronouns used in a specific context. If the rigidity of names 
and pronouns is a design-feature of natural languages, then names and 
pronouns will be very handy in metaphysical theorizing to describe the 
metaphysical profiles of particulars. 
Clearly it is not the case that every rigid designator is so in virtue of 




arguably a rigid designator. But this crucially depends on the metaphysical 
profile of the designated entity. If we hold that tigers could not have been tigers, 
then we have to deny that the species Simba belongs to  is a rigid designator; 
and such a denial arguably does not contradict any design feature of English.   
The idea that the rigidity of proper names and pronouns is a semantic 
design feature of natural languages is commonly expressed by saying that they 
are de jure rigid designators. In contrast the designators the rigidity of which is 
not a linguistic feature but a consequence of the metaphysical profiles of the 
entities they designate are qualified as de facto rigid designators.  
Returning now to Devitt, in light of what we have discussed above and in 
light of what Devitt himself thinks about rigid*-appliers, it appears that Devitt’s 
favorite rigid*-applier example, the species noun tiger, is a de facto rigid*-
applier. If it were de jure rigid* then it would not linguistic-semantically be 
possible for a believer in the Hindu doctrine to say something like I might have 
been a tiger but I am not. For if tiger were de jure rigid* he would then have run 
against a linguistically fixed feature of tiger.  The same may be argued to be the 
case for gold, another example by Devitt. Although the claim, something that is 
gold might not have been gold, is very unlikely to be endorsed by anyone, this 
arguably is not due to a linguistic feature of the noun gold, but rather due to the 
metaphysical profiles universally ascribed to entities which we apply the noun 
gold.  So, Devitt’s rigid*-appliers are at best de facto rigid appliers. 
But what is wrong with de facto rigid*-appliers? The property of rigidity 
that is of primary interest in semantic theory and in philosophy of language is 




by considering semantic phenomena patterns of a great generality and of a 
nature that cannot be dodged by any competent speaker. Semantic design 
features are postulated to explain such phenomena. Arguably this is the case 
with the rigidity of proper names. For example, we appear to have an 
apparently irreversible intuition that identity sentences that have as arguments 
names or pronouns are non-contingent, no matter what these sentences are 
about. This intuition can be explained by assuming that names are rigid 
designators as a design feature of natural languages –i.e. that names are de jure 
rigid designators.  For another example, the non-ambiguity of such sentences as 
Alice might have married Bob versus the ambiguity of such sentences as Alice 
might have married Claire’s eldest son  can be explained under the same 
assumption regarding names.  
De facto semantic properties of expressions however are by definition not 
suitable to play the same role as de jure semantic properties in semantic theory. 
The species that Simba belongs to is Panthera tigris may well be necessarily 
true, and The species that Simba belongs to might not have been the species that 
Simba belongs to may well not have a true reading. And if these are indeed the 
case The species that Simba belongs to has to be a rigid designator. But these 
semantic judgments are of a nature that can be contradicted by negating the 
former sentence and affirming the second sentence, without thereby 
committing any linguistic-semantic transgression. 
Kripke did not use the qualifications de jure and de facto in relation with 
rigidity in the main text of the lectures entitled Naming and Necessity. But he 




names were de jure rigid designators. This is in line with his remark that, if  
and   are proper names we a priori know that “if  is  then necessarily  is ” 
is true. If the rigidity of proper names is a feature of languages then competence 
in these languages will be enough to know this truth. He also makes a similar 
remark in relation with the natural kind nouns to which he ascribed rigidity. He 
claimed that we a priori know that if cats are animals then necessarily cats are 
animals is true because cat and animal are rigid. He apparently thought that if 
cat and animal are de jure rigid expressions then Cats are animals would entail 
Necessarily cats are animals, and we would know this entailment a priori. He 
apparently held the same opinion about many other similar sentences which he 
labeled as theoretical identifications. To this day no semantic analysis of such 
sentences as Cats are animals and no formulation of rigidity have been given 
that can support Kripke’s claim, and thus Kripke was probably wrong about this 
hunch. Yet, this very hunch suggests that Kripke thought that the rigidity of 
natural kind nouns, like the rigidity of proper names, was a feature fixed by 
natural languages. And he has been generally interpreted to have thought so. 
Then the controversy about the rigidity of general terms appears to be 
incited by the understanding that Kripke meant to ascribe de jure rigidity to 
natural kind nouns and related adjectives. That is that he meant to claim that 
such nouns and adjectives were different in that their rigidity was a feature of 
natural languages. The motivation behind the controversy about general terms 
was certainly not to find a property of rigidity applicable to general terms that is 





Devitt’s rigid*-application will therefore be irrelevant, or at best not as 
much of interest as a de jure property of rigidity, in relation with the 
controversy on the rigidity of general terms unless there are examples of de jure 
rigid*-appliers. If we believe Devitt’s own story of how rigid*-application comes 
about, which was expressed in the quoted passage, then we should not expect 
that there will be de jure rigid*- appliers. According to that story the rigidity* of 
a noun is neither fixed by language nor is it fixed stipulatively. But that story 
depended on the causal theory of denotation fixing, and for that matter on a 
certain specific conception of that theory. Neither we need buy that theory nor 
Devitt’s own conception of it. Still even if we disregard this story, the fact that 
such affirmations as I might have been a fish but I am not do not seem to be 
semantically problematic and that as such they are being produced by people 
who subscribe to certain metaphysical doctrines indicate that at least nouns for 
animal kinds are not de jure rigid*-appliers. In relation with such stuff nouns as 
gold I will rather withhold judgment. I will just indicate that gold too will not be 
a de jure rigid*-applier unless such claims as some gold might not have been 
gold are unacceptable on purely linguistic-semantic grounds.  
One may think that in principle it is impossible to have de jure rigid*-
appliers, because one cannot stipulatively introduce a rigid*-applier. This view 
is put forward and defended by Inan (2008).  I however think that it is in 
principle possible to introduce a rigid*-applier stipulatively. To see this let’s 





Let  be an applier, []s be ’s denotation at s, and De(s) be the domain of entities of 
type e at s, then 
 is a rigid*-applier  
iff   
there is a set Ω such that for every s,  for every x ∈ De,  []s(x)=1 iff  x∈ Ω ∩ De(s) 
One can stipulatively introduce a rigid* noun , by assigning it a set Ω 
determined by way of listing its members. Let’s then introduce the noun widget 
as a noun that applies to an individual x relative to evaluation index s if and only 
if  x ∈ Ωwidget ∩ De(s) and let’s put Ωwidget={the moon, Neil Armstrong, the actual 
Apollo 11 Capsule}. Then anything that might possibly be a widget will 
necessarily be widget.  But this won’t be in any way due to metaphysical profiles 
of widgets, but due to the linguistic stipulation through which the semantics of 
widget is defined.143 
Another way to introduce a rigid*-applier  by stipulation, apart from 
determining the set Ω by way of plainly listing its members, may be thought to 
be determining that set by way of description. Yet we should be careful here 
because a given descriptive condition might apply to an entity relative to one 
evaluation index but might not apply relative to another. And such a descriptive 
condition will not be suitable to determine a subset Ω of De, the set of all 
individuals actual or possible. For example only the first four of the following six 
set-descriptions will non-problematically manage to determine a subset of De: 
14 a {x∈De: x is actually a hunter who is also a bachelor} 
b {x∈De: x is possibly a hunter who is also a bachelor} 
c {x∈De: x is necessarily a hunter who is also a bachelor} 
d {x∈De: x has the same essence as these} 
                                                        
143 I figured out the possibility of this way of introducing a de jure rigid*-applier by way of 




e {x∈De: x is of the same species as these} 
f {x∈De: x is a hunter who is also a bachelor} 
14e will determine a subset of De only if we presuppose that necessarily 
anything of a certain species is necessarily so. 14f will not determine a subset of 
De because any possible or actual entity who is a hunter who is also a bachelor 
relative to an evaluation index may not be so relative to another to another 
evaluation index.  
It appears that, to descriptively determine a set Ω with the aim of 
introducing a rigid*-applier by stipulation one inevitably has to use a 
description with modal force. The need for a description with modal force does 
not entail that the description should specify a metaphysical profile as a 
condition for membership. For example the first description (14a) does not 
require the satisfaction of any metaphysical profile as a condition for 
membership. However, the noun which will be introduced on the basis of (14a) 
is bound to truly apply only to actual individuals. To stipulatively introduce a 
rigid*-applier  that can truly apply to non-actual entities as well one has to 
determine a subset Ω of De that contains non-actual entities as well; and such 
sets can be determined only by specifying a metaphysical profile as the 
membership condition –e.g. 14b-d.  
Nouns  that are introduced in the latter way, by specifying a general 
metaphysical profile that determines a subset Ω of De and by stipulating that 
for any s, for any x,  will truly apply to x relative to s iff x ∈ Ω ∩ De(s) should 
count as de jure rigid*-appliers. For, although their rigidity* depends on the 




explicitly brought in by the stipulation that introduced the noun. The rigidity* 
parameter is determined by the stipulation and it is not left for post-
introduction determination. A certain metaphysical profile, for example the one 
expressed by x is necessarily a hunter who is also a bachelor can yield an empty 
set Ω. Still the noun  to be introduced thereby is stipulatively bound to be a 
rigid*-applier, albeit one that is not true and that cannot be true of anything.  
So, it is possible to stipulatively introduce rigid*-appliers. But rigid*-
appliers that can truly apply to non-actual entitities relative to non-actual 
evaluation indexes can only be introduced by specifying a metaphysical profile 
as the membership condition determining the global set from which comes the 
entities to which the applier truly applies.  
Now the crucial question is whether any natural language common noun is 
introduced in one of described manners. If this is the case then there will be 
some de jure rigid* appliers. The introduction by way of listing can easily be 
ruled out. Natural language common nouns are semantically open in the sense 
that they can truly apply to merely possible entities as well.144 The stipulative 
introduction by way of a specifying a metaphysical profile cannot however be as 
easily ruled out. In fact, it is often thought that natural kind nouns are 
introduced by denotation fixing descriptions like things that have the same 
inner structure as these, things of the same species as these or things that have 
the same essence as these. 
                                                        




The descriptions of the latter type, those that explicitly refer to essences, 
are by themselves sufficient to specify a metaphysical profile; descriptions of 
the former two types will specify metaphysical profiles if it is also explicitly 
presupposed that entities instantiate inner structures and species necessarily. 
Such metaphysical profiles will determine subsets Ω of De which can then be 
used to stipulatively introduce rigid appliers .  
So, I think that if this rather popular account of natural kind noun 
introduction through denotation fixing descriptions, then it follows that the 
nouns introduced thereby will be de jure rigid*-appliers –provided that it also 
explicitly assumed that species or inner structures are instantiated non-
contingently. For, their rigidity* will directly follow from the stipulation that 
introduces them by way of fixing their denotations across possible worlds.  
This account lends support to Devitt’s position against the possible 
criticism that rigid*-appliers, if there are any, are de facto rigid*-appliers and 
thus not significant from the point of views of semantic theory and philosophy 
of language. For, if natural kind common nouns are introduced as this account 
claims them to be, these nouns will be rigid*-appliers by stipulation –i.e. de jure 
rigid appliers.  
But I am not sure whether Devitt will be ready to accept this account. 
Devitt is not an adamant supporter of a pure causal theory of denotation fixing 
for natural kind common nouns. Elsewhere he admits that fixing the denotation 
of a natural kind noun requires both causal contact with some original specimen 




the target for the noun to be introduced.145 But the quoted passage suggests that 
for some reason he does not want to presuppose that the descriptions that will 
accompany the causal contact should explicitly require that the target kind be 
instantiated necessarily by the tokens to which the noun will apply. Devitt 
rather envisions a post-introduction determination of the rigidity* parameter: 
in that passage we have seen him to put “…wherever being a member of that 
kind is essential to any member, the term will be a rigid applier”.  
Here, I am not in a position to criticize the sketched account for the 
introduction of natural kind nouns, nor can I propose an alternative account as 
to how the denotations of natural kind nouns are fixed across all possible 
evaluation indexes. However I think that most natural kind nouns are not de 
jure rigid* appliers, for reasons already stated: it is possible to affirm in English 
in these very terms that I might have been a fish but I am not or that some gold 
might not have been gold; such affirmations can be very tenuous from a 
metaphysical point of view but still it seems that they cannot be ruled out purely 
on linguistic-semantic grounds. Yet, if natural kind nouns were de jure rigid* 
appliers, they could be ruled out purely on linguistic-semantic grounds. If these 
considerations are accepted, it follows that it cannot be the case that such nouns 
as tiger have been introduced by stipulating that it will truly apply to anything 
that belongs to the same species as these by explicitly presupposing that species 
are instantiated necessarily. For, then tiger would be a de jure rigid* applier.     
                                                        




The Theoretical Work Done by Rigid*-application 
The two pronged argument raised against Kripke’s ascription of rigidity to some 
general terms challenges the linguistic-semantic significance of doing so. If 
general terms are designators of kinds/properties then all should be rigid 
designators. If general terms are appliers then virtually none (apart from those 
that apply to abstract entities) will be rigid appliers. Either way the property of 
rigidity will be not expected to do in any sort of linguistic-semantic explanation 
that is comparable to the one done by rigid designation in relation with singular 
terms –e.g. ambiguity divergence between modal sentences with proper name 
arguments and those with definite description arguments, non-contigency 
divergence between identity sentences with proper name arguments and those 
with definite description arguments. 
As indicated however Devitt’s rigid*-application is different than mere 
rigid-application, and even if all general terms are interpreted as appliers, only 
some are rigid*-appliers. Thus, prima facie there is a chance that the property of 
rigid*-application can do some work comparable to rigid designation’s work in 
relation with singular terms. 
To see what we mean by linguistic-semantic explanatory work here we 
can reconsider previously illustrated cases of linguistic-semantic explanations 
that had recourse to the property of rigid designation. Proper names’ being de 
jure rigid designators can be used to explain non-contigency of identity 
sentences with proper name arguments; it can also be used to explain divergent 




one of them having a proper name argument where the other has a definite 
noun phrase argument. The de jure rigidity of such kind designating definite 
phrases as the honeybee, the groundhog can be used to explain similar 
phenomena. These pass as linguistic-semantic explanations in so far as the 
phenomena are explained by recourse to semantic design features of languages. 
Proper names’ being rigid designators is commonly thought to be such a feature. 
The same is arguably the case for such kind designating definite phases as the 
honeybee, the groundhog: they are named as definite generics and their 
semantics is commonly acknowledged to be different than that of the ordinary 
definite noun phrases. Conversely such linguistic-semantic explanatory work 
constitute a justification for the assumptions that enable them –viz. proper 
names are rigid designators as a design feature of natural languages or that 
definite generics are rigid designators as a design feature of English. If no such 
explanatory work were done, if for example ascription of de jure rigid 
designation to names did not explain and correctly predict anything about the 
way we evaluate sentences then there would be no reason to make such an 
ascription. 
So, prima facie rigid*-application can be expected to do this type of 
linguistic-semantic explanatory work, provided that we come upon general 
patterns of semantic phenomena that is best explained by assigning rigidity* to 
certain common nouns as a design feature of the language.  
One apparently semantic phenomenon we can prima facie expect rigid*-
application, assigned as a linguistic design feature to natural kind nouns, to 




lightning is an electrical discharge, Tigers are cats etc. We’ve above mentioned 
that Kripke has been plausibly taken to suggest that this non-contingency is due 
to the rigidity of the common nouns involved and that it is also a priori known. 
These sentences are clearly not identity sentences and they are usually analyzed 
as universal quantifications. Perhaps rigidity understood as rigid*-application 
and assigned as a linguistic design feature to the nouns forming such 
identifications can yield a linguistic-semantic explanation of their non-
contingency as was apparently expected by Kripke. This expectation however 
does not materialize. The truth of the formula (∀x)([]s(x) []s(x)) relative to 
s does not entail that it be also true relative to any other evaluation index s’, 
even if  and  are assumed to be rigid*-appliers: for some s’ and x such that 
x∉De(s) and x∈De(s’) it is possible that []s’(x)=1 and []s’(x)≠1. That is, 
assuming that actually every tiger token is a mammal token and that tiger and 
mammal are rigid*-appliers, does not preclude the possibility that there might 
have been a tiger token different from all actual tokens, and also not a 
mammal.146 
The previously used test for rigid* application can also be regarded to 
constitute a candidate for a linguistic-semantic explanation. We noted that the 
following sentence schema yields true sentences for some common nouns and 
necessarily false sentences for some other common nouns; and that to yield a 
necessarily false sentence of this form a common noun has to be a rigid*-
applier: 
                                                        




15 Something might be (a)  and might not be (a) . 
Now it may be thought, the fact that when the place marked by  is filled in with 
natural kind nouns such as tiger and gold  usually the resulting sentence will be 
necessarily false can be explained by assuming that such nouns are rigid*-
appliers as a design feature of English. However, as noted previously the 
necessary falsity of these sentences can be contested on metaphysical grounds, 
and there are actual metaphysical doctrines that will contest it. If the necessary 
falsity had followed from a semantic design feature of English, these 
contestations would not be possible, they could simply be ruled out on 
linguistic-semantic grounds. So, rigid*-application cannot be cited as linguistic 
design feature of natural kind nouns due to which these sentences are false.  
Curiously Devitt thinks that the primary theoretical role to be expected of 
rigid*-application will not be to provide linguistic-semantic explanations of 
general semantic patterns as illustrated above. He even does not think that its 
primary theoretical role will be to give semantic explanations under some 
additional non-semantic, metaphysical presuppositions. He thinks that this 
latter type of work will be at best a secondary role. Rather Devitt thinks that in 
general the primary theoretical role of the property of rigidity (be it rigid 
designation or rigid*-application) is to refute certain strong variants of 
descriptivist theories for denotation fixing. According to these strong variants 
denoting expressions are synonymous with certain descriptions and thus have 
the same intensions as these descriptions. For example, according to such 
theories Bertrand Russell may be synonymous with some description like the 




designator refutes that theory, because the youngest son of Katherine and John 
Russell is not a rigid designator. Again according to such theories tiger is 
synonymous with something like feline that can roar and has a tawny yellow fur 
with black stripes and white belly; tiger’s being a rigid*-applier refutes this the 
theory because feline that can roar and has a tawny yellow fur with black 
stripes and white belly is not a rigid*-applier. 
Devitt’s taking such refutations to constitute the primary theoretical roles 
for rigid designation and rigid*-application is problematic in two respects. The 
relatively less significant problem, one that Devitt himself acknowledges, is that 
names’ being rigid designators and natural kind nouns’ being rigid*-appliers 
does not refute the general theory that names and natural kind nouns are 
synonymous with descriptions. For example, the claim that Bertrand Russell is 
synonymous with the actual youngest son of Katherine and John Russell, cannot 
be refuted by the fact that Bertrand Russell is a rigid designator, because the 
actual youngest son of Katherine and John Russell too is a rigid designator. In 
the same way, the claim that tiger  is synonymous with token that is necessarily 
of the same kind as the actual felines that can roar and have a tawny yellow fur 
with black stripes and white belly, cannot be refuted by the fact that tiger is a 
rigid*-applier, because token that is necessarily of the same kind as the actual 
felines that can roar and have a tawny yellow too is a rigid*-applier.  
The most significant problem about Devitt’s taking such refutations to 
constitute the primary theoretical role for rigid designation and rigid*-
application is that a theory’s refuting another theory can hardly be considered 




given with the primary aim of refuting another theory. Theories are given to 
explain phenomena. These explanations constitute the primary role of a theory, 
and its justification. Refuting alternative theories is a just a consequence of the 
fulfillment of the explanatory role better than the alternatives, and can hardly 
be qualified as a theoretical role.  
Specifically, the primary theoretical role of the theory that proper names 
are de jure rigid designators cannot be that it refutes some other theories about 
names. Rather the primary role is the semantic explanatory work done by this 
theory. And this explanatory work constitutes an abductive justification for this 
theory. Pending such work what would be the justification for that theory? It 
will at best be idle, or worse it will make predictions that contradict the 
observed semantic phenomena. Its contradicting another theory can hardly be a 
justification for it, if it too cannot explain the observed phenomena –e.g. the 
non-contingency of identity sentences with proper name arguments, and the 
divergent ambiguity patterns of modal sentences that involve proper names and 
definite descriptions. And pending a justification deriving from successful 
explanations that cannot be delivered by alternative theories how can the 
rigidity theory refute these alternative theories?   
Devitt puts the cart before the horses here. The theory that names are 
rigid designators refutes description theories because it explains the 
phenomena that contradict the consequences of these theories. The refutation is 
a consequence of successful explanations that it delivers. It is the horse of 
successful semantic explanations of phenomena that pulls the cart of the 




The same considerations clearly apply to the case of rigid*-application. 
Rigid*-application cannot refute any theory that it contradicts unless it does 
some explanatory semantic work. Above we have illustrated what such 
explanatory semantic work would be like: to explain the necessary falsity of 
such sentences as, Something might have been a tiger and it might also not have 
been a tiger.  There we claimed that unlike the case of proper names’ being rigid 
designators, the rigidity* of natural kind common nouns cannot be regarded as 
giving a linguistic-semantic explanation of this phenomenon. For, arguably this 
phenomenon partly follows from contestable metaphysical presuppositions 
extrinsic to suppositions about the semantic design properties of natural 
languages. Still, when these metaphysical presuppositions are granted this 
phenomenon will follow and rigid*-application, albeit not its de jure variant, can 
be alluded to explain it. And it is this explanation or similar ones that should 
count as the rigid*-application’s primary theoretical role.  
Devitt is aware of the prospect of such semantic explanations, but it 
assigns them secondary importance. Devitt (2005) illustrates some types of 
semantic phenomena which he believes can be explained by the rigidity* of the 
natural kind common nouns involved. Let’s now assesss them.  
16 Tigers make dangerous pets. 
Large carnivorous quadrupedal felines that are tawny yellow in color with blackish 
transverse stripes and white belly make  dangerous pets. 
According to Devitt the above sentences differ in that although both are about 
tigers when evaluated relative to the actual world, relative to other evaluation 
indexes only the first one will continue to be about tigers yet the second one 




difference can be explained by the fact that tiger is a rigid*-applier. Note that if 
tiger were not rigid* the same difference between the sentences in 16 would 
obtain. Thus rigidity* does not play any role in the explanation of the difference. 
To see this clearly consider the following pair: 
Wounded tigers are dangerous. 
Large carnivorous quadrupedal wounded felines that are tawny yellow in color with 
blackish transverse stripes and white belly are dangerous. 
Wounded tigers can hardly be claimed to be a rigid*-applier. Still the first 
sentence will be about wounded tigers relative to all possible worlds, although 
the second sentence may not be so.  
The second example of semantic phenomenon which Devitt thinks can be 
explained by alluding to the property rigidity* is the following: 
17 a Large carnivorous quadrupedal felines . . . might not have been large carnivorous 
quadrupedal felines. 
b Tigers might not have been tigers. 
The first sentence is true and the second sentence is false. Devitt thinks that this 
difference is explained by the rigidity* of tiger and non-rigidity* of large 
carnivorous quadrupedal feline that are tawny yellow in color with blackish 
transverse stripes and white belly. This is indeed true, provided that 17b is 
false. Yet, is 17b indeed false? As discussed above it is possible to contest its 
falsity. Thus, its falsity is not a semantic phenomenon that can be given a 
linguistic-semantic explanation. For if it were, it would on linguistic-semantic 
grounds be impossible to contest its falsity and tiger would be de jure rigid*.  
Devitt’s third example is the following: 
18 a It might have been the case that large carnivorous felines. . .with blackish 




b It might have been the case that tigers were not striped. 
Devitt thinks that the first sentence is ambiguous due to scope interaction 
between the noun phrase large carnivorous felines. . .with blackish transverse 
stripes and white belly with the modal operator it might have been the case 
that. If the noun phrase takes wide scope the sentence will be true, on the other 
hand if the modal operator takes the wide scope the sentence will be false. 
According to Devitt the second sentence is not however ambiguous, despite the 
fact that the same scope options should be available for tigers as well. Devitt 
claims that this is so because the reading that results when tigers takes the wide 
scope is equivalent to the reading that results when tigers take the narrow 
scope. This indifference in the semantic output of tigers under difference scope 
options relative to a modal operator is according to Devitt explained by the 
rigidity* of tiger.  
Now, contrary to what Devitt claims 18b can be ambiguous, and it will 
remain so even if we suppose that tiger is a rigid* applier. Clearly, 18b can be 
read as claiming that it is possible that tiger tokens are not striped but also as 
claiming that actual tiger tokens are such that it is possible that they be not 
striped. To make the possible ambiguity even more clear let’s interpret the 
modal operator in 18b as expressing a more restricted sense of possibility, say 
biological possibility. Let’s now evaluate 18b relative to an evaluation index 
where every tiger token is striped–although there too it is possible that there be 
some tiger tokens that did not have stripes due to some genetic mutations. Now, 
relative to such an evaluation index 18b will be false if tigers is interpreted in 




be striped, as they cannot biologically fail to have the genes with which they 
were born and the genes with which they are born biologically requires that 
they be striped. However, relative to the same index the reading of 18b with 
tigers interpreted in the narrow scope will be true. Because relative to that 
evaluation index it is possible that there be non-striped tigers, yet that 
possibility did not materialize. Clearly whether tiger is a rigid*-applier or not 
makes no difference here. Tiger tokens’ being metaphysically necessarily tigers 
is compatible with the facts that biologically a striped tiger could not fail to be 
striped tiger and that it is nonetheless biologically possible that there be non-
striped tiger tokens, and this is all that is needed for 18b to be ambiguous.  
It may be thought that the interpretation of possibility as biological 
possibility may be relevant in this result, but this is not the case. I alluded to 
biological possibility only to give a more plausible example. If modal sentences 
like 18b cannot be ambiguous when possibility is interpreted metaphysically 
because tiger is a rigid*-applier and otherwise they would be ambiguous then 
the same would be the case also when possibility is interpreted in a more 
restricted way -the set of biologically possible worlds relative to a possible 
world w should be a subset of the metaphysically possible worlds relative to w.  
Concluding Remarks about Devitt (2005) 
Devitt proposed rigid*-application as a semantic property that will contradict 
the two-pronged argument against seeking an analogue of rigid designation in 




properties, then all should be rigidly so. If general terms are appliers then 
virtually none will be rigid-appliers –in the sense of having the same predicative 
denotation relative to every evaluation index. That argument concluded that, 
pace Kripke’s discussion in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity, there is 
not a theoretically significant property of rigidity for general terms which is 
analogous to the rigid designation property for singular terms.   
Apparently Devitt circumvents this argument because there are many 
common nouns such as bachelor, hunter, paperweight  that are not rigid*-
appliers, but also many that are, apparently most natural kind nouns such as 
tiger, gold, star etc.  
The assesssment of the success of Devitt’s proposal in relation with that 
argument depends on how we interpret it. If we interpret the theoretical 
significance expected from the general term’s counterpart of singular term 
rigidity, merely to give an even division of general terms and explain semantic 
phenomena that hold only if certain metaphysical presuppositions are granted 
then rigid*-application is fine. For, if for example we accept on metaphysical 
grounds that some sentences of the form an  might not have been an  are 
necessarily false for some but not all common nouns , then such common 
nouns ought inevitably be rigid*-appliers. However so long as the necessary 
falsity of such sentences require metaphysical presuppositions from our part, 
we cannot apply the very important qualification de jure to the common nouns 
that should be rigid*-appliers if such sentences are necessarily false. 
If on the other hand the theoretical significance expected from a candidate 




capability to yield linguistic-semantic explanations of general patterns of 
semantic phenomena which apparently does not depend on metaphysical 
presuppositions of ours, then rigid*-application fails. The rigid*-appliers of 
English do not seem to be so due to a semantic design feature of English; that is, 
they do not seem to be de jure rigid*- appliers. For, there does not seem to by 
any general semantic phenomena pattern that is not conditional on 
metaphysical presuppositions in the explanation of which rigid*-application has 
to play a role. Nor, for that matter Devitt claims about any of his examples of 
rigid*-appliers that they are de jure; we have seen that he explicitly regards 
rigidity* as a parameter that is fixed after the introduction of a common noun. 
However if there are no de jure rigid*-appliers, then this indicates that rigid*-
application cannot play a role in linguistic-semantic explanations. 
I think the theoretical significance expected from the general terms’ 
counterpart of singular term rigidity should be interpreted in the latter way. 
For, only that level of significance can be a match for the significance the 
property of rigid designation in relation with the semantics of singular terms. 
Among the singular terms, proper names and pronouns are believed to be de 
jure rigid designators; that is, they are believed to bear the property of rigidity 
due to a semantic design feature of natural languages. This view is supported by 
general patterns of semantic phenomena –non-contingency of identity 
sentences, divergent ambiguity patterns- that do not seem to be conditional on 
metaphysical presuppositions. The assumption that proper names and 




give linguistic-semantic explanations of these general semantic phenomena 
patterns.  
It therefore seems that Devitt’s rigid*-application cannot achieve the level 
of theoretical significance that rigid designation has in relation with singular 
terms -unless, of course we are willing to regard such phenomena as the 
necessary falsity of most sentences of the form  might not have been an , 
where the place marked by α involves a natural kind noun, to be on a par with 
regard to independence from metaphysical presuppositions with the non-
contingency of identity sentences with proper name arguments. And it seems 
that it is precisely this level of theoretical significance that should be required 
from any candidate for general term rigidity that will be of interest for semantic 
theory and philosophy of language. 
Rigidity Does Not Have a Theoretical Significance in Relation with 
General Terms: Schwartz (2002) 
Schwartz (2002) contends that Kripke’s extension of the property of rigidity to 
the case of general terms is a mistake as it does not correspond to any difference 
among general terms. He considers LaPorte (2000) as an attempt to defend this 
extension, criticizes it. 
Schwartz’  formulation of LaPorte’s Position 
Schwartz (2002) reads LaPorte (2000) as an attempt to defend the extension of 




the first horn of the standard two-pronged argument previously described: 
namely that, if natural kind common nouns are attributed rigid designation (in 
the sense of having the same denotation of type e relative to every evaluation 
index) then the same attribution will follow for all general terms. Schwartz 
formulates LaPorte (2000)’s position as follows: LaPorte holds that general 
terms that are natural kind common nouns (honeybee, water, bumblebee etc.) 
are rightly taken to be rigid designators for kinds because their rigidity explains 
the non-contingency of such identities as The honeybee is the Apis mellifera; 
LaPorte moreover admits that this has the consequence that general terms that 
are nominal kind common nouns such as bachelor, hunter, soda pop as well will 
have to be regarded as rigid designators for kinds; but LaPorte rejects that it 
thereby follows that all general terms are rigid designators; for according to 
LaPorte besides common nouns there are such general terms as the insect 
species that is typically farmed for honey, the beverage my uncle requests at 
superbowl parties which designate different kinds relative to different 
evaluation indexes. 
Schwartz formulates LaPorte (2000)’s position using the label general 
term both in relation with common nouns such as honeybee and in relation with 
kind designating definite phrases such as the honeybee and the insect species 
typically farmed for honey. However as we have previously indicated LaPorte 
(2000) did not even once use the label general term, instead he refered both to 
common nouns and kind designating definite phrases as kind designators and 




Apparently Schwartz does not have any scruples against labeling such 
definite phrases as the honeybee and the insect species typically farmed for 
honey as general terms, and even against the consideration of the case of such 
definite phrases as being relevant with regard to the problematic aspects of 
Kripke’s extension of the property of rigid designation to the case of common 
nouns and adjectives (which above was discussed as my own principal criticism 
against LaPorte (2000)). For, the criticisms Schwartz raises against LaPorte 
(2000)’s position as he formulates it concern neither of these points. Instead, 
one criticism of Schwartz alleges that LaPorte’s claims that the definite phrase 
the honeybee is a rigid designator and that the definite phrase the insect species 
typically farmed for honey is not a rigid designator are based on a dubious 
metaphysical presupposition. Another criticism alleges that pace LaPorte the 
explanation of the non-contingency of such identity sentences as the honeybee 
is Apis Mellifera does not require us to presuppose that the honeybee and Apis 
Mellifera are rigid designators. And a further criticism alleges that LaPorte 
confuses rigidity with the banal fact that when we speak about possible states of 
affairs our expressions keep bearing their usual meanings. 
Schwartz’ Criticisms of the Metaphysical Underpinnings of LaPorte’s 
Claims 
Now, let’s consider these criticisms of Schwartz against LaPorte in a more 
detailed manner, beginning with his claim that LaPorte is able defend that the 
honeybee is and the definite phrase the insect species typically farmed for 




presuppositions. According to this criticism LaPorte’s claim that the insect 
species typically farmed for honey designates different kinds relative to 
different evaluation indexes is made possible only by LaPorte’s rejection of the 
existence of such a kind as the-insect-species-that-is typically-farmed-for-honey 
because it is an abstruse kind.  
We have previously related that the possibility of such kinds and the 
consequences of the existence of such kinds for the non-rigidity claims about 
such definite phrases as the insect species typically farmed for honey were first 
considered by LaPorte himself. Neither is it true that if one admits that such a 
kind exists he will be bound to take the insect species typically farmed for honey 
to designate that kind relative to all evaluation indexes. Nor is it true that 
LaPorte has completely dismissed the existence of such kinds in order to sustain 
his claim. These points have already been clearly established above in the 
section destined to LaPorte (2000). Let’s briefly review them. Indeed it is true 
that one part of LaPorte’s answer to a possible criticism that may arise by 
accepting the existence of such a kind as the-insect-species-that-is typically-
farmed-for-honey is that if such metaphysical oddities are to be taken into 
consideration then a similar criticism might also be raised against the claim that 
definite phrases such as the president of US are not rigid designators –
remember Sidelle’s PREZ. But this is just the first part of LaPorte’s response and 
if one considers the second part of LaPorte’s response it is seen that the first 
part is not meant to dismiss the existence of such abstruse entities as the-insect-
species-that-is typically-farmed-for-honey and PREZ. The second part of 




existence of such oddities it is obvious that just as we use the president of US to 
designate whoever concrete person is at presidential office relative to an 
evaluation index and we use the insect species typically farmed for honey to 
designate whichever insect species is typically farmed for honey relative to an 
evaluation index. As insect species that are typically farmed for honey change 
relative to different evaluation indexes, then under such a use the insect species 
typically farmed for honey will be non-rigid. That we use such definite phrases 
in this way can be demonstrated by pointing to such possibly true sentences as 
the following: 
19 The insect species that is typically farmed for honey is the honeybee. 
LaPorte is ready to grant that perhaps such phrases as The insect species that is 
typically farmed for honey are ambiguous between a non-rigid, ordinary use as 
in 19, and a rigid use to designate such an abstruse kind as the kind the-insect-
species-that-is typically-farmed-for-honey. But here LaPorte is being too lenient 
since as we’ve argued previously it is altogether dubious whether The insect 
species that is typically farmed for honey is ever used to designate the kind the-
insect-species-that-is typically-farmed-for-honey. 
So, Schwartz allegation that LaPorte’s can defend his claim that the insect 
species typically farmed for honey is not a rigid designator only by rejecting the 
existence of such a kind as the-insect-species-that-is typically-farmed-for-honey 
is false. But Schwartz extends this line of criticism by some new twists.  
Schwartz puts forward the following claims. In formal semantics there is 
not a need to postulate kinds. In formal semantics we instead have properties: 




property and these properties normally serve as the intensions of terms rather 
than as their denotata, pace LaPorte. Since any such set counts as a property, 
there will as well be properties corresponding to such a term as insect species 
that is typically farmed for honey  (Schwartz appears to suggest that this is the 
set  consisting of all possible and actual token bees that are of the insect species 
that is typically farmed for honey ).147 And if the insect species that is typically 
farmed for honey is taken to designate that property, it has to be a rigid 
designator because the property corresponding to insect species that is typically 
farmed for honey will not change relative to different evaluation indexes. So, 
LaPorte, in order to defend his position, has to assume that some sets of actual 
and possible particulars, such as the one determined by insect species that is 
typically farmed for honey, do not count as properties. LaPorte may attempt to 
contrast such sets with those corresponding to such terms as honeybee and 
exclude the former by arguing that they are not natural. However there are 
insurmountable difficulties in singling out some such sets as natural properties 
and exclude others.  
These claims by Schwartz are to a great extent erroneous or groundless. 
First, the properties Schwartz claims to be taken to be intensions of common 
nouns in formal semantics cannot be sets of actual and possible entities (unless 
one’s semantic framework adopts Lewisian worlds). Consider the noun 
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bachelor and a certain male x. Is x a member of the property expressed by 
bachelor? Even if x is actually a bachelor, he might well not have been, and vice 
versa. So there is not a well defined set that can be identified as the property 
expressed by bachelor. Rather in formal semantic properties are usually 
identified with predicative intensions of type <s,<e,t>>, unless one adopts a 
Lewisian framework of possibilia . 
Second, as we will later see in the present work, it is by no means obvious 
that there is not a need to postulate kinds in formal semantics. There are certain 
uses of common nouns and noun phrases formed by them which apparently are 
best accounted if they are taken to denote one way or another kinds. And, the 
postulation of kinds as entities of type e (i.e. as designata) alongside particulars 
to deal with some such uses is very common place in formal semantics.148 Some 
formal semanticists do indeed identify kinds with intensions of some sort or 
another –i.e. with functions mapping evaluation indexes into entities of type 
e.149 But these intensions are still assigned to expressions as their denotata, and 
are thereby distinguished from the proper intensions of these expressions.  
Third, let’s grant that there are no kinds but properties understood as 
functions of type <s,<e,t>> and that LaPorte has to re-formulate his position 
by taking such properties to be the denotata of such definite phrases as the 
                                                        
148 Carlson (1980), Krifka et al. (1995), Chierchia (1998), Dayal (2004) are much cited works 
dealing with the semantics of certain noun phrases formed by common nouns by way of 
postulating kinds taken as the denotata of these phrases. In the 5th and 6th chapters of the 
present work we have extensively referred to these works and discuss edexamples deriving 
from them. 




honeybee and the insect species typically farmed for honey.  It does not thereby 
follow that LaPorte will be bound to take the insect species typically farmed for 
honey to rigidly denote the same property –a function of type <s,<e,t>>- 
relative to every evaluation index. More specifically it does not follow that the 
insect species typically farmed for honey should rigidly denote the function 
which relative to an evaluation index s maps to truth all and only instances of 
the insect species that is typically farmed for honey at s. If one identifies a 
function of type <s,<e,t>> to be the denotation of a term  relative to a given 
evaluation index, then evidently that function will not serve as the semantic 
intension of . Rather the semantic intension of  will then be a function of type 
<s,<s,<e,t>>>, which relative to an evaluation index w will yield a function of 
type <s,<e,t>> as the denotation of  at w.150 As we indicated above the 
definite phrase the insect species typically farmed for honey can obviously be 
used in such a way that it has the same denotation as the honeybee, but these 
two definite phrases obviously have different semantic intensions. Under the 
presently envisaged reformulation of LaPorte’s position, this is accounted for in 
the following manner. The honeybee and the insect species that is typically 
farmed for honey have different functions of type <s,<s,<e,t>>> as their 
semantic intensions, but relative to certain evaluation indexes wi these semantic 
intensions will yield the same function of type <s,<e,t>> as the denotation 
relative to wi both of the honeybee and the insect species that is typically 
farmed for honey. So, there is no need for LaPorte to find a way to exclude some 
                                                        
150 At any rate Schwartz should now better. We have previously seen that Mondadori (1978) 




properties as non-natural in order defend his position, even if he were to take 
such definite phrases as the honeybee and the insect species that is typically 
farmed for honey  to denote properties (entities of type <s,<e,t>>) rather than 
kinds (entities of type e).  
Schwartz’s Criticism of the Theoretical Significance Attributed by 
LaPorte to the Rigidity of Such Phrases as The Honeybee 
LaPorte (2000) claimed that the rigid/non-rigid division among kind 
designators has the same level of theoretical interest as the rigidity of proper 
names and the non-rigidity of definite descriptions for particulars. He indicated, 
given that such kind designators as the honeybee and Apis mellifera are rigid, 
we can explain on semantic grounds our intuition that the identity sentence 
Apis mellifera is the honeybee will be necessarily true, if it is actually true. And 
again given that the insect species that is typically farmed for honey is not a 
rigid designator, we can explain our intuition that Apis mellifera is the insect 
species that is typically farmed for honey will not be necessarily true, even if it is 
actually true. 
As previously indicated LaPorte (2000) did not use the label general term 
at all; his discussion there was rather laid using the label kind designator. 
Schwartz however labels LaPorte’s kind designators as general terms, be they 
common nouns or definite noun phrases. Schwartz therefore formulates 
LaPorte’s claim of theoretical significance with regard to kind designator’s 
rigidity/non-rigidity as an attribution of theoretical significance to general 




Schwartz argues that that the honeybee  and Apis Mellifera are de jure 
rigid does not play a role in the explanation the necessity of Apis Mellifera is the 
honeybee  because that sentence is analytic.  
That a sentence is necessarily true because it is analytic does not relieve us 
of the need to analyze how come the contributions of the constituents of that 
sentence bring about that the sentence is necessarily true.  
For example we can see why and how in the case of Every bachelor is an 
unmarried the meanings of the constituents and their syntactic organization 
bring about the necessity only by giving a semantic analysis which reveals the 
semantic contribution of the constitutents and their organization to the truth-
conditions. One common way to analyze Every bachelor is unmarried will be the 
following: 
20 Every bachelor is an unmarried. 
[Every bachelor] [unmarried] 
λP.∀x([bachelor]s(x)P(x))([unmarried]s) 
∀x([bachelor]s(x) [unmarried]s(x)) 
Given this analysis we see that 20 will be true relative to every index of 
evaluation s if and only if for any evaluation index s, the extension of bachelor at 
s is a sub-set of the extension of unmarried at s. We can now state exactly which 
feature of the meanings of bachelor and unmarried makes this sentence 
necessarily true: these terms have such intensions that for every evaluation 
index s the denotation of unmarried at s maps to truth every individual that is 
mapped to truth by the denotation of bachelor at s. That 20 is allegedly analytic 
can then be seen as the result of bachelor and unmarried’s intensions being 




implicit semantic-lexical design feature of contemporary English. The alleged 
analyticity of 20 does not make it exempt from the principles that the truth-
conditions of sentences are determined by the meanings of their constituents 
and their syntactic organization and that necessity is a semantic feature the 
instantiation of which depends on these truth conditions. The alleged analyticity 
only indicates that the truth-conditions will be satisfied by every evaluation 
index by force of explicit or implicit semantic stipulations.   
Let’s now consider the case of Panthera tigris is the tiger, and attempt to 
trace out how its necessity comes about given the meanings of its constituents 
and its syntactic organization. To this end, as in the case of 20 we have to draw 
on a plausible semantic analysis of Panthera tigris is the tiger.  
21 Panthera tigris is the tiger 
[Panthera tigris][is [the tiger]] 
λx.(x=[the tiger]s)([Panthera tigris]s) 
[Panthera tigris]s =[the tiger]s 
Under the given analysis this sentence will be true relative to every evaluation 
index if and only if relative to any evaluation index s Panthera tigris and The 
tiger denotes the same entity. That is, if and only if the meanings of Panthera 
tigris and The tiger determine exactly the same semantic intension. That these 
meanings determine the same intension is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the necessity of 21, under the proposed analysis of that sentence. 
Admittedly, Panthera tigris and The tiger could meet this condition even if their 
common intension was not a constant one; that is even if they were not rigid 
designators. Yet, the consideration of some related semantic phenomena obliges 




condition for the necessity of 21 rather in virtue of having the same constant 
intension. The semantic phenomena to be taken into account is this. If the 
intensions of Panthera tigris and The tiger were non-constant then we would be 
at a loss to explain why the following sentences cannot have a true reading:  
Panthera tigris might not have been Panthera tigris. 
The tiger might not have been the tiger. 
Panthera tigris might not have been the tiger. 
If this consideration is granted, then one has to acknowledge that the de jure 
rigidity of Panthera tigris and the tiger plays a role in bringing about the 
necessity of 21. In this respect 21 is for example different from The keepers of 
Panthera tigris are the keepers of the tiger. This latter sentence too is necessary 
but not in virtue of the keepers of Panthera tigris and the keepers of the tiger’s 
determining the same constant intension.  
That Panthera tigris is the tiger is stipulated to be true and thus is analytic, 
cannot change the fact that its necessity is brought about by Panthera tigris and 
the tiger’s determining the same constant intension. Thus it does not change the 
fact that the de jure rigidity of Panthera tigris and the tiger plays a role in 
making it a necessary sentence. The attribution of analyticity can only aim to 
provide an explanation as to why Panthera tigris and the tiger determine the 
same constant intension. Instead of explaining it by recourse to how the world 
is, the attribution of analyticity seeks to explain it by recourse to linguistic 
stipulation.  
So, granting that 21 is analytic does not diminish the theoretical 





Of course it was all along questionable whether 21 is analytic at all or 
whether there cannot be any  necessary sentence similar to 21 but which 
arguably is not analytic. In this vein consider the following: 
22 The warmint is the groundhog. 
22 happens to be true; the species termed as the groundhog (Marmota monax) 
is the same species as the one that is termed as the warmint in the southern 
parts of the US. But the sentence is by no means analytic. The warmint is not 
identified with the groundhog by any stipulation, and it should have taken some 
empirical investigation to establish that the warmints of the southerners are 
groundhogs; after all it may have turned out that they are different species 
despite external resemblance. But regardless whether it turned out true or not, 
arguably we could intuitively fathom that if it is true it will be necessarily true 
(if it is true the warmint might not have been the groundhog will be false). And 
this intuition can readily and plausibly be explained by our linguistic 
competence, by the way we are linguistically wired to use such definite generic 
phrases as the warmint and the groundhog, namely rigidly just as we use proper 
names.  
I conclude that rigid/non-rigid difference with respect to definite phrases 
that designate kinds is a significant one (more of this in later chapters) and that 
Schwartz’ criticism on this point is ineffective on two counts. First, the 
analyticity of a sentence cannot be a reason to forego the explanation of its 
concomitant necessity, and in the case of such sentences as the honeybee is Apis 
melifera this explanation requires us to take the constituent phrases the 




wrong in thinking that there are no non-analytic necessary identity sentences 
formed with kind designators whose non-contingency can be explained on 
linguistic-semantic grounds alone. 
I should clarify though that by supporting the theoretical significance of 
rigid/non-rigid difference with respect to kind designating definite phrases I do 
not mean to imply that this difference is therefore also theoretically significant 
with regard to general terms or with regard to common nouns. First it is 
dubious that we would like to count such definite phrases as the honeybee and 
the insect species that is typically farmed for honey as general terms (as I 
argued in the section on Salmon (2005)). Second, as I argued in the section on 
LaPorte (2000) the rigidity (non-rigidity) of definite phrases such as the 
honeybee and the insect species that is typically farmed for honey does not by 
evidently entail the rigidity (non-rigidity) of the common nouns honeybee and 
insect species that is typically farmed for honey  that form them. 
Does LaPorte confuse rigid designation with constancy of intensions/meanings? 
Schwartz claims that LaPorte in taking such phrases as the honeybee and 
common nouns as honeybee to rigidly designate kinds is merely confusing the 
constancy of meanings in talk about different possible state of affairs.  
Apparently Schwartz thinks that the kinds which LaPorte and others take 
as the rigid designata of common nouns such as honeybee and the related 
definite generics such as the honeybee  are better regarded as the intensions the 
common nouns involved; and therefore, Schwartz thinks, what these people 




modeled as intensions remains the same in talk about different possible state of 
affairs. To support these considerations Schwartz sets a challenge:  
Explain what it means for e.g. ‘gold’, ‘tiger’, ‘water’ to be rigid just using set 
theoretic tools and possible worlds made up of individuals actual and 
possible (and perhaps using the notion of natural property).  
What Schwartz asks us here is to formulate a property of rigidity to apply to 
common nouns on the basis of a semantic-ontology that has as basic types 
entities of types e (individuals), s (possible worlds) and t (truth-values); and 
additionally functions defined in terms of these basic types (e.g. 
properties/intensions: type <s,<e,t>>). Although he is not explicit on this 
matter, clearly he furthermore requires that entities of type e will consist only of 
concrete particulars, and will not involve entities like kinds (otherwise this 
challenge could easily be met).  
Schwartz claims that this challenge cannot be met in such way that the 
rigidity of the common nouns will amount to something other than the 
sameness of their intensions (type <s,<e,t>>) in every verbal context they are 
used, be they modal or not: 
We can do it easily for rigid singular terms. A proper name that is rigid is a 
constant function from possible worlds to individuals. I.e. it takes the same 
individual at every possible world in which it designates at all. The 
corresponding try with general terms does not work. A rigid general term 
is not a constant function from possible worlds to sets of individuals. Nor 
will talk of natural properties help us. Of course, a rigid general term 
names the same property in every possible world because trivially words 
keep the same meanings when talking about other possible worlds. 
We can further explicate the portent of Schwartz’ claim here in the formal 
framework adopted in the present work in the following manner. For example, 




have to take the common noun dodo to contribute the same intension (the 
function λs.λx.[dodo]s(x) of type <s,<e,t>>) in both of the following sentences.  
23 a Alice might have shot a dodo. 
b Alice shot a dodo. 
In the former sentence λs.λx.[dodo]s(x) is within the scope of the modal 
quantifier expressed by might and the values of type <e,t> it will get for 
different possible worlds (dodo’s denotations for different possible worlds) will 
be relevant for the determination of the truth value of the whole sentence.  In 
the latter sentence λs.λx.[dodo]s(x) will be evaluated simply relative to the 
actual world, will yield the denotation of dodo relative to the actual world. So, 
although dodo will have different denotations relative to different possible 
worlds and probably different denotations will be relevant for the 
determination of the truth value in the case of 23a and23b, these different 
denotations will all derive from the same intension contributed by dodo. 
Now, the foremost questionable aspect of this challenge which shuns kinds 
is whether it is worthwhile. The ontological framework it imposes is arguably 
too narrow to be suitable. As we will see in a later chapter there are cases in 
which such definite generics as the honeybee, bare plurals as honeybees are 
used in such way that their semantic contribution cannot easily be cashed out in 
terms of the particular tokens which the common nouns that form them pertain 
to. In this vein consider the following sentences: 
24 The dodo is an extinct species. 
The dodo and the Rodrigues Solitaire descend from the same species. 
Dodos are extinct. 




These sentences will have very simple semantic analyses that are in line with 
those of the syntactically similar sentences that pertain to concrete particulars, 
if the phrases the dodo , the Rodrigues Solitaire, dodos, Rodrigues Solitaires 
were taken to denote kinds taken as entities of type e, alongside concrete 
particular individuals.  
If we shun kinds, and take any recourse to them as cases of confused 
recourse to the predicative intensions of common nouns, then we will have to 
find a find ways to analyze such sentences as those in 24 in terms of dodo’s 
denotation (type <e,t>). Perhaps this is possible but as we have amply 
discussed in the fifth and sixth chapters this not the way that is taken in the 
formal semantic literature pertaining to the interpretation of definite generic 
phrases and bare plural phrases.  Either the definite generics and the bare 
plurals, like the common nouns that form them, are taken to designate kinds 
taken as entities of type e (Krifka et al.1995, Krifka 1995, Zamparelli 2000). Or 
kinds are identified with certain intension of type <s,e>, and the definite 
generics and bare plurals are taken to denote such intensions which are derived 
from the predicative intensions of the common nouns (type <s,<e,t>>) that 
form them (Chierchia 1998, Dayal 2004). So, these intensions taken as the 
denotata of the definite generics and bare plural phrases will be different than 
the proper semantic intensions of the common nouns that form them. In the 
previous sentences I italicized ‘denote’ to stress the point that these intensions 
are assigned to definite generics and bare plural phrases as their denotata and 




sense of semantic intension as the function that yields the denotations of terms 
relative to different evaluation indexes.  
So, either way Schwartz’ stated claims are gainsaid by the formal 
semantics literature. On the one hand kinds as basic entities of type e and the 
designata of common nouns and/or definite generics and/or bare plural 
phrases are often included in the semantic ontology; and in such frameworks 
rigidity of common nouns and/or definite generics and/or bare plural phrases 
can simply be identified as constancy of designation relative to different 
evaluation index. Other approaches treat kinds not as basic entities of type e but 
identify them with a certain type of intension that pertain to particular tokens, 
thus they meet Shwartz’ challenge. But in these approaches these kinds qua 
intensions are still assigned to definite generics and bare plural phrases as their 
denotata and not as their proper intensions and they are not the same as the 
intensions of the common nouns that form them; and thus in these latter type of 
approaches it is possible to define the rigidity that pertains to definite generics 
or bare plural phrases as constancy of denotation, without thereby confusing, 
pace Schwartz, the rigidity of these phrases with the banal fact that the common 
nouns that form these phrases bring in the same intension to all verbal contexts 




Schwartz’s Principal and Concluding Claim that Rigidity Is Not a 
Theoretically Significant Property for General Terms 
Schwartz discussion of Laporte (2000) was destined to support his principal 
contention that rigid designation does not have any theoretical significance in 
relation with general terms.  
We have previously seen that Schwartz (1978) argued that rigid/non-rigid 
difference will either explain a certain intuited difference between such natural 
kind terms honeybee, tiger, water and nominal kind terms such as bachelor, 
soda-pop or it will be devoid of theoretical significance. Schwartz more than 
once indicates that LaPorte’s proposal and similar proposals cannot distinguish 
between natural kind terms and other terms. 
In response to this expectation LaPorte (2000) had previously argued that 
NKT can be distinguished by other means, and that it is not right to expect rigid 
designation to do that work. LaPorte has suggested that NKT are distinguished 
by the way their denotation is fixed: namely indexically by pointing to some 
specimen, whereas the denotation of non-NKT are fixed by way of general 
description. Now, Schwartz (2002) professes that it turned out erroneous to 
expect rigid/non-rigid difference to distinguish NKT from other common nouns. 
And furthermore, drawing on his criticism of LaPorte he proposes to go further 
and accept that rigid designation or some analogue of it does not play any 
theoretically significant role in the semantics of general terms. Now I want to 
briefly assess this sweeping claim by Schwartz.  
Schwartz, like LaPorte he criticizes, appears to semantically equivocate 




as the dodo, and take both to be general terms. We have previously argued that 
this equivocation is unwarranted. Furthermore we have argued that it is 
questionable whether definite phrases can be labeled as general terms. Anyway 
we can avoid this moot point and assesss Schwartz claim of theoretical 
insignificance of rigidity separately for common nouns and for definite phrases 
that apparently designate kinds. 
Definite phrases that apparently designate kinds are most easily 
interpreted as really designating kinds (taken as basic entities or identified with 
certain types of intensions), and this is the way they are standardly interpreted 
in the relevant literature. When these phrases are interpreted as designators 
whether they are rigid or not has a genuine theoretical significance. As LaPorte 
and many others have indicated if we suppose that kind designating definite 
phrases are divided into rigid and non-rigid ones we can easily explain the 
intuited contingency/non-contigency difference that obtains among the identity 
sentences that involve kind designating definite phrases.  
25 a The woodchuck is the groundhog. Non-contingent 
b The woodchuck is the only rodent with its own holiday. Contingent 
We have above seen that Schwartz (2002) dismisses this explanatory work 
assigned to rigidity/non-rigidity difference among definite phrases that pertain 
to kinds. But above I have counter-argued that regardless whether such identity 
sentences as 25a are taken to be analytic, a semantic account of how their 
necessity comes about will be required and that in such an account the property 
of rigid designation will play a role. I have also argued that there surely are non-




contingent but non-analytic identity sentences Schwartz thinks that their non-
contingency involves non-semantic, metaphysical presuppositions. Yet, when 
the non-contingency can easily be explained solely on linguistic-semantic 
grounds, in terms of rigid designation, presumably the linguistic explanation is 
to be preferred over explanation by implicit metaphysical presuppositions.  
The idea that in this case the linguistic-semantic explanation has to be 
preferred over a metaphysical one can be supported additionally by considering 
the ambiguity/non-ambiguity divergences that obtain among the modal 
sentences that involve definite phrases that pertain to kinds: 
26 The woodchuck might not have been the groundhog.  
Non-ambiguous, its only reading is false. 
The woodchuck might not have been the only rodent that has its own holiday. 
Ambiguous, it has one true one false reading. 
The ambiguity/non-ambiguity difference illustrated above can easily be 
explained by the supposition that definite generics such as the woodchuck and 
the groundhog  are de jure rigid designators but that definite phrases such as 
the only rodent that has its own holiday are merely taxonomic definite 
descriptions that are not rigid designators. In the case of definite generics the 
different scope possibilities for the definite generic phrase relative to the modal 
verb do not generate an ambiguity because definite generics are always de jure 
rigid; in the case of definite phrases that are not definite generics the same 
scope possibilities generate an ambiguity because the latter are not rigid 
designators. 
These pieces of theoretical significance of course presuppose that such 




how they are standardly treated in the formal semantic literature. And as we 
assured above no one who thus takes kinds as denotata, even those who identify 
them with some sort of intension, are thereby mistaking the proper semantic 
intensions of the common nouns for kinds.  It falls on Schwartz to show that 
such phrases as the woodchuck, the only rodent that has its own holiday can be 
interpreted without recourse to kinds in all the different types of sentential 
contexts they may appear, and that the semantic phenomena illustrated in 25 
and 26 can be explained this way without having to postulate an analogue of 
rigid designation.  
Perhaps Schwartz is wrong as regards the significance of rigidity/non-
rigidity difference in relation with definite phrases that denote kinds, but he is 
right as regards the significance of this difference in relation with common 
nouns. On this point Schwarz has few things to say other than the standard two 
pronged argument, already repeated several times above.  That argument 
roughly run like this. Common nouns are either designators or appliers. If they 
are designators then all will be rigid designators. If they are appliers and rigid 
application is understood in the sense of having the same predicative 
denotation relative every evaluation index, then only a few common nouns, 
namely only those like prime, rectangle which pertain to abstract entities, will 
be rigid appliers.  
Now I think that Schwartz as well as other authors contributing to the 
controversy accept the two pronged argument too easily in relation with 
common nouns. One of the principal goals of the present work has been to show 




the present work we have considered plausible semantic reasons to take some 
common nouns to be kind designators and some others to be appliers to kinds. 
Some common nouns such as tiger, whale, transistor can form definite generics 
like the tiger, the whale, the transistor and bare plural noun phrases like tigers, 
whales, transistors that are in the semantic literature commonly taken to 
designate kinds: 
27 The tiger is an endangered species. 
Compared to the lion, the tiger prefers denser vegetation. 
The transistor is invented by Edgar Lilienfeld. 
Clear communication between the officer of the bridge and the helmsman is 
essential for safe operations. 
Tigers are an endangered species. 
Compared to lions, tigers prefer denser vegetation. 
Transistors are invented by Edgar Lilienfeld. 
Clear communication  between officers of the bridge and helmsmen is essential for 
safe operations. 
One straightforward way to explain the kind designation by these noun phrases 
is to take the common nouns that form them to designate kinds and to take 
these phrases to inherit this designation.  
Some common nouns on the other hand appear to taxonomically apply to 
kinds:151 
28 Some whales are not endangered. 
The Beluga is an endangered whale. 
The NPN  is a new bipolar transistor. 
The TY 93 is an obsolete transistor. 
Alice used an obsolete transistor on this board. 
                                                        
151 Some apparently do double duty. Transistor and whale can be used to form the definite 
generics the transistor and the whale that respectively designate the super-kind of which every 
token transistor is an instance and the family of which every token whale is an instance. But 
they can also be used to form definite phrases that respectively designate the contextually salien 




And in the seventh chapter of the present work we have shown that there is an 
ambiguity divergence between such pairs of sentences as the following: 
29 Alice might have used a TY 93 on this board. 
Alice might have used an obsolete transistor on this board. 
That can be explained by taking such common nouns as TY 93 which can form 
definite generics as rigid designators whereas such common nouns as obsolete 
transistor, which cannot form definite generics, are taxonomic appliers that are 
not rigid (i.e. do not denote relative to every evaluation index the same 
predicative function of type <e,t> which applies to kinds). 
Thus, it is possible, or so I have argued in the main text of the present 
work, to defend that there is a theoretically significant rigid/non-rigid 
difference that applies to common nouns –albeit understood more generally as 
rigid/non-rigid denotation, and taking predicative application and designation 
as modes of denotation. Schwartz’ and other authors’ accepting the two pronged 
argument in relation with common nouns is premature in that they do not 
consider the semantics of common nouns and the noun phrases formed by them 
in all its richness and complexity. And in the present work I have aimed to 
compensate for this omission. By tapping on the resources of the formal 
semantic literature on the semantics of common nouns and the noun phrases 
formed by them I have strived to mount a plausible argument that uses the 
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